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Abstract
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2
This dissertation studies the relation between myth and demystification in post­
revolutionary France, notably in the literary depiction of Paris. I argue that, in this 
period, the functions of myth in society were being redefined by literature in the light of 
a new, 'secularised' conception of the sacred.
I begin by focusing on the social functions of myth (maintaining social cohesion and 
identity), particularly through the constitution of'collective memory'; I also examine the 
downside of this need for social cohesion: alienation [1]. I then look at the framework 
of modem myth-making that combines poetics, politics, history and myth. I show how 
new forms of the sacred emerged in the century of rationalism and disenchantment, and 
how Michelet in particular contributed greatly to the construction of the myth of 1789 
[2]. For it is indeed 1789 that explains Paris's unique status. I am focusing on Hugo in 
this regard to understand the sacralisation of Paris as the capital of the revolution [3]. 
Hugo also illustrates a general tendency in the post-revolutionary depiction of Paris: its 
darkness and claustrophobia seem to illustrate the condition of modern man. [4]. But 
beyond a material glance at the city, Hugo's vision sends a more disturbing message: in 
exile, the poet-seer redefines the march of history and offers new means of 
demystification [5]. This analysis then extends to looking at Hugo's central character, 
the People, and its difference from the equally mythical populace. In fact the confusion 
between the two will lead to the end of Paris as a myth, which coincides with the 
Commune and the debacle of Paris [6]. That ultimate defeat will prompt Hugo to go 
back and seek the origins of modem France, focusing this time on 1793 in a last attempt 
to oppose the seer's parole to that of the state, with the very definition of the republic at 
stake [7].
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The following abbreviations will be used throughout when referring to Hugo and 
Michelet. See Bibliography for full bibliographical information.
HUGO
AT L'Annee terrible
Chat. Chatiments
CV Choses vues
Cont. Les Contemplations
DJ Le Dernier Jour d'un condamne
D Dieu
FA Les Feuilles d'automne
FS La Fin de Satan
LS La Legende des siecles
Mis. Les Miserables
ND Notre-Dame de Paris
OC CEuvres completes (Ed. Massin)
P Paris
QT Quatrevingt-treize
RO Les Rayons et les ombres
RR Religions et religion
MICHELET
HF Histoire de France (preface de 1869)
RE Histoire de la Revolution frangaise
IHU Introduction a Vhistoire universelle (1831)
Pe Le Peuple
Je vais parler de Paris, non de ses edifices, de ses 
temples, de ses monuments, de ses curiosites, etc. 
Assez d'autres ont ecrit la-dessus. Je parlerai des 
moeurspubliques (...) des idees regnantes, de la 
situation actuelle des esprits, de tout ce qui m'a 
frappe dans cet amas bizarre de coutumes folles et 
raisonnables, mais toujours changeantes.
Mercier
Infatigablement, I'esprit humain ajoute a la vie ses 
gloses -  des mythes -  infatigablement il cherche a 
"confer er un sens" a la realite.
Bruno Schultz
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(i) Preface
There is nothing m ore seductive fo r man than the 
fi'eedom  o f  his conscience, but there is nothing more 
torm enting either. ^
(a) The Tale of the Grand Inquisitor
In a digression in The Brothers Karamazov, Dostoevsky chooses to imagine a 
confrontation between Jesus Christ and a Fifteenth-Century Spanish Inquisitor. In this 
passage, Dostoevsky seems to demonstrate that, tom between his urge for freedom and 
the comfort of certainties, man ultimately chooses the latter. The scene is set 'in Seville, 
in the most horrible time of the Inquisition'. In this austere Catholic time, Christ has 
chosen to return; to walk 'once again among men' (p. 248), performing miracles, and 
attracting an ever-growing crowd. The Grand Inquisitor is quick to act and has the 
potential troublemaker arrested. He seems in little doubt that the man he has 
incarcerated is indeed Jesus. But this matters little to him: this miraculous return can 
bring nothing but distress to a people the Church has relentlessly brought together in a 
coherent, stable and long-lasting structure. And this is why the Grand Inquisitor sees no 
alternative but to condemn his prisoner to death:
Why, then, have you com e to interfere with us. [...] Tomorrow I shall condemn you and bum you 
at the stake as the most evil o f  heretics, and the very people who today kissed your feet [...] at a 
nod from me, will rush to heap the coals up around your stake (p. 250).
In the head to head between the two characters that follows the arrest, Dostoevsky 
opposes the message of freedom brought by Christ to its Catholic interpretation; the gap 
between the two could not be greater. What is at stake here -  and on trial, for the Grand 
Inquisitor is essentially a prosecutor -  is the very premise of Christ's legacy: to bring 
freedom to men.
The Grand Inquisitor has nothing but contempt for this offer: 'Was it not you who so 
often said then: "I want to make you free"? But now you have seen these "free" men' (p. 
251). The Inquisitor points out what Jesus seems to have overlooked: this freedom
1 Fyodor D ostoevsky, The Brothers K aram azov, trans. by Richard Pevear and Larissa Volokhonsky  
(London: Everyman's Library, 1997), p. 254. Further references will be indicated in brackets in the main 
text.
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brings nothing but torment. This is where the Church stepped in, overtaking that burden 
for them: 'Yes, this work has cost us dearly [...]. [The people] themselves have brought 
us their freedom and obediently laid it at our feet' {Ibid.). It is understandable enough: 
although rebellious by nature, man is uncomfortable in freedom. 'You overestimated 
mankind, for, of course, they are slaves, though they were created rebels' (p. 256).
The tragedy of Christ's mistake lies in his overestimation of human nature: 
'Respecting him so much, you behaved as if you had ceased to be compassionate' (p. 
256).2 Holding men in too high esteem, he refused to operate miracles, requiring free 
faith that would not be based on the demonstration of divine power. Yet, in doing so, 
Christ overlooked a major flaw in human nature: 'you would have answered the 
universal and everlasting anguish of man as an individual being [...] namely: "before 
whom shall I bow down?" [...] He alone can take over the freedom of men who 
appeases their conscience' (p. 254). And if Christ is unwilling to oblige this human 
weakness, men will create their own miracles.3
The Inquisitor's pleading turns into an indictment: Christ is guilty of 
misunderstanding human nature, of having given men a burden too heavy to carry. In 
contrast, the Church has acknowledged the true nature of man, and brought him relief. 
The conclusion is bleak: all that man wants is 'someone to bow down to, someone to 
take over his conscience, and a means for uniting everyone at last into a common, 
concordant, and incontestable anthill' (p. 257).
(b) From servitude volontaire to alienating myth
What Dostoevsky voices here is the tension within human nature between a 
rebellious nature and a deep need to be guided, to obey. Clearly, for the author, the latter 
has prevailed over the former. This pessimism is nothing new: Rousseau had already 
highlighted how a naturally free man ends up in slavery: 'L'homme est ne libre, et 
cependant partout il est dans les fers', he famously argued.4 Some two hundred years 
before him, La Boetie had explained this paradox by reference to habit and slackness: 
men are so used to being slaves that the strength, will and courage needed to allow them 
to break free are lacking. In their servitude, men are willing victims: 'receleurs du larron 
[...] et ainsi traitres a vous-memes'.5
2'Trop d'estime et trop peu de pitie', M aximilien Rubel summarises in his French translation, La Legende 
du gran d  inquisiteur  (Paris: L'Insomniaque, 1999), p. 42.
3'Since man cannot bear to be left without miracles, he will go and create new miracles for h im self (p. 
255).
4Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Du C ontrat soc ia l (Paris: Gallimard, 1964), p. 111.
^Etienne de La Boetie, D iscours de la  servitude volontaire, (Paris: Gamier-Flammarion, 1983), p. 139.
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For La Boetie, three main reasons explain 'servitude volontaire': the habit of being 
enslaved; 'les appats de la servitude' -  which he also calls 'les drogueries' (spectacle, and 
generally every sort of distraction, in both senses);6 and, finally, the pyramidal structure 
of power. Yet, although La Boetie suggests that the mere wish to be free would be 
enough to awaken and free ourselves, what Dostoevsky's tale implies is that we are 
fundamentally reluctant to take such a step: between the comfort of being guided and 
the shambles of doubt, the very will to be set free remains in question. It is from the 
starting point of such a pessimistic view that I wish to develop a discussion of myth and 
demystification.
This thesis is based on a tension between collective beliefs and the urge for freedom 
that is at the centre of western civilisation -  particularly since Rousseau and Kant. 
Alongside a culture of scepticism (Descartes) and freedom (the Enlightenment), new 
forms of collective beliefs and modem myths developed. Myth can be regarded as one 
of the many forms this human need for certainties can take, a type of servitude 
illustrated by Dostoevsky's tale. As Alain Lagarde put it: 'Le mythe est bien un obstacle 
epistemologique ou mieux, une servitude intellectuelle puisque les hommes ne 
reflechissent pas le sens du monde mais attendent passivement et souvent 
complaisamment de son autorite qu'elle le leur confere'.7 This brings comfort, but at a 
cost:
Le m ythe a une dimension collective qui a valeur de mystification et d'alienation dans la mesure ou 
il a partie liee avec des pouvoirs qui doublent la servitude intellectuelle dont ils profitent, d'une 
servitude politique et sociale dont ils vivent.^
The pessimistic view of a human nature tempted by freedom, but even more so by 
the comfort of certainties, conformity and obedience, is at the heart of the constitution 
of a theologico-political model of which, as I plan to demonstrate, Paris was the capital. 
In the wake of 1789, the various, contradictory reactions generated by the revolutionary 
tabula rasa led to the constitution of collective memory and of modern history which -  
as we shall see -  did not escape the temptation of myth, but which also redefined the 
very possibility of resisting it.
This dissertation aims to examine a set of circumstances when religious institutions 
were allocated a new, secondary role in society, and when people claimed to govern 
themselves rationally. No country pushed the experience further than France, with its
6Ib id ., p. 151. Pascal talks of'divertissem ents' which bears a similar double meaning (both entertainment 
and deviation). Pascal, Pensees, 139 (Paris: Editions de Cluny, 1941).
7Alain Lagarde, Le M ythe, la  science et laph ilosoph ie , (Paris: Ellipses, 2001), p. 13. My emphasis. 
s Ibid.
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radical rejection of religion during the Revolution, the submission of the Church to the 
state with Napoleon, and the famous law on laicite in 1905. At the same time, Europe 
put science, reason, and history at the heart of their civilisation. The nineteenth century 
remains known as the century of the secularisation of society; of science liberating itself 
from, and even, to a certain extent, replacing religion. It prolongs the unprecedented 
eighteenth-century drive to set the human mind free from illusion, superstition and 
fantasy. However the century of rationalism also demonstrated that adding an -ism to 
reason transformed the servitude of certainties but by no means suppressed it.
The century o f  the Enlightenment, o f  rationalist secularism, brought with it its own modem  
darkness. With the ebbing o f  religious belief, the suffering which b e lie f in part com posed did 
not disappear. Disintegration o f  paradise: nothing makes another style o f  continuity more 
necessary. What then was required was a secular transformation o f  fatality into continuity, 
contingency into m eaning.9
And we shall see in that regard how much the constitution of modem history in the 
nineteenth century owed to a mythic framework.
Today, the nineteenth-century rationalist programme and its certainties seem 
seriously undermined. Freud's and Jung's work, and the development of anthropology 
and ethnology all questioned the rationality of modern man and his willingness to 
choose knowledge and freedom over belief and authority. 'How can we expect people 
who are under the dominance of prohibitions of thought to attain the psychological ideal, 
the primacy of the intelligence?' Freud asked in 1927.10 Indeed, what the modern 
human and social sciences seem to demonstrate is the constant, renewed temptation to 
follow some form of authority and belief. As Jean-Fran9 ois Revel reluctantly concedes: 
'des que l'homme a pu penser, il a eu peur de connaitre. La capacite de l'homme de 
construire dans sa tete a peu pres n'importe quelle theorie, de se la "prouver" et d'y 
croire, est illimitee'.11
What both the nineteenth and twentieth centuries have demonstrated is that an 
increased understanding of how reason and knowledge could be used for ideological 
purposes does not necessarily prevent this from occurring. The ideologies which have 
dominated the twentieth century rationalised the discourse but remained mythical in 
nature. In fact their claim for rationality hides their illusionary foundation: 'si l'appareil
9Benedict Anderson, Im agined  Com munities: Reflections on the origins an d  sp re a d  o f  nationalism  
(London: Verso, 1983), p. 11.
^Sigm und Freud, The Future o f  an Illusion, in The S tandard  Edition o f  the C om plete Psychological 
Works o f  S igm und Freud, vol. XXI, trans. by James Strachey (London: The Hogarth Press, 1961), p. 48. 
1 Lean-Fran9 ois Revel, La Connaissance inutile, (Paris: Bernard Grasset, 1988), p. 255.
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logique de l'ideologie est rationnel, les premisses ne le sont pas'.12 What is remarkable 
in this modem variation on myth, is how deep the renewed effort to free reason from 
beliefs keeps falling into new forms of mythical illusions, the scientific nature of the 
endeavour further helping in the elaboration of a new kind of hermeneutic violence that 
prevails to this day. This process is at the heart of the research underlying this thesis and 
an investigation of it constitutes its primary drive. But I also hope to demonstrate, with 
the dominant modern myth of Paris as a focus, that it is indeed through an 
understanding and an acceptance of myth, rather than in denying it, that we can hope to 
formulate valuable tools of demystification, without converting them into mythical 
certainties.
(ii) Paris: a Modern Myth
Com ment fa ire  une theorie vra ie de I'imaginaire sans 
delirer avec ra ison ,?1^
D ans ce deconcertant labyrinthe que constitue la 
realite mythique, a celui qui a eu I'audace d'y penetrer, 
elle apporte a tout le moins la prom esse  d'un f d  
conducteur. Toute la question est de savoir comment 
s'en servir, de savoir meme com ment le sa isir . 1 ^
In his famous article, 'Paris, un mythe modeme', Roger Caillois highlights the 
complex interaction between urban imaginary and the real at work in nineteenth-century 
French literature. Both Romanticism and modernism expressed a deep unease with their 
time, but while the Romantic response favoured a form of escapism, boredom and 
melancholy, modernism, set in the city, reacted with defiance, spirit, and energy.15 
Hence the irony of the flaneur, whose attitude expresses the inner strength of the 
modem man in his refusal of the comfort of illusions. The poetics of the city that 
derived from this modem attitude represent an acceptance of the dramatic changes that 
were affecting France (demographic, political, urban, technological, social), and a 
decision to face them, here and now. The development of a specifically modern
12Daryush Shayegan, Q u'est-ce qu'une revolution religieuse?  (Paris: Albin M ichel, 1991), p. 186.
15Helene Vedrine, Les G randes C onceptions de I'imaginaire, (Paris: Librairie generale ffanfaise, Le 
Livre de Poche, 1990), p. 10.
^ R aoul Girardet, M ythes et m ythologies po litiques  (Paris: Le Seuil, 1986), p. 18.
15Roger C aillois, Le M ythe et l'homme (Paris: Gallimard, 1938), p. 169.
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esthetics -  although owing much to a Romantic sensibility -  took place in an attempt to 
seize the real where it was most manifest: in the city.16
Caillois argues that the main craftsmen of the myth of Paris, Balzac and Baudelaire, 
reconciled imagination with action:
La tentative de Balzac et de Baudelaire [...] tend a in tegrer dans la  vie  les postulations que les 
Romantiques se resignaient a satisfaire sur le seul plan de l'art et dont ils nourrissaient leurs 
poesies. Par la, cette entreprise signifie toujours un accroissement du role de l'imagination dans la 
vie, en tant que, par nature, il est susceptible de provoquer a l'acte.17
This will be essential in the formulation of a theory of the modern myth which forms 
the basis for this dissertation. Myth has little to do with a form of escapism: not only is 
its main function to provide meaning and an accurate reading of the real, it is also the 
basis for action. Hence the title of this dissertation is not meant to suggest that myth 
shall necessarily be considered in opposition to demystification, but rather I am trying to 
suggest a complex interaction between the two: if myth is perceived as holding some 
relation to the truth, some hermeneutic quality, then a modern gnosis could turn to myth 
itself in an attempt to demystify the many modern myths that pervade bourgeois century. 
For if the century of rationalism claimed to rid itself of the illusions brought by mere 
belief and superstition, the literary imaginary at work at the time demonstrates a 
willingness to engage with fantasy and the legendary rather than purely oppose them.
This raises the question of the place and definition of myth in modern societies: 'qu'est- 
ce qui a pris la place essentielle que le mythe detenait dans les societes traditionnelles?' 
Eliade asks.18 The question becomes central in a culture that claims precisely to 
remove myth and act rationally.19
There is a well known dichotomy of two apparently irreconcilable trends: 
rationalism, the sciences, technology, and industry on the one hand, romanticism, 
reverie, the rediscovery of myth and legend on the other. However, beyond this 
opposition, there is a complex imaginary framework in the nineteenth century in France 
that mixes poetics, myth, history and politics. We shall see that one of the key features 
of this framework -  what Claude Millet described as a dispositif legendaire20 -  was a 
shift in the sacred from the religious to the secular. In this regard, it will be essential to
^°Ibid., pp. 163-9. See also Charles Baudelaire, 'De l'hero'i'sme de la vie modeme' in 'Salon de 1846', in in 
'Salon de 1846', in CEuvres com pletes , vol. II, (Gallimard, "La Plei'ade", 1976), pp. 493-96.
11 Ibid., p. 172.
18Mircea Eliade, Mythes, reves et m ysteres, (Paris: Gallimard, 1957), p. 23.
19Roger C aillois, Instincts et societe. Essais de socio logie contem poraine, (Paris: Denoel-Gonthier, 1964), p. 
129.
^ C laud e M illet, Le Legendaire au X IX e siecle. Poesie, m ythe et verite  (Paris: PUF, 1997).
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comprehend how this phenomenon was linked to a redefinition of what constitutes a 
place in history, how that generated new politico-religious models, and how this process 
was inscribed in a place, Paris.
(a) Paris: from semiotics of the city to histoire des representations
Penser PARIS?...
Plus on y songe, plus se sent-on, tout au contraire, pense 
par PARIS.21
To say that Paris achieved a unique status in the nineteenth century is an 
understatement. Since 1789, Paris had become something more than a geographic 
location and was attaining universal status. In literature too, the French capital became 
something more than a mere background or setting, as if the strong bonds which linked 
the capital of the revolution with its restless inhabitants had somehow modified the very 
nature of the city and literature alike. In the century of the novel, Paris became a literary 
character in its own right, developing its own personality, having a will of its own.
La ville est un etre social. Sa definition objective ne rend pas compte de sa totalite. Les 
contem porains projettent sur elle le faisceau deformant de leur culture et de leurs prejuges, et la 
conscience qu'ils en ont renvoie a une realite qui est aussi du ressort de l'histoire.22
This illustrates well enough the new status of'the capital of the nineteenth century'.
Paris came to encapsulate its time. Conversely, the city became the locus of a modem 
gnosis, as if the main function of its cryptic labyrinthine streets was to be deciphered. 
Many have outlined the correspondence between the city and the mind:
Le labyrinthe des im meubles dans la ville ressemble a la conscience pendant la joum ee; les 
passages (ce sont les galeries qui conduisent a son existence anterieure) debouchent le jour dans 
les rues, sans qu'on les remarque.2^
The maze of streets, the shape, even, of the capital recalls a brain; and Paris, capital of 
its time, seems to be holding some epistemological key to human nature itself:
21 Paul Valery, 'Presence de Paris', in R egards sur le m onde actuel et autres essais  (Paris: Gallimard, 
1945), p. 130.
22Guy Chaussinand-Nogaret, 'La V ille jacobine et balzacienne', in Emmanuel Leroy Ladurie (dir), La 
Ville des tem ps m odernes  (Paris: Le Seuil, 1998), p. 551.
2  ^Walter Benjamin, Paris, C apita le du XIXe siecle. Le Livre des p a ssa g e s , trans. by Jean Lacoste (Paris: 
Editions du Cerf, 1989), p. 109.
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II m'apparait que penser Paris se compare, ou se confond, a penser l'esprit meme. Je me represente 
le plan topographique de l'dnorme cite, et rien ne me figure mieux le domaine de nos idees, le lieu 
mysterieux de l'aventure instantanee de la pensee, que ce labyrinthe de chemins, les uns, comme au 
hasard traces, les autres, clairs et rectilignes.24
This unique status that links a geographic space to a form of modern hermeneutic 
explains why Paris is so constantly associated with semiology:
C'est dans la mesure oil Paris est une structure a dechiffrer, dans la mesure oil la ville a une 
lisibilite propre qu'elle se presente a travers un reseau de signes, que toute sa "matiere" est 
"semiotisee" et qu'elle se reflechit naturellement dans des tex tes .2 ^
A long tradition of semiotics attached to the French capital was recently prolonged with 
the publication of Karlheinz Stierle's Mythos von Paris.26 The concept of the myth of 
Paris has become such a classic of French literary studies, that when Stierle translated 
his work into French, he changed the title into La Capitale des signes. Paris et son 
discours, arguing that an accurate translation of the title would sound too banal to a 
French audience.27 But banal and well-covered as it is, I believe the myth of Paris is 
open to more perspectives than semiotics and literary studies only.
Essential to this thesis as this myth may be, it shall serve only as a case study here, 
and my main preoccupation is the analysis of myth in modern society and its relation to 
the real. I shall venture in the field of I'imaginaire as a historian as well as a literary 
historian and literary critic, and as such confess some unease with both the word 
I'imaginaire and the field.
I chose to use the French term imaginaire rather than its awkward English translation, 
the imaginary. As Wunenburger pointed out, the French noun has little or no equivalent 
in other languages: 'sans doute le signe d'une tentative de la langue et de la culture 
fran9 aise d'isoler et de construire un objet cognitif specifique, qui a sa consistance 
propre, a mi-chemin du sensible et de l'intelligible'.28 However, the elasticity of the 
term causes its own problems and challenges. To meet them, Wunenburger proposes to 
take the three aspects of the term into account: imagerie, imaginaire stricto sensu, and
24Paul Valery, 'Presence de Paris', in R egards sur le m onde actuel et au tres essais  (Paris: Gallimard, 
1945), p. 127. See also Georg Simmel, 'The Metropolis and Mental Life', in O r Individuality and Social 
Forms (Chicago: The University o f  Chicago Press, 1971), pp. 324-39.
25Laurence Giavarini, 'Paris, entre visible et invisible', <www.fabula.org/revue/cr/439.php>, 1 March 
2006, p. 3.
^ K a r lh e in z  Stierle, La C apita le  des signes. P aris et son discours, French trans. by Marianne Rocher- 
Jacquin (Editions de la M aison des Sciences de l'Homme, 2001).
27Giavarini, 'Paris, entre visible et invisible', op. cit, p. 1.
28Jean-Jacques Wunenburger, Im aginaires du po litiqu e  (Paris: Ellipses, 2001), p. 78.
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representations imaginales. The first simply refers to sets of images, imaged 
representations. The second, by opposition to the real, is defined as:
Creation d'irrealites, de contenus psychiques inventes de toutes pieces, c'est-a-dire ne 
correspondant a aucune donnee empiriquement constatable, observable [mais] ces representations 
ont [...] l'efficace de certaines fictions, qui trouvent d'ailleurs dans leur caractere irreel leur force 
de persuasion.29
The third category refers to archetypes and symbolic prototypes. '[Ceux-ci] n'ont pas 
d'equivalent direct dans le reel, mais [...] jouent un role psychique ou intellectuel en 
servant a donner du sens, a conferer de la valeur'.30 One can see from the last two 
categories the influence of I'imaginaire over the real which seems to go against a 
western philosophical tradition that has consisted in rejecting it as a sign of weakness or 
disorder of an otherwise rational and reasonable concept of man. From Pascal who 
regarded it as 'une puissance trompeuse' to Sartre who saw it as a deterioration of 
knowledge, the field of I'imaginaire suffers, still, from a relatively marginal position -  
Gilbert Durand ironically calls it the one per cent of rational, pragmatic, modern 
thought.31 But what Durand and the growing field of les sciences de I'imaginaire invite 
us to do is to reintegrate it as a full and major element of the human sciences, and to 
reconcile it with the real. As Wunenburger explained:
Cet intermonde de sym boles et de mythes, loin d'etre au seul service des passions et des pulsions, 
permet -  a certaines conditions -  de donner une consistance aux institutions, aux ideaux et aux 
valeurs, formulees en langages rationnels et raisonnables.32
We shall see in the course of the dissertation the importance of belief in that regard, in 
the sense given by Certeau: 'j'entends par "croyance" non l'objet du croire (un dogme, un 
programme, etc.), mais 1'investissement des sujets dans une proposition, Yacte de 
l'enoncer en la tenant pour vraie'.33 As we shall see, beliefs act as a bridge between the 
imaginary and the real, between a set of representations and the action in which they 
may result.
19Ibid., p. 79.
39 Ibid.
31 A llusion to the one per cent allocated in the budget o f  French public construction to architectural 
decoration. Gilbert Durand, Introduction a la m ythodologie. M ythes et societes  (Paris: Albin M ichel, 
1996), p. 22. See Pascal, Pensees, particularly 82, 131 and 133, and Jean-Paul Sartre, L'Imaginaire (Paris: 
Gallimard, 1940). Durand considers the posititon o f  I'imaginaire in western culture as being the result o f  a 
long tradition o f  what he calls iconoclasm e  despite various resistances (from Plato to Surrealism). See 
Gilbert Durand, L ’Im aginaire  (Paris: Hatier, 1994) and L'Imagination sym bolique  (Paris: PUF, 1964).
32Wunenburger, Im aginaires du po litique, p. 77.
33M ichel de Certeau, L'Invention du quotidien 1. Arts de fa ire  (Paris: Gallimard, 1990), p. 260.
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The increasing interest in I'imaginaire is nevertheless undermined by a problem of 
methodology and an unease felt particularly by historians, many of whom regard it as 
troubled waters:
La profusion des ouvrages embrassant de tels sujets cache mal la timidite des historiens face a un 
objet aussi labile. Sociologues, ethnologues, anthropologues eurent plus d'audace. L'eparpillement 
des etudes historiques, nouveau symptome de cet eclatement du savoir, a contrarie une reflexion  
d’ensem ble.34
However, history in recent decades has turned its attention more and more to the field of 
the intangible: in the wake of histoire des mentalites, interest was stirred in the 
emotions, sensitivity, perceptions, and beliefs.35 More attention was drawn to the way 
some events were understood at a particular juncture, why some reactions occurred 
within a particular context, how people's emotions -  their attitude to death for 
instance36 -  could evolve. However ill-defined the phrase, histoire des mentalites 
opens new perspectives in that it focuses on perceptions and interpretations; it links a 
situation, past or present, with contemporary representations. And it is perhaps from this 
interest in representations and perceptions -  a collective unconscious -  that a better 
definition of histoire des mentalites can be found. As Roger Chartier explains:
Les productions intellectuelles et esthetiques, les representations mentales, les pratiques sociales 
sont toujours gouvem ees par des mecanismes et des dependances meconnues par les sujets eux- 
memes. [...] C'est a partir d'une telle perspective qu'il faut comprendre [...] l'importance reconquise, 
aux depens des notions habituelles a l'histoire des mentalites, d'un concept comme celui des
representations
What modem historiography stresses is that an uprising, for example, is not caused only 
by an 'objectively' intolerable situation: people rebel because, at a certain time in their 
history, they start to perceive these conditions as intolerable. Therefore, the study of the 
objective conditions -  although essential -  is not enough to understand the motivation
34Christophe Prochasson, 'De la culture des foules a la culture des masses', in Andre Burguiere (dir), 
H istoire de la  France. Choix culturels et memoire, (Paris: Le Seuil, 2000), p. 185.
35Arlette Farge notes, however, that the study o f  emotions still remains almost taboo in social research.
See La Vie frag ile . Violence, pou voirs et so lidarites a Paris au XVIIIe siecle, (Paris: Gallimard, Hachette, 
1986), p. 10.
36See the work o f  Philippe Aries, for instance Essais sur l'histoire de la  m ort en O ccident du M oyen-Age 
a nos jo u rs  (Paris: Le Seuil, 1975), and L'Homme devant la m ort (Paris: Le Seuil, 1977), and Michel 
V ovelle, La M ort et VOccident. D e 1303 a nos jo u rs  (Paris: Gallimard, 1983), and M ourir autrefois (Paris: 
Gallimard, 1973).
37Roger Chartier, 'Le Temps des doutes', Le M onde, 18 March 1993.
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of a group and the reasons for their action; one has to understand why this situation 
started to be lived as intolerable by those involved.38
I believe this emphasis on perceptions and interpretations to be essential to 
comprehend the place and function of myth in nineteenth-century France. I will be 
arguing that the French Revolution defined the following decades in terms of a modern 
cosmogony, thus forcing subsequent generations to engage in a process of interpretation 
of their origins as a modern nation. I hope to demonstrate that Paris was at the centre of 
this process and operated as the locus of modern myth-making and a new form of, and a 
new relation to, the sacred:
C'est dans la m em oire [de la Revolution] que se forme le sentiment d'une rupture qui [...] fait surgir 
un mystere de l'histoire. Le sens religieux de cette rupture hante les esprits quel que soit le 
jugement formule. On retrouve une meme langue a la fois philosophique et religieuse.3^
Therefore, the way in which the 'sons of the Revolution' constructed their mythical 
'collective memory' (a highly problematic phrase, as we shall see) alongside a history 
considered as a science will be central to my argument.
The history of representations -  'histoire des attitudes mentales et des representations 
de la psychologie collective' as Georges Duby put it40 -  enriched with what 
anthropology can teach us about myth in both traditional and modern societies will be 
essential, and yet insufficient in this work.41 And since myth is central to my argument, 
one has to turn to those who wrote it: the poets and novelists who made the myth of 
Paris. And for the historian, literature may prove as challenging a field as I'imaginaire it 
illustrates so well.
(b) History and literature
In literature, the historian finds himself in an elusive field where aesthetics has an 
essential role to play, and where narratives are considered potentially deceptive:
Alors que l'histoire con9 ue, comme l'histoire vecue, ordonne les evenem ents sur l'axe du temps, 
attentive a leur enchainement logique, le roman suit une ligne chaotique: brusques ruptures, retours
38Claude Lefort, E ssais su r le po litiqu e  (Paris: Le Seuil, 1986), p. 124.
39Ibid., p. 82.
40Georges Duby, L'An M il (Paris: Gallimard, 1980), p. 36.
41 'II faut [...] tenter une approche du mythe qui tienne compte de ce qu'il fut dans les societes archaiques 
ou traditionnelles sans que pour autant il soit exclu des representations collectives de nos societes, en 
particulier des representations politiques'. Jean-Pierre Sironneau, 'Retour du mythe et imaginaire socio- 
politique', in Le Retour du M ythe, (Grenoble: Presses Universitaires de Grenoble, 1980), pp. 13-4.
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en arriere, ressauts imprevisibles, nouveaux departs relancent l'attente du lecteur et lui reservent de 
constantes surprises.42
The historian's response to literature remains ambiguous: on the one hand, it is tempting 
to regard literature as an illustration of historical trends. And indeed where else is the 
nineteenth century better depicted than in Balzac, Hugo, Flaubert, Baudelaire or Zola? 
But, on the other hand, the historian remains aware of the constant inducement to take 
literary sources at face value, to see them as some form of transparent evidence. The 
importance of literature in history, and particularly in the history of the nineteenth- 
century is not -  or should not -  be limited to some sort of illustration of the events and 
evolution of history. The relation between the nineteenth-century novel and history goes 
well beyond this:
Loin de se borner a faire voir les innombrables transactions d'une epoque effervescente, le roman 
contribue lui-m em e a les accomplir: agent done et non plus seulement interprete de la troublante 
richesse du m onde issu de la Revolution.43
This brings us back to the relation between myth and the real outlined above, whilst 
it also reconciles I'imaginaire with politics. The nineteenth century was a special 
moment in history when religion was being redefined in its social role, when science 
and history predominated in an effort to function independently of belief, and when, 
nevertheless, myth made a comeback through Romanticism. It is from this combination 
of myth and history, politics and poetics that a reading of the French Revolution came to 
be made, and from that reading Hugo, both modernist and archeologist, politician and 
seer, would attempt to propose a way to demystification through the means of myth 
itself.
(c) Victor Hugo, a modern seer
One of the difficulties of studying Hugo lies -  ironically enough -  in the mythical 
status he achieved, notwithstanding what is often perceived as the simplicity and 
Manicheism of his thought: he is still better known for his beatific optimism than for his 
cryptic symbolism; more as a naive spokesman for progress than as a visionary poet of 
darkness warning us against the perversity of modernity; as one who sanctimoniously 
professed his genius, rather than as the humble brother of Job, afraid of darkness and 
light alike. If Hugo is now seen mainly as the apostle of the sans-papiers, a similar 
distortion awaits the historian:
42M ona Ozouf, Les A veux du rom an, (Paris: Fayard, 2001), pp. 23-4.
43Ib id ., pp. 341-2.
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L'engagement de Victor Hugo n'a souvent pour les historiens qu'une valeur illustrative, integre 
dans une construction lineaire et somme toute harmonieuse de la Republique, dont le XIXe n'aurait 
ete que la progressive conquete.44
However, we shall see that Hugo's gnosis and philosophy undermine the convenient 
myth built up by the Third Republic; and that his taste for digressions and non- 
chronological narratives, alongside a deep scepticism towards material progress and 
history, challenged the mainstream use of his name in contemporary issues. Prophet he 
was, but also a brother to Goya and Baudelaire; his sombre, tormented imaginary 
reflects his time just as much as it attempts to shed light on it. For what Hugo actually, 
physically sees of the city soon provides the basis for a mental image and concept of the 
capital that is at the centre of this work: following Hugo in his chronological and urban 
maze allows us to reach the full scale of the myth of Paris; to seize beyond the 
appearance of the city, the social and political implications of modern myth.
(d) Final comments
The purpose of this study is to examine the alienating and potentially demystifying 
qualities of myth in a modem context. Traditionally the function of myth is to help 
social cohesion. However as modernity challenged the position of religion in society, 
the place of the sacred was the object of a socio-political shift. Within this framework, I 
will examine how the modern seer sees Paris, both as the cradle of modernity and the 
place of oppression and fate. Turning to Hugo's visions of Paris will help us understand 
how the alienating quality of myth can be compensated for by its inner demystifying 
potential. This is at the centre of the relation between myth and literature in the 
nineteenth century, but it is also at the heart of politics: Hugo's final plea for the 
resurrection of the Republican spirit in the aftermath of the Commune was in fact the 
expression of an acute vision of the Republic's institutions and their limitations. We 
shall see in that regard how institutions participate as well in the process of modern 
myth-making and the constitution of national identity.
I want to analyse the features and implications of mythic thinking within a given 
socio-political context, and to reconnect the political to I’imaginaire. I hope to deepen
44Sylvie Aprile, 'Victor Hugo et la politique en exil -  reflexions historiennes autour de N apoleon le p e tit", 
Groupe Hugo, 18 mai 2002, p. 1. Inevitably, the bicentenary o f  Hugo's birth in 2002 proved to be an 
occasion for the usual set o f  Hugolian stereotypes which were already dominant beforehand. See for 
instance Le N ouvel O bservateur, dossier on 'Victor Hugo Superstar', 25 fevrier-3 mars 1999. Recent 
popular adaptations o f  Hugo's work in France (the musical N otre-D am e de P aris  and TFl's rather loose 
adaptation o f  Les M iserables) are recent examples o f  m odem  variations o f  these and did nothing to 
temper the myth o f  Hugo.
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the understanding of the representation of the city, but also to gauge what Debray calls 
'le mentir-vrai des croyances humaines'.45 My aim is to define the modern myth of 
Paris which developed in nineteenth-century France as something more than a poetic 
and fantastic representation of the city. The urban imaginary which was being expressed 
in the literature of this period is not a matter of pure imagination, but rather the result of 
the most concrete, political, historical realities -  realities made concrete in the ways 
they are perceived and expressed.
In order to understand what a modern myth is, we first need to focus on the social 
functions of myth: to strengthen social cohesion and identity. The process is highly 
efficient but comes at a price, alienation, when the power of rhetoric and belief takes 
precedence over everything else. Looking first at Nora's concept of lieu de memoire, 
then at Halbwachs's cadres de la memoire collective, we shall examine the very concept 
of "collective memory", as modem anamnesis is central to the process of myth-making, 
particularly in a century defined by its mythic, revolutionary origins. We shall then 
consider various aspects of mythical alienation. Rene Girard's work will be essential in 
this regard, first because his theory of the scapegoat will serve as an example of the 
price to pay for social cohesion (this will also be illustrated by Stefan Zweig's Erasmus 
o f  Rotterdam), but also prepares for chapter 7 of the dissertation, when it will shed light 
on Hugo's often misunderstood politics.
Once the theoretical framework is established, we can contextualise it by looking at 
the century o f des enchant ement and what Claude Millet called le dispositif legendaire -  
the combination of politics, poetics, history and myth which was bom from a moment in 
history when religion was no longer the sole provider of collective representations and 
identity. As a result, the sacred shifted from the religious to the political, and we shall 
examine this movement of the resacralisation of politics and history through literature. 
We will look at one of the main historical myth-makers of 1789, Michelet, and how he 
brought history (considered as a science) and legends together. It is within that context 
that Paris as a modem myth can be fully comprehended: a myth that started in 1789.
To explore the sacred status achieved by Paris further (as the cradle of the 
revolution), we will consider both literature and history, concentrating first on Victor 
Hugo, an author who shares many of Michelet's values and ideas. In Paris, Hugo 
underlines the strong bind that brings Paris and 1789 together -  one cannot be 
understood without the other. But the association with the revolution has its dark side, 
and Paris also comes to embody more disturbing revolutionary legacies.
45R ig is Debray, Le Feu sacre  (Paris: Fayard, 2003), p. 21.
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As Hugo helps us to understand the revelation that is embedded in a lieu, Paris, he 
also illustrates how the city of the revolution encapsulates contemporary fears, and how 
the post-revolutionary imaginary projects its dark fantasy onto the urban stage par 
excellence, Paris. We will first explore the dark side of the capital that dominates the 
century from Mercier to Zola through Balzac. We shall then concentrate on Hugo, 
particularly Les Miserables and Notre-Dame de Paris, to examine his dominant theme 
of claustrophobia: the city is not just dark and grim, it also illustrates the penitentiary 
condition of modem man.
But Hugo's vision goes beyond the physical act of seeing, particularly after 1851, 
when he is in exile. Hugo, then, positions himself as a seer whose visions aim to 
enlighten the people, and to deconstruct the mystification of Napoleon le Petit. In that 
sense Hugo proves an excellent illustration of the dispositif legendaire which sees myth 
as closely connected to the real, in fact as revealing it. His prose was already deeply 
poetic, now his poetry becomes explicitly political {La Legende des siecles, Chatiments). 
Paradoxical as it may seem, it is in exile that his meditation of Paris reaches its climax, 
and the vision of the city becomes a vision on history and the place of the People in it.
But the People, as a key feature of the myth of Paris, fail to respond to the seer. In 
fact, since the People were bom in 1789, a clash developed between an idealised 
representation (Michelet and Hugo), and the perceived reality of actual barbarians and 
populace. These two opposed and yet complementary myths explain the almost 
unanimous rejection of the Commune. We shall see how Zola in La Debacle interpreted 
the fall of 'Babylon' and its revolutionary mob, and how he illustrated a thirst for urban 
apocalypse that can be dated back to Mercier.
On its knees in 1871, Paris seems to have nothing more to offer in term of mythical 
hermeneutics. From 1789 to 1871, the legitimacy has moved from the revolutionary 
parole to the state's discourse -  now the sole entity in charge of shaping the nation. 
However, for Hugo, the new regime is yet to throw off mythical illusion, and a genuine 
republic can certainly not grow from the ashes of the Commune. The seer decides to 
revisit 1793 in Quatrevingt-treize in order to solve the deadlock of 1871, and from this, 
hopes to offer a different form of republic, one true to the principle behind the myth of 
Paris. Going back to Girard's work will help us understand that there is more to his plea 
for charity and forgiveness than the outdated idealism of an old, romantic prophet. His 
plea for 'une republique d'esprits' (echoing 'Paris lieu qui pense') can be seen as a last 
attempt at demystification of which Paris had thus far been the locus -  before the voice 
of the prophet itself starts to serve the myth of the new regime.
Chapter 1
The Function of Myth. Social cohesion and alienation
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Ne denonqons p a s  la manipulation, tentons de 
com prendre I'acculturation. ^
As we shall see, the very concept of myth is extremely vague, and at the same time 
regarded with suspicion. As an indulgence in the land of fairy tales, it seems an obstacle 
to reason, whilst as a powerful vehicle for rhetorical power and collective beliefs, it is 
associated with manipulation and alienation.
We shall first look at the history of the term itself, but this raises more problems than 
it solves, given the elasticity of the word. The attempt to define the term will therefore 
lead to an analysis of the social function of myth. We shall examine how it is perceived 
as true, but also sacred, whilst one of its main purposes (to make sense) makes it a very 
adaptable hermeneutic tool. This helps to explain that far from being expelled from 
modem thinking, myth adapts to this new framework very well. We shall see how the 
traditional functions and characteristics of myth were redefined so as to adapt to a 
modern setting, despite the effort and pretenses of science and positivism to claim 
otherwise.
Myth belongs to the field of the religious, and is developed alongside religion as its 
narrative. Many, like Durkheim, have argued that the main function of religion is to 
favour and strengthen the community, giving it a clear image of its identity and of the 
world around it. The key factor in this regard is faith and beliefs, which bind the group 
together and turn myths into a powerful tool to make sense of the outside world.
An essential element in that regard is the constitution and telling of the community's 
origins. We shall see how traditional and modem societies conceive their origins, how 
modern ‘collective memory’ is a modern variation of traditional anamnesis, and how 
this affects and determines a given community's present (rather than its past). The so 
called 'collective' reading of a group's origin is particularly important to analyse here, as 
the (re)construction and 'remembrance' of the Revolution proved to be France's most 
enduring and defining myth. But it will be equally important to discuss the extent to 
which 'collective memory' is actually a collective process of remembrance.
If myth-making is highly effective in terms of social cohesion and the definition of 
collective identity, it also comes at a price: the making of scapegoats and a form of
1 Regis Debray, 'L'Europe somnambule', Le M onde, 1st April 1999.
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alienation. And this brings us back to the suspicion associated with myth. Rene Girard's 
theory of the scapegoat, supported by findings in social psychology (social conformity 
and obedience), underlines the alienation attached to the process. This brings traditional 
and modem myths together, as both cultures turn to social conformity to answer the 
need for comfort and certainties illustrated by Dostoevsky's tale -  a drive that explains 
how myth is a key feature of the dominant discourse's rhetoric.
This chapter will close on a definition of what I mean by 'modern myth', which will 
serve as a summary of the theoretical framework and premises on which this 
dissertation is intended to be based.
The vagueness of the word 'myth' corresponds to the wider field of the religious: 
'notion confuse et floue, comme le sont les vastitudes du sens commun', Debray says of 
'le religieux'.2 Myth and religion are concepts which are overused, and refer to the most 
diverse realities -  'emploi inflationniste ou cannibale', Debray notes '(la religion du 
drapeau, des grands hommes, du sport, du vin, de la vitesse, etc...)'.3 Myth is associated 
with fantastic narratives (legends, fairy-tales, epic) and can take the form of illusion, 
fantasy, allegory, or aspirations to utopia. What seems to unify all the various uses of 
the term, though, lies in the domain of legend: myth can be rooted in reality, but it has 
acquired a quality that transposes the story into an epic. Hence, actual facts and real 
people can acquire the status of a myth so long as their narrative seems 'larger than life'.
This variety of meaning matches the richness of the word's etymology: the Greek 
muthos, meant things as diverse and even contradictory as speech, rumour, news, 
conversation, command, or purpose.4 It is with Homer that the definitions entered more 
specifically the territory of fantasy: muthos came to be opposed to logos as a narrative 
which was not historical, true or verifiable. Other definitions convey a similar idea of 
fantasy and untrue narrative, and Bailly refers to the phrase mutho plokos which it 
translates as 'persuasif, literally meaning 'qui tresse des paroles', highlighting the 
potential power of words when artistically combined in order to convince. Myth moves 
from being a divine means of revelation -  interpreting the word of the gods -  to being 
seen as a human tool of falsification and manipulation.
As reason comes to dominate western philosophy, myth is increasingly regarded with 
suspicion, as the reverse side of rational thinking, twisting a truth that human sciences
2Re gis Debray, Le Feu sacre, p. 33.
3Regis Debray, Les Com munions humaines. Pour en fin ir avec 'la religion' (Paris: Artheme Fayard, 
2005), p. 15.
4See Liddel and Scott, An Interm ediate Greek-English Lexicon  (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001), and 
B ailly (Paris: Hachette, 1950), D ictionnaire grec fi-angais.
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hope to rediscover. Myth is acceptable so long as it provides fantasy and distraction. But 
when it claims to explain the world and the place of man in it, it becomes a threat to 
reason. Aristotle expressed the need to draw a clear boundary between what he called 
the mythologists (i.e. myth-makers), and serious minds interested in serious 
knowledge.5 The reliability of rational thought is opposed to the fantasy of myth which 
belongs to another sphere of understanding, a dangerous one for those in pursuit of the 
truth. Myth is presented as a dangerous rival to reason, in that it subjugates man, playing 
on his emotions, where he is vulnerable. Guilty of turning man away from truth and 
reason at the same time, myth opposes both the real (it is fictitious, fantastical) and the 
rational (it is absurd, illogical).6 It is a sin against reason. But how does it actually 
work?
(i) The social function of myth
Vague, elusive and irrational, myth is probably best comprehended through the social 
function it fulfills, that is, for the impact it has on a group. For if myth naturally affects 
individuals, their beliefs, and their behaviour, it is essentially social. Its primary 
function is to facilitate and secure a cement that would bind the community together. In 
this sense, it illustrates the social function of religion, as developed by Bergson and 
Durkheim: 'Les croyances proprement religieuses sont toujours communes a une 
collectivite determinee qui fait profession d'y adherer et de pratiquer les rites qui en sont 
solidaires. [...] Elies sont la chose du groupe et elles en font l'unite'.7 Perhaps not 
surprisingly, this link between religion and society was already highlighted by Christian 
etymology, which understood the Latin religare as to link (;relier in French).8 Social 
unity, guaranteed by religion, is then threatened by what divides, diabolos, in French 'le 
Diable'. What unites is thus seen as essentially good, what divides as evil: 'Le peche est 
eparpillement'.9
However, what makes myth so essential in the process of social cohesion, is not so 
much collective beliefs as such, as the sacred nature of these beliefs. Collective beliefs 
unite best when they gather people around something both greater than the group, and
5'Into the subtleties o f  the m ythologists it is not worth our while to inquire seriously'. Aristotle, 
M etaphysics, in The C om plete Works o f  Aristotle, vol. 2, Jonathan Barnes ed. (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press), pp. 1579-80.
6Jean-Pierre Vem ant, M ythe et societe en G rece ancienne (Paris: La Decouverte, 1974), p. 195.
7Emile Durkheim, Les Form es elem entaires de la vie  religieuse, (Paris: PUF, 1998), p. 60. See also Henri 
Bergson, Les Deux Sources de la m orale et de la religion  (Paris: PUF, 1946), p. 5.
8'Fausse etym ologie', Franck Laurent reminds us, 'en realite, l'etymon est "relegere", relire, ou plutot 
cueillir, rassembler... Le mot designe la religion du livre'. 'Discussion', Groupe Hugo, 20 septembre 2003, 
p. 4.
9Debray, Le Feu sacre, p. 45.
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unquestionable, in other words, something sacred: 'Est sacre l'etre, la chose ou l'idee a 
quoi l'homme suspend toute sa conduite, ce qu'il n'accepte pas de mettre en discussion, 
de voir bafouer ou plaisanter, ce qu'il ne renierait ni ne trahirait a aucun prix', Caillois 
explains.10 This sacredness commands total submission and guarantees social order and 
respect for the community's rules that form the cement of social cohesion:
Une religion est un systeme solidaire de croyances et de pratiques relatives a des choses sacrees, 
c'est-a-dire separees, interdites, croyances et pratiques qui unissent en une meme communaute 
morale, appelee Eglise, tous ceux qui y adherent.11
In other words, it is the strongest possible bond: "Tunion sacree" ne serait-elle qu'un 
pleonasme?' Debray wonders.12
This means that religion is not to be reduced to a mere opinion or belief, a status it 
has achieved in modern, secular societies. Religion is what guarantees social cohesion 
best because it is not so much a social contract agreed upon by the members of the 
community as a pact with the gods. This sacred bond gives the community the 
confidence to understand the word of the gods, and so to live by their rules. Hence, the 
importance of protecting and transmitting this sacred word and the tradition that derives 
from it which guarantees the community's perennity.
Hence, too, the fact that, despite what a modern mentality would perceive as its 
fantastic quality, myth is perceived as a true story, as an expression of absolute truth: 
the message and revelation of the gods.13 Truth in the modern sense of the word is 
secondary to the main function of myth. Myth serves to explain certain realities which 
are essential to the group's survival: the origins of humankind, of customs and taboos, 
of institutions and religious rites. And if myth is to be taken as a true story, it is 
precisely because it always refers to these realities; it always tells about what really 
happened which explains daily life observation. Cosmogony, for instance, is 'true' 
because the mere existence of the earth is there to prove it.14
Therefore, for traditional societies, myth is not to be opposed to truth, nor even to 
reality. The narrative may take liberties with the real, but the story-telling remains 
genuine in the sense that tradition vouches for the integrity of the story-teller. What is 
essential, and 'true' in the mythic sense, is tradition: 'la tradition etait la et elle etait la
10Roger Caillois, L'Homme et le sacre  (Paris: Gallimard, 1950), pp. 176-7. See also Mircea Eliade, Le 
Sacre et le profane  (Paris: Gallimard, 1965).
11 Durkheim, Les Form es elem entaires de la vie religieuse, p. 65.
12Debray, Le Feu sa cre , p. 35.
13Eliade, Mythes, reves et m ysteres, pp. 21-2.
14Mircea Eliade, A spects du m ythe (Paris: Gallimard, 1963), pp. 16-7.
28
verite'.15 Although myth takes great liberties with factual truth, it is born of the real and 
aims to explain it in return. It belongs to the real as well as to I'imaginaire; it is a bridge 
built between facts and their representation; a tertium quid.]6
The social function of this tertium quid is to facilitate a clear understanding of the 
group's identity, rules and mindset by its members. For Malinowski, myth expresses the 
codes a society forges to ensure its coherence and guarantee its functioning:
Dans les civilisations primitives, le mythe remplit une fonction indispensable: il exprime, rehausse 
et codifie les croyances; il sauvegarde les principes moraux et les impose; il garantit l'efficacite des 
ceremonies rituelles et offre des regies pratiques a l'usage de l'hom m e.17
Myth epitomises the group's aspirations, beliefs, and identity. But this is not confined to 
mere representations: Malinowski, here, emphasises the link between a coherent and 
unified mental framework and a code of conduct, a collective behaviour; an aspect later 
outlined by Dumezil:
La fonction de la classe particuliere de recits que sont les mythes est [...] d'exprimer 
dramatiquement l'ideologie dont vit la societe, de maintenir devant la conscience non seulement les 
valeurs qu'elle reconnait et les ideaux qu'elle poursuit de generation en generation, mais d'abord 
son etre et sa structure meme, les elements, les liaisons, les equilibres et les tensions qui la 
constituent, de justifier enfin les regies et les pratiques traditionnelles sans quoi tout en elle se 
disperserait.1^
So myth provides the group with meaning and a grille de lecture that prevents social 
chaos.
What makes myth so effective in this regard is its extraordinary fluidity: it is 
adaptable, applicable to multiple levels of reality. It is in the very nature of myth to be •
paradoxical and polymorphous, and it is so for a simple reason: its language is 
symbolic, and it is precisely in the nature of symbols to be reversible.19 In other words, 
as Lagarde puts it:
1 ^Paul Veyne, Les G recs ont-ils cru a leurs mythes? Essai sur Vim agination constituante (Paris: Le Seuil, 
1983), p. 19. This is why religious studies often refer to religious societies as 'traditional' (i.e. as opposed 
to m odem ).
]6Ibid., p. 40.
17Bronislav M alinowski, Myth in P rim itive Psychology>, cited in Eliade, A spects du mythe, p. 34. 
M alinowski also em phasises that myth is grounded in reality: 'Le mythe est done un element essentiel de 
civilisation humaine; loin d'etre une vaine affabulation, il est au contraire une realite vivante, a laquelle on 
ne cesse de recourir'.
^ D u m ezil, H eur et m alheur du guerrier, cited in Millet, Le Legendaire au XIXe siecle, p. 183, note 2.
19Girardet, M ythes et m ythologies po litiques, pp. 15-6.
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Le mythe joue sur la puissance metaphorique des images qui appelle a approfondir le jeu des 
analogies. [...] Le mythe dispose ainsi de ressources inepuisables de significations aussi 
ambivalentes qu'interchangeables qui lui permettent d'etre un principe d'intelligibilitd du reel.20
So, to sum up, myth serves its explanatory purpose despite its apparently paradoxical 
nature; the fluidity and dynamism of myth give the community a coherent and 
reassuring reading of a situation that would otherwise appear chaotic and confusing. 
Hence the importance of myth in times of crisis; hence, too, its contradictions: as myth's 
aim is not to be objective or to produce an accurate account of a situation, but to meet 
particular affective demands, it can absorb any intellectual contradiction: '[le mythe] se 
moque des contradictions pourvu qu'il installe une securite euphorique'.21 And the 
capacity to overcome any inner contradictions is explained by the affective needs it 
meets:
La valeur du mythe tient a la coloration affective que l'imagination lui confere des lors qu'elle lui 
accorde le pouvoir de nourrir ses espoirs ou de calmer ses craintes par des explications 
suffisamment globales pour que tout en procede et ou que tout en decoule.22
This is where myth gets its persuasive value.
There is an interesting paradox here between the fluidity of myth and what Barthes 
confirms as its conservative quality: its aim is to secure the cohesion and coherence of a 
society.23 Sacred tales help a group to face any fundamental change which might 
threaten its cohesion or challenge its references. However, sacredness is anything but a 
static wall erected against external threats. And if what is sacred claims to be immutable 
and settled -  unwilling to accept changes the flexibility of myth suggests otherwise. 
As we shall see in more detail with the example of collective memory, myth holds the 
capacity to embody and make sense of any deep change; its fluidity and paradoxical 
quality ensure that it can fulfill its function of interpreting a situation, however radical 
the change and however threatening it may appear. For the main function of myth is not 
the pursuit of knowledge or truth, but meaning.
Myth gives an explanation of the whys and hows of the universe, and of the place of 
man in it.24 'Sa fonction est de reveler des modeles, et de fournir ainsi une signification
20Lagarde, Le Mythe, la  science et laph ilosoph ie , p. 8.
2 1 Roland Barthes, M ythologies  (Paris: Le Seuil, 1957), p. 93.
22Lagarde, Le Mythe, la  science et la ph ilosophie, p. 6.
23Barthes, M ythologies. This aspect is most particularly illustrated by his texts on justice ('Dominici', Le 
Proc&s Dupriez'). See also 'Jouets', 'Grammaire africaine' and 'Le Mythe, aujourd'hui', pp. 228-9 and 243- 
4.
24Jean Servier, L'Homme et Vinvisible (Paris: Editions du Rocher, 1992), p. 206. See also Genevieve 
Droz, Les M ythes p la ton ic ien s  (Paris: Le Seuil, 1992), p. 12.
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au Monde et a l'existence humaine. [...] Grace au mythe, le Monde se laisse saisir en 
tant que Cosmos parfaitement articule, intelligible et significatif ,25 Myth explains, 
narrates and founds a reality; it sheds light on a confusing world; it is the language that 
deciphers it. In other words, it is a promise made to mankind, that however cryptic and 
mysterious the world may seem, it remains intelligible.
This is not confined to religious societies: the modern world too develops its own 
myths, which, as Raoul Girardet reminds us in the case of political myths, perform the 
same function of providing meaning:
Le mythe politique est bien fabulation, deformation ou interpretation objectivement recusable du 
reel. Mais recit legendaire, il est vrai qu'il exerce aussi une fon ction  explicative , foumissant un 
grand nombre de clefs pour la comprehension du present, constituant une grille a travers laquelle 
peut sembler s'ordonner le chaos deconcertant des faits et des evenem ents.2^
Here, Girardet provides a first glimpse on the similarities that bring traditional and 
modern societies together in their relation to myth: meeting the group's uncertainties, 
anxiety and fears. Indeed, myth seems the most efficient answer to collective fears: not 
so much because it reassures but because it brings meaning to what can cause havoc if 
left unexplained.
Myth is filled with the most violent emotions and the m ost frightful visions. But in myth man 
begins to learn a new and strange art: the art o f  expressing, and that means organizing, his most 
deeply rooted instincts, his hopes and fears.27
In other words, the lack of control over an environment is compensated for by an 
aspiration to control its representation. It is from this combination of fear and the power 
of interpretation that myth acquires its social force. And it also explains why myth is so 
enduring, even in modem settings: in that it gives its members an explanation of not 
only the human condition in general, but also of the present social order, and guidance 
for everyday life.
The fact that myth is enduring, even in secular modem societies, is at the same time 
obvious and hard to assess with precision: ancient myths are being replayed time and 
time again within new contexts, and their themes are relatively easy to recognise.28 
Looking at the nineteenth century, one can clearly see how a myth such as that of 
Prometheus was not only a Greek affair, but also best epitomised the century of
2^Eliade, A spects du mythe, p. 19.
26Girardet, M ythes et m ythologies politiques, p. 13. My emphasis.
27Emst Cassirer, The M yth o f  the State  (New  Haven: Yale University Press, 1946), pp. 47-8.
28See Pierre Brunei (dir), D ictionnaire des mythes d'aujourd'hui (Paris: Editions du Rocher, 1999).
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modernity. However, myth can not be called 'modern' just because some contemporary 
narratives keep revisiting Greek mythology. More importantly, the ground on which 
myth grows -  i.e. the need for meaning and social cohesion -  also persists. What 
psychology, anthropology, paleontology, the history of religions and mythologies, and 
literary studies show, is the recurrence of the same themes, the same structures, the 
same rituals.29 For that reason, it seems highly unlikely that myth should simply 
disappear in so-called rational societies. Indeed, as Eliade argues, some basic features of 
mythical behaviour are fundamentally human:
II faudra prendre conscience de ce qui reste encore de 'mythique' dans une existence modeme, et 
qui reste tel, justem ent parce que ce comportement est, lui aussi, consubstantiel a la condition 
humaine, en tant qu'il exprime l'angoisse devant le Tem ps.20
However, part of the adaptation of myth to modernity derives from the relegation of 
the field of Vimaginaire to a secondary level of importance: the arts and reverie. In a 
modern setting, myth is being denied any explanatory, enlightening competence. As it is 
reduced to safe epistemological insignificance, its enduring social function goes 
underground: '[un mythe] change seulement d'aspect et camoufle ses fonctions. Mais il 
serait instructif de prolonger l'enquete et de demasquer le camouflage des mythes au 
niveau social'.31 In that regard, one key example is provided by an essential myth in 
both traditional and modern societies: the myth of origins. 'C'est surtout en analysant 
l'attitude du modeme a l'egard du Temps qu'on peut decouvrir le camouflage de son 
comportement mythologique', Eliade argues.32 The interpretation of the past is essential 
because the group's identity depends on its collective reading of its origins. And in the 
period considered for this study, which is also the century of nationalism, this social 
urge is as crucial as ever.
(ii) Remembering origins
Myth, like history, is essentially the story of the past. My premise here, in line with 
Halbwachs's work, is that this story has probably less to do with the past it claims to 
remember, than with the time of the 'remembrance', the present. As a modern myth, 
collective memory meets the function of myth outlined above: facilitating the shaping of
29Gilbert Durand, Science de l'homme et tradition. Le nouvel esprit an thropologique  (Paris: Albin 
M ichel, 1996), p. 17.
30Eliade, Mythes, reves et m ysteres, pp. 38-9. See also p. 31.
31Ibid ., p. 26. On the idea o f  epistem ological insignificance, see Gilbert Durand, Introduction a la  
m ythodologie, p. 22.
32Eliade, Mythes, reves et m ysteres, p. 34.
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society's identity, and guaranteeing its perennity -  all of which are present-day concerns. 
In this section, I propose to look at the concept of collective memory not as an effort 
actually to remember the group's origins, but as a way to compensate for a knowledge- 
gap -  as a (re)construction of the past. I hope to demonstrate that the relation of a 
society to its past, rather than 'memory' as such, is crucial to understanding its present.
I will therefore examine the relation traditional and modern societies establish with 
their origins, or their idea of them. This will help to explain the apparently paradoxical 
coexistence of history and myth in modern societies. In this regard, it is worth 
remembering that nineteenth-century France saw two apparently contradictory, but in 
fact complementary drives: the return of myths and legends on the one hand, and the 
constitution of history as a science on the other.
But it will be equally important to look at the concept of collective memory itself as 
an answer to present-day needs, rather than a pursuit of truth about the past. The 
collective aspect of 'collective memory' needs also to be discussed, particularly as I will 
be arguing that myth-making depends largely -  although not solely -  on a limited 
number of myth-makers. The work of Nora and, most importantly, Halbwachs, will 
prove particularly relevant in understanding the construction of collective memory in 
relation to contemporary needs.
What is a myth? Eliade insists on the notions of origin and epiphany which are at the 
heart of myth-telling: 'Le mythe [...] relate un evenement qui a eu lieu dans le temps 
primordial, le temps fabuleux des "commencements". [...] C'est done toujours le recit 
d'une "creation'".33 The problem of course is that this origin is by definition out of the 
reach of the actual memory of the community. In traditional, religious societies (as 
opposed to modem and secular ones), the birth of the Earth and the creation of the first 
man escape human remembrance and knowledge. So the society which relies so much 
on its origin in the constitution of its identity is fundamentally built on a knowledge- 
gap: there is an epistemological rupture between the community and its origin.
Hence, the importance of the constitution, narration and transmission of a 'memory' 
of this origin to compensate for this aporia: 'La meconnaissance constitue une 
dimension fondamentale du religieux'. [...] La memoire a pour but de triompher de 
l'absence et c'est cette lutte contre l'absence qui caracterise la memoire'.34 It is precisely 
because origins cannot be remembered that their narration is so crucial.35
33Eliade, A spects du mythe, pp. 16-7. See also Rene Girard, La Violence et le sacre  (Paris: Grasset, 
1972), p. 139.
34Pierre Janet, L'Evolution de la  m em oire et de la notion du tem ps (Paris: A. Chahine editions, 1928), p. 
2 2 1 .
35Anderson, Im agined Com m unities, p. 204.
33
Constantly turned to their past to organise their present, traditional societies reject a 
historical conception of time and the idea of linear progress. One has to get closer to the 
origin, not further away. Traditional man sees the distance that separates him from his 
origin as a fall which needs to be compensated for by constant references to, and 
remembrance of, these origins. This is illustrated by the Greek conception of the ages of 
Gold, Silver and Bronze, or the Hindu ages of Manvantara: the further away humans get 
from their origins, the further they are from the message of the gods. History, then, is 
the long story of a gradual loss of that message, a plunge into incomprehension and 
uncertainty. The anti-modem apostle of Tesprit traditionnel', Rene Guenon, argues:
Le developpem ent de toute manifestation implique necessairem ent un eloignem ent de plus en plus 
grand du principe dont elle procede; partant du point le plus haut, elle tend forcement vers le bas, 
et, com m e les corps pesants, elle y tend avec une vitesse sans cesse croissante. [...] Cette chute 
pourrait etre caracterisee comm e une materialisation progressive, car l'expression du principe est 
pure spiritualite.3^
Historical societies, on the other hand, see their origins as the starting point of a linear 
progress, a gradual gain of consciousness and understanding: the further we are from 
our origin, the more advanced we become. The present is no longer the repetition of a 
divine primal act, an eternal return; it is the result of a human past, an accumulation of 
actions and thought. In other words, traditional man goes back to his origin, whereas the 
modern goes forward from his. So if both traditional and modern societies refer to their 
origins, the way they approach and understand them could hardly be more opposed. 
Edgar Morin explains that the main difference in that regard lies in the very perception 
of time:
L'opposition entre les temps historiques et les temps dits "prehistoriques" ou "mythologiques" n'est 
pas l'opposition rela tive  propre a deux parties hom ogenes d’un mem e temps... c'est l'opposition 
entre des temps (des experiences du temps) qui ne sont effectivem ent pas de la meme nature. ^
What is interesting in this with regard to nineteenth-century France is an unlikely 
combination of the two relations to time. The revival of myth in the century of 
modernity suggests a more complex relation to France's past than the status of history 
would otherwise suggest. Modernity may define itself through the establishment of 
history as a science, but together with its need for myths, it also suggests a more
^^See Rene Guenon, La C rise du m onde m odem e  (Paris: Gallimard, 1973), p. 22. W e shall explore this 
conception further when looking at Hugo's conception o f  history in chapter 5.
■^Edgar Morin, Un P aradigm e perdu ?  cited by Durand, Science de l'homme et tradition, p. 233.
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disturbed relation to the past: 'degout de sa propre histoire1 as Eliade puts it.38 The 
relation of modern man to his past -  a key factor of modern myth-making -  needs to be 
further explored, and anthropology gives some valuable insights into this.
In Mythes, reves et mysteres, Eliade proposes a religious reading of the 'monstrous' 
fascination that modem man seems to feel for history. This reading is relevant for two 
main reasons.39 Firstly, it reverses a general attitude -  a modern one, that is -  which 
explains the religious according to its own, non-religious (sometimes anti-religious) 
standards. Secondly, it attempts to provide a religious explanation of modern man's 
anxiety when confronted with the void; which is a way to explain that these anxieties 
and their expressions can be made sense of through a religious framework, even in a 
modern, secular environment.
With respect to religious symbolism, what the modern 'passion' for history expresses, 
is the imminence of death. A person about to die is said to remember his entire life 
within seconds. Similarly, the modern thirst for history and the need to collect and 
archive every possible aspect of both our present and past suggest a morbid unconscious 
feeling of our near demise. The anguish about death, Eliade argues, is a specifically 
modem phenomenon in that only modem societies see death as meaningless. In 
primitive thinking, in contrast, this is never the case:
Elle est valorisee au plus haut degre. [...] La Mort est la Grande Initiation. Mais pour le monde 
m odem e la Mort est videe de son sens religieux, et c'est pour cela qu'elle est assimilee au Neant; et 
devant le Neant, l'homme m odem e est paralyse (pp. 65-6).
Modem man finds himself the subject of an illusion that traditional man can very well 
explain: he believes in the reality of time and history, thus forgetting and despising 
eternity. Modem man falls for the illusion of present contingency and ends up in the 
terror of a time that has lost its meaning.
History and the desacralisation of origins lead to an anxiety specific to modernity: 
just like archaic man, modem man stmggles to escape from temporality, a present time 
of which he feels prisoner. But this effort has lost the direction and explanation 
provided by mythic thinking. The heroism of nineteenth-century literature and the 
resurrection of myth are a valuable illustration of this phenomenon:
38Eliade, Mythes, reves et m ysteres , p. 33. This shall be essential for my argument, and we will explore 
Hugo's conception o f  time and history in particular in chapter 6, when he turns to myth to oppose the grim 
reality o f  a present (p ost-1851 France) whose history is at fault.
39Ib id . Further references w ill be made in main text. See also his chapter 'anamnesis et historiographie', in 
A spects du m ythe, pp. 168-73.
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Vivre l'aventure personnelle comme la reiteration d'une saga mythique equivaut a escamoter le 
present. Cette angoisse devant le temps historique, accom pagnee du desir obscur de participer a un 
Temps glorieux [...] se trahit, chez les m odem es, par un essai parfois desespere [...] pour "sortir" 
de la duree et r^integrer un temps qualitativement different de celui qui cree, en se consommant, 
leur propre "histoire" (p. 34).
In other words, the predilection for myths in modern time is an indication of a certain 
unease in society's actual relation to history, and Eliade suggests a very mythical drive 
to escape from local, historical time in favor of what he calls 'un "Grand Temps" 
quelconque' (p. 33). This 'sortie du temps' is probably the main function of myths in 
modern societies (pp. 33-4).40 And if progressivist history dominates the nineteenth 
century, it seems to coexist very well with its opposite in an unlikely nostalgia for a 
mythic golden age, an eternal return, and archetypes: 'desir de retrouver. Yaxis mundi 
capable de resister au temps historique'.41
This contradiction and the anxieties of modern man -  as a historical and mythical 
being -  are expressed by recurrent features of nineteenth-century literature, notably on 
Paris; such as the fear of being swallowed which echos the myth of Cronos -  time 
devouring us. One key feature of the post-revolutionary imaginary matches Eliade's 
anthropological view of modern man's fears:
Le m onde m odem e est dans la situation d'un homme englouti par un monstre et qui se debat dans 
les tenebres de son ventre, [...] ou il est egare dans un labyrinthe, qui sym bolise, lui aussi, les 
Enfers, — et est angoisse, se croit deja mort ou sur le point de mourir et ne voit autour de lui 
aucune issue que les tenebres, la Mort et le Neant.42
I suggest that the nineteenth-century French urban, ghastly and tantalising imaginary 
was bom from a complex and uneasy relation to the society's origin. In the case of 
modem France, I propose that the origin is more historical than cosmological, yet 
remains highly mythical: France was constmcted from the making of a 'collective 
memory' of its origin as a modem nation, 1789, and the locus of this myth-making, 
Paris, transformed the capital into the ultimate lieu de memoire. However, the concept 
of collective memory is not as straightforward as it seems. We need to examine what 
this convenient phrase actually means, and to what extent it does in fact refer to a 
collective experience.
4^See also Eliade, A spects du mythe, p. 234-5.
41Brombert, 'Ma Destinee: l'ordre c'est le delire', in Jacques Seebacher and Anne Ubersfeld (dir), Hugo le 
Fabuleux  (Paris: Editions Seghers, 1985), p. 230.
42Eliade, Mythes, reves et m ysteres, p. 67.
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It is by now a commonplace to state that memory should not be understood as a 
simple recollection of facts, that it is in no way a frozen phenomenon and that human 
memory has little to do with computer memory. Memory builds a complex bridge 
between past and present: when remembering humans shape their representations of the 
past in accordance with their present. Therefore, the need for collective memory is an 
indication not so much of the domination of the present by the past as of the reverse -  a 
past which is constantly re-read, re-interpreted in the light of present issues, questions 
and motivations. As Steiner put it,
It is not the literal past that rules us. [...] It is images o f  the past. These are often as highly 
structured and selective as myths. Images and sym bolic constructs o f  the past are imprinted, almost 
in the manner o f  genetic information, on our sensibility.43
It seems legitimate then, to question the motivations of a particular age's thirst for 
some aspects of its past: why do we remember (or forget) a particular past in the context 
of a particular present? What is the drive of the 'devoir de memoire'?44 And if'memory' 
is essentially a present-day construction, to what extent can we then speak in terms of 
memory? One way to answer these questions is to turn to Nora's famous Lieux de 
memoire and the debates it generated.
The aim of this collective work was to explore in one study the places in which 
French national memory is embodied. The motivation behind this enterprise was a 
pessimistic acknowledgement that memory is necessarily followed by oblivion: 'II y a 
des lieux de memoire parce qu'il n'y a plus de milieux de memoire'45 -  a pessimistic, if 
not bitter disappointment about the limits of history that had been expressed by 
Halbwachs:
Le besoin d'ecrire l'histoire d'une periode, d'une societe et meme d'une personne ne s'eveille [...] 
que lorsqu'elles sont deja trop eloignees dans le passe. [...] Le seul moyen de sauver de tels 
souvenirs, c'est de les fixer par ecrit en une narration puisque, tandis que les paroles et les pensees 
meurent, les ecrits restent.4^
43George Steiner, In Bluebeard's Castle. Some notes tow ards a redefinition o f  culture (London: Faber & 
Faber, 1971), p. 13.
44A particularly acute question in contemporary France where the recent urge to dig deep into the Vichy  
regim e and, more recently, into the Algerian war, illustrates this 'devoir de memoire'. Having his doubts 
about the outcome o f  a process that combines collective education, the need for justice, and history, Henry 
Rousso confesses his unease as a historian, and, in line with Ricoeur, advocates a 'travail de memoire' 
rather than an ambiguous 'devoir de memoire'. See his interview, 'Le Tribunal de l'histoire a juge Vichy  
depuis longtemps', Le M onde, 7 avril 1998.
45Pierre Nora, 'Entre memoire et histoire', in Pierre Nora (ed.), Les Lieux de m em oire (Paris: Gallimard, 
1984-1992), vol. 1, p. 23.
^ M au rice  Halbwachs, La M em oire collective  (Paris: Albin M ichel, 1997), pp. 68-9.
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Indeed, the link between the witness and the following generations is bound to fade 
away, and with it, genuine collective memory. It is the time when the death of the 
witnesses is being compensated for by archives and museums; when history succeeds 
memory; in other words, when the spontaneous need for memory felt by all is replaced 
by a 'devoir de memoire1 felt by some. Nora acknowledges this knowledge gap in a 
Halbwachsian way: 'Faire l'historiographie de la Revolution fran9 aise, reconstituer ses 
mythes et ses interpretations signifie que nous ne nous identifions plus completement 
avec son heritage'.47 Thus, what we consider as memory is presented as 'la constitution 
gigantesque et vertigineuse du stock materiel de ce dont il nous est impossible de nous 
souvenir'.48
But what this seems to suggest, is that this 'devoir de memoire' has little to do with 
real, accurate memory. In fact, Nora has been criticised for this negative notion of 
collective memory, and generally for his use of this problematic concept. It has been 
pointed out that the individual praxis of memory remains unexamined in his book, and 
that he tends to confuse popular memory and history: 'confusion entre ce qui est 
effectivement de l'ordre de la memoire partagee par les membres du groupe, et ce que le 
savant designe unilateralement et a priori comme objet de memoire d'un groupe'.49 
Indeed, Nora does not demonstrate that what he calls a lieu de memoire is in any way 
lived as such by the members of the community (here, the French nation). Nor does he 
demonstrate any affective link between the support of memory {lieu) and the social 
agents.50
Since the work of Maurice Halbwachs, it has been argued that an important 
distinction ought to be made between collective memory, real and authentic, lived as 
such by the people on the one hand, and an official, academic artifact, reconstructed a 
posteriori by historians on the other; which is in fact to oppose popular memory to 
historical memory:
Comment l'histoire serait-elle une memoire? [...] Comment recreer des courants de pensee
collective qui prenaient leur elan dans le passe, alors qu'on n'a prise que sur le present?51
47Nora, 'Entre m em oire et histoire', p. 26.
48Ib id ., p. 31.
49Philippe Marliere, La M em oire socialiste. Un cas d'etude socio log iqu e de rapport au passe, 
unpublished doctoral dissertation (Florence, 2000), p. 21.
50Ib id ., pp. 43-8.
51 Halbwachs, La M em oire collective, p. 131.
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Halbwachs highlights the primacy of memory over history which he regards as an 
external, artificial reconstruction of collective memory. Worse, a reconstruction made 
according to the elite's representation of history, and thus opposed to popular history.52 
This is particularly important in my argument, as I will be looking in the next chapter at 
Michelet's attempt to combine the two. Halbwachs's position is to oppose the social 
time of collective memory to external historical time, which he said created a 
synchronic tableau that abstracts events from the real time of their living context.53
To overcome this difficulty, Halbwachs developed his now famous concept of cadre 
social. Contesting Bergson's idea of a pure memory reactivated by the individual, 
Halbwachs proposed a model of memory that is reconstructed according to the present, 
and within a social framework. For Halbwachs, there is no pure individual memory; it is 
always inscribed within a social context: 'il existerait une memoire collective et des 
cadres sociaux de la memoire, et c'est dans la mesure ou notre pensee individuelle se 
replace dans ces cadres et participe a cette memoire qu'elle serait capable de se 
souvenir'.54 These social frameworks and references are the external supports to the 
consciousness of the individual.55 The emphasis is put on the need to establish the 
collective settings within which collective perceptions and representations take (and 
change) shape. This means that memory must be contextualised, embedded within a 
social and, I would add, affective framework, so that its internal logic can be established 
outside any external reconstruction made by our present standpoint. And this is 
precisely at the heart of Halbwachs' most overlooked work.
In La Topographie legendaire des Evangiles en Terre Sainte, Halbwachs focuses on 
what he saw as the driving force of religious memory: belief. It is here that the power of 
influence of myth and its social function of providing meaning meet the more modern 
concept of collective memory. Halbwachs's work is particularly relevant to my 
argument for three main reasons: firstly it demonstrates the primacy of the present over 
the past in the process of'collective memory'.56 It is a reconstruction of the past made 
by our present. Secondly, Halbwachs thinks in terms of collective psychology, and 
collective representations: 'une societe est faite avant tout de representations et de
52Gerard Namer, 'Postface', in Halbwachs, La M em oire collective, p. 293.
53Halbwachs, La M em oire collective, pp. 164-5. For a similar criticism o f  a certain form o f  history, see 
Lucien Febvre, Com bats p o u r  l'histoire (Paris: Colin, 1992).
54Maurice Halbwachs, Les C adres sociaux de la m em oire (Paris: Albin M ichel, 1994), p. XVI.
55 See Halbwachs, La M em oire collective, pp. 86 and 107.
56See also Annette Becker, 'Halbwachs, modernity, religion and memory, modernity in memory: from the 
S ocia l Fram es o f  M em ory  (1924), to The Legendary Topography o f  the G ospels in the H oly Land, a 
Study in C ollective M em ory, (1941)', unpublished, and Jacques Le Goff, H istoire et m em oire (Paris: 
Gallimard, 1988), pp. 53-4 for a similar idea. Le G off refers to Piaget and Erikson to argue that memory is 
not an access to the past, but a reconstruction o f  the past made in the present.
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tendances', he explains.57 For Halbwachs, to understand human behaviour, we need to 
understand the system of representation in which individuals operate in order to give 
meaning to their conduct. As Mucchielli sums up:
Les hommes agissent en conscience, et d'abord en fonction de la signification  qu'ils donnent a leurs 
comportements et a ceux des autres. Or le contenu de ces significations, ce sens, est d'abord foumi 
par les conventions sociales, les habitudes et valeurs de la collectivite dont l'individu est 
membre.58
Thirdly -  and particularly interesting here - , for Halbwachs the process of establishing 
and developing collective representations and memory is not based solely on the values 
of the group. Those need to be firmly attached to some form of tangible, material 
realities -  places, for instance. Halbwachs looks at beliefs in their relation to the 
material traces and references in which the group embodies itself. Four decades before 
Nora, Halbwachs paved the way for the very notion of lieu de memoire.59 And this is 
essential if  we bear in mind that Paris was the locus of mythical, post-revolutionary 
memory in the nineteenth century. Hugo in particular, will look at that materialisation of 
the revolutionary principle within a lieu (ambivalent as it may be): Paris.
In La Topographie, Halbwachs focused on the memory of Christianity, studying 'the 
intention of the social agents to reconstruct the past in the light of the present and to 
replace a real topography with an imaginary one'.60 Halbwachs' aim is not to discuss the 
authenticity of the holy land -  that is something for the believer to reflect upon. He is 
trying to understand how traditions are shaped and localised in these places. The 
relative steadiness of these lieux provides the group with a principle of stability. It 
facilitates and strengthens the identity of the group and the sense of belonging, again 
fulfilling the function of myth.
Halbwachs puts belief at the centre of the process of collective memory, and studies 
the projection of faith upon a lieu and the localisation of belief according to present 
needs as felt by a given group. Christian memory-making serves as an example of the 
principles and laws that drive collective memory, a privileged example, he says, as for
57Maurice Halbwachs, M orphologie sociale, p. 168, cited in the preface to La Topographie legendaire 
des E vangiles en Terre Sainte (Paris: PUF, 1941), p. vi.
58Jean-Christophe Marcel and Laurent M ucchielli, 'Un Fondement du lien social : la memoire collective 
selon Maurice Halbwachs', Technologies. Ideologies. Pratiques. Revue d'anthropologie des 
connaissances, 13 (2), 1999, p. 63-88. Available on <laurent.mucchielli.free.fr/memoire.htm>, p. 10.
59Didier Guivarc'h, 'La memoire collective. De la recherche a l'enseignement', Groupe de recherche en 
histoire immediate, Fall 2002, <w 3.univ-tlse2.fr/grhi/cahier/select_articles/guivarch.htm>, p. 2.
60Namer, 'Postface', p. 258. My translation.
him Christianity is essentially shaped around the commemoration of the life of Christ: it 
is a religion-memory.61
Again, it is not a remembrance we are talking about here, but a construction. 
Halbwachs argues that the actual origin 'remembered' (in this instance the life and death 
of Jesus) matters less than the construction of its narrative made by the believers in their 
present time.62 For Halbwachs, the origins are not relevant per se for two main reasons: 
firstly because we cannot access them, and secondly, because societies do not go back 
to their origins -  even if they claim to do so; they create them, they imagine them.
Si, com m e nous le croyons, la memoire collective est essentiellem ent une reconstruction du passe, 
si elle adapte l'image des faits anciens aux croyances et aux besoins spirituels du present, la 
connaissance de ce qui etait a l'origine est secondaire, sinon tout a fait inutile, puisque la realite du 
passe n'est plus la, comm e un modele immuable auquel il faudrait se conformer (p. 7).
So the key idea here is the projection of beliefs onto a lieu, and the reinterpretation of 
the past in the light of present needs -  in this instance, the constitution of a Church and 
the organisation of its tenets. Halbwachs shows how early Christians put the Passion at 
the centre of their faith, and therefore reinterpreted Jesus's whole life in the light of his 
sacrifice (pp. 150-1). Meanwhile, his human, historical life falls into oblivion (together 
with his Jewishness, Halbwachs points out). In other words, in order for the religious 
memory of a divine Christ to develop, the memory of Jesus as a historical figure and 
human being had to be erased. By selecting the various elements that meet present-day 
needs from the past, the very act of remembrance breaks off from its actual origin.63 It 
becomes mythical.
Jerusalem is Christianity's lieu de memoire par excellence. Halbwachs explains that 
an abstract idea such as the interpretations of Jesus's death (dying for our sins) is likely 
to vanish if it is not rooted in some form of materiality (p. 124). Hence the importance 
of the place of that death in Christian consciousness. This is a two-way process as the 
elaboration of a faith which is localised in a sacred place benefits from this materiality 
while the lieu cannot be sacred if there is no organised cult to project its faith on it. The 
place has to be filled with the beliefs of the community to become sacred and a place of 
memory:
6  ^Annette Becker, M aurice H albwachs. Un in tellectuel en guerres m ondiales 1914-1945  (Paris: Agnes 
Vienot Editions, 2003), p. 275.
62Halbwachs, La Topographie legendaire des Evangiles en Terre S ain te , p. 163. Further references will 
be indicated in main text.
63Gaetano Ciarcia, 'Notes autour de la memoire dans les lieux ethnographiques', in Ethnologies 
com parees, n° 4, Printemps 2002, 'Memoire des lieux', p. 2.
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C'est du jour ou un culte est organise, du jour ou ce lieu devient le point de ralliement de tout un 
groupe de croyants, qu'il se transforme en lieu saint, et que la force d'inertie qui est en lui se 
manifeste au dehors, dans le monde des consciences humaines (p. 126).
In return the place strengthens the community's faith as it illustrates and incarnates its 
tenets (p. 124). It is not the fact that Jesus dies in Jerusalem that makes it a 'lieu de 
memoire' for the Christians. It is because Jesus' death acquired a central role in their 
dogma, and because that role can materialise in the stones of a city which people can 
visit, see, and touch.
It is not the place as such which matters but rather its image; the projection of an 
imaginaire onto the place. As in the case of Jesus, stripped from his Jewishness to 
embody the faith of later Christians, Jerusalem is emptied of its history and Jewishness, 
and gradually filled with the memory and I'imaginaire that developed later and in a 
different location. With the Crusades, a symbolic repossession of the holy land took 
place together with the material reconquest. The Crusaders opened Jerusalem to the 
forms of devotion that had developed in Europe and invested the city with their own 
cultural baggage:
II y a peu d'exem ples plus frappants d'un systeme de localisations constitue peu a peu apres coup 
dans des conditions telles qu'un cadre apparemment logique (determine par un point de depart et 
un point d'arrivee poses ou supposes), et d'abord entierement vide, se remplit peu a peu de 
souvenirs ou d'imaginations disperses a distance et qui y sont portes comm e s'ils descendaient 
irresistiblement sur une pente (p. 89).
The childhood of Jesus, the life and death of Mary, the mystical meditation about the 
Cross, the mystery plays that reproduced the Passion 'live', the iconography of the 
cathedrals: these were the elements that the pilgrims wanted to see in Jerusalem; this is 
what they wanted to locate (p. 163). In other words the real oriental, Jewish city became 
the receptacle of its imaginary, medieval and Christian representation.
This confirms that memory is what remains from the past as the community 
preserved and reinvented it,64 In other words, it is a reconstruction of the past which 
adapts the image of the past to the beliefs and needs of the moment; it is a projection of 
beliefs and reinterpretation of the past in the light of present needs. The perception of 
the past therefore depends on the understanding of the present: an outillage mental, a 
collective psyche, a social framework, in other words perceptions, representations and 
beliefs of the present.65
6AIbid., p. 3, my emphasis.
65The concept o f  outillage m ental com es from Lucien Febvre. See Le prob lem e de Vincroyance au XVIe 
siecle, La religion  de R abelais  (Paris: Albin M ichel, 1942), p. 327.
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Halbwachs's paradoxical account of collective memory lends weight to my earlier 
suggestion that myth is both sacred (i.e. unquestionable) and adaptable: religion is both 
something that preserves and innovates. Although tradition and the sacred are perceived 
as permanent, outside the realm of what can be discussed, criticised and opposed, they 
are in fact an object of history: they evolve. Neither fixed dates, nor fixed places (lieux 
de memoire) create a fixed memory, however sacred and mythical they claim to be; they 
are deceptive in that they hide a process highlighted by Debray: 'Nous inventons 
d'infalsifiables origines pour donner du credit a nos credo, car elles nous permettent 
d'oublier que nos points fixes se deplacent avec nous'.66
This shows that belief in its theorisation by Halbwachs goes beyond the field of 
religious studies. I believe this can successfully be applied to the study of the French 
Revolution and its role in the constitution of French national identity. As Furet noted: 
'Des l'origine, [la conscience revolutionnaire] est une perpetuelle surenchere de l'idee 
sur l'histoire reelle, comme si elle avait pour fonction de restructurer par l'imaginaire 
l'ensemble social en pieces'.67 The collective memory of the French Revolution could 
then be factually wrong so long as it sounded authentic to the contemporaries that were 
writing it in accordance with their present, affective needs. Their narrative had therefore 
an inner strength capable of overcoming any contradictions, thus ensuring a coherent 
construction of national identity.
What needs to be taken into account is that we have to deal with a succession of 
present moments, and that collective memory -  as a 'belief embedded in a social 
framework -  varies from one moment to another. The case of the French Revolution 
and the way it was 'remembered' throughout the nineteenth century show that this 
succession does not follow a causal developmental process, but consists rather of a 
series of discontinuous moments characterised by the concept of rupture, as we shall see 
in chapter 3: the memorialisation of the French Revolution as the rupture instituting 
modernity; and the rupture between the way in which the French Revolution was 
experienced by its agents and the way it was remembered subsequently.
This proposed change of perspective -  from a retrospective, linear reading of 
collective memory to a contextualised and conceptualised one that treats history as a 
discontinuous succession of socially embedded moments -  upsets a chronological 
explanation. To trace a chronological thread from the French Revolution to the 
nineteenth century may appear convincing a priori, but the existence of such a thread is 
not necessarily supported by evidence. As we shall see, it is one thing to demonstrate
66Debray, Le Feu sacre, p. 16.
67Fran9 ois Furet, Penser la Revolution franqaise  (Paris: Gallimard, 1978), p. 42.
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that there was a change in sensibilities between the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, 
illustrated by a change in the representation of Paris, and that this occurred at some 
point during the French Revolution; it is quite another to assert that these changes are 
explained by the French Revolution itself. The social framework has to be brought into 
the analysis: urbanisation, immigration from the provinces, bourgeois power and 
morality, among other things, and the various elements that facilitate Paris's myth­
making will be examined in the following chapters, as these color the reading of 
France's past. The revolutionary event being 'remembered' matters less than the value 
derived from the perception of that event and projected on a 'lieu' -  be it a place or a 
person.
Adopting such a perspective implies recognizing the importance, power and 
influence of representation over fact. This is not to say that representations are more 
important than facts, least of all that there are no facts but only representations. I believe 
this kind of excessive relativism leads to an impasse. More precisely, to quote Veyne: 
'chaque fait [...] ne joue pas le meme role, ou plutot n'est pas la meme chose d'une 
conjoncture a l'autre; il n'a de role et d'identite que de circonstance'.68 In other words, 
there is no 'pure' fact, nor is there any 'pure' memory; each depends on a framework 
which constantly evolves.
So-called collective memory is itself an essential myth in traditional and modern 
societies alike, fulfilling the social function discussed above: it builds a strong system 
which gives a society its references and code of conduct. It is there for society to 
attenuate its threatening contradictions, to unify opposites, to provide meaning.
But as I have suggested above, this comes at a price, and if the making of collective 
memory and myth more generally helps social cohesion, we also have to look at the 
negative effect of this process. Myth is this paradoxical enterprise that keeps fear alive 
in order to reassure, and in this regard, the constitution of the figure of the other is often 
of prime importance. Beliefs unite best when they focus against a figure that will help 
the constitution of the community's identity a contrario. Indeed, this is not limited to 
times of crisis, but represents an essential part of the group's constitution of identity: 
'intensement engage dans la logique de I'Alter, l'homme du mythe repousse 
constamment les autres dieux, les autres peuples'.69 A conflictual rhetoric serves to 
explain and define the threat posed by the outside. However monstrous and frightening 
it may be, at least it gains a face: anything is better than an unknown, featureless threat. 
Providing a definition is a way to regain power: the power of interpretation.
68Veyne, Les G recs ont-ils cru a leurs mythes?, p. 49.
69Claudie Bernard, Le Chouan rom anesque (Paris: PUF, 1989), p. 41.
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(iii) Social cohesion and the scapegoat
In La Violence et le Sacre, Girard famously argued that traditional, religious societies 
are based on a violence which is reoriented on to a 'victime emissaire': any inner tension 
incites the community to find a scapegoat to blame.70 The expulsion or sacrifice is a 
condition for a community's cohesion as it allows its members to orientate their need for 
violence outside the group: 'La societe cherche a detourner vers une victime 
relativement indifferente, une victime "sacrifiable", une violence qui risque de frapper 
ses propres membres, ceux qu'elle entend a tout prix proteger'.71 In return, the collusion 
of the members in the sacrifice ensures the future cohesion of the group.
All this is well-known. The originality of Girard lies in his premise that violence is 
somehow natural to mankind; that it is necessary to, and sacred in, human societies. He 
rejects the idea that violence would be something external to humankind: 'illusion 
ancestrale qui pousse les hommes a poser la violence hors d'eux-memes, a en faire un 
dieu, un destin, ou un instinct dont ils ne sont plus responsables et qui les gouverne du 
dehors'.72 For Girard, violence is consubstantial with human nature, a premise based on 
his theory of mimetic desire.
In a way that is reminiscent of Hobbes, Girard argues that internal violence is a 
constant threat to society, a threat that sprouts from mimetic desire and rivalry: if men 
desire the same things, they become rivals, and this rivalry can degenerate into never- 
ending conflict. This is illustrated by the myth of Cain and Abel: the original crime -  
one of rivalry -  put humanity in danger of being caught up in a cycle of eternal revenge. 
'La mort violente, le meurtre du prochain, surtout du frere de sang viennent dechirer le 
tissu social et fait planer sur la societe et meme 1'humanite la menace d'une 
autodestruction'.73 The main function of religion, then, is to prevent this from 
happening, and redirect the threat of inner violence to the outside: 'C'est la communaute 
entiere que le sacrifice protege de sa propre violence, c'est la communaute entiere qu'il 
detoume vers des victimes qui lui sont exterieures'.74 One can see how social cohesion 
and victimisation are actually complementary.
What we have here is an example of the collective dynamism of myth: not just a 
discourse that makes sense, but one that generates a unanimous action. Myth is not
70See also his other book on the subject, Le Bouc em issaire  (Paris: Editions Grasset & Fasquelle, 1982).
71 Girard, La Violence et le sacre, p. 13. See also p. 26: even if  the 'victime emissaire1 is picked from 
within the group, his marginal position makes him disposable without endangering the group's cohesion.
12Ibid., p. 216.
73Wunenburger, Im aginaires du politique, p. 23.
74Girard, La Violence et le sacre, p. 18.
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limited to narratives, but has its own dynamic: not only does it describe things and 
provide meaning but it also 'tries to produce effects and to change the course of 
nature'.75 It is myth that justifies the selection of scapegoats, explains what has to be 
done to them (ritual), and then justifies the collective murder; the social function of 
myth could not be more obvious: 'Le mythe est essentiellement le triomphe de ce 
mecanisme victimaire et le religieux mythique est avant tout un religieux social'.76 In 
other words, Girard emphasises the illusory nature of myth in its relation to social order: 
myth's main function here is to hide the fact that society is founded on a violence which 
binds its members, and it is precisely because they are unaware of the process that it 
works. This is precisely what Girard names Tillusion mythologique'.77
This illusion depends on the group's unanimity in their beliefs and actions: 
'L'abstention meme d'un seul assistant rend le sacrifice pire qu'inutile, dangereux'.78 The 
values of the community must be shared by all; its actions supported by each and 
everyone, as the community itself depends on this unanimity: 'Impossible de ne pas 
croire en Dieu dans le monde enchante. Cette impossibility est un fait social: la defense 
contre le mal suppose la solidarity necessaire au maniement de cette force positive. 
L'abstention est trahison'.79
Therefore, the exclusiveness and violence of the discourse against a perceived threat 
or enemy makes any neutral position untenable. We shall see later in chapters 6 and 7 
how relevant to post-Commune France this mechanism can be, and how crucial it is 
earlier in the thought of Victor Hugo. It is something that I will be referring to as the 
'Erasmus syndrome' (in reference to Stefan Zweig's Erasmus) and which will help us to 
understand better the effectiveness of myth, and the consequence of mythic thinking for 
communities that rely on it for their cohesion.
Written in 1935, from his exile in London, Zweig's Erasmus o f  Rotterdam is a bitter 
reflection on the impotence of humanism when faced with the power of fanaticism and 
mythical thinking.80 Trapped between the Church and Luther -  both becoming
75Cassirer, The M yth o f  the State, p. 283. See also Roger Caillois, Le M ythe et l'homme (Paris: Gallimard, 
1938), p. 173: '[le mythe] n'a rien de commun avec un gout du sumaturel qui agit a la maniere d'un 
d er iva tif  et manifeste seulement une adaptation insuffisante a la societe, au lieu d'en representer une vision  
collective, exaltee et entramante.'
76Girard, '2000 et le mythe de l'ere post-chretienne', in Cyrille M ichon (dir), Christianisme. H eritages et 
destins (Paris: Le Livre de Poche, 2002), p. 331.
77Rene Girard, Et j e  vois Satan tom ber comme Teclair (Paris: Grasset, 1999), p. 115.
78Girard, La Violence et le sacre, p. 151.
79Charles Taylor, 'Les Anti-Lumieres immanentes', in Cyrille Michon (dir) Christianisme: heritages et 
destins, pp. 159-60.
80Stefan Zweig, Erasmus o f  Rotterdam , trans. by Eden and Cedar Paul (New  York: The Viking Press). 
Further references will be indicated in brackets in the main text.
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increasingly intransigent -  Erasmus refuses to take sides, confident in a third way of 
moderation and mediation. Once the object of both sides' attention, in the hope of 
devoting his immense reputation to the service of the 'good' cause, Erasmus, in his 
stubborn neutrality, is soon rejected by both. There is no place for the measured in times 
of such religious passions and extremes; pulled in both directions, Erasmus, with his 
resistance, becomes a traitor to both (p. 233).
Zweig explains one of the reasons for such harsh treatment of once the most 
respected humanist of his time: 'the world of action was not his world. Erasmus could 
clarify but not shape, he could prepare the ground but not garner the harvest', (pp. 96-7) 
This is essentially what explains the effectiveness of mythic thought as we have seen: it 
is not just a representation, it leads to action. Although Zweig cannot help but admire 
Erasmus' attitude, he also acknowledges his inadequacy; courageous, most certainly (pp. 
15-6), and yet what influence did he have on events? Erasmus -  like Zweig in his time -  
is weakened by his faith in humanism: 'The fundamental belief of the earlier humanists 
-  and it was their beautiful though tragical error -  was that the progress of their fellow- 
mortals could be achieved by means of enlightenment' (p. 9); yet faced with religious 
fanaticism and mythic thinking, the 'touching and devout trust in the capacity of human 
nature to become more noble by means of the unremitting cultivation of learning and of 
reading' is shattered (p. 10).
One major consequence of the 'Erasmus syndrome', is to highlight the impotence of 
rational thought confronted with mythic thinking. Ernst Cassirer has explained how the 
power and influence of myth reaches its peak in times of severe crisis or conflict: 'In all 
critical moments of man's social life, the rational forces that resist the rise of the old 
mythical conceptions are no longer sure of themselves. In these moments the time for 
myth has come again'.81 An old answer in archaic and modem times alike, myth 
expresses society's aim to reach a secure representation of a threatening situation. The 
teratology of the adversary comes from a rhetoric of conspiracy which simplifies its 
image whilst overestimating the unity and power of the enemy. This follows the logic of 
mythical response to fear as we have seen earlier: what matters is not to diminish the 
threat posed, nor to assess the reality of the danger, but to give it words and images so it 
acquires a circumscribed definition. The violent nature of myth is above all an 
instinctive reaction to the perception of a threat -  whatever its reality.82
The danger is therefore magnified by Vimaginaire, but it gains in explanatory power. 
The threat loses its mystery and contingency: things happen for a reason. The main
81 Cassirer, The M yth o f  the S ta te , pp. 278-80.
82Girardet, M ythes et m ythologies politiques, p. 53.
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characteristic of conspiracy theories -  which, as we shall see, are extremely popular in 
nineteenth-century imaginaire -  is the belief in, and magnification of, the power of an 
external force. The process that combines the demonisation of the enemy and exorcism 
of evil allows the community to label what is feared, and thus consolidate a collective 
identity in opposition to what seems to threaten it. It seems paradoxical, yet logical then, 
that (symbolic) fear brings a sense of security in that it offers order, clarity and 
coherence in a combination of representations that derive from an imaginary which is, 
in its essence, anarchic, confusing, and contradictory: 'une certaine forme de rationalite, 
a tout le moins de coherence, tend a se retablir dans le cours deconcertant des choses'83.
The essential need to build a coherent representation for a community at risk from 
within as well as from the outside, and the ambivalent attitude of mythic thought to fear, 
suggest a collective identity whose making is closely related to violence, which brings 
us back to Girard's thesis. On the one hand, we see the violence of the discourse and 
images which match the level of fear faced by the group: as the image of the threat is 
magnified, so too is the fear -  so that the image never actually reflects the threat itself, 
but the fear felt within the community. On the other hand, we have the unanimous 
violence of the group's system of beliefs, and therefore of the praxis required by the 
group to protect its cohesion.
Original and controversial, Girard's thesis -  recently developed further in Et Je vois 
Satan tomber comme V'eclair** -  matches the idea of the social, constitutive importance 
of myth, as the natural, human response to any potential threat (whether internal or 
external) to the group. The polemical Christian anthropologist comes surprisingly close 
to similar conclusions reached in a different field working on similar grounds: social 
psychology. Its many experiments on sacred authority and social conformity seem to 
support Girard's view and my own premise that myth serves the purpose of securing an 
absolute priority: social cohesion. But what these experiments also demonstrate and 
illustrate further, is the relation between myth and power; between collective beliefs and 
dominant discourse. This supports Zweig's and Cassirer's contention that reason is 
deficient before the power of myth.
%3/bid., pp. 54-5.
8^Op cit. In this work, Girard claims the Passion can be interpreted as the revelation o f  this process: as it 
breaks the community's consensus about sacrifice and sheds light on the innocence o f  the scapegoat, it 
reveals the 'violence fondatrice', and the very function o f  myth, thus undermining the whole process.
(iv) Social conformity, sacred authority, hermeneutic violence
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Not ju s t to f in d  som ething before which I or som e other 
man can bow down, but to f in d  som ething that everyone 
else w ill also believe in and bow  down to .8-*
Social psychology — developed particularly in the United States in the twentieth 
century, and essentially based on experiments upon individuals and groups -  focuses on 
the mechanism and condition of social influence which is itself a matter of 
representations.
A series of experiments was carried out in the wake of the shock provoked by the 
Second World War. Mass hypnosis and the easy influence of propaganda had shed new 
light on human behaviour and dealt a fatal blow to the humanist optimism of inevitable 
progress brought by culture and education.86 The 1930s had been a decade of 
unprecedented political mass movements, and what was now perceived as political 
irrationality, including in democracies. A new reflection on the capacity of the 
individual to govern himself rationally and democratically seemed needed. Various 
experiments focused on social conformity and submission to authority, aiming to define 
the limits of man's obedience. Social psychology was returning to its roots when 
Gustave Le Bon and Gabriel Tarde sought to evaluate the extent to which the 
personality regressed in a crowd.
In 1952, Samuel Asch initiated an experiment where a group of people had to place 
three sticks projected on a screen in order of size. Only one person in the group is the 
actual object of the experiment, although he is not aware of this. At the beginning of the 
experiment, he has to give his answer before the others. But gradually, as more slides 
are projected, he is asked for his answer second and third, until he is the last to answer. 
The whole group is united in giving the same -  but wrong -  answer. By the time the 
subject answers last, he gives the same response as his group, although he cannot but be 
sure of what the right answer should be. What comes out of Asch's experiment is the 
difficulty of resisting peer pressure, even i f  the group is wrong and the individual knows
^ D ostoevsk y , The Brothers K aram azov, p. 254.
86The first blow  had been felt in the wake o f  the First World War. See Paul Valery, 'La Crise de l'esprif, 
in Variete I  et //(P aris: Gallimard, 1924 and 1930), pp. 13-51: 'II y a l'illusion perdue d'une culture 
europeenne et la demonstration de l'impuissance de la connaissance a sauver quoi que ce soit' (p. 17). This 
defeat was perhaps best illustrated by the suicide o f  Stefan Zweig in 1942. Zw eig had thus far epitomised 
what it was to be a European humanist.
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it. This concurs with Girard's reading of Peter's repudiation of Christ: 'il est comme nous 
tous, il ne peut resister a la foule'.87
With social conformity, sacred authority was the other object of psycho-social 
experiments: the two pressures of the pairs and of the pere combine as the conditions 
for a harmonious and strong community. In the 1960s and 1970s, Stanley Milgram 
developed Asch's experiment by working on submission to authority in a series of 
famous experiments of his own, also aimed at assessing the level of resistance of the 
individual, this time not to peer pressure but to authority.88 Milgram wanted to prove a 
difference between passive submission (as in Asch's experiment) and an active one; that 
an individual would resist if asked to do something he would know to be morally 
reprehensible.
The experiment takes place in a laboratory, where the organisers are wearing white 
coats. The subject is no longer facing a group, but a few scientists. Unaware of the real 
object of the experiment, he believes himself to be participating in a study about the 
relation between memory and punishment. His task is to help a learner, whom he 
believes -  wrongly -  to be a volunteer like him. The learner is tied up in an electric 
chair; the teacher has to read him a series of words, linked in pairs, and check his 
memory afterwards. Inevitably, the learner fails to connect the words of the list 
correctly, in which case the teacher has to send him a light electric shock from a 
keyboard he is sitting at. Every mistake leads to a higher voltage.
Needless to say, the electric chair is a fake, and the memory of the learner who is 
acting in it of little importance. What is tested is the willingness of an individual to 
inflict pain on a person he knows nothing about, without any ideological drive, no 
monetary gain, and in a democratic country that allows him to walk out at any time. The 
only force on him is the authority of the white coat, who, at some point in the 
experiment, relieves the uncomfortable 'teacher' of any responsibility.
The results of the experiment were disturbing and surprising: two thirds of the 
subjects sent the maximum voltage, and none refused to take part. The experiment was 
reset many times with variations (introducing visual, verbal, physical contact between 
the learner and the teacher) and in different countries. However, the overall lesson 
drawn from the initial experiment remains: an individual is prone to follow the lead, not 
only of a group, but of any form of authority accepted as such by his society, so long as
87Rene Girard, '2000 et le mythe de l'ere post-chretienne' (in Cyrille Michon (dir), Christianisme: 
heritages et destins, p. 334.
88Stanley Milgram, O bedience to Authority: an experim ental view  (London: Pinter & Martin, 1997).
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the burden of his individual responsibility is being taken care of, and assumed by, the 
holder or representative of this authority.
This experiment links traditional and modern societies together in their submission 
to an authority they regard as sacred (divine or scientific) -  that is, that they will not 
question. In religious societies, authority acquires a level of sacredness: as man and 
cosmos are interrelated, rebelling against authority puts both the group and cosmic order 
in peril.
C'est que l'ordre naturel continue l'ordre social et le reflechit. Tous deux sont lies; ce qui trouble 
l'un derange l'autre. Un crime de lese-majeste est l'equivalent d'un crime contre nature et nuit de la 
meme fa£on au bon fonctionnement de l'univers.^9
But the sacredness of authority is not solely religious: it springs from a social need for 
cohesion. We have seen that the primary peril in this regard was inner violence and the 
cycle of eternal revenge: crimes break the social bond. The condition for social cohesion 
lies not solely on a 'victime emissaire' but more essentially on an agreed authority, well- 
considered enough (or sacred) to decide the punishments that will prevent murder, 
revenge, and their threat to social cohesion. It is an authority invested with the power to 
judge and to inflict death where needed. The sacredness of this position places the 
judge-executioner in an intermediate position between the world of gods and the world 
of man, and belonging to both: human, he has authority over terrestrial affairs; divine, 
he has the gods' power to take life. This does not prevent violence or crime, but by 
delegating the monopoly of legitimate violence in the hands of an indisputable 
authority, the future of the community's cohesion seems protected.90
Power -  sacred and protective -  operates because of this delegation. Power then is a 
domination that is accepted, not forced:
Le pouvoir apparait com me la realisation d'une volonte. II m anifeste la toute puissance de la 
parole. [...] II fait qu'un ordre est execute. II se presente com m e une vertu invisible, surajoutee, 
irresistible, qui se manifeste dans le ch ef comme la source et le principe de son autorite.91
The combination of sacred authority and social conformity helps to explain the power of 
dominant discourse, however irrational it may sound, and the powerful influence of 
mythic discourse: 'Le propre de la pensee mythique est de croire au pouvoir des mots, a
^9Caillois, L'Homme et le sacre, p. 32.
90See Wunenburger, Im aginaires du politique, pp. 24-5. On the legitim acy o f  authority, see also Max 
Weber, The Sociology> o f  Religion, trans. by Ephraim Fischoff (Boston: Beacon Press, 1963).
91Caillois, L'Homme et le sacre, p. 117.
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leur magie, a leur efficacite ensorcelante', and faced with the magical power of words, 
reason shows its limits.92
This is eloquently illustrated by Caillois in his tale 'le crocodile ensorcele'. A cursed 
person who, it is predicted, will end in a crocodile's stomach vainly proposes a rational 
explanation for the outcome of the curse, whatever it may be: if the accident predicted 
happens (real), it demonstrates the power of the spell (imaginary); but if the person does 
not end up in the crocodile, he will fail to prove the conceit: 'j'invite chacun a 
reconnaitre l'impuissance de la magie. On ne reconnait que celle du magicien: on 
m'affirme que ma survie prouve au contraire l'efficacite des charmes'. And Caillois 
concludes: 'On aper£oit l'artifice: il n'importe guere que je sois indemne ou mis en 
pieces. Dans les deux cas me voici preuve patente de cette realite de la magie, qu'une 
aveugle obstination me pousse encore a nier. Des qu'on y  croit, tout est resolu'.93
The force of mythic thought, contrary to the rational mind, is that it is not reducible 
to intelligence, and is actually perfectly capable of existing outside and without it. 
Flexible enough, as we have seen, to adapt to any context, the symbolic refitting allows 
an interpretation compatible with any circumstance, even those that seem to deny its 
coherence. Analyses and conclusions made outside the inner logic of mythical thought, 
reasonably proving its inconsistency and incoherence, are doomed to fail: the truth of 
myth is not located in the coherence of the discourse, but in its 'puissance evocatrice'.94 
Girard and Cassirer, both in different ways, pointed out the relation of myth and 
violence: 'il existe une violence du mythe a l'egard du sens. [...] Le mythe etant, sous la 
forme d'un mensonge ou d'une affabulation, la transposition de la violence dans l'ordre 
de la culture'.95
I wanted to emphasise what traditional and modern societies have in common with 
regard to the way mythic thinking and dominant discourse operate to highlight the 
potential danger of modern, rational thought to fall in the same trap. And if Caillois' 
story of the crocodile illustrates an aspect of mythic thinking, he is quick to make the 
connection with his contemporaries' use of comparable rhetorical violence. The 
explanation given by modem science for human motives and behaviour may appear 
more rational; the rhetoric, however, may well be similar. Caillois refutes the use of the 
intellectual panacea that explains everything through a theoretical framework, but 
acknowledges the rhetorical efficiency of mythical thought in this context too; whatever
92Bertrand Vergely, Cassirer. La po litique du ju s te  (Paris: Editions Michalon, 1998), p. 58.
93Roger Caillois, B abel (Paris: Gallimard, 1978), pp. 283-4. My emphasis.
94Lagarde, Le Mythe, la  science et la  ph ilosophie, p. 9.
95Vergely, Cassirer, pp. 36-7.
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assertion, however arbitrary the demonstration, it is potentially irrefutable: 'Pour les 
memes raisons qu'il est impossible de prouver que de telles affirmations sont vraies, il 
ne l'est pas moins de demontrer qu'elles sont fausses. Leur arbitraire meme les protege 
et les rend irrefutables'.96 The believer in witchcraft is the victim of the same kind of 
rhetorical violence that can be used in a seemingly more rational setting:
Ces savants hommes ne se tiendront pas pour battus. Ils accuseront leur contradicteur d'etre 
victim e des apparences, de s'en tenir a la surface des choses et ils pretendront vite que dans le fond 
et en dem iere analyse, comme ils se plaisent a dire, ce sont bien les determinations qu'ils invoquent 
qui ont tout con d u it."
This way does not belong specifically to archaic societies, Caillois argues; 'En cette 
fa9 on de raisonner reside sans doute une tentation permanente de l'esprit'.98 In this way, 
mythical thought remains, and so does the rhetorical violence against the real, because 
when belief takes precedence, the fact that this belief is religious or scientific makes 
little or no difference. As Freud pointed out, belief is an illusion 'when a wish- 
fulfillment is a prominent factor in its motivation, and in doing so we disregard its 
relations to reality, just as the illusion itself sets no store by verification'.99
As Girard stated, 'la violence essentielle revient sur nous de fa9 on spectaculaire, non 
seulement sur le plan de l'histoire mais sur le plan du savoir'.100 We are not far from 
Barthes' concept of doxa here: the alienation facilitated by myth affects modem and 
traditional societies alike. Dominant discourse is essentially a discourse that sets the 
social norms. Its rhetoric aims to assert its authority and the submission of the 
individual to it, or, rather, his adhesion, as the whole process also aims to be hidden, 
making submission invisible.
I would like to conclude this chapter with a brief recapitulation of some essential 
points discussed thus far in order to provide a definition of the concept of modem myth. 
As Vergely rightly points out:
Toutes les definitions du mythe sont reductrices. Aucune n'aperqoit ce qui est veritablement en jeu, 
en faisant du mythe une vision primitive des choses. Car ce qui est veritablement en jeu est 
autrement profond. [...] Tout et n'importe quoi peut devenir mythique. [...] Le mythe est cette 
methode consistant a faire exploser la m ethode.101
" C a illo is , B abel, p. 281.
91 Ibid., p. 282.
9SIbid., p. 288.
99Freud, The Future o f  an Illusion, p. 31.
1 "G irard, La Violence et le sacre, pp. 480-1.
" IV erg e ly , Cassirer, pp. 62-3.
53
The nature of myth is paradoxical. Myth starts with a rupture with the past, as we shall 
see, but it establishes a social continuity; its narrative seems anarchic, but leads to social 
order; intellectually and epistemologically controversial (if not subversive), myth is also 
emotionally and socially conservative.
However, I would like to propose a short and convenient definition of myth as a 
sacred story, perceived to be true, and telling a society o f  its origins, thus providing 
them with meaning and a sense o f  collective identity. Stories of origins lead to the 
institution of rituals and beliefs; this emphasises the active, dynamic, social function of 
myth, compared to a simple tradition or story. Myth is a social system of representations 
which meets the needs of a society. But it is also a praxis as it provides the group with a 
code of conduct, particularly in times of crisis.
If a myth is a story, it is an exemplary one: bom within a society, it gives it a set of 
rules, and explanations in return. It is a religious, collective phenomenon, adaptable, 
flexible and socially necessary, which makes it highly influential and powerful. Because 
myth is the telling of origins, because the anamnesis is a guarantee of the perennity of 
the society, myth is also sacred and unquestionable. It is never doubted that a society is 
founded in primal time. But myth is flexible enough to adapt to changes and provide a 
necessary reading of events in tune with the moment's Zeitgeist.
I wish to insist particularly on the political implications of the influence of modern 
myth, its rhetorical power, control over representations, and capacity to lead to action. 
As we have seen, the constitution of'collective memory' is a reinterpretation of the past 
according to the needs of the present. This is particularly true in the case of France 
which, in the wake of the French Revolution, has to (re)constitute a collective identity 
based on a rupture. France shares with the United States the specificity of having 
created 'modern' origins (almost at the same time) in a rare attempt to bind mythical 
anamnesis and modem history.
The problem of the study of the French Revolution lies in its unique status in French 
historiography: since it is still widely considered to be the origin of modem France, it is 
largely read as an explanation of the present. After 'the French revolution substituted 
prophecy for teleology',102 the post-revolutionary construction of a collective memory, 
the devoir de memoire, takes up the greater part of a century that would see both its 
present and future as functions of its past. In this way, the nineteenth century recreated 
its past as much as it was constructed by it. Or perhaps one could say that it was
102Priscilla Ferguson, P aris as Revolution. Writing the N ineteenth-Century C ity  (Berkeley, Cal.: 
University o f  California Press, 1994), p. 224.
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constructed by the past it created. The nineteenth century is notoriously the century of 
memory and history, but also of ruptures and repetitions; of accelerations of time and 
sudden standstills; a time of secularisation, myth and a revival of Christianity that 
constantly sought to define the relation between the religious and modernity. The myth 
of Paris springs from this contradictory, fragmented framework. 'Une societe fondee 
dans une action commune [...] abesoin d’une definition commune ancree dans 
fimaginaire social', Taylor notes.103 It is this imaginaire that I now wish to explore.
103 Charles Taylor, 'Les anti-Lumieres immanentes' in Cyrille M ichon, Christianisme: heritages et 
destins, pp. 162-3.
55
Chapter 2
Dispositif Legendaire: Michelet and the remapping of myth in the nineteenth-
century literary imaginary
Le legendaire n 'estp a s un genre; c'est un d ispositif  
poetique de [ .. .]  soudure du m ythe et de I'Histoire, de 
la religion et de la politique, avec pou r horizon la 
fondation  de la com munaute dans son unite. ^
The century of modernity is often regarded as a turning point in the secularisation of 
western -  and particularly French -  society; a time that seems to have established an 
inexorable link between Voltaire and 1905; a time that saw the triumph of the scientific 
values of objectivity and reason over the superstition and illusory comfort brought by an 
obscurantist Church. The relatively rapid process of secularisation that affected France 
since the late eighteenth century is central to the theme of modern myth in that it 
brought a new, more political system of belief, which had the future for its horizon 
rather than the past for its model; and which, at the same time, had the representation of 
the past at its heart. We have seen in the first chapter that, in modem societies, the 
chronological conception of time heads for the future whereas religious ones keep 
returning to origins. However, nineteenth-century France largely constructed its identity 
on the basis of modem origins: 1789. After the French Revolution, the traditional fear 
of social disintegration combined with a contemporary need to rebuild a national 
identity within a new, modern and secularised framework.
However, as crucial as secularisation may be, it does not mean that the importance of 
the sacred recedes. In fact the nineteenth century shows more of a shift o f  the sacred 
from the Church to science and politics. The trend is well known that saw a new 
sacredness applied to the Nation, for example. Science also seems to become a new 
God, 'our God logos',2 and even positivism -  a faith  in scientific approach -  falls to the 
temptation of myth:
Parce que le positivism e renvoie tout entier a la croyance qu'il suffit de constater les faits pour 
pouvoir connaitre. Ce qui est une vision mythique de la realite consistant a avoir une croyance 
religieuse dans la verite des faits constatables. [...] Mythe et positivism e ne different que dans la 
forme pour arriver au meme point, a savoir la confusion entre les m ots et les choses}
* M illet, Le L egendaire au X IX e siecle, p. 5.
2Freud, The Future o f  an Illusion, p. 54. 
W ergely, C assirer, pp. 41-2. M y emphasis.
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This seems to suggest that a religious framework remains essential to social cohesion, 
only it is no longer encapsulated by the Church.
Rather than using 'secularisation1, it may prove more accurate to speak in terms of 
des enchant ement,4 and to focus on a situation by which the sacred shifts from religious 
institutions to politics during the French revolution, and later to history, with the 
attempts to build a revolutionary memory. We shall see the remarkable repercussions of 
this for the place and status of history in modern, post-revolutionary consciousness: the 
rejection of religious thinking in the private sphere leaves a new scientific discipline 
with a mission to tell society about its origins, attempting to reconcile the power of 
myth and the reliability of science, in an unprecedented goal to create a modern, man- 
made, theologico-political system. And this is precisely the mission Michelet set out to 
accomplish.
It is therefore by looking at the production and reading of history that we can best 
comprehend the combination of mythic and rational thinking which is the trademark of 
nineteenth-century France. We shall see that modern myth stems from what Millet 
called a dispositif legendaire, mixing history and legends to reach the best 
understanding of the revelation of 1789.5 As we shall see in more detail in the next 
chapter as well, 1789 came to symbolise the dawn of a new era, the sacred origin of 
modem France. It then fell on historians, particularly those of the 1820s and 1830s to 
explain this 'mythe fondateur', to solve the contradictions of the revolutionary legacy 
and to build a collective identity on these new foundations. If the French Revolution can 
be understood as a modern cosmogony, its narration had to bear a crucial social 
dimension of myth: to keep the memory of this origin alive and to form a living bond 
between the past and the present. We shall see that Michelet passionately endorsed that 
agenda, and paved the way for the model of the prophet-historian (in much the same 
way as Hugo will as a prophet-poet -  both seers in modern times).
Michelet positioned himself as a 'prophete de la memoire', which will be crucial to 
the understanding of modern myth. We shall see how he set himself the task to 
resuscitate a past that he could not bear to see dying, and give their voices back to a 
Peuple the past of whom had been neglected for too long. The first historian to give 
such prominent role to the masses, Michelet set himself the mission to be their voice 
and to bring their memory to life, initiating a process of revolutionary anamnesis, and
^See Marcel Gauchet, Le D esenchantem ent du monde. Une h isto irepo litiqu e de la religion  (Paris:
Gallimard, 1985). 'Desenchantement' is usually used to translate Weber's 'Entzauberung', although
'demagification' would be more literal. See Max Weber, The S ociology o f  R eligion , trans. by Ephraim
Fischoff (Boston: Beacon Press, 1963).
^Millet, Le Legendaire au XIXe siecle.
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bringing mythic and modern thinking together. There is something religious in 
Michelet's mission as he attempted to demystify the official history of kings and battles, 
and to resort to the legendary in order to resuscitate the long-forgotten memory of the 
People.
(i) The century of secularisation and desenchantement
The revolution operated by the Enlightenment -  most notably by Voltaire -  
challenged the authority and supremacy of Catholicism, and, without necessarily 
rejecting the concept of God as such, contested the sole divine explanation given by the 
Church on terrestrial matters. France remained Catholic, but society started a process of 
secularisation whereby religion was becoming a matter of personal belief rather than the 
sole holder of transcendental, external truth. The secularisation of France was closely 
related to this religious relativism -  religion becoming just one among many opinions. 
They can all be tolerated as long as they are confined in the private sphere, but their 
incursion in politics is increasingly regarded as awkward and dangerous -  'un vestige du 
passe, un defi pour la raison, une menace pour la liberte et la democratic'.6
The study of nature and the exercise of reason were now viewed as the best means to 
apprehend the world. And this process of rationalisation leads ipso facto to a movement 
of return to the human, to a certain form of anthropocentrism. The refusal to believe in 
any principle superior to man reduces every field of knowledge to human criteria. 
History, then, ceased to be the story of the people of God to become the gradual 
revelation and possession of reason by men. God was expelled from historiography: the 
agents of history are all men. The rationalisation and secularisation of society goes 
alongside this emergence of a new historical consciousness -  'reappropriation de cette 
puissance de se faire'.7
Such dramatic change takes time to permeate a society, yet, where Paris is 
concerned, the process was strikingly rapid: between the 1760s and the 1770s, the city 
that had backed the Ligue became almost indifferent in religious matters. 'En dix/quinze 
ans, tout s'ebranle; avec l'expulsion des Jesuites... ce sont les reseaux de la piete 
encadree qui sont casses; le rapport de beaucoup de Parisiens change, puis s'estompe'.8
6Rene Remond, Religion et societe. La secularisation auxX IX e et X X e siecles, 1780-2000, (Paris: Le 
Seuil, 2001), p. 107.
7Marcel Gauchet, 'Croyances religieuses, croyances politiques', in Le Pouvoir, I'Etat, la po litique  (Paris: 
Odile Jacob, 2002), p. 263.
8Pierre Chaunu, 'Avant-Propos', in Pierre Chaunu, Madeleine Foisil and Fran9 oise de Noirfontaine, Le
Basculem ent religieux de Paris auXVIIIe siecle  (Paris: Fayard, 1998), p. 16. Chaunu sees this turn as
decisive, 'le point de depart, la crise anticipatrice, le detonateur peut-etre de l'un des plus importants 
toumants de l'histoire religieuse des homines' (p. 18).
58
C'est la faute a Voltaire, naturally. But not only, Chaunu showed how Louis XV's own 
personal crisis played its part in the process as he distanced himself from the traditional 
sacred attributes of the monarch:
Le moralisme rigoriste des clercs gallicans, en alignant la conduite privee du roi sur les normes 
communes [...] a reussi a casser en Louis XV [...] le ressort de la royaute sacree auquel le peuple 
tient. Un roi qui ne touche plus les scrofuleux, qui ne guerit plus les malades est un roi qui a 
abdique sa legitimite profonde.9
This desenchantement is affecting the 'Fille ainee de l'Eglise' at its highest level -  the 
'Lieutenant de Dieu sur terre' -  and in its heart, Paris. This crisis was felt deeply by the 
Parisians: within a decade, half of them stopped regular practice.10 This religious 
indifference explains, Chaunu argues, the success of Voltaire's blows against Vinfdme 
(namely religious fanaticism): 'ils atteignent celui qui a abdique l'essence de son pouvoir 
et de son etre'.11 The desenchantement, however, does not mean that the need for 
sacredness and miracles diminishes. Quite the opposite: if the Church is weakened in 
that regard, and so is the king, there is a vacuum ready to be filled.12
But the nineteenth century proceeded on the path of secularisation and 
rationalisation, many being convinced that these would push religion aside and 
eventually defeat it. From Feuerbach to Nietzsche, the nineteenth century was the time 
of a fierce battle not so much against Vinfdme, as against amentia: 'a state of blissful 
hallucinatory confusion' that religion seemed to be reduced to.13 The century of science 
perceived religion as the long history of reason's hibernation: 'in religion man denies his 
reason. [...] Man, in relation to God denies his own knowledge, his own thoughts, that 
he may place them in God', Feuerbach wrote.14 If God was a creation of man, then 
worshipping God was in a sense worshipping oneself, he further argued: 'what was 
formerly contemplated and worshipped as God is now perceived to be something 
human. [...] Man is seen to have adored his own nature [Wesen]'.15
If religion is an empty shell, and this is all that man worships, this indicates a certain 
degree of archaism in modem man but also, and more importantly, the sign of the
^Chaunu, 'Le Defi du Siecle', in Le Basculement religieux de P aris au XVIIIe siecle, p. 442.
1 ®Ibid.
u Ibid., p. 442-3.
12On this religious vacuum, see A lexis de Tocqueville, L'Ancien regim e et la revolution  (Paris: 
Gallimard, 1967), pp. 242-47.
13Freud, The Future o f  an Illusion, p. 43.
14Ludwig Feuerbach, The Essence o f  Christianity, trans. by George Eliot (New  York: Prometheus Books, 
1989), p. 27.
15Ibid., p. 13.
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submission of his reason to the irrational and obedience alike. The mission of rational 
men was therefore to shed light on man's indulgence, creating a new, secular science of 
man that was essentially anti-religious. In that respect, Guenon is right when he points 
out that Tesprit moderne est anti-chretien parce qu'il est essentiellement anti- 
religieux'.16
This is the reason for the unprecedented attacks against the Middle Ages, where the 
Church had control over minds and abused its position. In the wake of Voltaire, the 
Church -  personified in the sinister figure of Torquemada -  was identified with the 
Inquisition; perceived as intolerant and obscurantist; responsible for the preposterous 
medieval belief in a flat earth.17 Freud criticises a system that forbids doubts and 
facilitates the submission to authority; in other words, the ascendancy of religion at the 
expense of the capacity to think independently and rationally.
Modern man, on the other hand, attempted to free himself from the dangers of 
illusions and the comfort of irrational beliefs, compared to a drug by Marx and Freud 
alike.18 The possibility of such alienation lies within each of us: the need to believe. 
'[Religious representations] are illusions, fulfillments of the oldest, strongest and most 
urgent wishes of mankind'.19 This enterprise was fundamentally anti-mythic: a reaction 
against the illusions of pensee magique.
To abolish religion as the illusory happiness o f  the people is to demand their real happiness. The 
demand to give up illusions about the existing state o f  affairs is the dem and to give up a state o f  
affairs which needs illusions. [...] The task o f  history, therefore, once the w orld  beyond the truth 
has disappeared, is to establish the truth o f  this world. The immediate task ofphilosophy, which is 
at the service o f  history, [...] is to unmask self-estrangement in its unholy forms?-®
Hence, the secularisation of French society was being seen as a movement of liberation. 
For the first time, a society envisaged functioning on a secular basis. No country pushed 
that experience further than France.
This disengagement from Christianity came to a head in the second part of the 
nineteenth century, following the Romantic period. The positivists were continuing the 
struggle initiated by the Enlightenment, but in a much more violent, anti-religious
^G uenon, La C rise du m onde moderne, p. 165.
17Jefffey Russell, Inventing the Flat Earth. Colombus and M odern H istorians (N ew  York: Wesport,
1991). Russell argues that this so-called medieval belief-system  was in fact a myth elaborated in the 
nineteenth century.
18Freud, The Future o f  an illusion, p. 49: 'the effect o f  religious consolations [are] likened to that o f  a 
narcotic'.
19Ibid., p. 30.
^9Karl Marx, 'Introduction', in Contribution to the Critique o f  Hegel's 'Philosophie o f  Law', in Karl Marx, 
Frederick Engels, C ollec ted  works, vol. 3 (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1975), p. 176.
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mode. Science sets itself free from theology.21 And if the Eighteenth century had 
accepted a certain form of religiosity -  deism for instance -  in their battle against the 
Church, the target now moved to encompass faith as such. Two conceptions of the 
world were perceived as mutually exclusive:
C'est une opposition raisonnee, qui se fonde sur l'affirmation d'une incom patibilite de nature entre 
la societe moderne et le catholicisme. Deux systemes se dressent ainsi l'un en face de l'autre qui 
s'opposent terme a terme: enseignement par voie d'autorite contre esprit critique, obeissance 
inconditionnelle contre liberte, soumission a la loi du groupe contre la volonte individuelle, dogme 
contre raison, egalite contre legalite, tradition contre progres, conservation ou reaction contre 
democratie.22
Modernity can be defined as a moment of emancipation from the religious and the 
sacred (social autonomy: independence from an non-human order), and the transfer of 
temporal power into the hands of secular institutions: 's'affirme un nouvel etat d'esprit, 
une disposition a concevoir [...] l'Etat comme entite independante et a releguer la 
religion dans le domaine des croyances privees'.23 And if religion remains, if the French 
remain Catholic, the position of religion in society is radically modified: 'Les croyances, 
si elles perdurent, ne font plus systeme, elles ne sont plus partagees par tout le monde'.24 
The Enlightenment had ultimately challenged the Church as the sole principle of social 
organisation -  initiating the end of a theologico-political model that had prevailed in 
France thus far.
The decline of religion in favour of religiosite is not a matter of practice only, not 
even of belief, but one of social function: 'Historiquement, l'age des religions en tant 
qu'ordre politique est revolu. La religion peut encore contribuer a la richesse spirituelle 
de l'homme, mais ne peut revendiquer la direction de l'ordre social'.25 Gauchet notes 
that a society can very well be constituted with believers and yet be secular.
Car la religion, ce fut d'abord une econom ie generale du fait humain, structurant indissolublement 
la vie materielle, la vie sociale et la vie mentale. C'est aujourd'hui qu'il n'en reste plus que des 
experiences singulieres et des systemes de convictions, tandis que faction sur les choses, le lien 
entre les etres et les categories organisatrices de l'intellect fonctionnent de fait et dans tous les cas
2 M ad elein e Reberioux, 'L'Heritage revolutionnaire', in Andre Burguiere (dir), H istoire de la France. 
Choix culturels et m em oire (Paris: Le Seuil, 2000), p. 163.
22Remond, R eligion  et societe  en Europe, p. 189. My emphasis.
23Lefort, Essais sur le politique, p. 276.
24Taylor, 'Les Anti-Lumieres immanentes', p. 158. In which case, Guenon argues, we can no longer speak 
in terms o f  religion. He uses the word 'religiosite' instead to refer to 'vagues aspirations sentimentales qui 
ne se justifient par aucune connaissance reelle', a combination o f  philosophical and religious decline (La 
Crise du m onde m oderne, pp. 111-2).
25Shayegan, Q u'est-ce qu'une revolution religieuse?, p. 244.
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aux antipodes de la logique de la dependance qui fut leur regie constitutive depuis le 
commencement.^^
The triumph of the anti-Church lobby in 1905 suggests a gradual dechristianisation 
and the inexorable secularisation of France that would have started in the few decades 
preceding the French Revolution: an important dechristianised Parisian population 
would then logically facilitate a Revolution that hit hard on the Church, creating a 
favourable context for secularisation in the nineteenth century which would grow 
alongside the progress of an equally secularised science. The reality of the French 
relation to the Church and religion in general is more complex though, as the radical 
politics of secularisation also find their origins in a system regalien: laicite and 
gallicanismc remain inextricably combined as the trademark of France's religious 
specificity. I will be arguing that the renewed Gallicanism of the French revolution and 
the Napoleonic regime pushed the Church away from public affairs. Meanwhile the 
void of sacredness that resulted was ready to be filled by the missionary call of the 
revolutionary: religious forms of representation could spread to social institutions, 
filling them with a certain degree of mysticism.27 This would lead to an unprecedented 
framework where the place of the sacred was still essential to social cohesion but was 
no longer embedded into traditional, ecclesiastic institutions, but in secular ones.
(ii) The shift of the sacred
The relation between the Church and the French State had long been characterised by 
Gallicanism, an attempt by the latter to control the former. This policy culminated with 
the revocation of the Edit de Nantes in 1685 which, in short, reinstated the principle of 
Cujus regio ejus religio: the king's religion was meant to be followed by all his loyal 
subjects.
Contrary to a belief in a Revolution that would turn against the Church and the king 
alike, the anti-Church policy of the revolutionaries actually partook of this tradition. 
What really initiated the religious crisis, and the first Christian schism in centuries, was 
the attempted continuation of the Gallican system of submission of the Church to the 
state. Following the nationalisation of Church belongings, Catholic priests became civil 
servants: the state had to provide for them. In return, they, just like any civil servant, 
now had to take an oath. The Constitution civile du clerge, was adopted on 12 July 1790
2^Gauchet, Le D esenchantem ent du monde, p. 133. See also his presentation, pp. I-III.
27See Lefort, Essais sur le politique, p. 326.
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by the Constituante, that is by a non-Catholic authority, an authority that held its 
legitimacy from souverainete populaire, not from God.
Not surprisingly, Pope Pius VI resented this further step of Gallicanism, and opposed 
the Constitution. Too late for the king, who had already signed it, thus creating a deep 
crisis between the pretres assermentes, who followed the Constituante, and the 
refractaires, who followed the Pope in his increasingly radical condemnation of 
revolutionary principles. The anti-religious policy that followed was thus more a matter 
of politics than religion: it was a matter of consolidating the higher authority of civil 
institutions. The refractaires faced deportation, and although the Convention -  like the 
Legislative before it -  counted a majority of believers who did not necessarily support 
the anti-religious movement that was taking hold of France, they found themselves 
drawn by the Commune into its mission of dechristianisation.28 The already 
dechristianised Paris led the rest of the country into a forced secularisation, that reached 
its climax with the Terror -  particularly the second one which started 2 June 1793 -  and 
the Vendee war (3 March 1793).29
As religion was under siege, churches and statues destroyed, priests and nuns 
executed, saints, relics and kings' tombs profaned, new temples and saints replaced 
them, in a new cult to the Republic and its values. Marat in particular was raised to the 
status of a saint -  'super-saint du catechisme republicain'.30 The Revolution was then 
caught in a symbolic struggle to fight every aspect of the Church's influence over the 
French. On 24 November 1793, a new, Republican, calendar was adopted, hoping to 
throw the Christian one and its references to saints into oblivion, but also developing a 
new religion to replace the old: '[la revolution] est devenue elle-meme une sorte de 
religion nouvelle', Tocqueville famously observed.31 In other words, the revolutionaries 
were caught up in a symbolic contest with what they were trying to eliminate: the 
political agenda, the will to regenerate society and create a new type of humanity all 
acquired a religious quality: politics became sacred; and the religious imaginary shifted 
to the new annunciation of a terrestrial, human salvation. The religious vacuum left by 
dechristianisation was filled with politics. A notable difference remained though, as the 
new religion was man made and no longer had God at its heart: 'cette regeneration n'a
28See Chaussinand-Nogaret, 'La V ille jacobine et balzacienne', p. 545.
29The Vendee war similarly started on economic and political grounds, as a reaction against those who 
most profited from the Revolution in Britanny: the urban petty bourgeoisie. The insurrection started after 
the Convention decided to raise 300 000 troups. The demands o f  king and Church came as an opposition 
to the values o f  the Revolution. See Jean Tulard, Jean-Franpois Fayard, Alfred Fierro, H istoire ei 
dictionnaire de la Revolution frangaise  (Robert Laffont, 1987), p. 1135.
30Chaussinand-Nogaret, 'La V ille jacobine et balzacienne', p. 546.
3 to c q u e v il le ,  L'Ancien regim e et la Revolution, p. 71.
63
plus aucun fondement transcendant. [...] Elle pretend, au contraire, se substituer a toute 
transcendance'.32 Hence the sacred nature that Paris will acquire, as the 'lieu de la 
revelation revolutionnaire' (which we will examine in the next chapter).
In La Revolution en debat, F rancis Furet explains the French specificity of this 
politico-religious transformation. In countries like England or the United States, 
revolutions and political transformations followed a religious tradition, if only to try and 
go back to a pure, original Christian message. But given the process of secularisation 
well in place in 1789 Paris and the clash with the Church, the French Revolution found 
itself in the position of refusing any pre-established religious frame; no golden age to be 
restored; no original message to rediscover and live by; Tesprit nouveau doit etre 
invente comme religion'. Furet concludes:
Le paradoxe de l'histoire de la France consiste a ne retrouver l'esprit du christianisme qu'a travers 
la democratic revolutionnaire. Ou encore: la Revolution franfaise renouvelle la parole religieuse 
sans jamais acceder au religieux. Les Fran9 ais ont divinise la liberte et l'egalite modemes sans 
donner aux principes nouveaux d'autres supports que l'aventure historique d'un peuple reste 
catholique.33
Politics replaced the Church in its eschatological enterprise; it did not undermine the 
eschatological nature of that enterprise, which is to facilitate the emergence of a new 
man, in a frame that remained Christian, but oriented against the Church. Religious 
authority found itself secularised, being transfered from Catholicism to the state.
The revolutionary anti-Christian digression may have ended with Napoleon, who 
paved the way for the Christian revival of the early nineteenth century. But here again, 
we have a new attempt, this time successful, to work with the Church in the ultimate 
interest of the state: 'La restauration des cultes en 1801-1802 par le Concordat et les 
Articles organiques releve du meme esprit et represente le triomphe de l'inspiration 
regalienne: c'est le modele du catholicisme administratif ,34 Napoleon combined 
typically Gallican willingness to have the Church under the control of the state together 
with a clear awareness of how religion could facilitate social order: 'L'enrolement de la 
tradition catholique [devient] sous Bonaparte un calcul de manipulation des masses'.35
Secular societies -  and which is more secular than France? -  may be misleading: the 
religious remains influential, even if religious institutions weaken. Debray contests the 
perception that the religious has become something marginal and insignificant:
32Fran9 ois Furet, La Revolution en debat, (Paris: Gallimard, 1999), p. 73.
33Ib id ., pp. 120-1.
34Remond, R eligion et Societe en Europe, p. 109.
35Furet, La Revolution en debat, p. 124.
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Plut au Ciel que les sciences religieuses fussent retrogrades et folkloriques. Tout porte a croire 
qu'elles denichent ce que les societes contemporaines qui se croient nai'vement protegees par 
l'individualisme democratique ont de plus resistant et de moins dicible.3^
Homo religiosus seems to survive very well in modernity, changing his religions, his 
gods, his idols, yet remaining essentially a believer: Tidolatre se montre mille fois plus 
resistant que ses idoles', Debray ironically points out.37
Indeed, modem anthropology has demonstrated the continuity and validity of 'la 
pensee sauvage' in modern societies. The consequence of expelling the divine from 
consciousness is -  paradoxically enough -  to reintegrate God among men: '[La] 
construction d'un Dieu moral et la projection d'un etre supreme par l'homme ont pour 
consequence la disparition de Dieu dans son exteriorite, sa resorption dans la 
communaute humaine qui l'a produit'.38
But more importantly, on an epistemological level, the permanence of myth and of 
mythical structures makes mythology one of the most valuable fields in which to 
explore the human because it explores what persists in humanity. History varies, so does 
science; but somehow myth holds the key to what Durand calls the 'figure traditionnelle 
de l'homme': 'cette pensee sauvage est plus universalisable, est plus universalisee dans 
l'espece humaine que ne Test le perpetuel bouleversement des theories et des methodes 
scientifiques', he argues before adding -  aptly, yet quite controversially -  'c'est le poete 
ou le sorcier qui demeure, et c'est le savant qui vieillit'.39
We should therefore resist the positivist image of a France divided between an 
arriere-garde of bigots led by the Church on the one side, and a progressive, modern 
science committed to the triumph of reason on the other. The French Revolution blurred 
the boundaries between the sacred and the secular rather than establishing a clear-cut 
opposition. This created a new theologico-political framework developing on the ruins 
of the one it claim to replace.
N e peut-on admettre qu'en depit des changements advenus, le religieux se conserve sous les traits 
de nouvelles croyance, de nouvelles representations, de telle sorte qu'il puisse faire retour a la 
surface, sous des formes traditionnelles ou inedites, lorsque les conflits sont assez aigus pour faire 
craquer l'edifice de l'Etat?40
3^Debray, Le Feu sacre, p. 21.
37Ibid., p. 16.
38Boulnois & M ichon, 'L'Agonie du christianisme?', in Cyrille Michon (dir), Christianisme: heritages et 
destins, pp. 20-1.
39Durand, Science de VHomme et tradition, pp. 55-7.
49Lefort, Essais sur le po litique, p. 278.
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It further demonstrates that the sacred persists in a different, secular mask, investing 
politics. As Sironneau argues: Tactivite politique, bien loin d'etre defmitivement 
desacralisee a ete, en notre temps, le support d'une nouvelle experience du sacre'.41
The violence of the attacks against the Church can be misleading in a society which 
remains in its huge majority deeply and actively Catholic. It is also misleading as it 
tends to suggest that this rejection of religion would favour rational attitudes. Yet the 
nineteenth century constantly emphasised that positivism seemed to go hand in hand 
with its opposite, 'our God Logos': 'C'est juste au moment ou le positivisme bat son 
plein, que le mysticisme s'eveille et que les folies de l'occulte commencent', Huysmans 
ironically remarked.42 As Nietzsche put it, 'one has given up religion but not the 
enhancement of feeling and exaltations one has acquired from it'.43
The mythical process of social cohesion finds, here, a valuable illustration: if the 
social bond of religion is desacralised, the community is in peril. The collusion of 
religion and politics during the French Revolution is at the heart of the major political 
division -  which is also a religious one -  of modern France: 'Avec la Revolution 
frangaise, le religieux est absorbe par le politique. Mais inversement quand il refuse de 
s'y perdre, il est constitutif de la Contre-revolution'.44 The sons of the Revolution -  
Michelet for instance -  will see 1789 was the dawn of a new, progressive age whilst the 
counter-revolutionaries like Maistre will interpret it as divine warning capable of 
shaking society and bringing it back to God. Overall, the questions around Christianity 
and the French Revolution are not only inextricable, they are also crucial in terms of 
political mythology: two discourses are confronted with each other, one of tradition, the 
other of progress; both highly religious. The question of a godless man, governed by his 
reason alone, is at the centre of the choices made by nineteenth-century thinkers in the 
constitution of an identity and of an image of the human condition. Michelet and the 
winners of history; those who were going to narrate that history in the nineteenth 
century were operating in a theologico-political framework whose prime function was 
to keep the community together as well as found a new society. And this, again, is 
exactly in line with mythic thinking: 'II s'agit de refaire, par un legendaire nouveau, 
l'unite de la communaute'.45 In order to explore further the framework in which the
41 Sironneau, 'Retour du mythe et imaginaire socio-politique', p. 17.
42Huysmans, La-Bas  (Paris: Gamier-Flammarion, 1978), p. 238.
43N ietzsche, Human, all too Human, trans. by R. J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1986), p. 105.
44Furet, La Revolution en debat, p. 73.
43M illet, Le L egendaire au XIXe siecle, pp. 182-3.
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chief apostle of these thinkers, Michelet, will operate, we now need to turn to Millet and 
his concept of dispositif legendaire.
(iii) Dispositif legendaire
L'histoire a sa  verite, la legende a la sienne ,4^
The concept of dispositif comes from Foucault who developed it as a way of 
complementing the notion of episteme. Foucault was trying to define the system of 
domination within society -  'mailles du pouvoir'.47 Whereas episteme focuses 
essentially on dominant discourse, the concept of dispositif allows the picture to be 
broadened, so as to encapsulate not only the discourse, but equally the practices and 
institutions which he viewed as an integral part of the mechanism of power and 
domination: how social norms are accepted and integrated by its members; how they are 
put into practice.
This question of practice is essential: as we have seen, mythic thinking requires the 
active participation of the community. This is not solely a matter of adhesion, but 
equally, and more importantly, a question of investment and practice. It is the 
participation of the community, their personal engagement in it, which gives beliefs 
their social importance. The system of belief is the foundation on which a system of 
domination can operate.
With regard to the nineteenth century, the system of belief found itself transformed 
by the unprecedented changes that affected the religious and political spheres. Claude 
Millet uses the phrase dispositif legendaire to refer to a framework that brought myth 
and history, religion and politics together in the hope of bringing the community 
together and guarantee its cohesion and unity.48 In his Legendaire au XIXe siecle,
Claude Millet shows how the nineteenth century had been the century of both history 
and mythical revival, and how both trends did more than coexist: they fused in a 
Romantic messianism -  'Double mouvement d'historicisation des mythes et de 
mythification de l'histoire', he writes (p. 118). Legends and myths were seen as the 
repository of some human truth, thus far overlooked by the contingencies of history. 
Myth here was seen -  by a remarkable inversion -  as being the tool that could allow 
history to be freed from its own myths, a mythification allowing a demystification: 'la
46Hugo, QT, p. 181.
47M ichel Foucault, 'Les M ailles du pouvoir', in Dits et ecrits (Paris: Gallimard, 1994), vol. IV, pp. 182- 
2 0 1 .
48Millet, Le Legendaire auXLXe siecle, pp. 5-6. Further references w ill be indicated in main text.
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mythification de l'Histoire, pour etre une fondation liberatrice, et non mystificatrice, est 
solidaire d'une conception de l'Histoire comme demythification' (p. 136). This 
constitutes a radical turn if we consider the suspicion myth was held in during the 
Enlightenment:
Myth had been a barbarous thing. [...] A mere monstrosity. [...] This view undergoes a radical 
change as soon as we pass to the romantic philosophers. [...] Myth becomes not only a subject o f  
the highest intellectual interest but also a subject o f  awe and veneration. It is regarded as the 
mainspring o f  human culture.49
The language of this revolution is poetry. Not because of its esthetic quality, but 
because its rhetorical precision makes it possible to encapsulate the new theologico- 
political agenda, and give meaning to a history that had thus far been meaningless: 
'revolution poetique qui [est], dans le meme mouvement, politique et religieuse. [...] 
Cette mythologie nouvelle [...] n'est pas hors Histoire, mais la comprend -  en meme 
temps qu'elle est destinee a la produire' (pp. 9-10). Myth is no longer seen as opposed to 
history; by a remarkable inversion, it now gives it its meaning.
This, again, undermines the conception of an inexorable secularisation. Despite the 
increasing distinction between private religion and public politics, the shift of the sacred 
-  which had accelerated during the Revolution -  and the framework in which the 
thinkers of the first half of the nineteenth century operated contest such a clear-cut 
dichotomy: for them, religion and politics could not be thought of separately, for 
politics had acquired a mystical quality: 'institution symbolique du lien social, a la fois 
immanent et transcendant' (pp. 181-2). The political sphere in the nineteenth century, 
just as it was during the Revolution, remained the place of this transfer of the sacred.
God is far from absent from this enterprise: the opposition of scientific history and 
religion is yet to come. Until 1848, a Romantic conception of history dominates:
Elle suppose que soit reconnu dans l'Histoire un ordre providentiel et un sens eschatologique -  
l'Histoire est en marche vers Dieu. Elle est liee a une conception theologico-politique du pouvoir 
(meme et surtout chez ces farouches anticlericaux que sont M ichelet, Quinet, Hugo). Elle destine 
l'Histoire a l'usage du peuple. [...] Une relligio  -  un lien sublime qui fonde la communaute dans 
son unite, et sa solidarity, qui institue les rapports entre les hommes de cette communaute, et leur 
rapport a Dieu, principe ultime du sens historique (p. 135).
But it now fell to historians and no longer the priests to produce social meaning:
'principe d'integration et d'intelligibilite. [...] C'est done l'Histoire qui doit desormais 
justifier, sur le mode profane, les institutions, les valeurs, les tabous du groupe', Bernard
49Cassirer, The Myth o f  the State, pp. 182-3.
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writes, and she adds, quite aptly: 'On pourrait meme [faire de l'historien] un "pretre" 
charge d'interceder aupres du passe disparu, voire un prophete tourne vers ce passe, qu'il 
lui incombe de faire etre'.50 History takes charge of a thus far religious social function 
and acquires a crucial influence on the making of collective memory, combining a 
scientific method and a religious mission: 'La legitimite du message de Dieu est 
remplacee par la fiabilite accordee a une science qui s'elabore uniquement sur la base du 
raisonnement, et de la reconnaissance de valeurs universelles et progressives'.51 In a 
society in need of reconstruction, history appeared as the best tool to meet the collective 
need for meaning:
Le siecle tout entier vit de la certitude que l'etre humain ne se saisit que charge d'histoire. Cette 
reverence pour 1'Histoire, nouvelle maniere de dechiffrer les destinees, recele une invitation a 
reunir les grandes sources de la fierte nationale, [...] a raccorder les calendriers, a celebrer une 
continuite patrimoniale.5^
After the revolution, France, traditionally 'fille ainee de l'Eglise' became 'fille ainee de 
1'Histoire'. The sacred nature of the revolution in French consciousness spread to the 
field in charge of making sense of the radical turn in its history. Nineteenth-century 
France was the century that recognised the sacredness of history.
If, as I shall try to show in more details in the next chapter, the French Revolution 
can be understood as a modern cosmogony, its narration had to involve a crucial social 
dimension: to keep the memory of this myth and to form a living bond between past and 
present. One historian in particular epitomises the mission of the historian in post­
revolutionary France: Michelet. Between memory and history, Michelet set himself a 
double mission: to bring the past back to life, and to give the People a voice that had 
thus far been ignored.
(iv) Michelet, 'prophete de la memoire'
N ot man or men but the struggling, oppressed class 
itse lf  is the depository o f  h istorical knowledge.55
Michelet successfully built a bridge between memory and history, combining his 
own personal memory with the nation's history. Not only did he tell the story of the
50Bemard, Le Chouan rom anesque, p. 38. She later adds 'on pourra alors qualifier l'historien de 
"scientific myth-maker'", p. 58.
51 Ibid., p. 39.
5^Ozouf, Les Aveux du roman, p. 326.
5^Walter Benjamin, Illuminations (London: Pimlico, 1999), p. 251.
Revolution, but his personal story proceeded from it. For Michelet was not just any 
historian, he was a son of the People and the Revolution: national history and personal 
memory blurred.
Michelet is a Parisian -  'J'etais ne, comme une herbe au soleil entre deux paves de 
Paris' (Pe, p. 68) -  and a son of the Revolution. Born in 1798, Michelet grew up in a 
deconsecrated church, used as a printing house by his father, a contemporary of the 
Revolution: 'Je naquis en 1798, dans le choeur d'une eglise de religieuses, occupee alors 
par notre imprimerie, occupee et non profanee; qu'est-ce que la Presse, au temps 
moderne, sinon l'arche sainte?' (Pe, p. 65). There is little doubt that the Romantic 
sensitivity of young Michelet was nurtured by this religious building, where the word of 
God seemed to have been expelled the better to receive a second advent, the People. 
Michelet, like his generation, grew up in the shadow of the Revolution: 'La Revolution 
est en nous, dans nos ames', he would later say (RF, p. 31). His generation was one 
dominated by the memory of these few dense years told by the parents who transmitted 
to their offspring the nostalgia of a time when they were part of history. Better even: 
when they had made history; 'L'acteur principal est le peuple', he said (RF, p. 37). It is 
their story that Michelet will attempt to bring back to life.
With regard to collective memory too, 1789 had been revolutionary, creating a need 
for memory among those who had been denied any such thing as a past. The Ancien 
Regime was a time of constant oblivion of the People. History focused on kings, the 
nobility. No real interest was shown in the 'masses obscures', decimated by wars, 
disease and malnutrition. Oblivion awaited the infinite number of destinies as if both 
the bodies of the deceased and the memory of their past lives were meant to be buried 
together. Michelet criticised this collective amnesia, denouncing for instance the 
destructions made by the Inquisition:
Bruler les livres, les homines ,les traces memes de leurs forfaits. La plus grande partie de ces 
destructions ne peut plus etre racontee. [...] Quand retrouverai-je l'histoire des Vaudois, des 
A lbigeois par exem ple ? [...] Qu'ils triomphent, nos ennemis, de l'impuissance qu'ils nous ont faite, 
et d'avoir ete si barbares qu'on ne peut avec certitude raconter leur barbarie!... (RF p. 62).
In contrast, 1789 is the year when the People entered the scene of history. From then on, 
they would have a past to transmit; a glorious history which owed much to the People 
themselves, and which could defeat oblivion at last. However, in 1815, history seemed 
to resume its dull and bleak path. The Ancien Regime was back, and this meant 
resuming the swallowing up of these multiple destinies. Hence the shock of the 
revolution of 1830 -  yet another revolution of the People, with no hero and no leader, 
Michelet noted: 'Ce que la revolution de Juillet offre de singulier, c'est de presenter le
premier modele d'une revolution sans heros, sans nom propre; point d'individu en qui la 
gloire ait pu se localiser. La societe a tout fait' (IHU, p. 326). This was the moment that 
determined his life and work: 1789 had been the moment of an awakening: the People 
too had a memory, and a generation later, in 1830, Michelet set himself the mission to 
be its voice.
We have seen the importance of "collective" memory in myth-making, and of both a 
traditional and a modem relation to the past. Michelet belongs to both. Michelet viewed 
history as an effort of anamnesis of popular memory which had thus far been ignored. 
But he also believed that this memory needed to be articulated and made sense of. The 
role of the historian, therefore, is one of interpretation. Michelet believed that history's 
meaning escaped its agents, and that the historian could decipher and translate it for 
them: 'II leur faut un CEdipe qui leur explique leur propre enigme dont ils n'ont pas eu le 
sens, qui leur apprenne ce que voulaient dire leurs paroles, leurs actes, qu'ils n'ont pas 
compris'.54 If history is to be anything else than an account of the powerful, if it is to be 
the living memory of the people, its production cannot be a collective one; it first needs 
to be processed by the interpreter before being given back to the people.
M ichelet not only claimed to speak on behalf o f  large numbers o f  anonymous dead people, but 
insisted, with poignant authority, that he could say what they 'really' meant and 'really' wanted, 
since they them selves 'did not understand'. From then on, the silence o f  the dead was no obstacle to 
the exhumation o f  their deepest desires.55
However, Michelet is aware of the temptation to steal that memory away from the 
collective; aware of the danger of hermeneutic violence that goes with his position. He 
therefore refuses to consider himself an author: 'Je n'etais pas auteur', he argues, 
'j'aspirais, j'ecrivais cette ame du tragique passe' (RF, p. 45). And if he speaks for the 
people, he is often aware of the instrumentalisation of that idea and critical of those who 
speak in its name.56
One reason why he is so sensitive to such instrumentalisation is that Michelet 
belongs to the people: 'moi aussi [...] j'ai travaille de mes mains', he said in Le Peuple', 
'J'en ai garde un sentiment profond du peuple' (Pe, p. 58). His vivid experience, makes 
him one of them: 'Les epreuves de mon enfance me sont toujours presentes, j'ai garde 
l'irhpression du travail, d'une vie apre et laborieuse, je suis reste peuple' (Pe, pp. 71-2).
54Cited by Roland Barthes (ed.), M ichelet p a r  lui-mem e, (Paris: Le Seuil, 1954), p. 92.
55Anderson, Im agined Communities, p. 198.
56See Lefort, Essais sur le politique, p. 130, and Michelet, La Revolution franqaise, in particular, chapter 
9, where he notes the public indifference that characterise Paris at the end o f  1792 and in the following  
year -  an indifference that grew allongside the increasing role o f  the Jacobins.
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But again, this experience is alive. It does not belong to a past, more or less forgotten 
now that he has become a respectable historian; Michelet claims that he still feels a 
profound feeling and solidarity with the people. This living bond gives him the 
legitimacy of talking in their name: 'Et moi, qui en suis sorti, moi qui ai vecu avec lui, 
travaille, souffert avec lui, qui plus qu'un autre ai achete le droit de dire que je le 
connais' (Pe, p. 63).
The mission Michelet set himself is more than a mere narration of the past: 'raconter 
leur combat, me placer dans leurs rangs [...]? Ce n'etait pas assez. Je repris tout de fond 
en comble pour leur rendre leur vie, leurs arts, surtout leur droit' (HF, p. 354). The vivid 
memory of his own upbringing urges him to consider his work as an act of justice. 
Reflecting upon the position he had reached in society, Michelet's sense of solidarity 
with the people makes it morally uncomfortable: 'Oh! qui me soulagera de la dure 
inegalite?' (Pe, p. 70). No longer living in their ranks, Michelet still feels their pain, and 
his own social position is of little comfort. However, he can still do something for them:
Alors, regardant celle de mes mains qui a garde la trace du froid, je  me dis pour me consoler: 'Si tu 
travaillais avec le peuple, tu ne travaillerais pas pour lui... Va done, si tu donnes a la patrie son 
histoire, je t'absoudrai d'etre heureux' (Ibid.).
Telling the story of the people is therefore more than a profession. It is a mission 
inextricably linked to a sense of justice. The oblivion of the people's destiny up until 
1789 is the mark of a history that disdained the country's misery for too long. Four 
hundred years of this misery now await to be voiced: 'Les souffrances lointaines de tant 
d'ames etouffees dans ces vieux ages se plaignaient a voix basse' {Ibid.). In the 
Archives, Michelet can hear their feeble voices, pleading for the historian to 
acknowledge them:
Sais-tu que nos martyrs depuis quatre cents ans t'attendent? [...] C'est dans la ferme foi, 1'espoir en 
la justice qu'ils ont donne leur vie. Ils auraient droit de dire: 'Histoire! compte avec nous. Tes 
creanciers te somment! Nous avons accepte la mort pour une ligne de toi' (HF, pp. 354-5).
Giving the people back their voice, is to give back their rights and a history that is 
rightfully theirs. Michelet's sense of solidarity with the people ultimately sets him to 
consider history as a way of expressing their truth: 'j'eprouve, quand on me parle de lui 
[le peuple], un besoin exigeant de verite' (Pe, p. 58).
Michelet's conception of history is one of a struggle: 'celle de l'homme contre la 
nature, de l'esprit contre la matiere, de la liberte contre la fatalite. L'histoire n'est pas 
autre chose que le recit de cette interminable lutte' (IHU, p. 307). The birth of the people
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is a direct result of the tension between fate and liberty, resulting from man's attempt to 
be the architect of his own destiny. Michelet played a central part in the secularisation 
of history, considering it as the work of man: 'Dans le progres humain, la part essentielle 
est a la force vive, qu'on appelle homme. L'homme est son propre Promethee' (HF, p. 
337), an idea found in Vico.57 For Michelet, 1789 is the decisive moment in human 
history when man takes possession of his history; it is the moment that reveals that 
history is man-made.
This explains his strong criticism of the Church. Michelet had no words harsh 
enough for the perverse role of the Church in that struggle between fate and liberty: 
'education qui surprend les ames et les chloroformise' (HF, p. 339). But his reaction 
against religion goes beyond his anticlericalism. If Michelet was glad he was spared any 
formal religious education, benefiting from a Parisian, revolutionary, secular upbringing 
-  'Je n'avais re(^u encore aucune idee religieuse' (Pe, p. 67) - , he was far from immune 
to religious feeling. The reading of Limitation in particular served him as catechism: 'La 
religion re9 ue ainsi, sans intermediate humain, fut tres forte en moi'. But it is a religion 
free from dogma, and which encapsulates all aspects of his life: 'Elle me resta comme 
chose libre, vivante, si bien melee a ma vie qu'elle s'alimenta de tout, se fortifiant sur la 
route [...] dans l'art et dans la poesie, qu'a tort on lui croit etrangeres' (Pe, p. 67). The 
religious nature of his mission as a historian is therefore of little surprise. When 
recalling the time when that mission appeared vividly to him, he writes: 'Telle fut ma foi 
du moins, et cet acte de foi, quelle que fut ma faiblesse, agif (HF, p. 335). For if 
Michelet is happy to believe that the Church is progressing fast to its near demise, it is 
because it has been replaced by a new religion.
Michelet saw in the Revolution the emergence of a new religion, radically 
antagonistic to the old one whose salvation depended on the arbitrariness of divine 
grace. The new religion he announced would be one of justice; a decisive step in man's 
struggle against fate, 'travail de soi sur soi' (HF, p. 336). Michelet perceived the history 
of civilisation as the materialisation of a divine order which had man at its heart; the 
emergence of a 'Dieu social': 'ce dernier pas loin de l'ordre fatal et naturel [...] en est un 
vers le Dieu social qui doit se reveler peu a peu dans notre liberte meme' (IHU, p. 327). 
This is directly in the line of the Enlightenment for Michelet: 'ce siecle a fonde la liberte 
sur l'affranchissement de l'esprit, jusque-la lie par la chair, lie par le principe materiel de 
la double incarnation theologique et politique, sacredotale et royale' (RF, p. 33).
Logically enough, this task calls for a new form  of history. Michelet's method is in 
this regard unique, as he combines the most serious analysis of new material -  he
57'Je n'eus de maitre que Vico', M ichelet claimed (HF, p. 339).
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describes his method and sources in RF (pp. 43-4) -  with his vision of the past: science 
and imagination, the work on archives and the vision of the prophet merge. Michelet 
famously reported how he conceived the project of his Histoire de France; that is, as a 
revelation: 'Cette oeuvre laborieuse d'environ quarante ans fut con9 ue d'un moment, de 
l'eclair de Juillet. Dans ces jours memorables, une grande lumiere se fit, et j'aper9 us la 
France' (p. 333).58 What he sees in this vision is more a persona, and he sets himself the 
task of transcribing its soul: 'J'avais pose le premier la France comme une personne', he 
claims (HF, p. 345), and the history he is going to tell is not one of a country as such, 
but of this person: 'pour la premiere fois parait fame de la France en sa vive 
personnalite' {Ibid., p. 341).
The sources are viewed as the starting point in an exploration of this collective soul. 
Michelet's use of archives does not aim to recount the past, but to bring it back to life, 
as a resurrection (HF, p. 350) -  'resurrection de la vie integrate', as he puts it (HF, p. 
334). Telling stories is no longer enough: the duty of the historian is to go beyond that 
history and to search for anamnesis: 'evoquer, refaire, ressusciter les ages' (HF, p. 339). 
This is the aim of history (Pe, p. 73).
Director of the Archives since 1831, Michelet refuses to see the tons of archives for 
which he is now responsible as the carcasses of a dried, dead history. For Michelet, one 
has to listen -  beyond the illusion of death associated with archives -  to the life which is 
inscribed on these documents.
La poussiere du temps reste. II est bon de la respirer, d’aller, venir, a travers ces papiers, ces 
dossiers, ces registres. Ils ne sont pas muets, et tout cela n’est pas si mort qu'il semble. Je n'y 
touchais jamais sans que certaine chose en sortit, s'eveillat... C’est fame' (RF, p. 45).
Beyond the illusion of death associated with archives, beyond the silence of the place 
some life remains which asks to be heard, to be listened to: 'Dans les solitaires des 
Archives [...], dans ce profond silence, des murmures cependant venaient a mon oreille' 
(HF, p. 353).
(v) History, myth and demystification; a revolutionary method
The historian is regarded as a medium who can communicate with the dead, who can 
tell their word to the living. In the company of the dead, he brings their story to life: 
'Refaisant leur legende, je reveillais en eux mille choses evanouies' (HF, p. 343). This is 
more magical than scientific, but it is what Michelet is after if he is to succeed in his 
mission to transform history: if his mission is one of resuscitation -  'Ressusciter par
58'L'eclair de juillet' refers to the revolution o f  1830.
l'imagination le mouvement meme de la vie, reconstituer la passion eteinte qui anima 
les saisons disparues'59 -  then this calls for an almost magical process to take place: 
'Cette magie naive avait une efficacite d'evocation presque infaillible' (HF, p. 343) he 
claims. The process is close to alchemy, whereby the alchemist himself is transformed 
and regenerated:
Cela me fit un autre homme. Une transformation etrange s'opera en moi ; il me semblait que, 
jusque-la apre et subtil, j'etais vieux, et que peu a peu, sous l'influence de la jeune humanite, moi 
aussi je devenais jeune. Rafraichi des eaux vives. [...] Quelle sante cela fit en moi, apres les 
dessechements de ma subtilite mystique! (HF, p. 346).
Not surprisingly, such a radical change in the mission and method of history attracted 
much criticism: 'C'est un ecrivain, un poete, un homme d'imagination,1 he recalls 
hearing from the right (HF, p. 347). Michelet answers by recalling what serious history 
owes to him: 'C'est la premiere fois que l'histoire eut une base si serieuse' (HF, p. 348) 
he claims, referring to his Histoire de France. He dismisses these critics as no proper 
historians for they are concerned with superficial history: 'le premier, sortant l'histoire 
du vague dont ils se contentaient, je la fondai sur les actes, les manuscrits, l'enquete 
immense de mille documents varies' (HF, p. 347-8).
He also notes that the taste for a dry, unimaginative history is the mark of seriousness 
only in appearance. When confronting his memory and the history books he read when 
he started to be interested in history, he notices that they contradict each other. (Pe, p. 
58). And when he started to research history, he, again, discovered information that had 
been dismissed by historians thus far: 'Mes etudes variees d'histoire m'avaient revele des 
faits du plus grand interet que taisent les historiens' (Pe, p. 59).
What he points out is how narrow his critics' conception of history can be, how it 
fails to comprehend the past: 'On ne donnait guere que l'histoire politique. [...] On ne 
tenait nul compte de ce qui accompagne, explique, fonde en partie cette histoire 
politique, les circonstances sociales, economiques, industrielles, celles de la litterature 
et de l'idee' (HF, p. 349). A century before l'Ecole des Annales, Michelet is paving the 
way for a broader picture, and for histoire des mentalites. Again, he aims for a living 
history, to encapsulate the life of the past that 'serious history' had thus far condemned 
to death: 'si l'histoire fut venue dans sa severite critique [...] je ne sais si ces morts 
auraient ose revivre. Ils se seraient plutot caches dans leurs tombeaux' (HF, p. 342).
Michelet does not deny his poetry and use of imagination, but he refuses to see these 
as a mark of'artistic history' (where art is associated to distraction and fantasy).
59Claude Mettra, 'Presentation' in Michelet, RF, p. 10.
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Michelet does not consider the resurrection of the dead souls and legends to be a matter 
of literary artefact. This magical process is aimed at grasping 'la vie integrate', and the 
historian-alchemist who walks in the world of the dead, resurrects their souls, also 
remains fully lucid: Tart garde en lui sa lucidite toute entiere' (HF, p. 344). So he makes 
a very clear distinction between literature and history, distancing himself from Walter 
Scott (HF, p. 353):
La m ethode historique est souvent l'oppose de Yart proprem ent litteraire. L'ecrivain occupe 
d'augmenter les effets, de mettre les choses en saillies, presque toujours aime a surprendre. [...] 
L'historien a pour speciale mission d'expliquer ce qui parait miracle, de l'entourer des precedents, 
des circonstances qui l'amenent, de le ramener a la nature (HF, p. 353).
Myth and history combine, are complementary even, in that both the historian's vision 
and his analysis of material are integral parts of the process. And this corresponds to 
myth in its modem sense. Myth is here opposed to the mystification it is sometimes 
associated with. On the contrary, myth is viewed as offering the opportunity to access 
the past in its totality and life. Myth is perceived as the repository of a human truth that 
transcends history's events. Legend and history coexist and even combine in such 
attempts, as the historian relies on documents just as much as his own visionary 
imagination.
Cette synthese transforme radicalement l'imagination, qui n'est plus une puissance d'affabulation 
plus ou m oins mensongere, mais la puissance meme de la compassion, qui permet a l'Histoire de 
se faire resurrection du passe, de faire vivre les morts, et de peupler le present des fantomes du
p a ssed
This is clearly a mythical enterprise, but the meaning of this has changed radically to 
oppose itself to mystification. Michelet is one of those who -  like Hugo in poetics -  
attempted this reconciliation of myth and history in the profound belief that a whole 
understanding of the historical being was within reach. They both set out to create a 
modern mythology; a historical one, one that has man at its heart. Romantic history sees 
itself as an anamnesis and a politico-religious myth; a myth born from 1789 and telling 
the story of a freed People who are at the same time its agent and driving force. Since 
1789, France finds itself at the heart of the process of civilisation. It is a religious 
process, but in a radically different way from the role the Church had thus far played. It 
is a revelation -  a social one this time:
^ M ille t, Le Legendaire avX IX e siecle, p. 123. See Michelet's 1833 Preface to L'Histoire de France, 
where he recalls his first impression in the section historique des archives, and the dialogue with the dead 
that followed.
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Si le sens social doit nous ramener a la religion, l'organe de cette revelation nouvelle, l'interprete 
entre Dieu et l'homme, doit etre le peuple social entre tous. Le monde moral eut son Verbe dans le 
Christianisme. [...] La France expliquera le Verbe du monde social que nous voyons commencer 
(IHU, p. 329).
Michelet places France specifically in the line of the great revelation from Israel to 
Greece 'mere du mythe'. The process of listening and understanding the Verbe goes on, 
this time it is France's turn and her mission to explain this new, social revelation (IHU, 
p. 330).
I believe that Michelet allowed a first step to be taken in drawing the distinction 
between official memory and authentic collective memory. He managed to bridge the 
two, just as he bridged the People and the elite -  belonging to both. One could regret the 
position of Michelet in French historiography: not objective enough, not critical enough, 
too romantic, too biased, too literary to be a serious historian. Michelet's legacy 
resembles his friend Hugo's in many respects; one the post-modern tend to sneer at. 
However, Michelet combined erudition and a very modern effort to comprehend what is 
now called histoire des mentalites.
But what matters most here, is that Michelet proved a major architect in the dispositif 
legendaire, combining the seriousness of history as a science with the resurgence of 
mythic thinking; politics with poetics: ' cette critique [de l'Ancien Regime] reexploite au 
service d'une apologie de la modemite les categories theologico-politiques 
apparemment discreditees'.61 A unique moment where the return of myth favoured by 
the Romantics was used for demystification. The revolutionary legacy, as a religious, 
modern revelation would be lost if left to rational thought only: the epic dimension of 
the message can only be comprehended by the legendary. This is a new, unprecedented 
framework where history and myth, the secular and the sacred coexist, where politics 
and history are both sacralised, and collective memory redefined, still highly mythical in 
its function.
This exploration of the religious imaginary highlights both the process of the 
elaboration of myth and the evolution of its social function in an ostensibly secular 
society. Once the religious framework of the nineteenth century -  and the importance of 
history in it -  are established {dispositif legendaire), one can turn to the sacred origins it 
will constantly refer to. As nineteenth-century France lived in the shadow of the French 
Revolution, the next chapter will be essential to understand how Paris achieved the
^ L efort, Essais sur le p o litiqu e , p. 306.
status of a myth. We have seen that Paris played an important role in the secularisation 
of France. In fact it is at the heart of the dispositif legendaire: 'Paris, mysterieux 
deplacement du pouvoir spirituef Hugo wrote in Paris (p. 85). For the dispositif 
legendaire is in fact embedded in a lieu, the cradle of the French Revolution, which is 
also a date: 1789.
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Chapter 3 
’Paris, Lieu de la Revelation Revolutionnaire': 
the making of "collective memory" and myth in Hugo
SUPREMA TIE DE PARIS  
1789. D epuis un siecle bientot, ce nombre est la 
preoccupation  du genre humain. Tout le phenomene 
m odern ey  est contenu. ^
In this quotation, Hugo explains Paris's unique status in the history of mankind 
through the prism of 1789. To say that the French Revolution had deep repercussions on 
the process of Parisian myth-making is an understatement. Not only had Paris taken the 
political, ideological and cultural lead over the whole country; it was also deeply 
transformed by the idea of rupture. The idea that the revolution acted as a tabula rasa, 
that a clear cut was then made between Ancien Regime and the dawn of new, modern 
era of liberty would put its mark on the way the capital was perceived in the following 
century.
The premise here is that the French Revolution was regarded by the nineteenth 
century as the sacred origin of a new, modern, urban era. In parallel, one cannot help but 
notice the profound changes in the sensibility of post-revolutionary France, expressed in 
both urban policy and literature, as we shall see in the next chapter. One could explain 
those changes by reference to the Revolution; the whole nineteenth century could be 
explained through the prism of the Revolution. Yet we have seen the limits of such a 
teleological approach. So the focus here will consist of assessing readings of the 
Revolution made in nineteenth-century France, and the impact not so much of the 
Revolution itself, but of the way it was interpreted by subsequent generations. The 
ambivalent legacy of the Revolution, the importance of fear in particular, and some 
aspects of the Terror, will be crucial to understand how Paris became the place that held 
the keys to the post-revolutionary psyche.
I will start by looking at the sacralisation of Paris by 1789, which is essential to 
comprehending the unique status achieved by the French capital. This process started 
with the Revolution itself: as Paris came to be identified with the revolution, and with 
the fall of the Bastille in particular, it became a universal capital of the mind ('capitale 
de l'esprif). 1789 had been a 'delivrance' (in its double sense of giving birth to and 
freedom from) for humanity. In the following years, the universal capital came to be
^Hugo, P, p. 80. 'Paris lieu de la revelation revolutionnaire' com es from the same page.
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seen as a place of epistemological significance, an urban palimpsest awaiting to be 
deciphered.
The destruction that took place in revolutionary Paris, following the idea of the 
tabula rasa, and the more constructive re-appropriation of the city by the state operated 
by Napoleon, would both soon turn the still medieval town into a modern city according 
to the new values of the bourgeois order. Although Haussmann is usually blamed for 
having destroyed the charm of an old town during the second Empire, it was the French 
Revolution (including its Napoleonic outcome) which discovered that a city could be 
transformed according to the values and ideals it was to convey; that it could evolve 
according to politics other than merely urban. In this sense, one can talk of a revolution 
in the city as well as a revolution o f  the city.2
This is an essential aspect in the narration of the memory of the revolution. If 
1789 was the dawn of a new age, then France would repeatedly turn to it to make sense 
of its present. We shall see how Paris came to be a sacred lieu de memoire -  not just the 
cradle of modernity, but also the locus of a modern affective system, arising from the 
new system of beliefs explored in Chapter 2.
As a mythe fondateur, the Revolution was lived in the present, in the moment of its 
telling, haunting the nineteenth century, contaminating the present with the past: it 'was 
contemporary in nineteenth-century France not only because of the recurrent political 
conflict and the repeated changes of regime but also because so many texts supplied a 
continuous social frame and literary narrative for the revolutionary tradition'.3 In that 
regard, we shall see how the tabula rasa generated a complex relation to the past, made 
of attempted erasure and remembrance of the Ancien Regime; and how the ambivalence 
of the process of revolutionary memory made it all the more essential to find a way to 
reunify a community in danger of being divided over the 1789 legacy.
As we have seen in Chapter 1, collective memory, and more generally myth-making, 
are a response to affective, present-day needs. One social function of myth is to 
represent the fears of the community in some meaningful way. Looking at the 
revolution and its reception in nineteenth-century France will illustrate this process. We 
shall see how fear was instrumentalised by the gouvernement revolutionnaire, and how 
the policy of Terror is connected to two trademarks of the nineteenth-century French 
literary imaginary: conspiracy and publicity.
Far from being the cry of Romantic poets and historians, the sacralisation of Paris as 
the cradle of 1789 illustrates the social function of myth: to make sense, to secure social
2See Ferguson, P aris as Revolution.
3Ib id ., p. 6.
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cohesion and to provide the community with a framework to label its fears. We will 
look at Michelet again, and most particularly at Hugo, who dedicated his work Paris to 
the capital, summing up what it had thus far symbolised, what its function ought to be in 
spite of the new regime of Napoleon III. But we will also look at histoire des mentalites, 
so that the word of the prophets and its collective framework are brought together, for 
they are both essential to the process of myth-making.
(i) Paris, 'capitale de l'esprit', sacralised by 1789
Since Louis XIV, Paris had been abandoned by its Kings and had thus lost the 
privilege of being the seat of French power. The beginning of the Revolution meant that 
Paris could resume its historic function as a capital: the fall of the Bastille, the 
constitution of the commune de Paris, and Louis XVI accepting the cocarde tricolore 
(Paris's colours combining with the white of the royalty), all showed the increasing 
preeminence of Paris in the revolutionary process. On 6 October, the Parisians brought 
the royal family back to Paris, followed by the Assemblee ('inseparable de la personne 
du roi'). The first few months of the Revolution seemed to emphasise that political 
power and Paris could no longer be separated. As Michelet put it: 'le siege de la 
revolution se place a Paris' (RF, p. 127). Furthermore, the process of centralisation of 
power initiated in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries profited Paris, now the sole 
seat of political national power.
Certainly, the Revolution was not entirely Parisian: the cahiers de doleance, the 
political revolution of the assembly, showed that at its beginning at least, the 
Revolution's momentum was national. But on 14 July 1789, the fall of the Bastille 
turned Paris into the capital of the Revolution of the People,4 and as such, the centre of 
history. Not only was Paris back in its historical function as the country's capital, 
leading politics for the rest of France, it also assumed the model of revolutionary virtues 
and ideas. Paris was to pave the way for the whole country and to lead France on the 
path to a new beginning.
Therefore the relation between Paris and the Revolution goes beyond a mere 
identification between a place and the events that shook it. If 1789 was regarded as the 
sacred origins of modern France, then Paris was its sacred cradle: 'La periode de la 
revolution a instaure la sacralite de la ville capitale, berceau de la liberte'.5 Given the 
magnitude of the event, not just for France, but for humanity -  as a turning point in the 
history of civilisation —, Paris came to encapsulate the universal, revolutionary project.
4Michel V ovelle, La Chute de la  monarchie (Paris: Le Seuil, 1972), p. 123.
5Alain Corbin, 'Paris-Province', in Pierre Nora (ed.) Les Lieux de memoire, vol. 2, p. 2860.
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More than just a city, Paris was the city, in the double meaning of cite and polis\ the 
cradle of modern civilisation, the birth place of a universal community.
Hence its mission of civilisation at that point in history. In Paris, at a time when this 
mission seems compromised by Napoleon Ill's regime, Hugo recalls what the role of the 
capital once was, and what it should, still, be: 'Paris a la pensee. [...] Paris est le point 
velique de la civilisation. L'effort partout disperse se concentre sur ce point unique' (pp. 
64-5). Hugo associates Paris with the activity of the mind itself -  'lieu qui pense' -  to 
explain the unique status achieved by the French capital. For Hugo Paris's function is 
linked to the arts, philosophy, science; in other words to the progress of civilisation: 
'c'est la dispersion de l'idee' (p. 81), 'epanouissement de la raison' (p. 82), 'foyer du beau 
et du vrai, de la raison et de l'art, de la vie reelle et de la vie ideale' (p. 86). Paris is the 
ultimate city, because it is now the beacon of humanity: 'le genre humain a besoin d'un 
point de repere universel' (p. 78) he says, and in 1789, Paris became precisely this.
Hugo reminds us of the importance of the city in the history of civilisation: no 
civilisation can flourish without the city, 'endroit cerebral, le generateur de l'initiative, 
l'organe de volonte et de liberte, qui fait les actes quand le genre humain est eveille, et, 
quand le genre humain dort, les reves' (p. 78). After 1789, Paris encapsulated the quality 
of a great capital as summed up by Valery:
Etre a soi seul la capitale politique, litteraire, scientifique, financiere, commerciale, voluptuaire et 
somptuaire d'un grand pays; en representer toute l'histoire; en absorber et en concentrer toute la 
substance pensante aussi bien que tout le credit. ^
But the capital is no longer French only, Hugo suggested, and its leading role in modern 
civilisation spreads to the whole world. In the line of those great cities that were the 
benchmarks of civilisation -  Athens, Jerusalem, Rome -  it now falls to Paris to lead 
humanity on a new chapter of its history -  'Paris, lieu de la revelation revolutionnaire, 
est la Jerusalem terrestre' (p. 80). As the place of 1789, Paris is a place with unique 
revelatory quality.
Hugo has repeatedly emphasised the unique status of Paris: 'rien de plus fantasque, 
rien de plus tragique, rien de plus superbe' (p. 38). Everything, every aspect of human 
life is to be found in the French capital: 'cette vieille terre parisienne est un gisement 
d'evenements, de moeurs, de lois, de coutumes ; tout y est minerai pour le philosophe'
(p. 48). Paris, if observed carefully, holds the key of some urban epistemology. 
'Contemplez au hasard', Hugo advocates (p. 44), and you will realise that Paris is a
^Valery, R egards sur le m onde actuel, p. 123.
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historical palimpsest; that each present place reveals a past event. Hugo embarks on a 
historico-geographic journey that everyone can follow (pp. 45-8).
The urban, epistemological palimpsest corresponds to the logic of correspondances. 
Paris may seem mysterious, but for whoever can decipher its code, it also holds the 
promise of meaning. Indeed, at first, nothing seems to make sense in this urban mystery: 
'Au milieu de ces enigmes on croit entendre derriere soi, en aparte, l'eclat de rire bas du 
sphinx' (p. 51). At the crossroad of the past and the present, of paths mysteriously 
meeting, Paris is identified with some immense recipient, piling up ideas, fanaticism, 
customs, and, most importantly, suffering (p. 60). Associated with the mind, Paris does 
indeed give the impression of someone wandering: 'Partout des contrastes ou des 
parallelismes qui ressemblent a de la pensee dans le hasard' (p. 51). But 'hasard' here is 
only apparent, and the palimpsest can be read. Beyond the apparent coincidences, this 
urban web of people, events and ideas hides the promise of a revelation. And this is 
precisely the function of 1789: Tout dans cette ville, si longtemps en mal de revolution, 
a un sens' (p. 44).
For if Paris is the palimpsest of history, 1789 is the key to make sense of it. As the 
opening quotation of this chapter suggests, 1789 is more a result for Hugo than a date. It 
is the sum of events that accumulated in Paris's streets, adding up, amid an apparent 
chaos, to a total that gives those events their meaning. The palimpsest in all its 
mysterious quality casts its shadow over the city. Its result, 1789, makes this 
accumulation comprehensible (p. 61). In reverse, the accumulation explains the 
sacralisation of Paris in the aftermath of 1789: 'sans eux [les faits rappeles par Hugo], et 
sans leur resultat, 89, la suprematie de Paris est une enigme' (p. 64). It is the revolution 
of 1789 that gives Paris its unique status in the history of civilisation; it is why Paris is 
now, for Hugo, its point velique: 'Paris est la ville pivot sur laquelle, a un jour donne, 
l'histoire a tourne' (p. 64).
Even more than a turn in history, for authors such as Hugo and Michelet 1789 is a 
new beginning. Both authors insist on 1789 as the origin of modern France: 'II semble 
que la France commence', Hugo says (P, p. 65)'; 'la France nait et se leve au canon de la 
Bastille', Michelet famously wrote. As opposed to the 'tenebres de la barbarie', 1789 is 
the birth, the year zero of a new world based on equality: it is a matter of restoring the 
'true' and legitimate origin of the nation.7 In so doing, the very word 'revolution' 
acquires its modern meaning of a radical change, one that cuts history in two, rather 
than the traditional idea of an eternal return. 1789 is an epiphany; the dawn of a new era 
-  a sacred dawn, that is: 'L'annee 1789 sera dans l'histoire de l'humanite une annee
7Furet, P enser la Revolution frangaise , pp. 14-5.
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sainte. [...] Le lieu ou l'humanite s'est proclamee, le Jeu de Paume sera un jour un 
Temple; on y viendra comme a Jerusalem'.8 The idea here, is that a new phase of human 
history has started in 1789, enough to change not just history, but human nature itself:
'un nouveau genre humain, c'est quelque chose' (P, p. 70). This new beginning is 
assimilated to both a birth and an opening up. Hugo plays with the word 'delivrance' to 
suggest that the birth of this new humanity is equally a movement of freedom. This, 
again, is in tune with Michelet's conception of history as a struggle between fate and 
liberty (see previous chapter). For the key event that sums up 1789 is the 14 July, the 
fall of the symbol of all prisons, the Bastille.
What the Bastille came to encapsulate is a movement initiated by the Enlightenment. 
Michelet reminds his contemporaries of what they owe to 'le grand XVIIIe': 'ce siecle a 
fonde la liberte sur l'affranchissement de l'esprit, jusque-la lie par la chair, lie par le 
principe materiel de la double incarnation theologique et politique, sacerdotale et royale' 
(RF, p. 33). For Michelet, the Enlightenment paved the way to a liberation that is more 
than purely physical or political. This is not just a change of regime that 1789 allowed, 
it is the liberation of the mind itself. What Michelet sees in the much hated symbol of la 
Bastille, is a prison of the mind (RF, pp. 89 and 146). The actual prisoners matter 
relatively little in face of the importance of the symbol: 'il y avait bien d'autres prisons, 
mais celle-ci, c'etait celle de l'arbitraire capricieux, du despotisme fantasque, de 
l'inquisition ecclesiastique et bureaucratique' (RF, p. 146).
The Bastille symbolises the penitentiary nature of the city, which, although it is, and 
because it is a place of liberation, needs to be controlled and secured by the power in 
place. And if the history of Paris leads naturally to the great liberation of 1789, Hugo 
reminds us of the many attempts to imprison the city. The whole history of Paris is one 
of expansion in spite of its walls, out of the multiple layers of enceintes that eventually 
failed to contain its ever-growing population (P, p. 73). All but in vain: 'autour de cette 
ville, la monarchic a passe son temps a construire des enceintes, et la philosophic a les 
detruire. Comment? Par la simple irradiation de la pensee. Pas de plus irresistible 
puissance. Un rayonnement est plus fort qu'une muraille' (p. 72). In 1789, these attempts 
are crushed once and for all: 'le fait fatal, le fait brutal a tout dejoue' (p. 73). The fall of 
the Bastille is the delivrance of Paris: '[Paris] prend sa clef dans sa poche. La clef de la 
Bastille' (p. 83). Once Paris is freed, the impulse of social progress can affect the whole 
world.
8Emest Renan, L'Avenir de la  science  (Paris: Calmann-Levy, 1910), p. 494.
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(ii) Decoding the modern city
The mythic foundation of Paris in 1789 as the birthplace of a new era, if not a new 
humanity, turns the capital into this vast riddle awaiting to be deciphered. The attempt 
to explain the French Revolution went alongside a growing interest in the city in which 
it took place and with which it came to be identified. Trying to know the city and the 
Revolution were viewed as part of the same process: 'sorting out the signs of revolution 
meant ordering the city in a complex interaction of political identity, social setting, and 
cultural practice'.9 Alongside historical work, there was growing interest in guides and 
physiologies about the city, and, however elusive the city seemed, many were convinced 
of, and obsessed by the legibility of the city.10 The question was whether to play with 
the sphinx's enigma or to to try and decipher it. In this regard, one trademark of such 
growing interest in 'la Ville monstrueuse et inintelligible'11 is the confrontation of two 
radically antagonistic approaches: the state's, and the poet's.
The success of physiologies was a sign of a growing interest in every aspect of urban 
life; a social curiosity felt by urban society for itself. This was no mere academic 
interest. As we will see in the next chapter, the city holds dark corners -  places that 
escape knowledge -  and looks extremely threatening. The fear generated by the many 
urban dangers triggered a need to know the city better. Hence, the growing interest 
shown by the state through countless surveys:
L'enquete sociale est d'abord un moyen de produire de la visibility, de dissiper pour l'Etat l'opacite 
du social, de devoiler ce qui est souterrain, cache dans les replis les plus intimes de la societe. En 
lanqant ces enquetes, l'Etat reconnait implicitement que la societe lui reste etrangere.1^
Compensating for this lack of knowledge, the state develops an unprecedented thirst for 
urban knowledge that grew steadily throughout the nineteenth century as the state 
wanted to know more, and more precisely what its nation was made of: 'par-dela la 
simple preoccupation de denombrement, ces comptes visent a reconstituer l'itineraire 
d'une population, a cerner son niveau intellectuel, ses caracteristiques physiques et 
morales, son origine professionnelle.'13 Balzac was not the only one interested in the
9Ferguson, Paris as Revolution , p. 2.
10Christopher Prendergast, Paris and the Nineteenth Century (Oxford and Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell,
1992), p. 2.
1 E a s to n  Bachelard -  referring to Hugo here -  in La Terre et les reveries du repos  (Paris: Corti, 1958), p. 
250.
^Pierre Rosanvallon, L'Etat en France de 1789 a nos jou rs  (Paris: Le Seuil, 1990), p. 43.
13 Ibid., p. 40. Rosanvallon refers to the publication o f  the first Com ptes de ju stice  criminelle in 1820.
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relation between 'especes sociales' and 'milieu'. The state too shared a similar taste for 
classification and categorisation of'its' population.
Very different was the motivation of the poet who, particularly under Haussmann, 
explored Paris at the very moment of its disintegration. The flaneur -  a product of 
urbanity in its most elusive and untamable quality -  went hand in hand with his city, in 
a colluding indulgence for urban ambiguity and unintelligibility. The poet of the 
nineteenth century was walking in the footsteps of Mercier, who had already understood 
that there was no urban writing without an acceptance of Valeatoire,14 The official 
enemy of the idea of progress, Baudelaire encapsulated the idea of the decadence with 
which his time was obsessed, and resisted the arid set of bourgeois moral principles his 
society had built up against its anxiety. His irony and the principle of uncertainty and 
incoherence challenged the very possibility of urban knowability. The poet was sending 
a disturbing message to the ruling class and state alike: no matter how sophisticated 
state knowledge would get, be it through history (making sense of the Revolution) or 
urbanity (bringing order and light in a place of chaos and darkness), nothing would 
allow the elite to fully comprehend the city.
The clearer, cleaner and more uniform the city came to appear physically, the more opaque and 
m ysterious it came to seem socially, as governed by a contingent and chaotic play o f  forces, 
transactions and interests, to which one could not attach a correspondingly clear description.  ^^
The Poet's promise of enduring urban mystery deconstructed the myth of security the 
bourgeoisie wanted to believe in. Nothing, it seemed, would ease their fears of the city.
The ambivalent, unknowable, unpredictable identity of the city was at the heart of the 
social constitution of nineteenth-century myth-making. And again, myth being a matter 
of political influence, the choice to learn the city or to accept its unknowability was a 
matter of politics. The full impact of this on the representation of Paris in literature will 
be discussed further in the next chapter. First, I believe the relation between Paris and 
the revolution must be explored further. As we have seen, the making of'collective 
memory' is crucial in the process of myth-making. And in 'collective memory', the 
emphasis is on the way the construction of past events can serve present-day concerns. 
As we have also seen, one of those concerns is to deal with collective fear, and, if the 
perceived danger cannot be expelled, to deal with those fears with the appropriate 
narrative.
14M ichel Delon, 'Louis-Sebastien Mercier, le premier pieton de Paris', M agazine litteraire n° 332 (Paris 
des ecrivains), p. 26.
' -Trendergast, P aris and the Nineteenth Century, p. 11.
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(iii) Modern myth-making: the collective memory of the Revolution
From the beginning, the French Revolution was represented and understood as a 
radical break with the past, regardless of the facts that might have contradicted this. The 
notion that 1789 marked a rupture was called into question first by Tocqueville, and 
later by historians such as Furet who have argued that, if there was such a rupture, it 
was at the level of the collective consciousness rather than of facts.16 But, as far as the 
study of collective memory is concerned, whether 1789 was in fact a rupture or not 
hardly matters. The point is that revolutionary discourse and its collective representation 
emphasised this break. This is how the Revolution was to be seen, and this is how 
almost all major nineteenth-century historians would explain it. Whether they supported 
or opposed the revolutionary ideal, whatever their political allegiance, they would not 
question the tabula rasa as such, thus subscribing to the collective reading of the 
revolution's agents.
To claim that the French Revolution is the origin of modern France is also to accept 
the notion of tabula rasa it claimed to bring about. The success of the phrase Ancien 
Regime illustrates the idea of a 'before' and an 'after' well enough: simultaneously old 
and depasse, pre-revolutionary France was presented as corrupted by usurpation and 
irrationality, and consequently relegated to 'les tenebres de la barbarie'.17 The French 
revolution saw itself as a unique attempt to eradicate a past perceived as the exact 
opposite of the new society and order. The perception of the Revolution as a dramatic 
rupture with the past found its climax with the execution of Louis Capet. His death, as 
Saint-Just famously pointed out, was the sign of a no turning back: the Republic could 
only be founded on Louis Capet's execution.
The Revolution's tabula rasa resulted in the urge to destroy the various signs of the 
Ancien Regime: 'the age of slavery', which had fallen with the Bastille and later with the 
king's head, was to be erased from people's view and memory. Places and streets were 
renamed, churches destroyed, damaged, or their function altered: the new church of 
Sainte-Genevieve (traditionally the patron saint of Paris) was turned into a pantheon.
The new calendar was introduced together with a new set of references aimed at 
defining the new era which the Revolution was instituting.
However, the relation of the Revolution to its hated and rejected past is not free from 
ambiguity, and although the Bastille was promptly demolished, a few of its stones were 
carefully preserved, carved into mini-Bastilles and sent to the 83 newly born 
departements as a reminder of the arbitrary nature of the Ancien Regime. Rupture
16Furet, Penser la Revolution frangaise, p. 29.
17Fran9 ois Furet, La Revolution, 1770-1880  (Paris: Hachette, 1988), vol. 1, p. 15.
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involves an attempt to remember what needs to be eradicated: the memory of the Ancien 
Regime survives its physical defeat. The past could be eradicated, but its memory 
needed to be kept alive as a constant reminder of what the 'tenebres de la barbarie' had 
once brought to France. The constitution of a new era depends on the constitution of a 
memory of what it is rejected. Equally, the foundation of a new era also raises the 
problem of the meaning to be given to those founding moments and events. And in that 
regard, the mythical origin of 1789 is anything but unifying.
Founded on a rupture, but with no clear ending, and even less of a clear legacy, the 
perception of the French Revolution as the sacred origin of modem times poses many 
problems to the nineteenth century in France. The tabula rasa forbids reference to a 
golden age, to any model. The very ending of the Revolution was not even clear, and as 
for the Revolution itself, there was no consensus on its meaning, its message and the 
type of society it should found. The perception of 1789 as the sacred origins of modern 
France was all that could be agreed upon, yet this very consensus presented insuperable 
difficulties to the sons of the Revolution who wanted to tell its story and decipher its 
meaning. And in the century of unprecedented historical repetitions -  tragic and farcical 
for Marx; progressivist and grotesque for Hugo -  this is not simply an intellectual 
matter, but one of political action. The absence of closure and consensus on the legacy 
led to a continuing attempt to find an end to the Revolution. In that sense too, the 
Revolution spread its shadow over the next century:
Le drame qui commence en 1789 ne cesse de se rejouer, generation apres generation, autour des 
memes enjeux et des memes symboles, dans une continuity du souvenir transforme en objet de 
culte ou d'horreur. * ^
The specificity of the French Revolution in the constitution of collective memory and 
national identity has been described by Furet: as France turned its back on its past -  
condemned as Ancien Regime -  it had to establish new principles, and yet until 
Napoleon, failed to inscribe them into institutions. France was thus caught in a struggle 
not only between revolutionaries and counter-revolutionaries, but between the 
revolutionaries themselves and their various readings and interpretations of the 
Revolution; 'traditions antagonistes nees de la revolution elle-meme: 1789 et 1793, les 
droits de l'homme et le salut public, la liberte et l'egalite, le gouvernement representatif 
et le bonapartisme'.19 The problem started as early as Thermidor, which for many 
sounded the death-knell of the Revolution. The Convention attempted to finish the
^Furet, Penser la Revolution frangaise , p. 19.
9^Furet, La Revolution en debat, p. 114.
Revolution and defend its legacy at the same time, while Babeuf tried to start it again, 
convinced that its promises had yet to be fulfilled. Although Prairial won a political 
victory in giving the legal power to the Convention, the ideological influence of 
Babouvisme was to spread, and gain much influence over the nineteenth century. To a 
great extent, the struggle of June 1848 had started half a century earlier, with the battle 
between what remained of the sans-culotterie and the bourgeoisie. The class struggle 
was yet to be formulated in these terms, but the struggle had indeed already started.20 
As we shall see in chapter 6, the myth of the People -  unified and progressivist -  would 
hide that antagonism for at least the next half century.
The second inner ambiguity of the Revolution and its legacy, is its relation to the 
Terror. Robespierre was defeated by some of his former allies: Tallien, Collot 
d'Herbois, Carrier, Fouche, Barrere and the like; those who were victorious in 
Thermidor ended the Terror having supported it. Overthrowing Robespierre as a tyrant 
allowed them to remain faithful to the Revolution. The time was now set to 
institutionalise the Revolution, to inscribe its legacy in political and social structures. 
But in fact the very attempt to end the Revolution made the ambiguity of its legacy all 
too clear, opening up a conflict between its many different, antagonistic interpretations. 
Torn between those who saw 1789 as a promise broken by the Terror, and those who 
perceived 1793 as some genuine Republican opposition to the bourgeois hijacking of an 
essentially popular movement, the legacy of the Revolution failed to unite France. It 
was, on the contrary, an instrument of national division which prolonged the 
antagonism that had started in 1789; this time between revolutionaries themselves.
(iv) History and myth-making: the affective framework of collective memory
As we have seen, it is a major function of myth to protect the community from inner 
divisions. The construction of a revolutionary memory, crucial for a country that viewed 
1789 as its sacred origin, was aimed at such reconciliation. The memory of the 
revolution is not simply a recall of what happened since 1789. The main goal was to 
piece a revolutionary France together. The discourse on the revolution, the 'travail de 
memoire' undertaken by many nineteenth-century historians constitutes modern France's 
identity. If 1789 was to be understood as the mythic origin of a new era, and was not to 
be challenged as such, then the history of the French Revolution written by later 
generations was meant to have a key social function: that of keeping the remembrance
20The theory o f  class struggle was originally formulated by the liberals, Thiers and Guizot, who saw in 
1789 the consecration o f  the middle class. It is after 1830 that the revolutionary tradition focuses on 1793, 
and reinterprets the class struggle in terms o f  an opposition between the working class and the 
bourgeoisie.
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of these origins alive. We have seen how Michelet made it his mission not only to 
explain the Revolution, but equally to revive it: to bring back to life what the people at 
that time thought and felt. If the nineteenth century was the century of history par 
excellence, it is also because historians made it their duty to highlight and explain this 
original crisis; to make sense of this dramatic rupture from the past; to tell a coherent 
story of potentially contradictory events, and, in so doing, to build a coherent identity 
for modern society.21 The quest for the origin of a specifically 'modern' era remained as 
mythic as ever:
If the story o f  Genesis tells us that in the beginning God made the world and made man in his own 
image, M ichelet is telling us that 14 July 1789 is the moment o f  a second Historical Coming, the 
moment when man can remake the world in the image o f  the Revolution.22
This is where the bridge between past and present constituted by collective memory 
finds its full social function, for to tell the story of origins is to tell present-day society 
about its identity; more precisely, it is to create a present identity through the 
remembrance and (re)construction of the past. But, again, memory here is to be 
understood in the wider sense, involving emotional response generally, and trauma 
particularly.
Collective memory can generally be traced in the visible and the spoken: 
monuments, commemorations, accounts left by witnesses; but is equally to be found in 
the invisible and the unspoken: in what is not represented or said, whether because 
societies spontaneously or willingly forget parts of their past, or because the collective -  
like the individual -  psyche is driven by an 'unconscious remembrance.'23 These can 
take the form of psychological traces, and sometimes scars, such as traumas, fears, 
obsessions and phobias -  unspoken memory. To understand the process by which 
collective memory is constituted, one has to take into account not only the memory of 
events, but equally the more subtle traces which they leave: that is, the affective 
framework within which collective memory will take shape, and according to which it 
is interpreted, lived, sometimes re-enacted. We shall see how the myth of Paris was 
bom out of trauma and how the construction of the revolutionary moment in the 
consciousness influenced the urban imaginary as well as politics itself.
To see how the process of revolutionary remembrance and the constitution of trauma 
began, I shall focus on three main stages which I believe left their mark on subsequent
21 See Ferguson, Paris as Revolution , p. 224.
22Prendergast, P aris and the Nineteenth Century, p. 109.
23Michel V ovelle uses the phrase 'souvenir inconscient', in Ideologies et m entalites (Paris: Maspero,
1982), p. 264.
generations, and affected Paris particularly. The first goes back to the early days of 
September 1792, in a frantic atmosphere of panic, rumours of conspiracy and treason, 
which ultimately led groups of Parisians to enter the prisons where those suspected of 
counter-revolutionary sympathies had been incarcerated, and to kill virtually everyone 
they found there. Of these, 72% were common-law criminals; only 5% of the victims 
were actual political prisoners.24 The September Massacres, as these events came to be 
known, would weigh heavily on the future of Paris,25 as the capital came to inspire fear 
and disgust. The image of Parisians leading the whole country into a bloodbath would 
come to be both a nightmarish memory and a terrifying prospect for nineteenth-century 
France.
The second stage is the Terror as such. After the election of Robespierre at the all 
powerful 'Comite de Salut public’ (27 July 1793), the Convention tried to take the 
monopoly of violence back into its hands. Under the pressure of the sans-culottes -  who 
proved they could impose their will when they considered the regime to be failing their 
revolutionary aspirations -the Convention made terror official, remaining within that 
logic, though attempting to control it. The emblematic guillotine was meant to forbid 
the chaotic irruption of death: '[la guillotine] substitue en effet le supplice serialise et 
concentre a l'abattage dissemine qui constitue le massacre'.26 This allowed a distancing 
process to begin, since the main protagonists of the Revolution hitherto -  the people -  
found themselves in a new, more passive role as spectators.
The third and last stage is Thermidor and the fall of Robespierre. As if France had 
suddenly awakened from a nightmare, a rhetoric stigmatising the blood and violence of 
the Terror, denouncing its 'cannibals', now attempted, with little success, to root out the 
terrifying images that, for years to come, would link the Revolution with bloodshed.
What is interesting in this process is how quickly the memory of the Revolution 
distanced itself from the logic within which the Revolution had once been perceived. 
Post-revolutionary reaction insisted on reinterpreting the Revolution in terms of 
bloodthirsty savagery, without appreciating the gap that existed between this sort of 
discourse and the perception of the events by their agents. Gustave Le Bon relates the
24Tulard, Fayard, Fierro, H istoire et dictionnaire de la Revolution frangaise, p. 106.
25Jean Tulard, Le Consulat et I'Empire. N ouvelle Histoire de Paris  (Paris: Association pour la 
publication d'une histoire de Paris, diffusion Hachette, 1983), p. 218. To be accurate, these massacres 
were by no means a specifically Parisian phenomenon: the killing actually started in the provinces (the 
Om e department for example) then, from Paris, spread to many other cities. Historians disagree on the 
responsibility o f  the Com ite de sw-veillance de la Commune de Paris. But whether it was initiated or 
spontaneous, the scale o f  the massacres in the capital certainly seems to bear out Tulard's point.
26Alain Corbin, Le Temps, le desir et I'horreur. Essais sur le XIXe siecle  (Paris: Flammarion, 1998), p. 
217.
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famous example of the killing of the governor of the Bastille, the Marquis de Launay.27 
Shortly after the fall of the Bastille, the governor -  who had been promised before he 
surrendered that his life would be spared -  found himself surrounded by a threatening 
crowd. After he inadvertently kicked one of those present, it was decided that the 
'victim' should cut off the governor's head, which he did 'out of patriotism' -  as Le Bon 
put it: 'il juge que, puisque tel est l'avis general, faction est patriotique' -  first using an 
ill-sharpened sword he was lent for the occasion, then, to finish him off, his own knife 
(demonstrating his skills as a cook, as Le Bon ironically reports): all this without 
questioning the moral value of his act, without describing as savage an act that he did 
not perceive as such,28 In other words, post-revolutionary generations distanced 
themselves from the Revolution's logic. The logic of participating, acting, performing, 
which had been that of the revolutionaries, gives way in the long term to that more 
passive position of spectator ship.
This is not to say that violence and massacres disappeared during the nineteenth 
century, but they simply became -  at least officially -  intolerable. As Corbin notes: 
'Entre la liesse de la foule massacreuse et l'horreur eprouvee par fame sensible, la clarte 
du partage favorise la lisibilite des comportements sensoriels'.29 In other words, distance 
produced a new relation to violence and an attitude which was afraid of, and hostile to, 
what had previously been tolerated but which would from now on be considered animal, 
bestial, abnormal.
One can conclude from this that collective memory bears strong emotions which 
emerge indirectly in the present-day imaginary. As we have seen, these emotions should 
not be confused with those that were felt in the past that is being remembered. The logic 
of some of the excesses of the French Revolution came to be considered excessive by 
subsequent generations, who expressed their deep unease toward the Terror. If the logic 
of what was now called revolutionary cruelty had rapidly faded away, the image of the 
bloodthirsty capital remained. The memory of events still largely depended on the 
interpretation given by their agents and witnesses; in other words, the French 
Revolution remained a break in history for these next generations, who did not question 
the interpretation given by their forefathers but failed to understand fully how they had
27Gustave Le Bon, Psychologie des fou ies  (Paris: Retz-CEPL, 1975), pp. 155-6.
28This contrasts sharply with the reaction o f  a non-revolutionary witness o f  the early days o f  the 
Revolution, Chateaubriand, who recalls the sight o f  two bloody heads before his window, and how this 
horrid scene changed his perception o f  the Revolution. See M em oir es d'outr e-tom be  (Paris: Le Livre de 
Poche, 1973), vol. I, pp. 219-20.
29Corbin, Le Temps, le desir et l'horreur, p. 234.
92
arrived at the excesses of the Terror. And yet it is precisely these few months that I 
believe explain much about the nineteenth-century psyche.
(v) The social function of myth: providing meaning and labeling fears
Although the victims of the Vendee civil war and the revolutionary and Napoleonic 
wars outnumbered those of the Terror, its impact on Vimaginaire was dramatic: 'Elle 
crea une atmosphere de peur, une dramatisation aux profonds retentissements 
psychologiques et d'incroyables tensions'.30 The acceleration of the number of 
executions and their geographic concentration in Paris generated a reaction of panic in 
the few weeks that led to Thermidor; and it was indeed in the nature of the regime to 
provoke fear. During the Terror itself, the gouvemement revolutionnaire justified its 
action -  the legal regime of terror -  as the sole way to protect the Revolution's 
achievement and to defeat its enemies, particularly those from within.
To achieve this, but also in order to be viewed as speaking in the name of the people, 
the government sought to monitor and influence public opinion. The Bureau d'esprit 
public was created in August 1792: the first institution responsible for propaganda in 
modern times.31 The terrorist propaganda was based on the construction and spread of 
politico-religious myths. While the press propagated and defined the revolutionary 
credo, ceremonies and demonstrations ensured the active participation of the newly 
created citizens. Mona Ozouf has shown how these activities were founded on a 
renewed sense of sacredness, and were aimed at helping the people to realise the 
strength of their cohesion.32
But beyond propaganda, fear was one of the key political and psychological elements 
of revolutionary myths. The fear that was intended to spread through every layer of the 
society had the mythical function of magnifying the threat and defining the community 
at once. Robespierre excelled at mastering this ambivalence, arousing suspicion in 
everyone, while at the same time making fear illegitimate: 'je dis que quiconque tremble 
en ce moment est coupable; car jamais l'innocence ne redoute la surveillance 
publique'.33 Whoever felt frightened was already guilty. The tone was set that 
encouraged a general and constant surveillance of all by everyone. The power of the 
government here lay in its ability to delegate general surveillance to the citizens 
themselves.
30Chaussinand-Nogaret, 'La Ville jacobine et balzacienne', p. 531.
31 See Jacques Ellul, H istoire des institutions (Paris: PUF, 1979), vol. 5, pp. 102-3.
32Mona Ozouf, La Fete revolutionnaire, 1789-1799  (Paris: Gallimard, 1976).
33Robespierre, cited by Lefort in Essais sur le politique, p. 88.
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Claude Lefort has eloquently deciphered this extraordinary process of global 
surveillance and the myth of conspiracy. The revolutionaries found it legitimate to 
monitor the nation because the nation was itself being scrutinised by some evil power; 
'une puissance invisible, [...] une puissance qui n'a pas d'existence empirique: la 
malveillance. Celle-ci est partout, ou, ce qui revient au meme, nulle part. Et, cependant, 
invisible, elle est un ceil, elle epie sans cesse'.34 This myth of conspiracy justifies a 
similar surveillance: 'soulevons le voile qui cache les complots; epions les discours, les 
gestes, l'esprit de suite de chacun'.35 The people's exercise of this global surveillance 
takes the form of interpretation. Their capacity to see depends on their revolutionary 
virtue; their power and will to expose the enemy: 'le revolutionnaire ne se signale aux 
autres et lui-meme que par le temoignage de sa connaissance de l'ennemi. Ou bien, 
autant dire que l'identite du revolutionnaire lui est donnee par l'ennemi'.36 This 
antagonistic view of the revolution forbids any neutral position -  the Erasmus syndrome 
is here at work and those who are afraid are immediately suspected, as honest 
revolutionaries know no fear.
The figure of the public enemy is central to the discourse of the Terror. In a context 
perceived as threatening, the existence of enemies from within justifies the exceptional 
nature of the government and the superiority of its actions over normal institutions. The 
public enemy is anything but public: he is hidden, acting in the shadow, thus opposing 
everything the Revolution stands for. The struggle is one between the Revolution which 
is public, transparent, open, and the secrecy and plot of its enemies. We have here a 
further example of the social function of myth seen in chapter 1: to label, to make sense, 
to explain.
II faut mettre un nom sur ce que Ton redoute, on expulse ainsi le Mai du mystere dont il 
s'enveloppe. On peut alors le denoncer et 1'afffonter. Le com plot repond a une fonction sociale qui 
est de l'ordre de 1'explication.3^
This process enables the failures of the Revolution to be explained as the result of some 
treason. Everything can be reinterpreted in the light of conspiracy in an antagonistic 
situation where what is not public is necessarily a threat.
I believe that those two trademarks of the revolutionary imaginary -  secrecy (if 
not conspiracy) and publicity -  deeply influenced post-revolutionary literature.38
34Lefort, Ibid., p. 108.
35Saint-Just, cited by Lefort, Ibid., p. 109.
36Lefort, Ibid.
3^Girardet, M ythes et m ythologiespolitiques, p. 54.
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Je vous defie de fa ire  deux p a s  dans Paris sans 
rencontrer des m anigances infernal e s M
Le M ai est une societe secrete. 411
A striking example of how the rhetoric of the Terror's discourse struck sensitive 
chords in the nineteenth century is found in the way the theme of conspiracy and 
mystery developed in post-revolutionary literature. In 1797, l'abbe Barruel started to 
publish his Memoire pour servir a l'histoire du jacobinisme, in which he proposed a 
masonic conspiracy theory to explain the inexplicable: 1789. The omnipotence and 
power of the conspirators, their meticulous preparation, the overall sense of mystery 
orchestrated by the author, pave the way for less politicised yet equally chilling 
narratives in the following century.41 Barruel described the magnified power of the 
conspirators, their extraordinary intelligence, their flawless preparation: 'tout a ete 
prevu, medite, combine, resolu, statue'.42 Barruel's thesis sounds like an opening of 
Balzac or Sue:
Vers le m ilieu du siecle ou nous vivons, trois hommes se rencontrerent [Voltaire, d'Alembert and 
Frederic II]. [...] Un grand nombre d'adeptes furent, dans la suite, entraines dans cette conspiration. 
[...] Le jour de l'insurrection generale fut fixee au 14 juillet 1789. [...] La chame des 
correspondances du Code illumine a si bien reussi qu'au meme instant tous les brigands et tous les 
freres sont en insurrection.4^
This image rapidly spreads in the nineteenth-century: it affects history, politics and 
literature alike. The three main myths of Jewish, Masonic and Jesuit conspiracies are 
magnified by the literary fascination for those themes. After Barruel, conspiracy 
evolved: the already uneasy phantasm of seeing institutional power being conquered led 
to the even more chilling prospect of the conspirators succeeding in controlling the very 
minds of each and everyone: Tappareil politique et administratif ne constitue plus son
shall use the term in the sense of'the quality and condition o f  being open to public observation and 
knowledge' (O xford English Dictionary).
39Balzac, Le P ere G oriot (Paris: Gallimard, 1971), p. 152.
40Eugene Sue, Les M ysteres de P aris (Paris: Robert Laffont, 1989), p. 10.
41 Barruel's influence can be found most obviously in Alexandre Dumas' Joseph Balsam o  (Paris: Robert 
Laffont, 1990), but the theme o f  conspiracy is recurrent in French literature o f  that period: see Balzac's 
H istoire des Treize (Paris: Calmann Levy, 1892) and Eugene Sue's J u if errant (Paris: Robert Laffont,
1983) whose first episode was published in 1844, just a year after M ichelet and Quinet's Des Jesuites 
(Paris: Hachette, Paulin, 1843).
42Abbe Barruel, M em oires pou r servir a l'histoire du Jacobinism e (Hambourg: P. Fauche, 1798), p. xi.
** Ibid., pp. 1-3. Barruel adds a fourth leader, Diderot, Tenfant perdu' o f  this conspiracy (p. 2).
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seul enjeu. Celle-ci s'elargit a tous les domaines de la vie collective, qu'il s'agisse des 
moeurs, de l'organisation familiale aussi bien que du systeme educatif ou des 
mecanismes economiques'.44
The post-revolutionary imaginary bears the double mark of the Terror's experience: 
not just the trauma, but also the power devolved to a central state and its police. This 
increasing power of the state apparatus generated an increasing awareness of the limits 
of individual sovereignty. The fascination for secrecy and conspiracy reflects the fear of 
an individualistic and modern society in the making, a fear also connected to the theme 
of the crowd where individuality is diluted: 'la masse des affides n'apparait plus que 
comme un immense mecanisme, aux rouages strictement agences, ou la personnalite se 
dissout, l'individu se perd'.45 The apparently chaotic nature of the crowd is deceptive: in 
reality masses operate like a machine. The theme of conspiracy paradoxically reconciles 
reason with the irrational: chance and contingency are being expelled from history. 
Everything can be explained by a superior -  yet human and logical -  power operating in 
the dark.
But, as I briefly outlined above, and parallel to this sense of secrecy and fascination 
for conspiracy theories, there is an important public element in the Revolution which is 
reflected in a theatricality of politics. Paris was the stage, and the Parisians the actors;
'La Revolution est un theatre ou se rejoue sans cesse dans la rue fair du peuple 
souverain'.46 The capital of the Revolution turned into a vast theatre where each and 
everyone performed in front of an audience. Everything was then public: from the clubs 
to the tribunal revolutionnaire; from the streets to the assemblies.
La Revolution est pour beaucoup une fete permanente, une gigantesque scene des vertus 
patriotiques et civiques. [...] L'echafaud lui-meme est un theatre. [...] Tout est theatral dans cette 
Terreur dominee par la liturgie publique du sang verse et le verbe fascinant.47
Michelet remarked that the power of the Jacobins, and their apparent unity were due 
precisely to the oral communication of their message. While the press gave countless 
numbers of individual perspectives, an assembly in front of which issues were presented 
and interpreted gave a much more favourable context: 'les Jacobins procedent par 
l'association et la predication, comme les ordres mendiants du Moyen-Age: des lors, ce
44Girardet, M ythes et m ythologies politiques , p. 31.
45Ibid., p. 35.
4^Furet, La Revolution frangaise , vol. 1, p. 229.
47Jean Favier, Paris. Deux mille ans d'histoire (Paris: Fayard, 1997) p. 856.
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qui importe c'est Interpretation orale des textes devant des assemblies, exercice qui 
permet de plier n'importe quelle situation a leur canon'.48
The public nature of politics is an essential aspect of the popular aspect of the 
Revolution and of the sans-culotte's psychology: the sans-culotterie is not so much a 
social class as a political attitude.49 The sans-culotte stands out and speaks up; he has 
participated in the great revolutionary journees -  'la participation aux "journees" 
revolutionnaires est ici un test et un passeport'.50 The Revolution is identified with the 
people who make it: protagonisme became a fundamental idea of the Revolution. The 
true revolutionary is defined by his actions, and those actions are public.
The inherent public character of the French Revolution -  putting politics on display -  
connected revolutionary Paris with modernity.51 As we will see in the final chapter, 
politics soon returned into the hands of the state, and protagonisme gave way to 
spectacle: the revolutionary crowds participated in the events, whereas the elite of the 
nineteenth century watched them. This in turn created a distance, analogous to the one I 
mentioned between the memory of the Terror and its reality as lived by its agents. As 
Chateaubriand noted, 'les forfaits n'inspirent d'horreur que dans les societe au repos; 
dans les revolutions, ils font partie de ces revolutions memes, desquelles ils sont la 
trame et le spectacle'52. The passage from protagonisme to spectatorship allows this 
distance, and with it, a dissociation from an event; the capacity to watch it, to analyse it. 
It is this 'mecanique du regard'53 that generates a feeling of horror.
With the end of the Revolution, Paris, its main protagonist, became 'spectateur de 
l'histoire'.54 Having been the stage of the French Revolution, Paris is still a living 
theatre, although the nature of the separation between actors and spectators has evolved 
from protagonisme to reification. On stage, still, Paris remains 'le seul theatre du sacre 
de la modernite'.55 Since the Revolution, man and politics are on display: 'tout y est 
spectacle'.56 And yet, beyond the spectacle, post-revolutionary unease is growing, in 
exactly the same setting, Paris.
48Furet, La Revolution en debat, p. 68.
49Albert Soboul, Les Sans-culottes (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1968), pp. 40-1.
59Chaussinand-Nogaret, 'La V ille jacobine et balzacienne', p. 538. See also Sylvie Gamier and Jacques 
Guilhaumou, 'Les "Conduites politiques" en l'an II', in Beatrice Didier and Jacques Neefs (eds.), Sortir de 
la revolution  (Saint-Denis: Presses Universitaires de Vincennes, 1994), pp. 13-31.
51 See Ferguson, Paris as Revolution, p. 2.
52Cited by Jean-Claude Chesnais, H istoire de la violence (Paris: Laffont, 1981), p. 27.
53Corbin, Le Temps, le desir et l'horreur, p. 234.
54Lavier, Paris, p. 871.
55Corbin, 'Paris-Province' in Les Lieux de memoire, vol. 2, p. 2872.
56Balzac, Illusionsperdues, p. 185.
To speak of nineteenth-century France as living in 'the shadow of the guillotine'57 is 
to use an appropriate metaphor to express a form of collective haunting: despite the 
dominant discourses of progress, modernity and science, the period was characterised 
by deep social anxieties and phobias, which it is tempting to explain by the trauma of 
the French Revolution. Not only did revolutionary excesses generate an obsession with 
violence and blood, but the Revolution itself left an ambiguous political legacy of which 
the antagonism 1789 / 1793, the Rights of man vs. the Terror was probably the most 
acute. In trying to make sense of its origins, to reconstruct its anamnesis, the nineteenth 
century -  the century of history -  would get caught up in its own contradictions, moral 
and political, thus remaining in a state of ongoing anxiety.
And here, we reach the full scale of Paris' function as a myth: Paris is the place 
where the real and imagination meet through the writer who is already regarded if not as 
a seer, certainly as a visionnaire. Balzac paves the Parisian way for Hugo who later 
wrote:
Paris eclaire dans les deux sens ; d'un cote la vie reelle, de l'autre la vie ideale. [...] Fond et forme, 
idee et image sont, dans Part complet, des identites. La verite donne la lumiere blanche ; en 
traversant ce milieu etrange qu'on nomme le poete, elle reste lumiere et devient couleur. [...] Elle 
reste realite et devient imagination (P, p. 86).
Again, imagination here has little to do with trivial distraction. As Durand put it,
L'Imagination n'est pas la fantaisie; elle n'est pas non plus la sensibilite. [...] L'Imagination est une 
faculte quasi divine qui perm it tout d'abord, en dehors des methodes philosophiques, les rapports 
intimes et secrets des choses, les correspondances et les analogies.58
This is certainly how Michelet and Hugo viewed it, and it is that imagination, projected 
on Paris, that I now wish to explore -  Paris's darkness and claustrophobia having much 
more to tell than the actual colour of its streets.
57An image notably used by David Bindman, The Shadow o f  the Guillotine (London: British Museum 
Publications, 1989). It is also a very Hugolian image, given his obsession with the guillotine, the French 
Revolution and Paris. See also Daniel Arasse, La Guillotine et Timaginaire de la Terreur (Paris: 
Flammarion, 1987).
58Charles Baudelaire, 'Notes nouvelles sur Egar Poe', in Allan Poe, N ouvelles H istoires extraordinaires 
(Paris: Gallimard, 1974), p. 37.
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Questa pa lu de che 7 gran puzzo spira eigne 
dintorno la cittd dolente, u' non potem o intrare omai 
sanz'ira. *
If Paris generally remains known as the urban incarnation of the nineteenth century's 
ideals of progress and modernity, the city of lights also bears a darker side as a city of 
mystery and evil -  a new Babylon. 'Classic Janus face of modernity',2 the myth of Paris 
bears two opposing, antagonistic faces. On the one hand, the bright, positive side 
glorifies the capital of progress, of modernity; the city of lights, magnificence, 
prosperity and power. And as we have seen, the city of 1789 transformed Paris into a 
universal capital. On the other hand, literature shows a dark, negative side, representing 
Paris as dirty, murky, unhealthy, and dangerous.
These two apparently contradictory sets of representations are in fact complementary, 
for if the city encapsulates the very idea of progress and civilisation, it is also the locus 
of the fear they generate; the fear of what lies ahead.3 The main characteristic of the 
representation of Paris in nineteenth-century French literature is therefore expressed 
through the constant use of the oxymoron: both inferno and paradise, city of luxury and 
misery, of darkness and light. As Chaussinand-Nogaret summarized:
Paris, somptueux et sordide, sublime, monstrueux, partie or et partie fange: des monuments 
admirables qui font la gloire des rois [...] et tout autour, des ruelles, des verrues, des 
enchevetrements d'edifices, d'impasses, de rues etroites oil la circulation est une aventure souvent 
dangereuse, des coupe-gorge, des depotoirs infames [...].4
Since Mercier, and throughout the nineteenth century, the figure of oxymoron remains 
central to the discourse on Paris and translates the ambivalence of the different feelings 
aroused by a city that fascinates and repulses alike. Flamboyant and dominant, the urban 
persona of Paris is equally elusive, restless and threatening.
1 Dante Alighieri, Inferno , trans. by Robert M. Durling (Oxford, N ew  York: Oxford University Press, 
1996), p. 142.'This swamp that breathes forth the great stench, girds the grieving city all about, where 
now we cannot enter without wrath' (p. 143).
2Max Silverman, Facing Postm odernity: Contem porary Thought on Culture and Society  (London: 
Routledge, 1999), p. 67.
3Chesnais, H istoire de la violence , p. 433.
4Chaussinand-Nogaret, 'La V ille jacobine et balzacienne', p. 564. On the representation o f  Paris in 
literature, see Pierre Citron, La Poesie de Paris dans la litterature frangaise de Rousseau a Baudelaire, 2 
vols (Paris: Minuit, 1961).
It is the dark side of the myth of Paris that I will be discussing in this chapter, a 
quality that predominates in nineteenth-century novels on Paris, and which expresses 
the other side of modernity: fears, obsessions and sombre phantasms. As Paris served as 
a symbol for humanity in general, the choice to depict it in the most gruesome and dark 
manner reveals the fears and obsessions of a new, modern, urban society; it reflects the 
moral concerns of both a bourgeois society and of those who sought to undermine its 
comforting values. We have seen that fear is essential to myth-making, and I will show 
how Paris came to be the locus of a specifically modern fear. I will be looking at some 
major themes of the literary imaginary of Paris, expressed by authors such as Balzac, 
Huysmans, and above all, Hugo.
Roger Caillois famously argued that a new literary representation of Paris arose in 
the 1840s with such a powerful effect that its truth was never challenged.5 Paris 
became, then, a central figure: as soon as Paris was mentioned, lyricism, adventure, 
heroism, and mystery were evoked. A dark and mysterious Paris was presented as the 
'real' Paris, the Paris that normal people, in their everyday routines, might not see, but 
which was 'real' precisely because it went beyond its surface appearance -  'all is true'.6 
The images of, and references to the urban nightmare of nineteenth-century France are 
especially powerful as they find their roots in the reality of daily life. The detailed 
description of the city in literature implicitly tells the reader that, however fictional what 
he reads seems to be, it dwells on a mysterious side of the city which is very real:
Comment [...] ne se developperait-il pas en chaque lecteur la conviction intime [...] que le Paris 
qu'il connait n'est pas le seul, n'est pas meme le veritable, n'est qu'un decor brillamment eclaire, 
mais trop norm al, [...] et qui dissimule un autre Paris, le Paris reel [...] d'autant plus puissant qu'il 
est secret, et qui vient a tout endroit et a tout moment se meler dangereusement a l'autre?7
After examining the importance of the past and notions of origin in myth-making, 
this chapter will focus on the contemporaries' present experience -  a rather grim one. I 
will be looking at the relation between reality and fiction that led to such a sombre 
representation of the capital of modernity. The radical demographic expansion for 
instance, the fact that Paris was changing too fast at a time when history seemed to be 
slowing down greatly contributed to shape the urban imaginary. 'Modern Babylon' -  'on 
ne nomme plus Paris autrement'8 -  may have been the capital of modernity, it also 
encapsulated new fears and an obsession with blood, unhealthiness, disease and evil -
5Caillois, Le M ythe et I'homme, pp. 152-75.
6Balzac, Le P ere Goriot, p. 22.
7Caillois, Le M ythe et I'homme, p. 160.
^Ibid. p. 158.
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all leading to an organic representation of the city: a literary monster. This will lead me 
to focus more directly on Hugo. I will be looking at Notre-Dame de Paris and Les 
Miser able s in particular to further explore some major themes of urban and modern 
anxiety: claustrophobia, the question of fate and the representation of an organic city, all 
illustrating modern man's new, post-revolutionary fear and receptiveness to new forms 
of mythic thinking as we shall see.
(i) Paris, the locus of modern fears
The mythical representation of Paris stems from a very tangible aspect of its reality: 
the demographic revolution that was taking place in the first half of the nineteenth 
century. At the turn of the century, Paris counted around half a million inhabitants. This 
followed a period of relative demographic stability when the population had grown 
steadily, although in relative anarchy.9 From the Empire up until the Restoration, urban 
development was remarkably slow, and, despite what amounted to pure speculation, 
virtually nothing was planned, let alone put in practice, to prepare Paris for the massive 
demographic explosion then in the making: within half a century, the population 
doubled to reach a million in the 1840s. Regular censuses informed the authorities of 
the scale of the problem. Although the techniques were still rudimentary, and the results 
not always reliable (particularly to include the seasonal workers), the overall trend was 
abundantly clear from the period's figures.10
However, despite this demographic ticking bomb, no large-scale, coherent plan was 
implemented before Haussmann. Some buildings were constructed, and new areas 
developed, but these concerned mostly residential areas and next to nothing was done in 
the poorest quartiers, except for occasional demolitions after the cholera outbreak of 
1832. One can only imagine the effect of such inertia on some of the quartiers already 
overcrowded in Mercier's time. The overpopulated slums were close to breaking point.
Equally concerning for the authorities was the change that was occurring within the 
population itself which was transformed by a massive immigration from the provinces. 
Paris had lost a significant proportion of its population since the Revolution: the 
emigration and the wars had cost Paris an estimated 150 000 men. And yet the figures 
show that the Parisian population had been stable during this period. The losses were 
compensated for by a new, unsettled population, made up essentially of seasonal 
workers, and miserables. 'Cette population neuve est d'autant plus fragile et instable
9Chaussinand-Nogaret, 'La Ville jacobine et balzacienne', p. 574.
10See Alfred Fierro, H istoire et dictionnaire de Paris  (Paris: Robert Laffont, 1996), p. 279 for the 
seventeen censuses o f  the nineteenth century.
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qu'elle est plus recemment immigree. [...] Elle campe plus qu'elle ne s'etablit.'11 The 
unsteady identity of the new 'Parisians' was a major source of concern for Haussmann 
who feared their rootless nature: 'veritables nomades au sein de la societe parisienne, 
absolument depourvus du sentiment municipal'.12
The population of Paris was therefore undergoing some serious and profound 
changes: less Parisian (as more Provinciaux flocked in), more masculine (this type of 
immigration involving essentially single men), and with a higher proportion of adults 
(with fewer children and elderly people). Characteristically enough, this new population 
was also poorer: if we follow Adeline Daumard's argument, almost three quarters of 
Parisians who died in 1847 were too poor to leave any inheritance.13 The newcomers 
who flocked to the capital to find a job often found none, or a seasonal one. Once 
jobless again, they stayed in the city, swelling the ranks of those already concentrated in 
the many blocks of poverty in the capital -  those unhealthy and overcrowded places 
where epidemics spread rampantly and that Hugo described as le bas-fond. Not only 
was Paris overcrowded, it was overcrowded with the poor.
But perhaps more important for the urban imaginary, the growing population of the 
poor in a city unprepared to cope with their number and needs, made them more visible. 
In Mercier's time, the Faubourg Saint-Marcel was safely contained geographically, and 
only the decrotteur would go and see for himself the existence of such a slum.14 
Parisians were unaware of it. At the time, the people and the bourgeois were out in the 
open air of the boulevards; the miserables were confined in their ghetto, like the 
medieval underworld of the Cour des Miracles.15 The nineteenth-century bas-fond, in 
contrast, was in motion: the gueux were corning out as they became more numerous, 
and miser ables like the Thenardiers knew no more geographical boundaries than 
Marius.16 Needless to say, the bourgeois were becoming concerned.
The bourgeoisie was the dominant force after 1789, and to a large extent, Paris was 
their capital. After Thermidor, and particularly after Prairial, the return of the notables 
at the forefront of politics and society had pushed the lower classes into a social ghetto:
u Ibid., p. 577.
12Haussmann, cited in Benjamin, Paris, Capitale duX IX e siecle, p. 152.
13 Adeline Daumard, La Bourgeoisie parisienne de 1815 a 1848  (Paris: Albin Michel, 1963). Daumard 
studied inheritance: in 1847, 73% o f  the deceased left none.
14See Louis-Sebastien Mercier, 'Le Faubourg Saint-Marcel', in Tableau de P aris , in Paris le jour, Paris 
la nuit (Paris: Robert Laffont, 1990), pp. 72-4.
13In ND, the C our des M iracles is presented as the bas-fond  o f  the M iddle Ages, yet the space was 
circumscribed in a specific location; a closed labyrinth. It was forced by heavy military forces in 1668, its 
gueux dispersed and its slums razed to the ground.
16Marius' noble grand-father, on the other hand, is one o f  the few  characters o f  the novel confined at 
home.
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Tous ces notables imposent a la societe urbaine leur influence et le prestige de leur fortune, sinon 
de leur culture, et repousse le peuple, prive desonnais de ses p ossib ility  d'expression spontanee et 
de toute initiative, dans un ghetto silencieux et les precaires conditions d'existence qui caracterisent 
la societe urbaine du premier tiers du XIXe siecle .17
The bourgeois had taken hold of Paris once and for all. After all, the city had been the 
place of their gradual self-affirmation at the expense of the aristocracy. Yet they failed 
to master it fully, feeling increasingly uneasy about the hidden recesses that resisted 
them. The common representation of Paris as a modern Babylon, the contradictions of 
modernity, the bloody reminiscence inscribed in the capital, social unrest, and 
unhealthiness, made Paris the city of all dangers in the very setting of bourgeois 
domination.
Dealing with a profound and massive urban fear, bourgeois society was keen to bring 
light, order and calm into what they viewed as a world of darkness, anarchy and 
violence. Striving against the hideous face of the underworld -  its mud, blood, 
diseases -  was seen as a major need resulting from the bourgeois perception of the 
modern city.18 But in doing so, the bourgeoisie was creating the very condition of a 
massive phantasmagoria, expressing in various ways, consciously or not, an urban 
phobia of darkness, both material (how the city looked) and moral (what kind of 
perversion it generated) that came to encapsulate the nineteenth-century imaginary.
When we look at the representation of Paris in the literature of the time, the 
dominant picture is a gloomy, mysterious, dangerous, unhealthy and -  above all -  evil 
place; a place where the pure and the innocent are not just ruined and crushed, but also 
demonised when they are ultimately exposed bearing the very sins of their tormentors, 
whose own reputation remains untarnished.19 It is where the most evil and perverse 
characters are certain to succeed despite, or rather thanks to, the judiciary system; where 
conspiracy is rife and where power is in the hands of the unknown; where fate weighs 
heavily on individuals. In other words, a major trend of literature on Paris offers the 
exact opposite of the model that the bourgeoisie claims to offer: darkness, iniquity, 
irrationality. In a century well-known for its ostentatious confidence and morality, for 
its faith in progress, science and rationalism, the representation of the city as immoral, 
sinister, dark, and tormented is strikingly pessimistic.
17Chaussinand-Nogaret, 'La Ville jacobine et balzacienne', p. 550.
18See Alain Corbin, Le M iasm e et la Jonquille. L'odorat et Vimaginaire social, XV llIe-X IXe siecles 
(Paris: Flammarion, 1986).
19Among many examples, see Sue's Les M ysteres de Paris and Balzac's Le Cousin Pons.
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The perception of the city as evil is nothing new, and there was a preexisting 
Rousseauian tradition of suspicion towards the city in general, which was opposed to an 
idealistic vision of the rural. But the tradition of perversion by urban society of an 
otherwise naturally good man reaches new highs as Paris becomes the centre of literary 
attention. Never before the nineteenth century had the city been the focus of such strong 
imagery of darkness and evil. From Balzac, Hugo and Sue to Zola, authors seemed to 
indulge in the spectacle of urban evil and human degradation.20
Particularly prone to end up the victim of the city's many threats is the provincial.
The young and naive provincial is easily destabilised by the frantic pace of the city; 
both fascinated and frightened by the capital. Their innocence helps to build the image 
of an all-powerful, ruthless city, and gives a vivid representation of the capital of 
modernity. Everything is new, everything happens at breakneck speed: 'la vie y est d'une 
effrayante rapidite', notes Balzac's new-comer Lucien de Rubempre.21 As opposed to 
the provinces, Paris is a world of complexity, fluidity, and mobility, giving an 
impression of chaos, resembling a modern Capharnaum, a new inferno. The capital is 
another world to its newcomer, who has to adapt fast. Dragged into the city's many 
temptations and dangers, he cuts himself off from his past, his traditions and his social 
group, which makes him even more vulnerable.22 Isolated, but also dazzled by the city, 
the migrant faces a new game the rules of which he seems unable ever to master, and 
thus he ends up as the city's next dupe.
The speed and frenzy of the city that dazzles Lucien will be even more of a Parisian 
trademark with the Haussmannisation of Paris: an urban policy which aimed to facilitate 
the new taste for speed and mobility, and be in tune with a pace of life that was 
perceived to be accelerating. The old Paris of the flaneur disappeared fast under the 
policy of urban rationalisation. As we have seen, the scale of the demographic explosion 
and related housing problems demanded dramatic actions. And how dramatic these 
actions were: 117,000 lodgings were destroyed between 1853 and 1870, 215,000 were 
built in the same period. However, the immediate effect of Haussmannian policy on 
Paris was not to solve the housing problem (as construction did not keep up with the 
speed of destruction),23 but to ease urban circulation. The new Haussmannian straight 
avenues allowed light and order; they could be cleaned and the 'abnormal' easily spotted
20Interestingly, the city is often compared to nature in its most disturbing aspect: dark woods, wild 
vegetation, savage populations. The violence found in nature seems to contaminate the city but loses its 
innocence: man retains his violent nature, but his humanity seems inexorably perverted by urbanity. 
Among many examples, see Hugo, Mis., I, p. 112 or Balzac, Le Pere Goriot, p. 156.
2 * Balzac, Illusions perdues  (Paris: Gallimard, 1962), p. 185.
22Corbin, 'Paris-Province', pp. 2852-3.
23Favier, Paris, p. 209.
and contained by the police; they were designed as major weapons against all the evils 
of the city:
De nouvelles arteres [...] participeraient au combat engage contre la misere et la revolution; elles 
seraient des voies strategiques, per^ant les foyers d'epidemies, les centres d’emeute, permettant, 
avec la venue d'un air vivifiant, l'arrivee de la force armee [...].24
In this extraordinary passage, health and order hope to defeat misery and revolution 
alike; the military carries out a cleaning-up process which is also a political one, without 
ever saying so. 'Haussmann detruit parce que le Paris ancien s'oppose a la circulation 
rapide, a la manoeuvre des regiments de cavalerie, a l'assainissement', Favier sums up.25 
The circulation of the bourgeois was facilitated, but so, too, was the circulation of the 
military against any potential revolutionary uprising. Similarly, the prostitute, the 
ragman, the jobless migrant became central figures and a preoccupation of the 
authorities, as they were perceived to be an obstacle to the slogan of the regime: circulez
L'attention de la police des moeurs va se focaliser sur la  sw veillan ce  de la rue\ faire circuler, 
assurer le passage, degager la chaussee devient un objectif primordial. [...] Jusqu'a la premiere 
guerre mondiale, la moralisation de la rue restera un theme majeur du discours bourgeois.26
The above-mentioned social outcasts represented disease, the night and nomadism; 
restless and unpredictable, they were viewed as an aberration in the social order, the 
archaic signs of a hideous past.
One way to eradicate this past and facilitate urban circulation was to transform the 
notion and reality of the city's centre. Haussmann's first 'boulevard' was initially named 
the boulevard du Centre (before being renamed boulevard de Sebastopol after the 
Franco-English victory of 1855). The centre of the capital would now be associated with 
an idea of passage, and not with a spider's web dragging its prey to its middle. 
Symbolically, the historical and geographic centre of Paris underwent major reshaping: 
the old ile de la cite (described in Sue's Les Mysteres de Paris) was almost entirely 
destroyed and rebuilt, its population reduced by two-thirds.27 Rationalised, the city 
could now expand (from 12 to 20 arrondissements in 1860), without the disturbing 
prospect of some unknown territory at its geographical heart. From now on, the urban
24Georges Laronze, Le Baron Haussmann , cited by Walter Benjamin, Paris, Capitate duX IX e siecle, p. 
153.
25Favier, p. 205.
26Alain Corbin, Les Filles de noce. M isere sexuelle et prostitu tion au XIXe siecle  (Paris: Flammarion, 
1982), p. 303.
27Favier, P aris , p. 208.
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threat and disturbing elements would be redirected in the outskirts. The inner city was to 
welcome a more 'urbane' population -  civilised and urban at once -  with light, order and 
prestige. The subtext of this urban revolution was the creation of a new urban setting 
facilitating the display of commodity and the motion of consumers.
Alongside the second Empire's urban policy, the first modern department stores 
made their appearance: the new temples of modernity, the shrine of exuberant frenzy in 
response to the new in all its forms. In this regard, Huysmans' condemnation of Le Bon 
Marche later in the century remains the apt illustration of the new, perverse, alienating 
religion of the commodity.28 It is located in a place long known for its convents and 
congregations; but for how long? The whole place is perverted, 'diabolise par le Bon 
Marche', and the religious places which alone could resist the progress of evil (p. 39) 
seem to live their final days.
Huysmans describes the fascination of petty bourgeois and working class women 
alike (p. 31) and the continual temptation aroused by the department store: 'c'est une 
obsession continue du mal; c'est l'adultere pour les unes, la kleptomanie, le vol, 
irresistible, pour les autres' (p. 31), 'des idees d'emprunt, de prostitution, de vol, leur 
traversent la cervelle' (pp. 32-3). Huysmans vehemently denounces the 'feodalite 
financiere et commerciale' (p. 35) which survives very well in a supposedly modern era; 
'le courant de lucre et de dol qui circule aussi bien chez les oppresseurs que chez les 
opprimes' (p. 36). 'Usine a peches' (p. 30), 'entrepot du mal' (p. 32) ruled by TEsprit des 
Tenebres' (p. 33), Le Bon Marche -  one of whose entrances is situated, aptly enough, 
rue de Babylone -  seems to encapsulate all the evil and perilous temptations of a 
modern capital.
This vision of modem frenzy and evil is not the trademark of a reactionary Catholic 
only. In fact, one finds a similar picture of the very same department store in Zola's Au 
Bonheur des dames. Radically different political sides agreed on the illusion and the 
consequent alienation of the bourgeois phantasmagoria, and an unlikely alliance of 
Catholics and socialists join in a common protest against what Paris had come to 
symbolise: the century of Prometheus -  'progressiste, mercantiliste, industriel, 
urbanistique', as Durand sums it up.29
Blanqui echoed this concern, reaching a conclusion later summarised by Benjamin: 
Thumanite sera en proie a une angoisse mythique tant que la fantasmagorie y occupera 
une place'.30 What was criticized in the fascination for the constant spectacle provided
28Huysmans, Paris (Paris: L'Heme, 1994). Further references will be indicated in the main text.
29Durand, Science de I'homme et tradition, p. 226.
30Benjamin, Paris, C apitale du XIXe siecle, p. 48.
106
by the city was its depoliticised status, its emptiness combined with its fake sacredness 
that operated as an ersatz of religion, the religion of illusion. By a remarkable inversion, 
those cheap illusions have reached a sacred quality in the century of modernity:
Certainly for the present age, which prefers the sign to the thing signified, the copy to the original, 
fancy to reality, the appearance to the essence. [...] For in these days illusion  only is sacred, truth 
profane. Nay, sacredness is held to be enhanced in proportion as truth decreases and illusion 
com es to be the highest degree o f  sacredness.31
In the vast dreamland of modernity, the people were seen as reified. What prevailed 
was the integration of man to the economic organisation of society and his conformity 
to the community's set of rules. Modernity, its speed and frenzy were deceptive. As 
Walter Benjamin observed, the hypnotic fascination for the new and speed hides the 
fact that everything always stays the same. The 'effrayante rapidite' is senseless, as 
Huysmans denounced:
Ces rues, tirees au cordeau, oil Ton ne flane plus, ou tout le monde court. [...] Et il n’est 
malheureusement plus un quartier oil les automobilistes, les m otocyclettes, les velocipedes, toutes 
les montures d’une racaille pressee ne sevissent.32
This counter-discourse aimed to undermine the confidence of bourgeois discourse and 
policy by contesting the increasing identification of the capital as a bourgeois city, and 
claiming that, on the contrary, it is the city's dark comers which reveal its true essence. 
Haussmann's enterprise of modernisation faced the hostility of the poet, as his urban 
policy was perceived to undermine the very nature of the city itself. Ambiguous, dark 
and unknowable in essence, Paris was now being reshaped, and its authenticity therefore 
destroyed, according to a bourgeois agenda facilitating circulation and trade.
This cult of speed was at odds with a sense of deceleration also felt by nineteenth- 
century contemporaries. The nineteenth century was caught up in a deceleration of 
history for which it tried to compensate by the acceleration of modernity. The real 
acceleration of time had happened with the Revolution and the Napoleonic regime 
which 'literally quickened the pace of felt time. [...] The whole enterprise of 
consciousness had formidably accelerated'.33 The extraordinary density of this period 
was then followed by a similarly extraordinary emptiness: in 1815, France woke up with 
a hangover and immense boredom -  as Balzac perfectly summed up: 'Cette vie creuse,
31 Feuerbach, The Essence o f  Christianity, p. xix.
32Huysmans, Paris, 1994), p. 27.
33Steiner, In Bluebeard's Castle, p. 18.
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cette attente continuelle d'un plaisir qui n'arrive jamais, cet ennui permanent, cette 
inanite d'esprit, de coeur et de cervelle, cette lassitude du grand raout parisien 34
In a century dominated by bourgeois values, what place was left to the surviving 
sense of heroism? What was the use of the romantic memory of the Great Army, except 
to torture some nostalgic officer in his provincial garnisonl 'The past drove rat's teeth 
into the grey pulp of the present; it exasperated, it sowed wild dreams. [...] Moreover 
the city itself, once festive with the tocsin of revolution, had become a prison'.35 In this 
context, the frantic life of Paris appeared dangerously inadequate, acting as a drug to 
escape from a deceptive memory made of glory that no longer had any place in a 
bourgeois city.
Both discourses contributed to the representation of a dark Paris: whilst the poet 
explored the slums to find the authenticity of his capital, the bourgeois dived deeper 
into the belief that some urban evil not only resisted his values, but more worryingly 
was spreading. As the city is the place where the norm is set, it also serves to define 
deviancy and abnormality, and if the city is the historic setting of bourgeois political 
domination, it is equally the instrument of a cultural, artistic, and political expression of 
dissidence. Both contributed to, and reflected an immense anxiety that derived from 
both the reality of the situation (demography, urban policy) and the change of 
perceptions that followed the Revolution; making the sombre perception of the city 
intolerable and yet dominant at the same time.
(ii) Paris, darkness, urban teratology
As I have argued earlier, the representation of Paris owes much to the French 
revolution and its socio-psychological impact on later generations. For instance the 
sensitivity to blood changed after the Revolution, with important consequences for the 
urban imaginary. We have seen how the post-Thermidor generation dissociated 
themselves from the bloodshed of the Terror, how a distance developed between post­
revolutionary France and the affective framework of the Revolution. Alain Corbin 
famously showed how new urban attitudes subsequently developed. It seemed that the 
bourgeoisie could no longer bear the vision and smell of blood within the city. Hence, 
its obsession with hygiene, an important part of which consisted in eradicating blood 
from the capital. As we have seen, a new era, modernity, was dawning, and violence 
was no longer welcome on the public stage: something else was now being put on 
display, namely, the commodity. And this called for some serious mopping-up:
^ B alzac, La Fille au xyeu x d'or (Paris: Gallimard, 1976), p. 263.
35Steiner, In Bluebeard's Castle, p. 22.
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La nettete de l'espace public, nettoye, desodorise, protege de toutes sortes d'epanchements, de 
stagnations et de fermentations, le deferlement des lumieres, la circulation salutaire des produits et 
des etres vulgivagues preparent le temps de l'extraversion, de 1'ostentation, de l'exposition, la 
proliferation de la vitrine et le regne de la marchandise. Pour que la lisibilite de l'argent s'impose, 
pour que le luxe se deploie, il faut qu'ait ete evacue le spectacle du sang, exorcise la peur 
sociale.36
It was therefore essential to ensure that whatever was on display would not be likely to 
trigger the 'animal senses' that had previously been unleashed during the worst moments 
of the Revolution.
Thus, a certain number of practices common in the Paris of the eighteenth century 
came to be perceived as an object of horror in the next. The concern with blood and 
cruelty was at the centre of urban legislation: the transportation of both corpses and 
meat was regulated requiring it to take place in closed carriages; the killing of cattle was 
separated from the selling of meat, and expelled from the city centre to its outskirts.37 
The aim was to exorcise violence and ensure that Paris would no longer be marked by 
blood. The emblematic guillotine itself was put in a semi-clandestine place, barriere St 
Jacques. But this attempt to purge the city of the traumatic source of anxiety made it 
worse. As Corbin puts it in a striking phrase, 'le sang efface des pierres de la capitale 
s'est incruste dans les memoires'.38
Blood was by no means the sole trigger for this need to clean up the city. In fact it 
illustrates a wider concern about Paris, both moral and pathological: on the one hand, 
the city appeared as evil, damned, the new Babylon, the anti-Jerusalem, the anti-Rome. 
On the other hand, the city was also represented as ill, lepreuse, falling apart, decaying, 
rotten. Both these aspects illustrate an idea of urban depravity but generated two 
different types of discourse: whilst the misere could be cured as a disease, criminality 
was to be eradicated as evil.
The range of vocabulary used in nineteenth-century France to describe the bas-fond 
focused on its unhealthiness. The richness and variety of a vocabulary of illness and 
pathology highlight a horrid fascination for mud: the recurrence in literature offange, 
cloaque, bourbier, sentine, pestilence, remugle underline the ugliness of the city of mud. 
The city itself seems to be ill: 'le cloaque est la maladie de Paris. L'egout est la maladie 
que la ville a dans le sang', Hugo writes, 'la pierre elle-meme semblait malade dans ce 
milieu irrespirable' {Mis., Ill, pp. 302 and 294).
3^Corbin, Le Temps, le desir et Vhorreur, p. 222.
37Ibid., p. 219.
38Ib id ., p. 218.
The symptoms are abundantly clear and all too visible: misery, overcrowded slums, 
lack of air, fear, and criminality. The city is infected, gangrenous, poisonous, purulent. 
'L'apoplexie n'est plus a craindre, mais la phtisie est la', Hugo diagnoses (Mis., Ill, p.
25).39 The doctors are at the city's bedside, watching its temperature, concerned with its 
unhealthiness. The diagnosis requires a close examination.
There is therefore a need to descend into the fange -  for the urban organism needs to 
be purged -  but this promises to be horrific as well as potentially dangerous. When 
talking about the need to know Vargot, Hugo describes this dreadful journey:
Certes, aller dans les bas-fonds de l'ordre social, la ou la terre finit et ou la boue commence, 
fouiller dans ces vagues epaisses, poursuivre, saisir et jeter tout palpitant sur le pave cet idiome 
abject qui ruisselle de fange ainsi tire au jour, ce vocabulaire pustuleux dont chaque mot semble 
etre un anneau immonde d'un monstre de la vase et des tenebres, ce n’est ni une tache attrayante, ni 
une tache aisee (Mis., Ill, p. 7).
This prolongs the urban explorer's approach as initiated by Restif and Mercier in the 
previous century. Refusing to let any aspect or part of the capital pass him by, Mercier 
initiated the model of the urban traveller, exploring the darkest recesses of his beloved 
and untamable Paris; he was the one who dared to go as deep in misery and danger as 
the Faubourg Saint-Marcel -  'ce foyer de la misere obscure' so deep indeed, that he 
wondered if this was still Paris at all:
Si Ton fait un voyage dans ce pays-la, c'est par curiosite; rien ne vous y appelle; il n'y a pas un seul 
monument a voir; c'est un peuple qui n'a aucun rapport avec les Parisiens, habitants polis des bords 
de la Seine.40
Mercier does not only express a new need to explore the city; he also sets the 
appropriate way to do it: to walk, and to walk deep in mud: 'Lutetia, la ville de boue' 
(Mis., Ill, p. 287) requires the skills of the decrotteujA] and a willingness and heart to 
plunge deep into the repulsive darkness, as ragmen do, for only they can claim to know 
the city's soul.
This exploration of urban mud leads to a further diagnosis -  a social one. For if fange 
undermines the city's health, it also undermines its order: 'la boue ne peut jamais etre 
bien famee', Hugo says (Mis., Ill, p. 292), 'la boue est synonyme de honte' (Mis., Ill, p. 
322); it is the lair of rats, themselves a sort of bestial brother to the gamin: 'La apparait
39'La phtisie sociale s'appelle misere', Hugo adds. At the end o f  the century, Huysmans shows that this 
representation o f  urban disease is still vivid in its appeal: 'Tout n'est que Syphilis', he exclaims. Huysmans, 
A rebours (Paris: Gamier-Flammarion, 1978), p. 37.
40Mercier, 'Le Faubourg Saint-Marcel', in Tableau de Paris, pp. 72-3.
4 1 Mercier, 'Decrotteurs', Ibid., p. 199.
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dans la brume humide, le rat, qui semble le produit de l'accouchement de Paris' {Mis., Ill, 
p. 287).42 This is equally the lair of convicts, con men, thieves, murderers, as Sue 
recalls in the opening chapter of Les Mysteres de Paris (also -  inevitably it seems -  
reminiscent of Mercier): 's'il [le lecteur] y consent, il penetrera dans des regions 
horribles, inconnues; des types hideux, effrayants, fourmilleront dans ces cloaques 
impurs comme les reptiles dans les marais'.43
This interest in the appalling condition of life in the bas-fond of the city is not only 
one of genuine philanthropic concern or philosophic curiosity. The misery of the city’s 
bas-fond may trigger pity, but it is also generates an uneasy feeling arising from dangers 
associated with it. It is hardly possible to separate the sufferering miserables from 
menacing criminals, as the example of the Thenardiers -  both victims of misere and a 
threat to society -  illustrates.
Such moral depravation is revealed in the physiology of Paris according to which 
darkness is not only the city's prevalent tone, it also reveals its moral depravation.
Hugo's representation continues a tradition initiated by Balzac, which combined the 
fantastic and the realistic, the sublime and the horrific, and indulged in representing 
Paris as a dark, and consequently evil place: 'Le vrai Paris est naturellement une cite 
noire, boueuse, maleolens, etriquee dans ses rues etroites... fourmillant d'impasses, de 
culs-de-sac, d'allees mysterieuses, de labyrinthes qui vous menent chez le diable'.44 
Paris and its inhabitants share the same gloomy and infernal physiology: 'Peu de mots 
suffiront pour justifier physiologiquement la teinte presque infernale des figures 
parisiennes, car ce n'est pas seulement par plaisanterie que Paris a ete nomme un 
enfer'.45
Balzac's Paris can be particularly dark but his representation also contains elements 
of the fantastic: describing the tiny streets by night, Balzac -  as will Hugo in Les 
Miserables -  creates suggestive images of dust, dampness and mud. Paris is depicted as 
a dirty and miserable place with narrow and tortuous streets leading to dark courts and 
impasses. The walls are grey, dark, and yellowish. Paris bears the stigma of misery on 
the verge of decay. The city is crumbling away, metaphorically exuding its misfortune:
42This seems to echo the 'c'est mon petit' (II, p. 105), by which Paris recognises the gamin  as its own. It is 
suggestive in that regard, that Gavroche sleeps surrounded by rats.
43Sue, Les M ysteres de P aris , p. 31.
44Paul-Emest de Ratier, Paris n 'ex istepas, cited in Benjamin, Paris, C apitate duX IX e siecle, p. 540.
43Balzac, La Fille au xyeu x d'or, p. 246. Both Balzac and Hugo compare Paris with Dante's inferno: the 
milieu des affaires is a 'troisieme cercle de cet enfer' {La Fille au xyeu x d'or, p. 256); the bas-fond  is the 
place o f  the 'Ugolin social' {Mis., II, p. 249).
Il l
'illustre vallee de platras incessamment pres de tomber et de ruisseaux noirs de boue'.46 
Balzac evokes a sordid reality but his vision transforms the abject into something 
grandiose and powerful: 'Alors apparait un Paris obscur en surface, redoutable en 
profondeur [...]. Tel est le Paris de Balzac, reellement et fantastiquement noire, violente 
et tenebreuse gravure'.47
The dreadful vision given by the literature of Paris lies largely in the nocturnal 
quality of its representation: Paris is never as thrilling, phantasmagoric and evil as at 
night, the moment par excellence of crime and conspiracy. A literature influenced by 
the success of the roman noir encapsulated a nightmarish vision of Paris, blending all 
the dangers of the nocturnal city into a very potent recipe: the Paris of dangers and 
darkness was enriched by another idiosyncratic ingredient, its underworld.
Paris as the capital of crime became a recurring image in nineteenth-century French 
literature: the anonymity of the big city protects and hides the criminals while it blocks 
police efficiency. A specifically urban imaginary develops in literature, turning the 
"realistic" threat of petty con men into the far more emblematic image of master 
criminals. Paris becomes the capital of mystery and crime, the city of the 30,000 
criminals, notwithstanding most of the workers, 'occasional criminals'.48 The picture of 
a hideous and threatening Paris reached its climax with the phenomenal success of 
Eugene Sue's Les Mysteres de Paris, in 1842. Like Victor Hugo a few years later in Les 
Miserables, Sue delighted in depicting the worst parts of the city, dominated by the 
classes dangereuses\ a Paris of mud, disease, criminality and social unrest. Socio­
political concerns about a city that was growing too fast converged with a literature 
fascinated by its darkness and crimes. The myth of Paris combined fear, mystery and 
conspiracy: the very same ingredients that had turned the French Revolution into a 
powerful and threatening myth. Years after the Terror, Paris remained a large-scale 
threat: if not for the same reasons, with very similar ingredients nonetheless.
As we have seen, the theme of conspiracy was prepared for by the French Revolution. 
Literary Paris as both the capital of crime and a revolutionary city became the ultimate 
place of conspiracy: the place where mysterious characters gather at night, for some 
obscure purpose, in a Paris they have learned to tame perfectly well; all-powerful men, 
dressed in black, conspiring at night, and disappearing into secret passages. The
46Balzac, Le P ere G oriot, p. 22. This picture o f  Paris 'lepreux' is in turn reflected in the 'teint have, jaune 
et tanne' o f  the Parisians {La Fille au xyeux d'or, pp. 245-6).
47Genevieve Poncin-Bar, 'Aspects du fantastique dans les romans realistes de Balzac', in L'Annee 
balzacienne, 1974, p. 240. My emphasis.
48See Philippe Vigier, N ouvelle h istoire de Paris. Paris pendant la M onarchie de Juillet (1830-1848) 
(Paris: Association pour la publication d'une histoire de Paris, diffusion Hachette, 1983), p. 273. In fact 
half o f  the 'crimes' concerned begging and vagrancy. See Fierro, H istoire et dictionnaire de Paris, p. 442.
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nineteenth century is literally obsessed with the city's secrecy as illustrated by the 
recurring allusions to its underground: sewers, tunnels, passages, cellars, galleries; the 
city rests on a maze of darkness and holes where evil is growing.49 'Note the prophetic 
images of subterranean danger, of destructive agencies ready to rise from sewerage and 
cellar, that obsess the literary imagination 50 The underworld is all the more 
dangerous as it constitutes the shaky and elusive foundations of a city and a society that 
recklessly ignores it; 'immense fourmillement inconnu. La societe se doute a peine de ce 
creusement qui lui laisse sa surface et lui change les entrailles' (Mis., II, p. 248). Behind 
the comfort of the rationalised politics of the modern city, the feeling of some 
underlying peril threatens to undermine the bourgeois dream and the dreamer alike.
Not surprisingly then, there is in all the literature about dark Paris a strange 
fascination with, and long-repressed desire to see Paris reduced to ruins. In the late 
eighteenth century, Mercier recalled how the spectacle of Paris from the towers of 
Notre-Dame initiated a strange vision in him. Watching the city from above, Mercier 
contemplates an already overcrowded and confined place; 'cette enceinte peuplee'.51 
Interestingly enough what he sees brings him to wonder about what he cannot directly 
see, yet adds to the reality of Paris: the stones Paris is made of. And what Mercier does 
not see but is fully aware of is that Paris was built with the material which is now 
lacking below: 'tout ce qu'on voit en-dehors, manque essentiellement dans la terre aux 
fondements de la ville. [...] Ce que nous voyons en l'air manque sous nos pieds.'52 In 
other words, this huge city, these heavy buildings have galleries -  holes -  for 
foundations. And as if this was not enough, Mercier reminds us of the rather brittle 
material Paris is made of: 'elle est batie de craie, et [...] repose sur la craie.'53
A glance at the city from above then combines with this knowledge and also the 
fragility of Paris -  exciting and vibrant, but too heavy: the idol with feet of clay is in a 
Venice-like position. Mercier cannot help but be dragged from what he sees to a 
fantastic vision of prophetic quality: what if Paris collapsed like a house of cards? In the 
nineteenth century, this actual, concrete vulnerability of the city combined with the 
socio-political metaphor attached to the polls: concretely as well as metaphorically, the 
galleries of the underworld threaten the upper world literally with collapse.
The unpredictability, restlessness, and unknowability of the city is once again 
epitomised by the bas-fond, which appears as a city within the city, a different world
49See Poncin-Bar, 'Aspects du fantastique dans les romans realistes de Balzac', p. 239.
^Steiner, In Bluebeard's C astle , p. 27.
51Mercier, 'A vue d'oiseau', in Tableauparisien, p. 328.
52Ib id ., 'Les carrieres', p. 36.
53Ib id ., 'Physionomie de la grande ville', p. 34.
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emerging from depravation. The bas-fond and the underworld of conspiracy are the 
exact opposite of the bourgeois model of the cite ideale, but when it comes to 
denouncing it, the dominant discourse tends to abandon its taste for rationality to adopt 
an apocalyptic tone more in tune with the perceived monstrosity and abnormality the 
city's recesses. An image of evil develops which highlights this: the Leviathan. This 
religious rhetoric leads to a new, modem crusade against the eternal enemy of Progress: 
the spectre of Chaos. This is when rational concerns about the city's unhealthiness meet 
urban teratology; when Paris becomes 'Cette cite-monstre' (P, p. 72).
The identification of Paris with a monster is a recurring picture in nineteenth-century 
literature: 'Cite tentaculaire', giganticpieuvre, spider, hideous Gorgon, 'physionomie 
grima9 ante',54 all these images recall the child's fears and their residue in the adult's 
psyche:
Peur des reduits tenebreux, des murs sans issue qui se referment, des fosses d'ombre d'ou l'on ne 
remonte pas; peur d'etre livre a des mains inconnues, vole, vendu ou abandonne; peur enfin de 
l'ogre, des dents camassieres des betes de proie, de tout ce qui broie, dechire et engloutit.55
The dark corners of the city suggest some hideous and threatening creature hiding in it. 
Throughout the nineteenth century, one image stands out in the abundant literature on 
Paris: an enormous mouth, ready to suck, chew and swallow all those too naive, too 
green, too kind or too provincial to master its elusive rules - '  gouffre enorme qui 
ingurgite tout'.56
Cette terrifiante accumulation de references animales: celle d'une bouche monstrueuse, toujours 
avide, toujours devorante. Une bouche machoire qui broie, transperce et dechire, mais aussi une 
bouche ventouse qui suce et qui aspire.5 ^
The constant references to an ugly, hideous, and dangerous Paris transfigures the 
whole city into something which is monstrously organic. Not only does Paris swallow 
its victims; we are also informed about the whole process of digestion and even urban 
sickness: 'cet estomac de la civilisation digerait mal, le cloaque refluait dans le gosier de 
la ville, et Paris avait l'arriere gout de sa fange' (Mis., Ill, p. 291). Nothing is spared 
about the city's guts, and the theme of the ventre is found throughout the literature of the 
period: Hugo refers to Paris' sewers as Tintestin du Leviathan';58 Valjean, like a
54Balzac, Illusionsperdues, p. 248.
55Girardet, M ythes et m ythologies politiques, p. 56.
56Balzac, La Fille au xyeu x d'or, p. 372.
5^Girardet, M ythes et m ythologies politiques, p. 44.
58Title given to part II, livre cinquieme.
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modem Jonah, is said to be 'dans le ventre du monstre' (Mis., Ill, p. 308); Zola talks of 
Le Ventre de Paris, and Balzac also indulges in this gruesome metaphor: 'espece de 
ventre parisien, oil se digerent les interets de la ville et oil ils se condensent sous la 
forme dite affaires, se remue et s'agite, par un acre et fielleux mouvement intestinal, la 
foule 59 The reference to the ventre combines the interest of the urban doctors in 
the diseases of the city and their fear of urban evil. As the city's ventre is animated by an 
ugly life of its own, the labyrinth-intestine becomes animated, the sewers are alive,60 
which suggests that the Leviathan is not so much the personification of the city's belly, 
as a foreign body, a parasite growing in it. Leviathan is traditionally the monster of 
primal chaos. Although temporarily dormant, it remains a threat which can awaken at 
any time. It is a constant danger hanging over (or, rather, in this instance, under) the 
bourgeois attempt to rationalise the city and its inhabitants. Its image combines the 
symbols of the snake and the labyrinth. Demoniac monster par excellence, the 
Leviathan is the power of evil that resists God. It is also, quite aptly in the case of the 
new Babylon, the personification of a mortal sin: pride. It is a creature of darkness, 
hiding in the depths of the sea... in this case the urban sea.
The association of Paris with a modern Leviathan encapsulates the various fears 
generated by the capital. Violent and sordid for Balzac, equivocally attractive for 
Baudelaire, mysterious and criminal for Sue, bestial for Zola or decadent for Huysmans, 
literary Paris appears as a voracious monster, a new Babylon, a modern Leviathan. The 
inherent corruption of the city's underworld spreads amongst the rest of society, like a 
disease. Babylon above, Leviathan below, the image of the city is grim, despite its 
magnificence. Behind the bright facades, under the large avenues, one has the ill- 
defined feeling of rampant and monstrous threats: the city bears too many dark corners, 
hides too many suspicious activities, gives refuge to too much irrationality.
Through the numerous allusions to Dante, to the 'egouts sociaux', the fascination for 
the figure of the convict, the interest in the underworld of Paris, one forms the image of 
a 'penitentiary' Paris. Strong affinities bring the capital and the cell together: the sense of 
oppression, sweating walls, the predominance of grey, black and yellowish; the 
darkness and confinement is common to both. And if we recall Valery's metaphorical 
association of Paris with Vesprit, who more than Baudelaire expressed the carceral 
nature of the Parisian's boredom and imprisonment within oneself?
Quand la terre est changee en un cachot humide,
Ou l'Esperance, comme une chauve-souris,
60Balzac, La Fille auxyeux d'or, p. 256.
60Durand, Les Structures anthropologiques de I'imaginaire (Paris: Dunod, 1992), p. 130.
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S'en va battant les murs de son aile timide 
Et se cognant la tete a des plafonds pourris;
Quand la pluie etalant ses immenses trainees 
D'une vaste prison imite les barreaux,
Et qu'un peuple muet d'infames araignees
Vient tendre ses filets au fonds de nos cerveaux [...].
Paris and the brain seem to merge in a picture of the penitentiary condition of modern 
man. In this regard, no one did more than Hugo for the claustrophobic depiction of the 
'capitale of the nineteenth century'; and if Paris is the promise of a better future, it also 
serves as the allegory of the contemporary, urban, human condition; a sombre and
oppressive one. In order to appreciate fully Hugo's contribution as a myth-maker, we
need to look both at his dark representation of Paris and some major features of his 
tonnented imaginary (claustrophobia, fate, matter, the organic); each complements the 
other.
(iii) Hugo's dark representation of Paris
Fear, and the pit, and the snare, shall be upon thee, O 
inhabitant o f  Moab, saith the Lord. He that fleeth  from  
the fea r  shall fa l l  into the pit; and he that getteth up out 
o f  the p it shall be taken in the s n a r e d
Although Hugo is undoubtedly one of the main contributors to the elaboration of the 
bright side of the myth of Paris -  its revolutionary revelation in particular -  and 
although he probably remains more well-known as the idealist 'prophet' of Paris, an 
equally important aspect of this representation of the capital is its darkness, materiality 
and depravation. Hugo's work both aptly illustrates his century's anxiety and actively 
contributes to the process of myth-making: anguished, oppressive, and fearsome, the 
Hugolian Parisian imaginary enhances the fears of his time and encapsulates the dark 
side of a phantasmagoria where, as Walter Benjamin famously wrote, Thumanite [...] 
fait figure de damne'.62 Hugo is often seen as a brother to Goya,63 transcribing his 
bleak and sombre visions into words as well as on canvas.64 And if Hugo dreams of a
6  ^Jerem iah  48, 43-4.
62Benjamin, Paris, C apitale du XIXe siecle, p. 47.
63Brombert, Victor Hugo and the Visionary Novel, p. 5.
64Hugo left an impressive collection o f  drawings which denotes an obsession with ruins, towers, and 
black skies. See Odile Blanchette (coord.), Du Chaos dans le pinceau..., catalogue o f  the exhibition at the 
Maison de Victor Hugo, Paris, 2000-2001.
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new Jerusalem in the future, what he sees in the present focuses his attention more on 
the lower depths of the city, its depravation and misery (both economic and spiritual).
One feature dominates Hugo's work: claustrophobia. The image of the prison, the 
metaphors and allusions related to imprisonment, are omnipresent in his poetry and 
prose.65 It is, in fact, an obsession. References to caves, cages, tombs, cells, dungeons, 
chains, keys, locks and bars are countless, and we shall see how various metaphors (the 
spider, the bat, the labyrinth) further enhance the suffocating tone of Hugolian 
production. One significant example of this is the scene from Les Miserables which 
narrates the arrival of Jean Valjean in Paris.66
Valjean is a convict on the run. He is in charge of Cosette, a young girl whose 
mother has just died and whom he is trying to protect. On his arrival in Paris, he had 
found refuge in the 'masure Gorbeau', in a sinister area ('plus morne qu'un cimetiere', I, 
p. 462) between the Paris wall, the guillotine and the Salpetriere: closure, death penalty 
and madness enhance a gruesome place which seems to be quintessentially criminal -  
'innombrables traditions patibulaires du lieu', Hugo notes (I, p. 466). The dark place is a 
promise of the 'traps' yet to come: 'On croyait pressentir des pieges dans cette obscurite, 
toutes les formes confuses de l'ombre paraissaient suspectes' (I, p. 466).67 Soon after, 
inspector Javert -  who incidentally was born in a prison - , believing he had recognised 
the convict, starts the chase again. For it is properly a chase that pits a pack of dogs ('les 
limiers de meutes', I, p. 510) and their leader ('chien fils d'une louve', I, p. 198) against 
their prey. Valjean tries to find his way into the labyrinth of the streets. He finally finds 
himself trapped in an impasse: the 'cul-de-sac Genrof. 'La, barrage [...] Jean Valjean se 
sentait pris comme dans un filet qui se resserrait lentemenf (I, p. 486). He manages to 
escape by climbing over a wall, and lands in a convent, 'le Petit-Picpus'.68 In order to 
take refuge in this convent, he first has to leave it without being noticed. And the 
solution arranged by Valjean's friend Fauchelevent, is to hide him in a coffin.69 Valjean 
is buried alive in the cimetiere Vaugirard, the cemetery where religious victims of the
65See Victor Brombert, La Prison romantique. Essai sur Vimaginaire (Paris: Corti, 1975).
66See 'A Chasse noire, meute muette' (I, pp. 479-510), and 'Les cimetieres prennent ce qu'on leur donne' 
(II, pp. 52-91).
67'La Masure Gorbeau' will be a recurrent threat in Valjean's life: firstly, when he lives there, his 
generosity makes the concierge suspicious o f  him, which eventually brings Javert to investigate, and, 
secondly, when the Thenardiers, having recognised him, prepare a deadly trap with their gang, trying to 
get Cosette involved as well. The trap then turns against the Thenardiers themselves, under the close 
surveillance o f  Marius and Javert.
68Hugo, in one o f  his many digressions, stresses the carceral nature o f  the convent. Like the prison, it is 
an aberration which underlines the spiritual darkness, ignorance and weakness that endures in 
contemporary society. See Victor Brombert, Victor Hugo and the Visionary N ovel (Cambridge, Mass., 
and London: Harvard University Press, 1984), p. 129.
69 Valjean takes the place o f  the body o f  a nun who is about to be buried -  illegally -  within the convent.
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September Massacres were interred and which, then, was used to bury the beheaded.70 
Unfortunately, there is a new guardian there who undermines Fauchelevent1 s attempts to 
deliver his friend. Ultimately Valjean is saved but only moments before he would have 
died in his coffin; Hugo plays with the nineteenth-century phobia of being buried alive. 
The coffin recalls the image of the cachot, mingling in a common sense of oppression 
the lack of freedom suffered by the prisoner and the lack of air of the run-away buried 
alive.71
This significant passage illustrates a constant tendency in Les Miserables'. the 
numerous mentions of the guillotine, prisons and convicts are enhanced by more 
secondary allusions such as Gavroche sleeping under a wire-netting (protecting him 
from being bitten by rats) or the Thenardier daughters' 'toy' -  'une grosse chaine digne 
de Goliath format' (I, 173).72 Moreover, this scene will be echoed further on in the novel, 
in the famous episode of the sewers: the locked grille that seems to be a dead-end 
recalls the barrage mentioned above, whilst Valjean renews the near-death experience 
when about to be drowned in the mud, gathering 'the phantasms of being blinded, 
drowned and buried alive':73 'inexprimable horreur de mourir ainsi !' (Ill, p. 322). The 
suffocating tests set by Hugo remind us that the penitentiary condition is not limited to 
confinement: it is first and foremost a torture.74
In his escapes in the maze of streets and later in the labyrinthine sewers, Valjean, like 
the forqat he once was, carries another form of ball-and-chain, an innocent victim he is 
trying to protect: young Cosette in the streets, Marius in the sewers.75 There again, he 
only succeeds in escaping from one prison to another: he had escaped from Javert by 
finding refuge in a convent; he now escapes the military by hiding in the sewers. 'Jean 
Valjean etait tombe d'un cercle de l'enfer dans l'autre' (III, p. 305). And when the sewers' 
exit turns out to be closed by bars, Hugo makes the analogy clear: 'On n'avait reussi qu'a 
s'evader dans une prison' (III, p. 328).
Although the Hugolian obsession for prison-symbols is everywhere in his work, I 
believe Les Miserables holds a special place in this regard, particularly if we place the
70Emile Tersen, 'Le Paris des M isera b le sE u ro p e  394-395, 1962, pp. 102-3.
71 See Severine Jouve, Obsessions et perversions  (Paris: Hermann Editeur, 1996), p. 155. The phobia o f  
being buried alive is a recurring theme in Poe, who was known in France through Baudelaire's translations.
72Fantine fails to see the threatening symbol, blinded with the sight of'deux roses dans la ferraille' (p.
174). This will lead to the ill-fated decision to leave her daughter Cosette under the 'care' o f  the 
Thenardiers.
73Prendergast, Paris and the Nineteenth Century, p. 93.
74Jouve, Obsessions et perversions, p. 158.
75Hugo makes the connection between the two situations (III, p. 283).
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novel in the perspective of his poetic work during the time of his writing:76 Before 
completing Les Miserables, Hugo had worked on La Fin de Satan. In the poem three 
forms of evil were bom from Cain's crime: the first one -  the nail — turned into the 
sword, the second one -  the stick -  into the gibbet and the last one -  the stone ('le 
caillou') -  into the prison. But this third and final part was left unfinished under the 
suggestive title of 'La Prison'. Instead, Hugo started to work again on his old manuscript 
then entitled Les Miseres, the story of a convict.77 Satan -forqat leads the way to Jean 
Valjean:
[...] Quoiqu'il eut horreur des ailes de la bete,
Quoique ce fut pour lui l'habit de la prison,
[ • • • ]
Hideux, il prit son vol de montagne en montagne,
Et ce forqat se mit a courir dans ce bagne. (FS, p. 5)
The figure of evil in La Fin de Satan, once a beautiful rebellious angel, falls into a 
never-ending increasingly dark void whilst being transformed into a bat-shaped creature. 
Similarly, the Baudelairian image of this 'chauve-souris du cachot eternel' (FS, p. 6)78 
is to be found throughout Les Miserables. In fact, the bat is one of many metaphors used 
by Hugo: Quasimodo and Frollo in Notre-Dame\ Eponine in Les Miserables are all 
identified with a bat which symbolises abnormality (seeing in the dark, living by night, 
blinded by light) and monstrosity (both bird and rat). In Les Miserables, it also refers to 
the bas-fond and the people living in 'la grande caverne du mal' (Mis., II, p. 250). The 
bas-fond is this place of monstrosity; its evil comes from the inherent abnormality of 
these non-human places peopled by barely human creatures: the place is abnormal 
because of its dark, sick, claustrophobic, and evil quality, when human nature requires 
light, health, freedom and God. The creatures leaving there too are abnormal as they are 
trapped within urban materiality like in a cell: 'La pierre est une cave ou reve un 
criminel' (D, p. 208). Their monstrosity is thus related to their carceral condition: 'Le 
monstre a le carcan, I'homme a la liberte' (Cont., 'Ce que dit la bouche d'ombre', p. 398).
In Notre-Dame, Hugo had already drawn on an elaborate series of variations on the 
themes of oppression and incarceration -  themes symbolised by the recurrent image of
76The novel was written within a period that goes from 1845 to 1862 (with a long interruption from 1848 
to 1860).
77Hugo stopped La Fin de Satan  on 11 April 1860 and started re-reading Les M iseres (he had abandoned 
it on 14 February 1848) two weeks later, the 26th. He starts writing later the same year, on 30 December, 
from his exile in Guem esey. Baudelaire noticed the poetry o f  Hugo's prose in the novel: 'C'est un roman 
construit en maniere de poeme'. Baudelaire, 'Les M iserables par Victor Hugo', in CEuvres completes, vol. 
II, p. 200.
78See Baudelaire's 'Spleen' (Quand le ciel bas et lourd...) in Les Fleurs du Mal, pp. 147-8.
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the spider. The spider (arachne) serves as a symbol of Fate (ananke) throughout the 
novel. This symbolism culminates in two famous scenes: the first one shows Maitre 
Jacques attempting to save a fly from being eaten by a spider. He is then stopped by 
Frollo, shouting in anguish 'laissez-faire la fatalite !' before comparing himself both to 
the spider and the fly (ND, p. 360). Frollo here symbolises man's belief in fate, rather 
than fate itself: the belief that human action is fundamentally irrelevant. It is this 
belief -  this renunciation -  that weighs like a burden on man's shoulders.79
The second scene emphasises more obviously the link between the spider and the 
prison by focusing on Louis XI -  TUniverselle Aragne' -  descending into the depths of 
the Bastille to admire his new and costly cage whilst ignoring -  or pretending to 
ignore -  the victim inside, who has spent the past fourteen years agonising in a tiny cell 
(ND, pp. 564-8). The relation between the prison and the spider developed by Hugo 
enhances the oppressive claustrophobia of the city and stresses the idea of the power of 
Fate over an individual isolated in it.
Paradoxically though, this carceral condition is also an invitation to escape. If Les 
Miserables can be read as a prose variation on the unfinished chapter of La Fin de Satan 
entitled 'La Prison', it can equally be read as a novel on the theme of liberation. The 
Bastille itself in Notre-Dame, the ultimate stone turned into the symbol of prison, was 
also a promise of liberation through its demolition in 1789. The poetics of confinement 
and the image of the wall developed by Hugo suggest something behind the obstacle, 
the existence of a mystery to be unveiled:80 the wall prepares for a revelation, it 
suggests the possibility of being set free.
Still the question remains as to where to escape; for Valjean keeps going forward 
without ever knowing his destination, and this is more particularly the case in the 
sewers, just as it was in the labyrinthine streets of Paris. Like the metaphors of the 
spider and the bat, the labyrinth is, in Hugo, yet another claustrophobic theme. Although 
it allows some movement that a prison does not, the motion is a difficult and agonising 
one.81 The use of this symbol in nineteenth-century literature, particularly to define 
Paris' maze of streets, emphasises a specific urban perception of space, consisting of an 
excess of both vastness and oppression: 'labyrinthe immense ou l'on n'aper9 oit dans les
79Again, Hugo shares with M ichelet the conception o f life as a struggle. Renouncing it weighs man down: 
Ceux qui vivent ce sont ceux qui luttent [...]
[...] les autres, je les plains.
[...]
Car le plus lourd fardeau, c'est d'exister sans vivre. (Chat., p. 162)
80Brombert, La Prison romantique, p. 119.
8 ^ 'im agination  du mouvement difficile, du mouvement an goissan f, Bachelard explains in La Terre et 
les reveries du repos, p. 185.
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tenebres que des lieux de perdition, comme si le chaos n'etait qu'un vaste desert fait de 
bruit, de fumee et de boue'.82 The labyrinth combines the idea of being lost in an 
everlasting wandering and the fear of confinement, of never finding a way out. It can be 
related to the image of the void, with which Hugo is fascinated. Both traps reflect the 
same fantastic imaginary of urban space, whether it is horizontal (being lost in the 
streets of Paris) or vertical (falling into the depths of the city). And, of course, as soon 
as the labyrinth is beneath the city, it is identified with the Leviathan and its digestive 
system.
This image of the city's intestine is a good illustration of the seer's journey down into 
hell. Valjean is compared to a modem Jonah, moving around in the belly of the urban 
monster -  Tintestin du Leviathan'. Valjean's incursion recalls, of course, Orpheus' 
journey into the underworld. The myth prepares for the figure of the monster that the 
hero will have to defeat in order to be allowed to return. As always in Hugo's work, this 
is not a mere poetic embellishment but a transfiguration of the evil essence of the 
underworld into the organic: the dark recesses of Paris, the bas-fond is the place where 
'la protestation de la matiere' (Mis., II, p. 250) crawls like a hideous snake-shaped 
monster.
The evil of the city is closely linked in Hugo to his concern for matter, and part of his 
personification of matter comes from the cabalistic tradition -  darkness being seen as 
the materialisation of evil.83 In 'Ce que dit la bouche d'ombre', Hugo refers to the 
apparition of matter as a fall; the weight brought the angel down: 'II [le poids] tomba, 
trainant l'ange eperdu dans sa chute. Le mal etait fait'. And Hugo concludes: 'Le mal, 
c'est la matiere' (Cont., 'Ce que dit la bouche d'ombre', p. 388). The mud which is so 
closely linked to Paris as we have seen, is a further image of urban evil: 'La matiere, le 
bloc, la fange, la gehenne' are closely connected in Hugo's mind (Cont., 'Ce que dit la 
bouche d'ombre', p. 402). Fange suggest inertia, immobility, lifeless weight, like the 
forqats ball-and-chain, dragging humanity down -  matiere sans mouvement, resistant 
au souffle, a Vanima, a fame.84 Matter is the prison walls of the modem human 
condition.
What is striking in the process of the condemnation of matter is the discourse and 
Vimaginaire which it produces. Criticising the materiality of urban civilisation, Hugo, 
amongst others, describes it as very much alive; as a monster. 'Paris-matiere' is not
82Giovanni Macchia, Paris en ruines (Paris: Flammarion, 1988), p. 172.
83 See Leon Cel Her, L'Epopee humanitaire et les g lands mythes rom antiques (Paris: Societe d'edition 
d'enseignement superieur, 1971), p. 298.
84Claude Millet, 'Bloc, evenement - une representation de l'Histoire dans l'ceuvre de Victor Hugo',
Groupe Hugo, 6 avril 2002, p. 3, and the following discussion.
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made of cold stones; it is a monster of flesh and blood in the purest biblical tradition: 
gigantic, voracious, pitiless, bloodthirsty, powerful; but most importantly, it is actually 
alive.
Jean Gaudon notes a Hugolian phobia of immobility and mineralisation.85 
However, the horror of immobility is only the apparent surface of an equally horrific 
underlying crawling reality: matter may be still, but not lifeless. And if the exploration 
of darkness ends in a cell, it is tempting to develop the connection Hugo establishes 
between a cell and a coffin (as the example of Valjean's escape mentioned earlier 
suggests): 'Hermetiquement clos, le sepulcre retient prisonniere la matiere, qui, 
lentement, se desagrege. II est le lieu de la decomposition et de la putrefaction.86 There, 
in the 'stagnation de la tombe' (Mis., Ill, p. 304), the human condition slowly decays. 
This is the place of immobility, confinement and putrefaction.
The urban monster is characterised by its 'vie morte et terrible' (Mis., Ill, 48). The 
apparent paradox of a living death stresses the specificity of materiality as being alive 
but not humanly alive. It is a sort of'death-in-life' which is being evoked in these urban 
tombs, a very Baudelairian image, if we think of'Une Charogne':
Tout cela descendait, montait comme une vague,
Ou s'elanqait en petillant;
On eut dit que le corps, enfle d'un souffle vague,
Vivait en se multipliant.8^
It is within its very decay, in the wriggling of the worms, that an illusion of life is 
created, although it is anarchic, hideous, non-human and eventually threatening: 
'L'imagination materielle, qui trouvait son repos dans l'image d'une substance fixe, 
enferme une sorte de bataille dans la substance agitee'.88
The image of the fourmillement appears as a major aspect of the tormented Hugolian 
imaginary. Although he tends to secure the comforting image of the dead forever 
protected in marble (and this is particularly the case when referring to his daughter 
Leopoldine), Hugo is willing to open his eyes to the more gruesome reality of decay and 
fourm illement: 'sur I'homme fige dans l'horreur immobile, sans defense, pese la menace 
du fourmillement'.89 Like the restlessness of the cloaque (place of both death and life), 
the fourmillement emphasises an abnormal, disturbing motion: 'ce qui bouge sans
85Jean Gaudon, Le Temps de la contemplation  (Paris: Flammarion, 1969), p. 348.
86Jouve, Obsessions etpei-versions, p. 154.
^ L e s  Fleurs du mal, p. 66.
88Bachelard, La Terre et les reveries du repos, p. 62.
89Gaudon, Le Temps de la contemplation, p. 356.
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avancer'.90 They both represent 'ce monde inferieur ou tout rampe et s'altere' {Cont., 
'Cerigo', p. 279), the place where the only life one can guess at in the dark is a 
monstrous and evil one. The very act of crawling recalls Satan who, after being 
transformed into a creature of darkness (the bat) achieves his logical evolution at the 
bottom of the funnel, crawling first like a snake, then like a worm:
II se tramait, visqueux, bleme, eclipse, temi,
Reptile colossal du cloaque infrni
[...] il semblait necessaire
Qu'au fond de cette tombe on vit ramper ce ver. (FS, p. 136)
The image of worms operates on different levels: it suggests the weakness and 
deprivation of those who find themselves at the bottom of the social hierarchy. It is also 
associated with death in an ambiguous way: the imagination is repelled by the idea of 
the corpse being eaten by worms. On the other hand, this process is part of the cycle of 
life, and however horrific the image may be for Hugo, he willingly emphasises this 
aspect of a voracious nature: man in his materiality ends up rotting, being no more than 
part of nature's cycle.91
More threatening, though, is this very idea of rot with which worms are associated. 
The image insists on the unnoticeable menace that crawls uncontrollably in the 
underworld, ready to spread amongst the upper world as well. Like worms spoiling the 
fruit, an evil material is threatening to infiltrate the whole of society and lead it to 
decay.92 The image of the devouring monster is reversed: the huge mouth awaiting its 
prey is only one aspect of an equally disturbing prospect of worms and rot. Still, the 
same menacing idea prevails in an even more repellent mode: the ingestion and 
digestion of a paralysed victim -  this time, eaten away from within.
The destructive power of the worm is developed in La Legende des siecles: 'La Mort 
d'en bas, la Mort sans transfiguration qui travaille au pourrissement grotesque des corps, 
et a l'effondrement derisoire des merveilles du monde'.93 The most glorious 
construction calls for the greatest fall, the worm's promise of annihilation:
N e vous arretez pas. Montez! montez encore!
M oi je  rampe, et j'attends. [...]
90Ibid., p. 358.
9^See Cont., 'Pleurs dans la nuit', p. 317.
92See Bachelard, who recalls the relation beteween the original sin and human death: 'Le peche originel a 
mis le ver dans la pomme, et tous les fruits du monde, dans leur realite et dans leur metaphores, en ont ete 
gates'. La Terre et les reveries du repos , pp. 72-3.
93Millet, 'Bloc, evenement', p. 5.
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La mine est promise a tout ce qui s'eleve.
Vous ne faites, palais qui croissez comme un reve,
Fronton au dur ciment,
Que mettre un peu plus haut mon tas de nourriture,
Et que rendre plus grand, par plus d'architecture,
Le sombre ecroulement. (LS, 'Les Sept Merveilles du monde', p. 224)
(iv) Hugo and the myth of Paris
This analysis of the city's darkness and claustrophobia confirms that relation between 
literary representation and social concerns which is at the core of modern myth-making. 
The myth of Paris uses key images to deal with the fears and uncertainties faced by a 
community. And yet, the question of whether Hugo did develop a myth of Paris, 
particularly in Les Miserables, can and has been challenged, notably by Emile Tersen.94 
This, I believe, remains a fair point; Tersen rightly questioned the fashionable -  
although vaguely poetic -  idea of a myth of Paris, particularly in that novel. The author 
argues that the detailed and realistic description of the capital denied any mythical 
essence to it. I will respond to Tersen's point and argue that there is indeed a myth of 
Paris in Hugo, and a vibrant one. But my argument is that the main feature of that 
myth -  paradoxically as it may seem -  is its demystifying potential.
I would argue that Hugo was probably one of the chief architects of the myth of Paris. 
This, of course, if we accept the definition of myth and of its social function I have 
given. Indeed, Tersen's notion of myth as a mere fantasy, opposed to 'reality' does not 
seem to be supported by Hugo's obsession with providing a detailed and accurate 
portrayal of the city. However, if we consider myth as the means to transcribe the main 
emotions of a society, and to try to provide meaning from them, then the accuracy of the 
description of Paris can very well favour modem myth. As we have seen, myth stems 
from a combination of fiction and reality, it is rooted in daily-life reality.
In fact, I would argue the importance of Hugo in the myth-making of the capital is 
fundamental -  and particularly in Les Miserables -  in many regards. Beyond his passion 
for the capital (Paris was 'la grande affaire de sa vie')95, his sense of the epic, together 
with his use of symbolism and his 'metaphysics', make him a major contributor to the 
dispositiflegendaire of nineteenth-century France. Furthermore, it can be argued that 
Hugo was characteristic of a period in French history which produced a rather 
optimistic discourse while being, at the same time, submerged by a dark, specifically
94Tersen, 'Le Paris des Miserables', pp. 92-4.
95Hugo, 'J'ai eu deux affaires dans ma vie: Paris et l'ocean', in Carnets, 1872, cited by Jean Massin, in his 
introduction to Hugo's Paris  ('Presentation', in OC, XIII, p. 563). Both elements are o f  course deeply 
connected, as emphasized many times by Hugo himself: 'ressemblance de plus de Paris avec la mer. 
Comme dans l'ocean, le plongeur peut y disparaitre1 (Mis., Ill, p. 304).
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urban, imaginaire. As Massin rightly pointed out, 'Pour reprendre le vocabulaire 
hugolien meme, la 'fonction de Paris', c'est d'etre un mythe'96 -  it is the locus where the 
seer can make sense of his visions and provide meaning to the community he is in 
charge of deciphering the world for.
And yet turning to Hugo to study the myth of Paris presents major difficulties which 
may explain why he remains an author many tend to sneer at. His apparent seriousness 
and idealism seem at odds with post-modernity whilst the lack of psychological depth 
and Manicheism of his characters cast him as 'simplistic'. Hugo is therefore one writer 
particularly prone to misreading and misinterpretations. Christopher Prendergast warned 
against the risk of describing Les Miserables 'condescendingly, from the assumption of 
our own superiority, in the way the novel itself so often describes what, in the 
nineteenth-century social world, it sees as lying 'beneath' it. In brief, it is to reproduce 
the patronizing view de haut en bas'91 In this regard, it is worth remembering the 
deeply ironic and subversive quality of Hugo's production: 'une lecture litterale, non 
ironique de Hugo ne saurait tenir compte ni des elements de parodie et de fantaisie, ni 
des subversions plus profondes de son art'.98
Reading Hugo presents the major difficulty of mythic thinking: it is highly 
ambivalent and flexible, using symbols whose signification is reversible. Just like myth, 
Hugolian texts resist ready-made systems, and to some extent interpretation itself:
Le fonctionnement du texte hugolien echappe, d'une certaine fa9 on, a ce que chacun peut en 
devoiler. Que toute critique assume done ses presupposes: il s'agit de voir en quoi le texte hugolien, 
toujours, resiste a son inscription dans un discours.99
The paradoxes, contradictions, twists and turns of Hugo's work are something to work 
with, not against, as Benichou advocates: 'II ne faut pas essayer de les attenuer [les 
contradictions] pour les resoudre: c'est au plus fort d'un contraste apparent que se revele 
le mouvement profond d'un esprit.100
As Brombert argued, Hugo's Paris has the ambivalence, flexibility and adaptability 
which characterise mythic tales:
96Massin, ’Presentation', in Hugo, Paris, OC, vol. XIII p. 563.
9^Prendergast, Paris in the Nineteenth Century, p. 97.
98Victor Brombert, 'Ma Destinee: l'ordre c'est le delire', in Jacques Seebacher and Anne Ubersfeld (dir), 
Hugo le fabuleux  (Paris: Editions Seghers, 1985), p. 227.
"jean-C laude Fizaine, Le Christ dans Vimaginaire de Victor Hugo, 1848-1869, unpublished doctoral 
thesis (1979), p. 713.
100Benichou, 'Victor Hugo et le Dieu cache', in Seebacher and Ubersfeld, Hugo le fabuleux, p. 159.
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Tout est polyvalent, notamment la vertu civilisatrice et corruptrice de Paris, ville absente et irreelle 
(a la fois Babylone et Jerusalem terrestre). [...] A la limite, cette rhetorique de contraste et de 
conflit est confue comme une imitation des procedes createurs de D ieu.101
Paris is the place of the fears, but it is also the locus of an urban epistemology, the 
promise to make sense and provide meaning. If Hugo -  like all writers of Paris -  plays 
with oxymoron and the ambivalence of the capital, it is because it is in the nature of 
mythic tale. But it is also because, as a seer operating in the nineteenth- century 
dispositif legendaire, those rhetorical contradictions help to defeat the myth of 
modernity:
Le systeme des antitheses, le reseau complexe des oxymorons qui invitent a la transcendance, les 
structures metaphoriques avec leur principe inherent d'inversion et de conversion, un ludisme 
langagier qui subvertit le langage de toutes les ideologies, le caractere polysemique des 
descriptions de la nature, les figures d'effacements impliquant l'ecriture elle-meme -  toutes ces 
caracteristiques et tous ces procedes suggerent que les structures sous-jacentes sont mobiles, voire 
instables; que les textes de Hugo eludent leur sens premier.102
If we are to demonstrate that Hugo was a major initiator of the myth of Paris, we can 
only do so by looking at his work within the context of dispositif legendaire, because it 
is precisely this combination of politics and poetics, legend and history which allows 
mythic and modern thinking to be articulated: 'la disparition des "personnages" 
conventionnels au profit d'une voix poetique, rattache les textes de Hugo aux valeurs 
tragiques, tout en leur conferant une surprenante qualite modeme'.103 But more 
essentially, we need to remember that this combination has one aim in mind: to use 
myth to demystify. Here again, Hugo and his myth of Paris is of prime importance: 
'Valjean's underground journey does not so much produce as challenge a 'myth'. [...] The 
myth of the modern city.104 Turning to legends in the century of modernity is an 
attempt to deconstruct its myth. Interestingly enough, it also suggests a clear 
understanding of the process of myth-making.
Modern criticism, when influenced by psychoanalysis, is not always prepared for the 
symbolic logic of his work. The character of Hugolian novels is a legendary one; it 
constitutes a psycho-social unity which does not follow a psychological logic, but a 
moral one. 'Les personnages legendaries ne sont pas des personnalites riches, profondes 
complexes, ils ne construisent pas des individualites idiosyncratiques, mais sont des
101 Brombert, 'Ma Destinee : l'ordre, c'est le delire', in Seebacher and Ubersfeld, Hugo le fabuleux, p. 227.
102/ & /7/ .
103/ 6/ c/.
104Prendergast, Paris and the Nineteenth Centuiy, p. 98.
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types'.105. Thus, a purely psychoanalytical perspective can fail to see that Hugo's world 
is hardly a conceptual one: 'la contemplation ni le naturalisme hugolien ne sont des faits 
de pensee, mais des faits de poesie'.106
Hugo chooses his metaphors with great care, repeats them throughout his work, 
blurring boundaries between his poetry and his prose and creating a complex symbolic 
system which has images at its core: Timage convainc, l'image demontre; l'image a sa 
verite.'107 Hugo sees his imagination as a revelation of reality, and, thus, tends to 
identify the expression with what is being expressed: 'comprenez que les mots sont des 
choses' (Cont., 'Suite', p. 49). As Denis Saurat explained, 'Les images, les metaphores 
meme tendent a etre, non pas des ornements appliques exterieurement a l'objet, mais 
l'expression meme de son essence'.108
Hugo's symbolism, his sense of contrast, deep concern with Evil and Fate, and 
obsessive claustrophobia, have made him a major contributor to the myth of Paris.
Using the classical labyrinthine representation of the city, Hugo turns the capital into a 
gigantic spider's web that symbolises the power of Fate upon the individual and stresses 
the carceral oppression of the city. Hugo's phantasmagoric darkness does not only echo 
the blackness and gloom of the city, but also illustrates the blindness and ignorance of a 
civilisation trapped in its materiality.
The vision of Paris in Hugo is related, inevitably, to his metaphysics and to his 
religious concerns. The dark side of his imaginaire, which, I have argued, is prevalent 
in his literary and poetic representation of Paris, depicts the capital as oppressive, 
suffocating, claustrophobic, dark, ugly, and, most of all, evil. Although typically 
Hugolian, this representation corresponds to the dominant urban imaginary and 
discourses of that time: the belief in a monstrous Paris. Moreover, the obsessive images 
of ingesting, swallowing, digesting, can be interpreted as literal counter-images of the 
consumer society: it is as if the very presence of the bas-fond was not only a threat in 
itself, but equally a warning that the new, modern society above it could very well be 
eaten away by its own matter; that the marchandise which the bourgeois so passionately 
wanted to consume could eventually devour them. But more importantly for Hugo, Paris,
105Millet, Le Legendaire auX IX e siecle, p. 32. See pp. 32-4. A similar point can be found in Baudelaire 
writing about Les Miserables: 'c'est un roman [...] ou chaque personnage n'est exception  que par la 
maniere hyperbolique dont il represente une gen era lity , in 'Les M iserables  par Victor Hugo', p. 220.
106Gaudon, Le Temps de la contem plation , pp. 406-7. My emphasis. Having said that, psychoanalysis 
can be profitable when applied to Hugo's imaginaire. See Charles Baudouin, Psychanalyse de Victor 
Hugo (Geneve: Mont-Blanc, 1943).
107Pierre Albouy, La Creation mythologique chez Victor Hugo (Paris: Corti, 1963), p. 147.
108Denis Saurat, La Religion de Victor Hugo (Paris: Hachette, 1929), p. 13.
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as the capital of'revolutionary revelation'109 and a potential new Jerusalem, was the 
natural setting of the poet's visions; the place for his revelations, and thus the encounter 
of the 'poete-mage [and the] ville-mage'.110 Hugo sees his work as a redefinition of 
religion; his hermeneutics is a theology. To understand the first, we need to examine the 
second.
109Brombert, Victor Hugo and the Visionary Novel, p. 113.
110Claudette Combes, Paris dans Les M iserables (Nantes: CID Editions, 1981), p. 281. She refers to Les 
M iserables here.
Chapter 5
Hugo's Vision of Paris: the seer's promise of demystification
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Les villes sont des bibles de pierre. ^
As we have seen, the dispositif legendaire places the year 1789 and Paris at the heart 
of a 'revolution de l'esprit'. Sacralised by this mythical origin, the capital becomes the 
locus of the century's contradictory feelings in response to the revolution's legacy, but 
also constitutes the promise of a modern epistemology in the nineteenth century to 
come. However the poetico-political framework was shattered by the interpretation of 
Louis Napoleon's coup as moving history backwards: the whole conception of history 
developed by Hugo and Michelet takes a formidable blow in 1851, forcing them to 
redefine their conception of history, and with it, the whole of that dispositif legendaire.
Condemned to an exile he will stubbornly endure after the amnesty of 1859, Hugo 
assumes the position of a modem prophet, in the hope of demystifying the new myth of 
'Napoleon Le Petit'. In exile, Hugo develops his vision of the capital. But the vision here 
is not to be reduced to a representation of the city's poetic quality. Les Miserables was 
written in the wake of some of Hugo's major poetic work, and this relation needs to be 
examined if we are to understand the full implication of the myth of Paris. In his 
solitude, the seer listens to the word of God and projects his vision over a capital that is 
out of sight. This brings a political as well as poetic result in the logic of the dispositif 
legendaire. The work of Hugo shows us how the dispositif legendaire can be the 
framework of'la  sortie du mythe': 'en ce qu'il croit en la force fondatrice du mythe [... 
Hugo croit] en la necessite de sortir le mythe de la mythologie'.2 Hugo, as a modern 
seer, engages in a theological framework, using Paris to see beyond appearance, not 
only to look at the penitentiary condition of modern man, but also his historical 
condition.
Paris is the location where the prophet can see beyond appearance and tell his society 
what escapes their eyes. We have seen how a claustrophobic depiction of the city 
symbolises the penitentiary condition of modern man. The understanding of what is at 
stake in the myth of Paris for Hugo requires us to go beyond his description of the 
oppressive prison of humankind, and to put his vision of the capital in the perspective of 
his theologico-political framework. I will therefore examine further Hugo's function as
JHugo, P, p. 104.
2Millet, Le Legendaire au XLXe siecle, p. 161.
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'poete-voyant', his status as a seer in the century of modernity, before looking at his 
vision of the city's depth. While in exile, Hugo developed a particular interest in Paris, 
and I will examine his fearsome vision of the city -  a city he can only imagine. Plunging 
into the urban abyss, Hugo uses the myth he elaborates as the groundwork of a modern, 
political and poetic gnosis.
The message the seer brings back from his visionary exploration of the city's depth 
aims to restore the meaning of history, at fault since 1851. The vision of the city needs 
the wider understanding of history to make sense, and fulfill the function of myth. As an 
illustration of this process, I will explore the image of the sewers further, because for 
Hugo, it symbolises the accumulation of events and misery in the form of matter. It will 
be essential to understand the political implication of Hugo's poetic image of the filthy 
heap of history. The awakening of the people in 1789 is the moment when this heap 
collapses in a revolution made possible when the people finally hear the word of God 
and act accordingly. In Hugo's time, this revelation is still there to be acted upon, 
although the people seem eerily asleep.
(i) Paris from exile
O Paris, j e  t'ai fu i comme le noir prophete  
Fuyait Tyr. ^
Hugo was not in Paris when he wrote Les Miserables: he had been living in exile 
ever since Louis Napoleon's coup. So the novel relies mainly on Hugo's memory, which 
he complements with friends' accounts and verifications. The Paris of Les Miserables is 
therefore at odds with contemporary events, as Paris was then being transformed under 
the direction of a regime Hugo loathed. A parallel can be drawn between Hugo in exile 
and his character Fantine, as Combes points out: 'tous deux ne voient pas l'enfant 
grandir'.4 This absence from his beloved capital is emphasised further by Hugo who 
chooses to ignore the Paris of his time which he cannot see, but which is also perverted 
by the new regime, to turn to the early 1830s. Moreover, he is projecting his more recent 
memory of 1848 back onto the uprising of 1832.
This is reflected in the narrative's own resistance to chronological continuity. The 
literature of Paris has been, ever since Mercier, that of the promeneur, and therefore 
resists chronology: 'illusoire l'ordre chronologique. Les evenements sont brouilles et le
3Hugo, Chat., 'Au Moment de rentrer en France 31 Aout 1870', p. 359.
4Combes, Paris dans les M iserables (unpublished doctoral thesis), pp. 208-9.
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point de vue reste celui du promenenur attentif a voir ce que les autres ne voient pas'.5 
Moreover, and as we shall see later in this chapter, the novel aims to undermine the very 
belief in chronological coherence and continuity. Mona Ozouf recently showed how 
Marius operated as a 'passeur' between all the various episodes of recent history, 
allowing Hugo 'desinvolte et sur de lui, et au mepris de toute chronologie, de tenter la 
comparaison entre femeute de 1832 ou s’illustre son heros, et celle de juin 1848 qu'il a 
si severement jugee'.6
Just like chronology, the description of Paris, although accurate and strongly 
documented, is secondary for the poet, who articulates his vision according to his 
imagination.7 There are no fundamental differences in Hugo's world between what he 
remembers and what he imagines, nor is there any difference between what he imagines, 
and what he sees: 'impossible de distinguer chez Hugo la part du souvenir de celle de 
l'imagination. Tout souvenir est immediatement recouvert par le deploiement des 
images'.8 Hugo accepts that he ignores the new Paris; he explains that 'il ecrit avec le 
Paris ancien devant lesyeux dans une illusion qui lui est precieuse'.
Tous ces Iieux qu'on ne voit plus, qu'on ne reverra peut-etre jamais plus, et dont on a garde l'image, 
prennent un charme douloureux, vous reviennent avec la m elancolie d'une apparition [...]; et on les 
aime et on les evoque tels qu'ils sont, tels qu'ils etaient, et Ton s'obstine, et Ton n'y peut rien 
changer, car on tient a la figure de la patrie comme au visage de sa mere {Mis., I, pp. 479-80, my 
emphasis).
This distorted and increasingly mythified memory has been explored by Julien Green 
who describes how Paris can be imagined and magnified from afar:
Je ne prenais pas garde qu'avec le temps, ce Paris transpose risquait de devenir un peu plus abstrait 
chaque jour. [...] Que ces choses sont difficiles a dire! C'etait un Paris de visions dans lequel je me 
promenais maintenant, un Paris d ’une realite intense, mais qui em igrait im perceptiblement de la 
chair a Vesprit
In exile, and while the old Paris disappears under Haussmannisation, Hugo becomes the 
'poet of memory'.10 In fact, I would argue that it is probably his exile that turns him into 
one of the major contributors to the myth of Paris. As a 'seer' and a passionate devotee 
of the capital of revelation -  a place that he is not certain he will ever see again -  he
5Delon, 'Louis-Sebastien Mercier, le premier pieton de Paris', p. 28.
^Ozouf, Les Aveux du roman, p. 164. Not just judged actually, as he participated in the repression o f  the 
June movement.
7Gaudon, Le Temps de la contemplation, p. 286.
8Georges Poulet, Etudes sur le temps humain (Paris: Plon, 1952), vol. 2, pp. 205 and 313.
^Julien Green, P aris  (Paris: Champ Vallon, 1983), pp. 17-8. My emphasis.
10Gaudon, Le Temps de la contemplation, p. 21.
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magnifies in his imagination the absent object of his dream. As Grillet noted, 'les 
circonstances de l'exil, la solitude, le bannissement, les reveries spirites, developperent 
en Victor Hugo le visionnaire apocalyptique et le prophete rheteur'.11 The seer's visions 
combine with the memory of Paris in such a way as to shape the myth of Paris -  'Et cela 
au moment ou l'exil permet a la memoire d'operer la transmutation indispensable. D'ou 
la presence de Paris dans Les Miserables, son intense degre de realite poetique'.12
Hugo reacted to his exile in two contrasting ways: at first, Le Proscrit satisfait13 felt 
a certain pride in his position, but soon the isolation would start to affect the poet 
negatively. The first moment of exile led to a jubilant mode: for Hugo, the fact of being 
condemned to exile by one of the people he despised most was almost worthy of 
celebration; there is an exaltation and pride associated with this sort of persecution -  
'cela le grandit a ses propres yeux'.14 Year after year, he would confront the Second 
Empire -  his defiant attitude made all the more prestigious by the popular success of his 
work {Les Contemplations, La Legende des siecles, Les Miserables).
The first moments of exaltation gone, however, Hugo started to suffer from his 
isolation: Thistoire de son acte fut celle d'un continuel assombrissemenf, Rosa explains, 
'etre exile, c'etait vivre une vie reduite a elle-meme, autant dire n'etre rien'.15 His morbid 
imagination was quick to see his condition as a social -  almost actual -  death. He then 
wrote Texil ne m'a pas seulement detache de la France, il m'a presque detache de la terre 
et il y a des moments ou je me sens comme mort et ou il me semble que je vis deja de la 
grande et sublime vie ulterieure'.16
Yet this solitary suffering enhanced his vision and stimulated his vocation as a seer. 
Solitude is seen by Hugo as a sign of divine election. Prophets are aloof. So too are 
visionaries. Why not turn this solitude into an instrument of revelation? On his isolated 
rock, Hugo now turns to Paris again, in an attempt to redefine the dispositif legendaire 
challenged by the events of 1851. Hugo builds a mythical shell, away from the 
representation of Paris that is being developed by those poets and writers who are in the 
capital. By contrast,
1 C laudius Grillet, La Bible dans Victor Hugo, 2 vols (Lyon: Librairie catholique E. Vitte, 1910), vol. 1, 
p. 128. See also Citron, 'Le Paris du poete exile: Hugo apres 1852' in La Poesie de Paris, vol. 2, pp. 267- 
307.
12Massin, 'Presentation', in OC, XIII, p. 565.
13 As Hugo sees him self in a letter to his wife on 19 January 1852.
4^Grillet, La Bible dans Victor Hugo, vol. 1, p. 130.
,5 Guy Rosa, 'Ce que c'est que l'exil de Victor Hugo', Groupe Hugo, 20 octobre 2001, pp. 1-2.
16Letter to Villemain, dated 9 Mai 1856, cited by Rosa, Ibid., p. 3.
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Hugo continue seul sur la lancee ancienne du mythe. [...] Prisonnier du mythe de Paris tel qu'il 
existait dans sa diversite sous la monarchic de Juillet, Hugo dans sa solitude va degager, et realiser 
enfin son propre Paris poetique.17
But what is essential here, again in relation to the theory of mythic thinking, is that this 
poetry is not only visionary but political, for such is the language and mission of the 
seer.
(ii) The seer's vision
Le voyeur veut p lus que voir, il veut penetrer le secret 
de la vie en mouvement. ^
Much has been said about Hugo the seer, the visionnaire\ his exile probably 
conferred on him the status of a modem prophet. Grillet shows how the poet positioned 
himself as an heir to the prophets of Israel: solitary and exiled, and like them inspired by 
the word of God. And yet this prophet is a modern one, talking to the sons of the 
Revolution.19 Hugo is that poet who makes the leap from traditional, prophetic religion 
to a modem, political message in an attempt to merge the two. The common goal is for 
the seer, modem and traditional, to deliver to his people a message that he will have to 
fight for. A seer has the mission to unveil the word of God, something not to be 
attempted by the common man, but which, in the esoteric tradition, is reserved for an 
initiated elite: only a few poets, geniuses, thinkers can receive the sacred mission to 
unveil the word of God -  'forcer Dieu a se decouvrir'.20 And Hugo's mission is precisely 
that: 'les paroles secretes, je les devoile,' he says; 'les influences cachees, je les 
demasque: c'est mon devoir' (Actes et Paroles I. Avant l'exil, in OC, VII, p. 208).
This religious process requires the poet-seer to start with the contemplation of the 
real, then to leave the world of appearance and go beyond the level of the object to rise 
to God. It is by this act of contemplation that the seer is granted by God the privilege of 
becoming a prophet, 'le grand interlocuteur de Dieu'.21 He will thus be able to see what 
ordinary men cannot. This itself isolates the poet-seer by raising him within God's 
hierarchy: 'il voit, quand les peuples vegetent' (RO, 'Fonction du poete', p. 138).
17Citron, La Poesie de Paris, vol. 2, p. 271.
^A lberto Moravia, 'Entretien', M agazine litteraire, n° 229, avril 1986, p. 95.
19Grillet, La Bible dans Victor Hugo, vol. 1, p. 136 and vol. 2, p. 89*.
20Paul Benichou, 'Victor Hugo et le Dieu cache', in Seebacher and Ubersfeld, Hugo le fabuleux, p. 161.
21 Marc Eigeldinger, ’La Voyance avant Hugo', in Rimbaud, Lettres du voyant, Gerard Shaeffer (ed) 
(Paris: Minaud and Geneve: Droz, 1975), p. 65.
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However, the 'poete-voyant' cannot become detached from common daily life if he 
wants to fulfill his mission. Quite the opposite: the poet's deeper visionary tendencies 
are determined by social and historical realities, by 'the need to relate private phantasms 
to the thrust of external events'.22 Hugo understands the need to keep a firm grip on the 
real to avoid the risk of being doomed by one's reverie: 'ne craignez pas de vous 
surcharger d'humanite. Lestez votre raison de realite', he advises, so that 'le songeur soit 
plus fort que le songe' (Promontorium Somnii, II, pp. 31-3). What the poete-voyant aims 
to achieve is an intermediate position between God and man; to operate as a bridge 
between the real and the ideal:
J'appartiens a Dieu comme esprit et l'humanite comme force. Pourtant l'exces de generalisation 
mene a s'abstraire, en poesie, et a se denationalise^ en politique. On fmit par ne plus adherer a sa 
vie et par ne plus tenir a sa patrie. Double ecueil que je  tache d'eviter. Je cherche l'ideal, mais en 
touchant toujours du bout du pied le reel. Je ne veux ni perdre terre comme poete, ni perdre France 
comme homme politique (CV, 2, p. 805).
The seer belongs to a superior place of consciousness while, at the same time, keeping a 
plunging vision over terrestrial life. The seer does not cut himself off from humanity; 
neither does he detach himself from matter, which is the place for revelation.23 As a 
revelateur, capable of shedding light on deeper truth, he assumes a moral and social 
function; again, his mission is not to contemplate a vague infinity but to reach what 
Hugo thought to be eternal: moral truth. The divine gift of seeing is given to the poet- 
seer to serve humanity: his regard is partly divine and allows him to bring back part of 
the light that he was allowed to see, literally to enlighten the Peuple.
In Hugo, the theme of the eye is crucial: in the Preface to Les Feuilles d'automne, he 
compares the ideal poet with an eye: 'un ceil, ophthalmos, comme dit admirablement la 
metaphore grecque' (FA, 'Preface', p. 13). It is a theme that he will repeat throughout his 
work: 'Deviens le grand oeil fixe ouvert sur le grand tout' (Cont., 'A celle qui est restee 
en France', p. 418);
Je suis le regardeur formidable du puits;
Je suis celui qui veut savoir pourquoi; je suis 
L'ceil [...] (D, 'Le Hibou', p. 22).
The 'regard' of Hugo is by no means a comforting one. 'Le poete est le premier effraye 
de ses propres images',24 and the theme of the eye remains particularly distressing in his
22Brombert, Victor Hugo and the Visionary Novel, p. 11.
23Eigeldinger, 'La Voyance avant Hugo', pp. 63-7.
24Grillet, La Bible dans Victor Hugo, vol. 1, p. 162.
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work and life: Hugo was affected by ophthalmia and seems to have been prone to 
psychosomatic problems affecting his eyes, notably after the loss of his brother and later 
of his daughter, Leopoldine.25
On a symbolic level, we have seen that deciphering the word of God, which means 
unveiling, is the function of the poet-seer, and yet it remains a transgression. It is deeply 
dangerous to raise one's eyes to divinity; since voir leads directly to savoir, looking 
directly at God or at God's truth -  whether willingly or not -  has always been the 
promise of certain death, unless God permits it. Death in this case punishes both the 
rashness of man and the human inability to bear divine light. Only the seer can be 
allowed to survive his visions. But this does not go without risks, and visions are 
associated with madness: fever, illusion and hallucination await the reckless voyeur.
Hugo is not only afraid of what he might see, or to see what he might not be allowed 
to see; he is equally afraid of the very act of looking: 'peur de la libido oculaire, la 
difficulte de separer l'agression du voyeur de la revelation du voyant'.26 The danger does 
not come only from the vision itself, but equally from the sensuous visual addiction that 
might interfere with true vision. As Victor Brombert noted, Hugo compares the eyes to 
'windows opening on the spectacle of obscenity and cruelty. [They] are dangerous 
invitations not only to reverie, but to voyeurism of all sorts';27 just as Frollo in Notre- 
Dame can no longer see God, having been blinded by his repeated, desperate looks at 
Esmeralda, Hugo feels a similar inclination to what I might call 'la pente du 
voyeurisme'.28 To thwart this, Hugo feels the need to rely on his inner eye. He is 
constantly aware that the world is not only made of what he can see, but also of what he 
can imagine, and consequently of what his imagination really displays to his eyes.29 So 
Hugo will constantly use his imagination to articulate his visions in order to prevent 
himself from being taken over and eventually doomed by the physical act of seeing.
Hugo's fascination with the spectacle given by the underworld is rather ambiguous: it 
highlights both the temptation of the voyeur faced with the ugliness of what he sees and 
the duty of the seer to find redemption and salvation where humanity itself seems to be 
denied. In both cases, the poet is attracted by the abyss, by darkness, in other words by 
evil. Inevitably, if he wants to become a visionnaire, he first has to be a voyeur, which
25Jacques Seebacher and Anne Ubersfeld, 'Discussion avec Jean-Marc Hovasse a propos de sa biographie 
Victor Hugo - Avant l'exil parue chez Fayard', Groupe Hugo, 19 janvier 2002, p. 9.
^Brom bert, 'Ma Destinee : l'ordre, c'est le delire', p. 231.
27Brombert, Victor Hugo and the Visionary Novel, p. 78.
28In reference to 'La Pente de la reverie' (FA, pp. 80-4) and to Hugo's tendency to voyeurism. See 
Brombert, Victor Hugo and the Visionary Novel, pp. 76-8.
29Poulet, Etudes sur le temps humain, p. 209.
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itself is likely to distract the seer from his mission. And indeed, evil soon appears to be 
even more dangerous to look at than God: instead of risking just one's life, one faces the 
more perverse danger of being seduced and doomed by Satan's illusions.
I would like to explore Hugo's attraction to abysses further, as it is an essential part 
of his urban imaginaire, one that links the void to vision. The seer's visionary 
imagination starts with a global view from above:
Oh! qui m'emportera sur quelque tour sublime
D'ou la cite sous moi s'ouvre comme un abime ! (FA, 'Soleils couchants', p. 99).
Similarly, the poet sees himself in a Christ-like position in 'Ce que dit la bouche 
d'ombre' (Cont., p. 386), where he finds himself on top of a cliff ('sur le haut du rocher'), 
overlooking the world in order to be offered a better perspective, a plunging view, 
reminiscent of Baudelaire:
[...] je  suis monte sur la montagne
D'ou Ton peut contempler la ville en son ampleur,
Hopital, lupanars, purgatoire, enfer, bagne,
Ou toute enormite fleurit comme une fleur.30
For the prophet does not climb a mountain to be closer to God, to look up at the sky, but 
to see the depths of the earth, and from there to start a journey downward. Hugo 
answers a prophetic calling that first implies a plunging into mud and putrefaction 
because, paradoxically, God, for Hugo, emerges from subterranean darkness, from 
chaotic and dynamic human suffering and human becoming.31 And just as Baudelaire is 
certain to find Satan on his way back to the evil city, Hugo is equally convinced of 
meeting God in the darkness of the social hell, namely, the bas-fond.
This need to gain high ground in order to get a better look at the everyday is not new. 
Since Mercier, the marcheur-decrotteur has felt the need to take some distance, 
allowing the eye to take in the whole picture: 'Montez sur les tours de Notre-Dame', 
Mercier advocates,32 describing the picture 'a vue d'oiseau'. In both Notre-Dame de 
Paris and Les Miserables, Hugo proposes a similar view of Paris from above.33 In both 
novels, what appears from this flight over the capital is a web of streets, a maze of 
passages, courtyards and impasses, a labyrinth. In this regard, it is worth noting that 
even a horizontal symbol like the labyrinth is described by Hugo as vertical. And if, as
3®Charles Baudelaire, 'Epilogue', in Petits poem es en prose  (Paris: Corti, 1969).
31Brombert, Victor Hugo and the Visionary Novel, p. 114.
32Mercier, 'Physionomie de la grande ville', in Tableau de Paris, p. 34.
33'Paris a vol d'oiseau' in N otre-Dam e, 'Paris a vol de hibou' in Les M iserables.
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Hugo stated in Dieu, 'il faut bien un axe a ce qu'on voit' (D, 'Le Hibou', p. 35), then 
clearly, his preference will be a vertical one: the prophet starts his journey from above, 
plunging into the abyss, the 'gouffre universel' (Cont., 'Ce que dit la bouche d'ombre', p. 
386); and entering the 'immenses profondeurs de Paris' (Mis., II, p. 299).
Hugolian verticality tends to insist on depth rather than height.34 The maze of streets 
appears not merely as a surface labyrinth but as a depth -  'profond labyrinthe' (D, 'Le 
Hibou', p. 18) -  to be plumbed, a nether region filled with mysteries and revelations.35 
Hugo's vertical imaginaire leads to an idea of 'surface trompeuse' which hides a secret 
depth which the seer cannot resist. Entering the maze is clearly for Hugo a journey 
downward. It is significant in Notre-Dame to see TUniverselle Aragne' going down in 
the depth of the Bastille, visiting a prison within a prison. The spider's web then takes 
the shape of a funnel that seems to swallow the above city: 'eglises, palais, bastilles 
avaient de la terre a mi-corps' (ND, p. 413). Similarly, Les Miserables evolves around 
images of falling and descent: Fantine's fall from the status of a grisette to the worst 
destitution; the Thenardiers' decline from the poverty of an inn to the misere of their 
galetas.36 The titles of many chapters and sections convey this idea: 'la chute', 'la 
descente', 'les mines et les mineurs', 'le bas-fond', and 'la decroissance crepusculaire' are 
the more obvious. This adds to the author's own descent into the 'immenses profondeurs 
de Paris' (Mis., II, p. 299); and of course to the fact that the sewer itself descends: 
'labyrinthe qui a pour fil sa pente' (III, p. 287), 'l'intestin de Paris est un precipice' (p. 
308), and Hugo mentions a proverb according to which 'descendre dans l'egout, c'est 
entrer dans la fosse' (p. 302). The image of sinking (enlisement) mentioned earlier also 
suggests that this frontier between the above and the underworld is neither strict nor 
immobile; 'ces puissantes batisses n'avaient pas simplement des fondations, mais, pour 
ainsi dire, des racines qui allaient en se ramifiant dans le sol en chambre, en galeries, en 
escaliers comme la construction d'en haut' (ND, p. 413). As for sinking, it is not sure 
whether it is the victim that goes down, or the mud that rises: 'L'enlisement, c'est le 
sepulcre qui se fait maree et qui monte du fond de la terre vers un vivant' (Mis., Ill, p. 
321). This journey downward is very much reminiscent of Dante:
[...] Ei son tra 1'anime piu nere;
diverse colpe giu li grava al fondo:
34Gaudon, Le Temps de la contemplation, pp. 282-3.
35Brombert, Victor Hugo and the Visionary Novel, p. 79.
36The fall is also physical: both Frollo and Javert die in a fatal plunge while Satan's fall opens La Fin de 
Satan.
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se tanto scendi, la i potrai vedere.37
Hugo describes the dangers that await the seer who undertakes such a journey:
[...] Une pente insensible
Va du monde reel a la sphere invisible;
La spirale est profonde, et quand on y descend,
Sans cesse se prolonge et va en s'elargissant,
Et pour avoir touche quelque enigme fatale,
De ce voyage obscur souvent on revient pale ! (FA, 'La Pente de la reverie', pp. 80-1).
The Hugolian obsession with falling and the abyss combines his vertigo with his fear 
of darkness: going down is to wander away from the light; it is a journey towards 
spiritual darkness. The monster, hiding in the dark, is at the wrong end of a line that 
leads to God and to Light. Les Miserables evolves according to a rhetoric which 
opposes Evil to God, Light to Darkness, and thus sees Evil within the urban space. The 
novel emphasises that only the city contains places where light no longer penetrates; 'ou 
la lumiere s'eteinf (Mis., II, p. 249). A similar journey into darkness is to be found in the 
opening of La Fin de Satan, where Satan starts his never-ending fall:
'Depuis quatre mille ans il tombait dans 1'abTme 
[ .. .]
Les tenebres sans bruit croissaient dans le neant.
[. ..]
Et deja le soleil n'etait plus qu'une etoile.
[ .. .]
L'etoile maintenant n'etait qu'une etincelle 
[ ... ]
Et l'archange comprit, pareil au mat qui sombre,
Qu'il etait le noye du deluge de l'ombre;
II reploya son aile aux ongles de granit
Et se tordit les bras. -  Et l'astre s'eteignit (FS, pp. 3-8).
Thus, claustrophobia and vertigo are not so much contradictory as complementary, 
and the fall here is closely linked to the image of the prison: 'abime, gouffre, trou et 
chute suggerent sans doute l'espace, mais ne sont pas etrangers au sentiment de cloture. 
[...] Satan apres tout, estprisonnier de I'infini'.38 For as much as he develops an 
oppressive urban atmosphere, Hugo also surrenders to a the appeal of the void,39 
developing what Seebacher called '[une] construction en abime'.40
37Dante, Inferno, p. 104. 'They are among the blacker souls; various sins weigh them toward the bottom: 
if  you descend so far, you can see them there' (p. 105).
^B rom bert,  La Prison romantique, p. 105. My emphasis.
39 Ibid.
40Jacques Seebacher, Victor Hugo ou le Calcul des profondeurs (Paris: PUF, 1993), p. 181.
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Abim e  reste un terme ambivalent, connotant la misere aussi bien que le potentiel revolutionnaire 
des bas-fonds, mais aussi la descente du poete dans le monde dangereux et exaltant de la reverie et 
de la contemplation. Dans cette exploration intime, l'axe de la verticalite signale souffrance et 
proximite de la folie. D'ou l'importance des images carcerales (prison de l'espace, geoles de 
l'esprit) et de la tour de Babel renversee, symbole de perspectives vertigineuses.41
But this verticality suggests yet another disturbing vision. Since Hugo follows an 'axe 
vertical', what he sees at the lowest levels soon appears as a reflection of the 
upperworld. In Les Miserables, the reflection is architectural, the sewers mapping the 
streets of the upper city: 'Paris underground is seen as an extension of Paris 
overground'.42 As Hugo describes the sewers as the 'succursale de la Cour des Miracles' 
{Mis., Ill, p. 289), he thus echoes a previous attempt to plunge into the urban 
underworld, the city's evil twin: in Notre-Dame, the reflection of Paris in the Seine as in 
a mirror reflects the counter-society that lives below. Yet this reflection soon turns out 
to be deceptive, offering anyone daring to go any deeper a misleading and distorted 
image of the upperworld and its rules, as Gringoire experienced: lost in his reverie, the 
jaunty character goes from dream to nightmare, failing to realise that he is going beyond 
the 'surface trompeuse'. He then finds himself in a scene reminiscent of what he saw 
previously, although something has been monstrously perverted: at the opening of the 
novel, Gringoire is an ironic spectator waiting for a mystery play to be given at the 
Palais de Justice. No trial there. Only once he has got lost in the Cour des Miracles is he 
to attend one: his own. If the upperworld has transformed a Court of Justice into a 
theatre, similarly the underworld transforms a never-ending show (the Cour des 
Miracles itself) into a parodic trial. 'The inverted society turns law upside down',43 the 
Cour des Miracles reflects the Court of Justice in both an ironic and grotesque way. 
Although the general tone is humorous, Gringoire puts his life at risk by the very fact 
that, coming from above, he fails to respond in an appropriately grotesque manner to the 
leader ('the king') of the Cour des Miracles.
The mission of the 'poete-voyant' brings him back to the surface with a political 
message. Hugo sees the dangerous absurdity of a city that prides itself on being 
powerful, superb and modern, while hiding a perverse inverted image. 'Paris-Matiere' is 
absurd because it means relying on what one can see with one's eyes, and therefore 
being duped by appearance. It is a tragic mistake because it does not follow the model 
set by the prophet. From his exile, Hugo denounced the deviation from the
4 ^Brombert, 'Ma Destinee : l'ordre, c'est le delire', p. 230.
42Prendergast, Paris and the Nineteenth Century, p. 89.
43Brombert, Victor Hugo and the Visionary Novel, p. 80.
revolutionary ideal of the 'Jerusalem celeste'. In Paris-Guide (1867), he vilified the 
doomed materialism of the Second Empire that betrayed the sacred mission of Paris as a 
leader of the 'Peuple universel' in its march towards progress, which is a spiritual and 
moral one.
Hugo made a striking statement in Les Contemplations: 'Voir, c'est rejeter' (Cont., 
'Magnitudo parvi', p. 196). The very act of contemplation ultimately requires that the 
poet-seer free himself from the concrete object that had initiated the vision in the first 
place. No longer useful, the 'chose vue' is now an obstacle to the poet's ultimate vision.
Car, des effets allant aux causes,
L'oeil perce et franchit le miroir,
Enfant; et contempler les choses,
C'est finir par ne plus les voir.
La matiere tombe detruite 
Devant l'esprit aux yeux de lynx;
Voir, c'est rejeter; la poursuite
De l'enigme est 1'oubli du sphinx {Cont., 'Magnitudo parvi', p. 196).
'La pente de la reverie' ultimately leads to the erasure of the 'chose vue' from the poet's 
visual field, to the point where there is nothing left to be seen -  at least physically:
R ejeter l'objet per$u comme un support inutile a l'elancement de la vision, se detacher des 
contingences de la chose vue pour atteindre a la vision de 1'absolu de Dieu, au-dela de toute 
frontiere, dans un temps et un espace eclates qui ne peuvent etre vus que par le regard interieur de 
l'ame.44
Valjean himself disappears, first from the life of the newlyweds Marius and Cosette, 
with a stunning lack of interest on the part of his adoptive daughter; but then his 
memory itself disappears from the earth. Valjean requires a nameless tomb: 'pas de nom 
sur la pierre' {Mis., Ill, p. 488). And even the few lines that were written by a mysterious 
hand on his tomb are said to be probably erased by now. 'Jean Valjean, en depit de ses 
prodiges, n'a fait que passer, astre sombre qui illustre la condition humaine tout 
entiere'.45 A novel of Parisian memory, written in exile, Les Miserables is equally a 
novel of amnesia: Valjean had spent most of his life hiding, assuming false identities, 
keeping silence, burying his past, when not himself. It is no coincidence that he faces
44Eigeldinger, 'La Voyance avant Hugo', p. 68.
45Ozouf, Les Aveux du roman, p. 180. Interestingly enough, only the beheaded had nameless tombs in the 
nineteenth century. See Guy Rosa, 'Du Moi-Je au mage: individu et sujet dans le romantisme et chez 
Victor Hugo', in Seebacher and Ubersfeld, Hugo le fabuleux, p. 272. This is the second allusion to the 
guillotines after Valjean's first burial (alive) in a cemetery known for its section for the beheaded.
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being buried so often and particularly in the mud of the sewers: 'sinistre effacement d'un 
homme' (Mis., Ill, p. 321). It seems to sum up his whole life.
Hugo's erasure of both the 'chose vue' and the visionary journey bear two powerful, 
poetically revolutionary and politically subversive consequences. The vertical visions 
developed by Hugo combine with the ultimate contemplation of nothingness. In 
'Magnitudo Parvi', the poet develops the theme of erasure to the point where the voyant 
himself disappears: only the eye remains. The total erasure of both the poet and his 
visual field brings Hugo to develop images of abysses and voids, inviting us to a poetics 
of emptiness.
Viens, si tu l'oses!
Regarde dans ce puits mome et vertigineux {Cont., 'Ce que dit la bouche d'ombre', p. 393).
For if Hugo's imaginaire is well known for its richness, he is probably just as powerful 
when he explores the symbol of nothingness. 'Hugo atteint la plus haute poesie [...] 
quand il reussit a exprimer la realite meme du vide. Avant Mallarme, Hugo avait 
decouvert la poesie negative'.46 The following extract illustrates this well:
Nuee en bas, nuee en haut, nuee au centre;
Nuit et nuit; rien devant, rien derriere; rien entre.
Par moments, des essaims d'atomes vains et fous
Qui flottent; ce qu'on voit de plus reel, c'est vous,
Mort, tombe, obscurite des blemes sepultures,
Cimetieres, de Dieu tenebreuses cultures (D, 'Le Hibou', p. 35).
One could then wonder whether this might not contradict the seer's prerequisite to hold 
a firm grip on the real. Can the divine eye with which the poet identifies still 
communicate with 'la foule bleme'? {Cont., 'Les Mages', p. 382). Can the new Hugolian 
gospel find any echo in the century of revolutions? Does a seer have any place in 
modernity? But despite this poetics of emptiness, the seer's message remains embedded 
within a specific social framework which is both the starting point of the visions and the 
context in which they can reach their full meaning. Hugo blurs the boundaries between 
the real and fantasy, drawing a 'Goyaesque' picture of modern, urban society, and 
revealing his century's deepest anxieties. The distortions he sees in the city's depths 
have the visionary power of dreams, or rather, nightmares. Yet with the accuracy of his 
poetic language, he manages to master those visions and express them, voicing his 
contemporaries' disquiet behind the bright fa9 ade of both modernity and bourgeois 
morality.
46Poulet, Etudes sur le temps humain, p. 225.
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If we bear in mind that imagination assumes the role of reason in Hugo's thought,47 
and if we subscribe to Gerard Schaeffer's view that 'la modernite [consiste] bien a faire 
voir l'invisible, l'essentiel, selon ses propres donnees interieures',48 then it becomes 
possible to consider Hugo as a 'modern seer', who in a century of rationalism and 
progressivist history indeed makes the archaic choice of imagination and myth, but only 
to give an account of 'la realite totale', beyond the physical appearance accounted for by 
history.
Hugo's vision and interpretation of Paris go deeper than a mere conflict with 
'Napoleon le Petit' and reveal a more subtle, although equally political, orientation. As 
Victor Brombert rightly noted, 'la pente de la reverie' -  consisting in a downward 
movement associated with pure contemplation -  aims to transcend chronological and 
historical time: the vertical insight corresponds to the transhistorical vision of the 
prophet, whose intemporelle perception is radically alien to the chronological, linear, 
progressive time of history:49 'sur la mouvance universelle, le poete pose un regard 
immobile'.50 This vision of history will be developed later in this chapter, but it cannot 
be analysed properly without a deeper look at the seer's religion and gnosis; for Hugo, 
just like Michelet, does not accept a secular conception of history.
(iii) Between God’s Word and human history: Hugo's gnosis
Hugo writes as a Christian: 'La Bible est son livre' he famously wrote (RO, p. 134). 
But if he is a Christian, he is certainly no Catholic.51 I would even label him as a 
Christian heretic. Indeed he manifests a great degree of scepticism, if not distrust, for 
any official religion. His Christianity is deeply critical of the Church, in fact the more 
biblical he sounds, the more he is perceived as anti-Christian,52 which I do not think he 
ever was. But he certainly embarked on developing his own conception of Christianity -  
one that had as little to do as possible with the Church.
In Les Miserables, Valjean dies without a priest, but in the respectful remembrance 
of Monseigneur Myriel -  a saint rather than a Churchman, for Hugo; 'un juste', who had 
bought Valjean's soul (Mis., I, p. 134).53 When about to die, Valjean declines the offer 
to bring in a priest: 'j'en ai un', he answers, as though he saw Myriel in the room. A
47Albouy, La Creation m ythologique chez Victor Hugo, p. 497.
48Gerald Schaeffer, 'Commentaires', in Rimbaud, Lettres du voyant, p. 176.
49Brombert, Victor Hugo and the Visionary Novel, pp. 81-2.
50Gaudon, Le Temps de la  Contem plation, p. 316.
51Jean-Marc Hovasse, Victor Hugo (Paris: Fayard, 2001), vol. 1, p. 1067.
52Grillet, La Bible dans Victor Hugo, vol. 2, p. 89*.
53'Un juste' is the title o f  the opening chapter o f the novel.
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moment before, he had used his last strength to take down a little crucifix. But this 
gesture is not to be mistaken: 'le geste de Jean Valjean vers le crucifix signifie 
seulement son amour du condamne sublime qui ouvre ses bras au monde; il n'implique 
pas une croyance chretienne dogmatique'.54 Similarly, Hugo, when thinking about his 
own death, resents the prospect of rites and official prayers, preferring simple, 
individual prayers, delivered from the heart by simple people.
As a heretical, anticlerical Christian, Hugo opposes the Christian message to the 
power of the Church and its trahison des clercs: 'la collusion des pretres avec le 
pouvoir'.55 In a trend similar to Dostoevsky's, Hugo defends man against Christian 
mythology. For Hugo, there is something fundamentally perverse in the word of God 
when frozen by dogma.
Aux religions institutes qui se figent necessairement dans la forme sclerosante des rites et du 
dogme, Hugo oppose [...] un argument poetique de poids: si 'le ciel se defend' [...] cela tient a la 
nature meme du langage, toujours rebelle a l'homme qui le petrit pour donner forme a 1'indicible.
La poesie a ceci de superieur a la religion, c'est que non seulement elle connait ses limites, mais 
qu'elle travaille precisement a la limite, sur la limite, a la jointure du connu et de I'inconnu.-^
Every religion attempts to end the quest for God, to freeze his word, to end the effort of 
interpretation of his message. Yet, for Hugo, this message is alive, and should remain 
so: '[II] ne se lasse pas de denoncer la petrification spirituelle qu'implique tout dogme: 
accorder la priorite aux ideologies, c'est trahir le mystere de la vie'.57
Hugo's religion is based on a deistic approach: if he denounces the authority of 
established religions, it is because none of them can pretend to access God's knowledge. 
The very concept of God escapes man's capabilities. And there is a certain arrogance in 
man when he pretends to establish rules and rituals that are supposedly required by God; 
'supercherie et superstitions se cachent derriere cette arrogance humaine'.58 Hugo rejects 
dogma and rituals as essentially barriers that prevent access to the word of God instead 
of facilitating it. Opposing spiritual truth to religious lies, Hugo uses his own reading of 
the Bible to create his own religion, one free from dogma, and intrinsically linked to his 
poetics. 'II s'attache [...] a la creation de sa propre mythologie, et, avec elle, de sa propre
54Raoul Simaika, L'Inspiration epique dans les romans de Victor Hugo  (Geneve: Droz, 1962), p. 109.
55Dufiez-Sanchez, 'La Religion hugolienne dans la Premiere Serie de La Legende des siecles. De la priere 
au salut par la poesie', in Andre Guyaux and Bertrand Marchal (eds.), Victor Hugo, 'La Legende des 
siecles' (Prem iere Serie), (Paris: Presses de l'Universite de Paris-Sorbonne, 2002), p. 81.
56Ib id ., p. 82. See Hugo, RR.
57Brombert, 'Ma Destinee : l'ordre, c'est le delire', p. 226.
58Benichou, 'Victor Hugo et le Dieu cache', p. 149.
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theologie, qui s'exprime en vers, par la metaphore, et non dans le discours ordinaire de 
la theologie'.59
Poetics and mythology here are not to be understood as mere loopholes and, as we 
have seen with regard to his poetics, one of the main characteristics of Hugo's religion is 
the duty to be rooted in political and historical meditation. Like Michelet, 'Hugo situates 
God in history'.60 In his new religion, Hugo aims to reconcile the political with the 
spiritual, and to bring the word of God and historical progress into one philosophy.61 
This is the purpose of La Legende des siecles: 'tracer l'histoire de la creation eclairee par 
le visage du Createur, histoire done a la fois du progres et de la religion. Hugo tremble 
devant l'histoire car dans l'histoire il voit "les grandes lois du sort'".62 Hugo, then, 
combines spiritual and political meditation, by thinking about progress in a religious 
mode, using traditional thought to think the modem. It is a specifically Hugolian 
singularity: 'avoir mis au service d'une ideologic du progres un systeme de 
representations du sacre a l'origine dirige contre elle'.63
Let us look at this theologico-historical philosophy further. Hugo's epistemological 
hierarchy64 consists of three ways and levels to apprehend the world: observation or 
intelligence would be at the bottom of the ladder, too dependent on what one can see, on 
causality, too precise to seize the real. Then comes imagination, which allows more 
freedom, more choice, but which is still too passive to have much influence on one's 
destiny. Finally, the best way to approach the real for Hugo is intuition, which is given 
by action. Intuition corresponds to what Hugo calls surnaturalisme: 'prodige immanent, 
la nature en ce qu'elle est ouverte a l'illimite, a cet infini qui a un moi et dont l'autre nom 
est Dieu. L'intuition, c'est l'ouverture du regard a cette illimitation'.65
Now if we apply this to Hugo's literary work, one striking feature is the distance that 
separates his characters from this 'ouverture du regard'. The fate of Hugo's characters, 
their lack of control over their destiny, all point out to a rather modest place on this 
epistemological ladder. Again, the famous scene of the sewers in Les Miserables 
provides a highly relevant illustration of this, combining the symbolism of the labyrinth, 
the sense of oppression felt by the reader, and Valjean's fate. In that scene, three levels 
of knowledge are at work, recalling Hugo's epistemological hierarchy (intelligence,
59Frank Paul Bowman, 'Le Systeme de Dieu', in Seebacher and Ubersfeld, Hugo le fabuleux, p. 174.
6®Ibid., p. 169. This in itself is very Christian as God was incarnated in man, Christ, and thus in human 
time: history.
61Ozouf, Les Aveux du roman, p. 325.
62Bowman, 'Le Systeme de Dieu', p. 171.
63Fizaine, Le Christ dans Vimaginaire de Victor Hugo, p. 585.
64See Saurat, La Religion de Victor Hugo, p. 58, and Millet, Le Legendaire au XIXe siecle, pp. 165-6.
65Millet, Le Legendaire au XIXe siecle, pp. 165-6.
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imagination, intuition).66 The first degree is basic knowledge: how to find one's way, 
which Valjean does not possess, but which is given to the reader. If Valjean is lost and 
takes the wrong direction, the author tells his reader exactly where he is, in what way he 
is getting things wrong, and how dangerous his mistakes may be. Then there is the 
enigma represented by the labyrinth of the sewers: the outcome of the story. At this 
point, the author is less willing to share his knowledge with the reader, subjecting him 
instead to a series of questions that all come down to: will Valjean and Marius get out 
alive and safe? Yet this outcome is not an end in itself, as Valjean's fate follows God's 
plan. This is the last level of knowledge, known to God only; 'Heurts et ruptures de la 
destinee, hasardeux en apparence, necessaires en realite'.67 Valjean may be unaware of 
the test to which he is submitted, yet 'Hugo detects in what Valjean mistakes for pure 
chaos the shape of a providential design'.68
In this framework, the labyrinth is no longer a simple metaphor for oppression. 
Hugo's use of this symbol is extremely rich: 'On n'en finirait jamais de se promener dans 
les meandres plus labyrinthiques qu'on ne croit des Miserables [...] d'interroger cette 
sagesse d'une etonnante complexite'.69 As we have seen, Hugo blurs the boundaries 
between the construction of the novel and the symbolism of the narrative, the symbol of 
the labyrinth belonging to both. The numerous digressions of the novel constantly seem 
to undermine the sustained development of the plot, leaving the reader disconcerted. 
However, and although acknowledging that few readers are prepared to make the effort, 
Fizaine advocates following the thread of the narrative too: 'II faut suivre patiemment 
les anneaux d'une longue spirale. [...] Peu de lecteurs des Miserables [...] ont consenti a 
suivre les detours d'une temporalite non lineaire, parce qu'elle enferme l'infini'.70
The labyrinth may be deceptive, but it also contains the promise of a path. As a 
modem variation on initiation, it serves to define the complexity of urban knowledge 
and the risks of venturing into these deceptive territories without an Ariadne's thread.71 
As we have seen, the labyrinth is the ultimate test: it symbolises the need either to 
master the set of rules imposed by the city, or else to be swallowed by its monster.
66See Prendergast, P aris an d  the Nineteenth Century, pp. 93-4 and Mis., Ill, pp. 307-9.
67Millet, 'Bloc, evenement', Groupe Hugo, p. 1.
68Prendergast, P aris an d  the Nineteenth Century, p. 94.
69Georges Piroue, Victor H ugo rom ancier ou les dessous de Vinconnu (Paris: Denoel, 1964), pp. 20-1. 
76Fizaine, Le Christ dans I'imaginaire de Victor Hugo, p. 584. See also Brombert: 'La linearite de 
l'intrigue est constamment m inee par le symbolisme d'une descente en spirale et les recurrences cycliques'
in 'Ma Destinee : l'ordre, c'est le delire', p. 230.
71 See Balzac, Le P ere G oriot, p. 117.
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Surviving in the city requires an urban epistemology,72 to master 'les zigzags de la 
strategic', to borrow Hugo's phrase (Mis., I, pp. 479-82).73 Balzac distinguished between 
the neophytes and those who mastered the urban code: Vautrin tries to save Rastignac 
from becoming Paris's next victim, which is very likely to happen if he refuses to see 'la 
vie telle qu'elle est'.74
But Hugo's characters often do not understand this code. They are described as being 
trapped in a destiny in which they are blind and defenceless. Whereas the fall of 
Balzac's characters is explained by their lack of adaptation to the city's rules, Hugo's 
maladaptations find their logic in the idea of fate: his characters cannot be anything else 
but what they are; they are put into a situation they cannot master; their room for 
manoeuvre is extremely limited. In the sewers, Valjean is clearly described as being 'in 
the dark': both blind and ignorant. If the labyrinth operates as an initiation for Valjean, it 
is an unconscious one. Only the author knows the path through the sewers and his 
character's destiny.
The labyrinthine sewers appear therefore not so much as a classical ritual of initiation 
that would require a proper epistemology, as a test of faith. The intelligence which is 
given to the reader (through detailed descriptions of the sewers), but denied to Valjean, 
only serves as a way to trigger the reader's sense of suspense. It is irrelevant to the 
escape of Valjean, who relies on his total submission to his fate despite, or rather thanJks 
to, his blindness and ignorance: 'il valait mieux s'enfoncer dans ce dedale, se fier a cette 
noirceur, et s'en remettre a la providence quant a Tissue' (Mis., Ill, p. 306). The 
important thing is to emerge from the labyrinth (to the light of God), to give oneself 
over to providence, not to understand how it works. And to get out depends on acting 
according to providence, which is to be found through intuition, not factual knowledge.
This does not mean the character is incapable of evolving or reacting. Quite the 
opposite: he will have to be active in order to overcome obstacles, but his actions are 
carried out in the dark, in an intellectual blindness where he is denied the possibility of 
evolving consciously towards a higher understanding of his situation.75 The tension 
between the burden of man and his call to the word of God is typical of Hugo's thought:
72See M ichele Hannoosh, 'La Femme, la ville, le realisme: fondements epistem ologiques dans le Paris de 
Balzac', Rom anic Review , LXXXII, 1991, pp. 127-45.
73This is the title o f  the first chapter o f  the 'Livre cinquieme'.
74Balzac, Le P ere G orio t, p. 153.
75This accounts for the numerous deaths o f  both those who attempt to rebel or who are in the process o f  
changing their very nature, and o f  those who surrender to their Ananke-Arachne: Javert's suicide is a well- 
known example o f  the first category, which can be added to the killings o f  Eponine (unable to achieve the 
transformation operated by Marius) and Gavroche (who has to remain a child). The second category can 
be illustrated by the deaths o f  Fantine and Mabceuf, the logical end o f  a previous death o f  the soul 
(Fantine becom ing a prostitute; Mabceuf having to separate from his cherished books).
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Hugo a introduit, a un pole, une exageration tragique de l'occultation divine qui fait songer aux 
theologies les plus sombres, et, au pole oppose, un glorieux defi humain, une sorte de messianisme 
de l'homme qui rejette toute entrave et toute humilite.76
This offers an interesting insight into the often sadistic treatment suffered by Hugolian 
characters. To understand this tension, we need to understand Hugo's conception of the 
human calling: a Promethean revolt which may seem too much to carry out, but which 
remains man's calling nonetheless.
Just as Hugo's religion is rooted in historical realities, human history is to be 
understood as the slow, gradual revealing of God's will. But the process is linked to a 
fundamental contradiction: God may be hidden, but man's calling is to unveil Him 
nonetheless. And this is a violent act of defiance and rebellion:
L'homme [...]
Doit faire comme Promethee 
Et comme Adam
II doit ravir au ciel austere 
L'etemel feu,
Conquerir son propre mystere 
Et voler Dieu
[■■•]
Pourquoi cacher ces lois profondes?
Rien n'est mure.
Dans vos flammes et dans vos ondes 
Je passerai (Cont., 'Ibo', pp. 300-2).
But this rebellion is itself a fundamental obedience to God -  a deus absconditus who 
only hides so as to be found: 'Le grand obscur se derobe mais veut etre poursuivi. 
L'enigme [...] vous regarde et veut etre vue' ('Contemplation supreme' in OC, XII, p. 
122). This paradoxical enterprise that sanctifies man's boldness recalls Jacob's struggle 
against the angel near Jabbok;77 'la transgression de l'interdit est benie de celui qui l'a 
edicte.78 If we keep the example of Valjean in mind, 'La grande revolte obeissante a 
Dieu' (LS, 'Plein ciel', p. 839) seems to summarise the convict's life; a fight Valjean 
often appears too weak to undertake. But, as Benichou argues:
Hugo exagere 1'impuissance de l’esprit humain, il l'accable sous un defi obsedant, pour l'exciter a 
dresser devant le Dieu impenetrable et muet l'elan d'une recherche inlassable. L'esprit part en
7% enichou, 'Victor Hugo et le Dieu cache', p. 164.
77Genesis, 32, 24-33.
78Benichou, 'Victor Hugo et le Dieu cache', p. 160.
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quelque sorte a l'assaut de Dieu, mais il faut entendre que ce combat est a la gloire des deux 
combattants.79
For Hugo -  and it will be important to remember this point when we come to his 
conception of the People of Paris -  what makes man's greatness is his ability and 
willingness to dare, oser. Tenter, braver, persister, perseverer, etre fidele a soi-meme, 
prendre corps a corps le destin [...] tenir bon, tenir tete' (Mis., II, 121). And with Louis 
Napoleon Bonaparte's coup, this is more urgent than ever.
(iv) History after 1851: myth and demystification
C'est de l'histoire ecoutee au xportes de la leg en d e .^
L'Histoire que voit I'ceilprophetique est tendue entre 
deux aveuglements, I'eblouissement de I'avenir et 
I'obscurcissement du p a s s e d
The difficulty in grasping Hugo's conception of history derives from the fact that he 
himself constantly explored and experimented.82 We have seen that his characters often 
seem to be in an untenable position. Fate seems to drive human action more than men 
make history. But what the episode of Frollo's 'Laissez-faire la fatalite' mentioned 
earlier suggests, is that fate here is not a super-natural force that men have to live by. 'II 
ne s'agit pas alors de materialisme historique: l'histoire reste soumise a une loi "physico- 
divine": Dieu sait ou il va, il y a une conscience qui preside a l'emportement'.83 For 
Hugo, 'le progres [...] n'est pas seulement Inspiration de l'homme mais la loi de Dieu'.84 
Hence, Hugo's scepticism regarding history: as a series of human events, history is 
valuable only in so far as it follows God's principles.
Hugo famously denied ever having written historical fiction or drama,85 preferring 
the novel to history; '[il] prefere la verite morale a la verite historique' ('Sur Walter 
Scott', Litterature etphilosophie melees, OC, V, p. 1834). Historical attention to details 
and facts can be distracting for Hugo, who keeps his focus on spiritual truth. This 
historical pessimism is not solely explained by the seer's philosophy, but also by his
79Ibid., p. 159.
80Hugo, 'Preface' in LS, p. 23.
81Millet, 'Bloc, evenement', p. 2.
82Millet, discussion following 'Bloc, evenement', p. 5.
83Ibid .
840zouf, Les Aveux du roman, p. 176.
85Hovasse, Victor Hugo, p. 388.
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perception that 'history's march forward is a chancy affair, that faith in horizontal, linear 
progress does not necessarily correspond to the most probing vision'.86 In 1830, just one 
year after publishing Le Dernier Jour d'un condamne, a text arguing against the death 
penalty, Hugo had to bear the spectacle of demonstrations in the streets of Paris 
opposing the abolition of the death penalty for political crimes. The revolution of 1830 
had raised great expectations and Hugo was convinced that the time to condemn the 
guillotine once and for all had finally come. Although he blamed the government for 
squandering this historic opportunity, the popular reaction left him deeply disenchanted; 
'ne demandez pas de droits pour le peuple tant que le peuple demandera des tetes', he 
even wrote (CV, I, p. 112).
II faut done s'y resigner: le progres n'est ni continu ni lineaire; les conquetes de l'homme ne 
viennent pas docilement s'ordonner sur l'axe du temps, l'humanite n'en a pas fini avec l'epuisante 
succession des destructions, des germinations, des nouvelles destructions.87
According to Christopher Prendergast, Hugo, after the experience of 1830, started to 
distance himself from a history that was too submissive to facts and too indifferent to 
principles: 'Hugo's way with the intractable in history is finally to move out of history 
altogether'.88 The experience of 1830 seemed to comfort him in not allowing 'the 
pressures of history and politics to take precedence over the deeper commitments of 
art'.89 No doubt the bitter disillusion of 1848-1851 felt by many writers affected him 
also. Fizaine speaks of his reaction as 'un desespoir a l'egard de l'histoire, et [...] une 
colere dont la poesie aura a remplir le programme d'action'.90 The 2 December in 
particular forced Hugo and a whole generation with him to redefine the relation history 
to progress.
Michelet and Hugo shared a common, moral interpretation of 1851 as a takeover by 
an evil power: history has started to regress. The awakening of the People in 1789, the 
whole legacy of the French Revolution is undermined by Napoleon le Petit's coup.
Hence a political reorientation and rethinking of history:
86Brombert, Victor Hugo and the Visionary Novel, p. 77.
87Ozouf, Les Aveux du roman, p. 176. Discussing Les M iserables, she does not refer specifically to the 
events o f  1830 in this remark which applies to Hugo's conception o f  history in general.
88Prendergast, Paris in the Nineteenth Century, p. 97.
89Brombert, Victor Hugo and the Visionary Novel, p. 12.
"F izain e, Le Christ dans I'imaginaire de Victor Hugo, pp. 556-7.
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II s'agit pour eux d'elaborer un rapport au monde qui ne soit pas dementi par la realite. Cette 
realite, celle du Second Empire, est ignoble, plus encore elle est scandaleuse, parce qu'elle 
implique que l'histoire pourrait ne pas etre en progres.91
Both, then, have a similar attitude of refusal, reaction, and denunciation against this 
power; 'selon des modes differents mais selon une meme voie, celle de l'histoire': Hugo 
writes Histoire d'un crime, Napoleon-le-Petit and Chatiments while Michelet continues 
his Histoire de la Revolution frangaise92
In this regard, Chatiments is particularly significant in Hugo's meditation on history. 
It is a poetic work that has history, or, rather its aim and meaning, as its main theme. 
Since 1851, history is perverted, blind, having lost touch with any sense of moral, 
spiritual progress. 'Mais si elle a perdu son sens, l'histoire sous le second Empire n'est 
pas denuee de signification, c'est du reste toute la portee du recueil que de degager une 
inversion'.93 Against the contingency of historical downturn and inversion, Hugo 
chooses the principle set by the Revolution to bring back some form of sense in post- 
1851 France:
Faire 'la preuve de la revolution' (formule de Hugo) c'est-a-dire montrer qu'elle est le principe 
d'organisation de l'histoire, ce principe fut-il en defaut. Resultat: une histoire chimerique qui 
s'instaure contre la realite au nom du reel, et qui travaille a mettre au jour un monde accorde a cette 
chimere.94
If the principle of history is momentarily at fault, then it falls to legend to highlight its 
meaning and direction (or lack of it): 'La legende donne le sens: c'est en fonction d'elle 
que l'histoire signifie. [...] L'histoire historique si l'on peut dire est mise en conge; une 
autre histoire se met en place dans l'ailleurs de la legende'.95 This also applies to La 
Legende des siecles, another attempt to find the principle of history through legend, to 
compensate for the flaws in history as it was being told: 'la memoire legendaire apparait 
ainsi comme le conservatoire de la possibility meme de progres historique dans les 
temps catastrophiques ou celui-ci s'eclipse'.96 Napoleon III owes his power to the 
illusion of an epic of which he claims to be the continuation. Hugo deconstructs this
91Pierre Laforgue, 'Hugo et Michelet entre 1853 et 1859, ou revolution et histoire', in Andre Guyaux and 
Bertrand Marchal (eds.), Victor Hugo, 'La Legende des siecles' (Prem iere Serie), p. 157.
92Ibid., p. 153. However, Hugo's concern for history as such will come later: 'ce n'est qu'a l'automne 1857 
que la pensee de l'histoire l'occupera totalement, comme si a l'enigme de dieu s'etait substitue l'enigme de 
la revolution'(p. 154).
93Pierre Laforgue, 'Epopee et histoire chez Hugo (1852-1862)', Groupe Hugo, 26 octobre 1996, p. 3.
94Laforgue, 'Hugo et Michelet entre 1853 et 1859', p. 160.
9^Ibid., , p. 157.
^ M ille t, Le Legendaire auXLXe siecle, p. 121.
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myth and turns epic back to the originator, thus unveiling the perversion of modern 
history: the neo-Napoleonian epic is bleak, and the new emperor nothing more than a 
faquin: 'cette gloire est ton trou, ta bauge, ta demeure !' (Chat., 'Napoleon III', pp. 215- 
6).
Not surprisingly, the conception of history as an epic collapses in Les Miserables: 
'Waterloo et la barricade de la rue Saint-Denis s'achevent en desastre. Hugo denonce 
comme anachronique et depourvue de prise sur la realite toute conception de l'histoire 
relevant de l'epopee'.97 Hugo the seer uses historical events to de-historicise them: 
'perspective hermeneutique et visionnaire de l'histoire', Brombert argues; 'en fait le 
mode prophetique au meme titre que le mode mythique, de-historise l'histoire'.98 Les 
Miserables echoes the hiccups of history -  well-known trademark of the nineteenth 
century, a time of repetition and gaps, 'epoque instable de transition, de confusion, 
d'alliages saugrenus'.99 The 'super saint' of the Revolution rots in the sewers, the 
miserables have preposterous names such as Eponine or Azelma; bishops ask for 
Conventionnels' benediction; convicts are saints; prostitutes not necessarily perverse: 
'Dans Les Miserables, le determinisme historique trebuche a chaque tournant'.100
One example of such deconstruction of history is the way Hugo uses the grotesque in 
his work. It seems to me that its use in both Chatiments and Les Miserables provides the 
key to fully understanding Hugo's relation to myth and history. Hugo had started from a 
perversion of values in the first instance to make a different use of the grotesque in his 
novel: negative in Chatiments, it acquires a positive quality in Les Miserables. Millet 
showed how the poem operated this 'sortie du mythe' with the very material of myth:
II s'agit de sortir du mythe, et de mythifier cette sortie du mythe, afm qu'elle ne soit pas, comme 
dans la parodie burlesque, la chute deceptive dans une realite derisoire, mais la renaissance meme 
du reel, en sa grandeur sacree.101
Millet highlighted the importance of'Le Satyre' in this regard: 'il est oriente (des son 
titre) vers le depassement du mythe et l'acces a une verite superieure, d'ordre 
ontologique et theologique, qui rend l'adhesion au mythe impossible'.102
In Les Miserables, the use of the grotesque is similarly opposed to mystification, but 
is presented as the condition of a reversibility that would reconcile history and the real:
97Laforgue, 'Epopee et histoire chez Hugo', p. 8.
98Brombert, 'Ma Destinee: l'ordre c'est le delire', p. 229.
" O zou f, Les Aveux du roman, p. 165.
100Ibid.
101 M illet, Le Legendaire au XIXe siecle, p. 138.
102/6id.
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Cela tient a ce [que le grotesque] n'est plus pense comme l'objet de la satire (le pouvoir s'affublant 
des depouilles de l'epopee), mais qu'il est constitue en sujet transcendantal de l'histoire (le peuple 
accedant a la conscience de son destin epique). En 1862, le grotesque cesse d'etre le signe d'une 
perversion des valeurs, mais designe tout ce qui doit, un jour, rendre possible l'avenement de 
l'histoire 'reelle'.103
The full impact of Hugo's philosophy of history is to be understood only if we 
remember the importance of matter for him, his identification of history with matter -  
and thus with evil. Hence the importance of the sewers in his work, an apt illustration of 
his religious conception of history. We need to explore this image further here, this time 
in direct relation to Hugo's conception of history. The sewers have a history, narrated by 
Hugo in Les Miserables; but more importantly, they are history. The answer to why the 
bas-fond can be a principle of human regeneration and how the grotesque can trigger a 
reversibility of history can be found there.
(v) The metaphor of the sewers: history, accumulation and reversibility
Le sous-sol de Paris est un receleur: il cache 
l'histoired^4
Pour un homme du XIXe siecle, I'ananke supreme est 
evidemment historique
The sewers are yet another obsession of Hugo's: the metaphor of the sewers as 
historical accumulation is developed in Paris, and most famously in Les Miserables and 
Chatiments:
Tous les vices de Rome, egout du genre humain,
Suintent, comme en un crible, a travers cette voute,
Et l'immonde univers y filtre goutte a goutte {Chat., 'L'Egout de Rome', p. 275).
The sewers and the city are identified in that they are the place of accumulation of 
history, filtering actions and time alike:
[Des villes comme Paris] sont des entonnoirs ou viennent aboutir tous les versants geographiques, 
politiques, moraux, intellectuels d'un pays, toutes les pentes naturelles d'un peuple; des puits de 
civilisation, pour ainsi dire, et aussi des egouts, ou commerce, industrie, intelligence, population,
103Laforgue, 'Epopee et histoire chez Hugo', p. 9.
104Hugo, P ,p . 44.
^^Christophe Calame, "'Ananke" narrative et fatalite philosophique', in Seebacher and Ubersfeld, Hugo 
le fabuleux, p. 117.
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tout ce qui est seve, tout ce qui est vie, tout ce qui est ame dans une nation filtre et s'amasse sans 
cesse goutte a goutte, siecle a siecle (ND, 146).
Hugo articulates all the resources of his most sombre and disturbing imaginaire: 
teratology, darkness, evil, unhealthiness, all serving to suggest the horror of such places;
[...] lieu monstrueux 
Enfer d'ombre et de boue [...]
Ou les murs ont la lepre, oil, parmi les pustules 
Glissent les scorpions meles aux tarentules.
M om e abime ! {Chat., 'L'Egout de Rome', p. 273).
The pavement exudes blood, the ponds are filled with the most horrendous objects and 
animals; it is the place of'la vieille hydre chaos'; 'tout est fetide, informe, abject, terrible 
a voir' {Chat., 'L'Egout de Rome', pp. 274-5).
However, Paris's sewers had been rationalised by Bruneseau and by the time Hugo 
wrote Les Miserables, he acknowledged that it was almost a monument worth visiting: 
'L'egout actuel est un bel egout; le style pur y regne'. 'L'appareil digestif de Babylone' 
{Mis., Ill, p. 297) belongs to the past now. And yet it is the sewers of this past that Hugo 
describes {Mis., Ill, p. 301). Why Hugo is so interested in the sewers of the capital is 
because they constitute the perfect metaphor of post-1851 France: 'L'Histoire a pour 
egout des temps comme les notres...' {Chat., Ill, XIII, p. 134).
For Hugo, history is agglutination, aggravation, and the accumulation of weight. If 
history does not follow a principle of divine progress, then it can be no more than the 
gradual filling of the city's sewers or well.106
Or, la premiere faute 
Fut le premier poids,
[...]
Le Mai etait fait. Puis tout alia en s'aggravant {Cont., 'Ce que dit la bouche d'ombre', p. 388).
If history is identified with matter and evil in Hugo, it is precisely because it fails to be a 
transformation, being reduced to mere aggregation instead; and if the seer goes down to 
the lowest part of the city, it is because history follows the law of gravity, just like 
matter does: 'Quel precipice que ce passe! Descente lugubre! Dante y hesiterait. La vraie 
catacombe de Paris, c'est cela. L'histoire n'a pas de sape plus noire' (P, p. 60). Hugo goes 
on to identify the past with a corpse; the past is gone, its bones alone remain.
What is interesting about this vision of history is that it combines matter with 
movement: the piling up of past events eventually reaches saturation and then collapses.
106'paris est un puits perdu' Hugo says in P, p. 36.
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This is 1789, which for Hugo is not so much a date as a number; the figure of this 
accumulation, the addition of past centuries and misery in the city's underground: 'cette 
ombre avait un total' (P, p. 61); and when the filter is saturated, the moment has come 
for revolution. The story of this accumulation is symbolised in the vision of 'le mur des 
siecles'; a vision of petrifaction of humanity and history alike:
C'etait de la chair vive avec du granit brut 
[...]
C’etait une muraille et c'etait une foule (LS, pp. 9-10).
And if this accumulation goes up -  'muraille, bloc d'obscurite funebre, Montait dans 
l'infmi' (p. 13) - , it also goes deep down, along that vertical axis mentioned earlier:
J'entendais sous mes pieds, dans le goufffe,
Sangloter la misere aux gemissements sourds (p. 12).
Michelet shares with Hugo this vision of history as the long accumulation of misery 
and suffering: 'ce qui m'a perce le coeur, c'est cette longue resignation, cette douceur, 
cette patience, c'est l'effort que fit 1'humanite pour aimer ce monde de haine et de 
malediction sous lequel on l'accablait'.107 Michelet opposes this longue duree to the 
sudden acceleration of time during the Revolution: 'brusque condensation dans le 
"jour", "l'heure" de l'evenement, la Revolution'.108 This moment is, for them, the 
moment of saturation. Michelet describes the 14 July as the result of centuries of history 
accumulating in the People's consciousness: 'l'histoire revint cette nuit-la, une longue 
histoire de souffrances, dans l'instinct vengeur du peuple. L'ame des peres qui, tant de 
siecles souffrirent, moururent en silence revint dans les fils et parla' (RF, p. 145).
Earlier in the same work, Michelet had described a very Hugolian vision of historical 
accumulation, deriving from a glance at a dark peak. 'Ce solitaire, noir et chauve, etait 
trop visiblement le fils des profondes entrailles du globe'. The peak serves as a starting 
point for Michelet's meditation: 'sombre temoin des tortures du monde interieur. [...] 
Quelles convulsions, quelles tortures arracherent du fond du globe ce prodigieux 
soupir!'. The disturbing vision of the peak triggers a form of anamnesis for Michelet, as 
if the past misery had been encapsulated in its substance, much in the same way as the 
celtic belief recalled by Proust which sees the souls of the lost ones being imprisoned in 
objects, waiting to be freed by our remembrance of them:109
107Michelet, La Revolution franqaise , p. 59.
108Millet, 'Bloc, evenement', p. 6.
109See the passage that immediately precedes the famous episode o f'la  madeleine'. Marcel Proust, Du 
Cote de chez Swann (Paris: Gallimard, 1992), p. 49.
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La nature m'avait trop rappele l'histoire. Ce chaos de monts entasses m'opprimaient du meme poids 
qui, pendant tout le M oyen-Age, pesa sur le coeur de l'homme, et dans ce pic desole, que du fond 
de ses entrailles la terre lan9 ait contre le ciel, je retrouvais le desespoir et le cri du genre humain 
(RF, p. 58).
Hence 1793: the excess of this misery explains why 14 July fails fully to absorb it. 
The bloodshed that follows comes after centuries of accumulated horrors. In Les 
Miserables this is exactly the defence presented by the Conventionnel when Myriel 
brings up the infamous date of 1793: 'un nuage s'est forme pendant quinze cents ans. Au 
bout de quinze siecles, il a creve. Vous faites le proces au coup de tonnerre' (Mis., I, p.
65). It is also a theme developed in Les Contemplations:
Alors subitement, un jour, debout, debout!
Les reclamations de l'ombre miserable,
La geante douleur, spectre incommensurable,
Sortent du gouffre. [...]
Tout est dit. C'est ainsi que les vieux mondes croulent
Oh ! 1'heure vient toujours ! (Cont., 'Ecrit en 1846', IV, p. 248).
But if 1793 was inexorable, the moment of revolution is not in the hands of the People:
while Michelet is touched by the People's long resignation, Hugo suggests that it is God 
who triggers the revolutionary moment. Again, Hugo does not have a vision of a 
bloodthirsty God, eager for human suffering. Misery is piling up in spite of God's will, 
not with his blessing. 'Dieu est le grand impatient, dont la colere et l'amour font un 
revolutionnaire, pour briser l'immuabilite des tyrans, et arracher l'Humanite a sa lenteur, 
a sa patience, sa trop grande endurance a la douleur'.110
Revolution is this moment when God announces that this point of saturation has 
been reached, and puts history back in motion, and when this word is finally heard and 
acted upon: 'Dieu dit au Peuple: Va !' {Cont., 'Ecrit en 1846', IV, p. 248. The livre 
cinquieme is headed 'En Marche').111 The main actor of Michelet's L'Histoire de la 
Revolution Frangaise -  indeed more important than the usual heroes, leaders and well- 
known agents of history (RE, p. 113)112 -  the People finally put history (back) in motion 
when their action and the word of God finally meet.
The action is bound to be painful, but this is, again, Prometheus's calling: 'ce n'est 
pas sans un cruel effort, sans un douloureux dechirement qu'il s'arrache a la fatalite au
110Millet, 'Bloc, evenement', p. 8.
11 ^ 'aven ir et le passe faisaient tous deux meme reponse; tous deux ils dirent: "Va!"' M ichelet wrote (RF, 
p. 145).
112'Seul le 14 juillet fut le jour du peuple tout entier' (RF, p. 145).
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sein de laquelle il est reste si longtemps suspendu' (HU, p. 327). The mission of the 
People is this divine fight with their creator; when, driven by the seer, they start their 
march again. Since 1789, the command has been given and the people were born in 
Paris; Paris, the sacred location of this divine fight -  the holy mission of the Parisians 
consisting in fighting: 'la pensee de Paris conduit au combat'.113 And from 1789 to 
1871, had the Parisians risen to it. Yet in 1851 it seems that the people fail to hear the 
divine command, let alone to move. The impulse given to history in 1789 reaches a 
surprising halt in 1851. How would the poet of the people react to his flock's remarkable 
passivity?
Hugo was and would remain the poet of the People, choosing his heroes among the 
crowd and addressing it in his titles; 'premier grand poete qui ait donne a des oeuvres 
litteraires des titres communs'.114 The relation was strong between the poet and the 
people of Paris, particularly poignant when he buried his son Charles during the siege of 
1871.115 Moreover Hugo was and continued to be read by the working class. Hugo gave 
an identity to the People of the nineteenth century, narrated their story. At a time where 
urban teratology saw the miserables with horror and disgust, Hugo turned them into 
heroes; when the responsibility of society for criminality was hardly envisaged, Hugo 
highlighted the injustice of the condemnations endured by Valjean and Fantine.
J'ai, dans le livre, avec le drame, en prose, en vers,
Plaide pour les petits et les miserables;
[ ...]
J'ai rehabilite le bouffon, l'histrion,
Tous les damnes humains, Triboulet, Marion,
Le laquais, le forfat et la prostituee (Cont., 'En marche', p. 249).
Having Valjean the for gat -  'tout a la fois une victime sociale et un proscrit politique'116 -  
as the hero of his novel was scandalous at the time. In an openly religious novel, it operated 
a symbolic inversion, a Christian revolution:
Car sur cette croix des pretres c'est aussi un de ces hors-la-loi qui est 'figure'. [...] C'est meme le 
hors-la-loi par excellence, celui qui est venu, a un moment unique de l’Histoire, recuser, au nom de 
l'amour, tout l'appareil symbolique ou un peuple avait laisse se petrifier les valeurs et les verites 
lentement conquises au cours de son histoire.1 ^
113Combes, Paris dans les M iserables, (unpublished doctoral dissertation), p. 253.
114Cited by Benjamin, Paris, Capitale du XIXe siecle, p. 771. See also Walter Bejamin, Illuminations 
(London: Pimlico, 1999), p. 162. Benjamin refers to Les M iserables and Les Travailleurs de la mer. Les 
M iserables eventually replaced the initial title Les Miseres.
115See CV, II, p. 627 and AT, pp. 139-43.
1 ^Brombert, La Prison romantique, p. 112.
1 ^Fizaine, Le Christ dans Vimaginaire de Victor Hugo, p. 203.
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Identified with a modern Christ, the masses of miserables can operate this inversion 
because it is in the recesses of the deepest misery that human salvation is to come:
-  Le sublime est en bas. Le grand choix,
C'est bien de choisir l'affront. De meme que parfois 
La pourpre est deshonneur, souvent la fange est lustre.
La boue immeritee atteignant 1'ame illustre,
L'opprobre, ce cachot d'ou l'aureole sort,
Le fond noir de l'epreuve oil le malheur nous traine,
Sont le comble eclatant de la grandeur sereine.
[...]
La Laideur de l'epreuve en devient la beaute.
[ • • • ]
L'abjection du sort fait la gloire de l'homme (Cont., 'Les Malheureux', p. 291).
However, faced with the most radical blow to the march of progress, the people show 
remarkable passivity. And as if this was not worrying enough, Napoleon III seemed to 
be supported by public opinion through his numerous plebiscites. The people, who were 
given a voice in 1848, use it to support the faquin, producing consternation in the ranks 
of the exiled:
Mais qui done a vote? [...]
Oil done [etait] la nation ? Ou done la liberte ?
Ils ont vote !
Troupeau que la peur mene 
Entre le sacristain et le garde-champetre (Chat., Ill, IV, p. 109).
Hugo encapsulates perfectly what the plebiscites will be throughout Napoleon Ill's 
reign. His surprise, though, is tainted with growing resentment about a People that are 
letting history down. The People are asleep and Hugo attempts to awaken them: 'O 
France, quoique tu sommeilles' (Chat., 'Luna', p. 232). Hugo urges Paris to resume their 
historical mission: 'redevenez le grand Paris !' (Chat., 'A ceux qui dorment', pp. 230- 
l) .118 As a seer, he tries to raise the alarm:
Lazare ! Lazare ! Lazare !
Leve-toi ! (Chat., 'Au Peuple', pp. 80-2).
But the people do not move and the deception turns sour: Hugo has no words harsh 
enough to vilify the submission of what he can no longer call 'le Peuple', but sees as a
118'Etre Paris, c'est marcher' Hugo says in P, p. 97.
157
'herd' -  'le bas du genre humain qui s'ecroule en troupeau' (Chat., IV, IX, p. 162 -  again 
an image of fall):
Et j'aimerais mieux etre, o fourmis des cites,
Tourbe, foule, hommes faux, coeurs morts, races dechues
Un arbre dans les bois qu'une ame en vos cohues ! {Chat., IV, IX, p. 163).
Chatiments denounces a people that turn their back on their historical, revolutionary 
mission. 'La colere du poete n'est pas passagere: Hugo se metre du populaire. La 
populace est une force aveugle'.119
And this is why the 1851 coup is a catastrophe: not so much because the faquin is on 
the throne, but because the People let it be. Hugo does not see what the people's 
passivity of 1851 owes to June 1848. For him, it was illegitimate then to fight the 
Republic, it is legitimate now to rise against 'Napoleon le Petit'. The working class, 
however, makes a very different reading: legitimate in June 48, an insurrection seemed 
pointless in December 51. Meanwhile, Hugo is left with a distant disenchantment from 
his exile. The People seem satisfied with the new regime and indulges in its 'values':
O faubourien, le salaire a double. Les joum ees sont bonnes; [...] on t'a alloue une grasse liste civile 
de travaux; Paris s'est endette, l'Empire s'est endette; on t'a donne a manger sur le pain du deux 
decembre un cervelas de deux cent cinquante millions; et avec le pain, le cirque, les fetes, les 
hippodromes, les feux d'artifice, les illuminations, les Te Deum, les parades, le grand spectacle 
gratis du treteau imperial (CV, II, p. 286)4  20
Panem et cir censes; the faubourien is being transformed into a Daumier-like bourgeois: 
'te voila florissant, repu, dodu, brosse, lustre, peigne, te voila gros et gras, faubourien'. 
Like the dog of La Fontaine's fable, he has renounced his freedom for a miserable 
'pitance': 'Vive l'empereur, tout est bien. La carrosserie va, le batiment marche. Le 
Peuple est content' Hugo observes with contempt; 'J'aimais mieux le loup maigre', he 
bitterly concludes (CV, II, p. 286). But the promise of demystification survives 'le 
peuple en panne', and awaits a decision by the People to listen to the Word of God -  
that, for Hugo, is their historical calling.
As the mythical figure of the People develops, so does the disenchantment about the 
actual Parisians and their attitude. Not much progress has been made, it seems, since 
they actively supported the guillotine in 1830. One of the main consequences of the
119Brombert, 'Ma Destinee: l'ordre, c'est le delire', p. 228.
^ H u g o  identifies faubouriens and Parisians: 'C'est surtout dans les faubourgs [...] que la race parisienne 
apparait' {Mis., Ill, 121); 'Paris est surtout son faubourg' (P, p. 83).
constitution of the myth of the People, is to make its mythical opposite -  the counter 
myth of populace and barbarians -  all the more acute. The horror grows in the face of 
the ticking social bomb: after June 1848, popular violence becomes the focus of all 
urban and social fears.
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Chapter 6
From the Myth of the People to the Nightmare of the Populace'. Paris's debacle
Fantasm agorie terrib le [...]. Nul ne resister ait a une 
telle epreuve. Cette manie singuliere de se denigrer soi- 
meme, d ’etaler ses plaies, et comme d'aller chercher la 
honte, serait m ortelle a la longue. ^
As we have seen, the change of perception that affected post-revolutionary France 
favoured new forms of fear, and particularly urban fear. In this chapter, I will be looking 
at these further, as myth depends on the affective framework it sprouts from. I will be 
looking in particular at the obsession with the People's violence in an urban context -  be 
it criminal or political -  with reference to various texts, historical (Corbin) and literary 
(Sue, Hugo), before focusing on the Parisian episode in Zola's La Debacle, which I 
believe illustrates the outcome of such an imaginaire, as well as the end of Paris as a 
myth.
In the century of progress and rationality, the permanent outbursts of violence carried 
out by the classes dangereuses (in the form of petty crimes or revolutionary riots) echo 
the monstrous nature of Paris described in chapter 4 .1 will return to the Hugolian image 
of the bas-fond, this time focusing on its inhabitants -  scarcely human creatures that 
crawl in Paris's worst and darkest recesses. An urban phantasmagoria derives from this 
dreadful representation which confuses the representation of the people with that of the 
city in a global, teratologic image of evil. Just like the representation of the city itself, 
the image of its populace is not to be reduced to mere metaphors or some literary thrill. 
In this instance, it helps to understand the framework in which the dominant discourse 
can deny popular revolts any legitimacy, or even any form of political justification. This 
framework of representations helps the dominant discourse to delegitimise any form of 
violent protest as essentially a mark of urban abnormality and monstrosity. Alongside 
the 'cite ideale', the ideals of progress and the myth of the People, the survival of bloody 
and criminal excesses seems to undermine the very foundation of the 'century of 
modernity'.
In that regard, it will be important to draw a parallel between the myth of the People 
and that of the populace. Hugo in particular tried to draw a clear line between the two. 
But contrary to the path of progress initiated by \1S9, jacquerie seems to survive the
1 Michelet, Pe. p. 61. Michelet refers to the literary representation o f  the people and its phantasmagoric 
quality which is being confused with the reality o f France. 'Prenez garde, he warns, ce jeu-la est 
dangereux' (p. 63).
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myth of the People in the very location where the latter was born. The afterglow of the 
image of jacquerie in urban settings illustrates the growing fears that increasingly focus 
on the working class, as though the ouvriers were following in the footsteps of their 
rural forefathers to become bloodthirsty savages themselves. The ill-defined image of 
criminal mobs denies any legitimacy to their revolt and radicalises a discourse that 
stigmatises any form of violent protest as a scourge, rejecting it as barbarous and bestial. 
One illustration of this is to be found in Zola's La Debacle. We shall see that in the final 
part of the novel, a revolutionary Parisian comes to articulate the dominant discourse 
and abide by it in a pathetic confession, and in repentance of his city's wrongdoings.
The spectacle of urban expiation (sprouting from a long desire to see the proud capital 
on its knees, as I shall argue) brings the feverish agony of a Parisian revolutionary, and 
the fire that is threatening the capital of greed, together in a single picture of hopeful 
and depoliticised regeneration.
(i) La Bete... humainel From the bestialisation to the demonisation of the People
The perception of violence has evolved since the eighteenth century when it 
seemed -  although regrettably -  part of human nature, the inevitable price to pay for the 
contrat social,2 the dark side of this awkward human creature, half way between animal 
and God. It seemed, then, that human beings, either as imperfect creatures unworthy of 
their creator or as victims of the social compromise, were somehow 'naturally violent'.
In the nineteenth century in France, by contrast, violence tended to be more clearly 
assimilated to animality than humanity; considered not so much as man's natural bestial 
side, as the exact opposite of what human nature should be -  a 'nature' which was very 
much modem, urban, and civilised. This evolution in the perception of violence affected 
social and artistic discourses, even in those who voiced a strong empathy for the 
suffering of the poor; self-proclaimed socialist writers too participated in the elaboration 
of a collective phantasmagoria that confused 'classes laborieuses et classes 
dangereuses'.3
I would like to explore further the change of perceptions analysed by Alain Corbin 
and mentioned in Chapter 3. Corbin argues that such a change occurred at the end of the 
eighteenth century, when the two most public types of violence -  physical punishment 
and massacres -  gradually disappeared: in the eighteenth century, street violence and
2See Pierre Saint-Amand, Les Lois de I'hostilite. La politique a I'age des Lumieres (Paris: Le Seuil, 1992).
3The much quoted phrase is from Louis Chevalier, Classes laborieuses et classes dangereuses (Paris:
Plon, 1958). See also Honore Antoine Fregier, Des Classes dangereuses de la population dans les 
grandes villes et des moyens de les rendre meilleures (Paris: Baillere, 1840).
massacres were relatively familiar events.4 But the end of the century saw what Corbin 
refers to as Tavenement de "fame sensible'": 'la discordance engendre des discours 
d'horreur vis-a-vis d'une violence desormais tenue par certains comme intolerable'.5 It 
is the moment when the horrified reaction of Chateaubriand mentioned in Chapter 3 
clashed with the sensitivity (or lack of it) of the revolutionary mob. As the reality of 
violence decreased throughout the nineteenth century, the sensitivity to its manifestation 
became more acute, as if the urban imaginary became the receptacle of a violence that 
was gradually leaving the stage of everyday reality. Violence became a major theme, an 
urban obsession alongside the others discussed in Chapter 4. The city's chaotic nature 
was perceived as generating abnormal (i.e. non-human) types of behaviour. A whole 
section of the population of Paris was seen as an aberration. As Sue perfectly summed it 
up: 'ces hommes ont des mceurs a eux, des femmes a eux, un langage a eux, langage 
mysterieux, rempli d'images funestes, de metaphores degouttantes de sang'.6 So what 
set these creatures aside? The most obvious sign of their abnormality was that they 
seemed to have been stripped from their human shell.
One first step in sketching violence as abnormal is to associate it with bestiality. 
Violent individuals or masses were equally 'bestialised'. At the end of the century, 
phrenology successfully claimed to demonstrate scientifically that the shape of the skull 
indicated a person's criminal tendencies. It followed physiognomy, a similar attempt at 
scientific classification which claimed a connection between physical appearance (the 
face in particular) and morality. Phrenology was popularised in 1876 by Cesare 
Lombroso who proposed a theory of the natural-born criminal.7 The portrait drawn -  
hardly surprisingly -  seems closer to that of an animal than a human: the long, monkey- 
type arms, big canines and ears, prominent brow-ridges, and small eyes, combined with 
little intelligence (but unquestionable cunning) and physical strength, paint the perfect 
picture of animality: at best, the criminal looks like a primate, at worst, a wolf. Science 
here aims to underline the biological inadaptability of violent criminals, by presenting 
them as primitive and savage beings.8
4Farge, La Vie fra g ile , p. 310.
5Corbin, 'La Violence est-elle un accident: Approches philosophique, historique, sociologique de la 
violence', conference held in Paris, 20-21 novembre 1997, <cindynics.org/iec-violence2.pdf>, p. 14.
6Sue, Les M ystere de Paris, p. 31. A similar language is to be found in the famous chapter on Targot' by 
Hugo in Mis. ('idiome abject qui ruisselle de fange', III, p. 7): some words seem to be bom from the 
underworld and thus appear not so much as mere metaphors, but literally soaked in blood or mud, the two 
most idiosyncratic elements o f  the bas-fond.
7Cesare Lombroso, L'Homme criminel, criminel ne,fou  moral, epileptique: etude anthropologique et 
medico-legale, trans. by M. Boum et (Paris: F. Alcan, 1887).
8This rhetoric draws on the themes o f  the 'two races' which had served to justify the domination o f  the 
nobility (issued from the Francs) over the roturiers (descendants o f  the defeated Gallo-Romains). In the
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The very idea of progress, which ran so high at the time, was meant to highlight the 
archaism of any element resisting the dominant pattern of evolution. Any such 
resistance labeled 'primitive' could then promptly be seen as a deviancy, an anomalous 
reversion that seemed to contradict its modern context. The anachronism of the human 
beast is the first sign of his abnormality. Furthermore, the animality of the savage 
individual rapidly combines with that of the mob. Authors as diverse as Taine, Le Bon 
and Zola all pointed out that individual (human) consciousness dissolves in an (animal) 
crowd, leading otherwise 'normal' people to the worst excesses -  'le deferlement de la 
Bete humaine'.
I would like to insist particularly on the close link between the city and the betes 
humaines which is key to this urban phantasmagoria. This elusive, dangerous 
population is particularly frightening as they live in the recesses of a city which is itself 
daunting. We need to take the full scale of this process of confusion, as it is a major 
factor in this system of representations: the worker and the city form an ambiguous, 
tenebrous and chaotic relation, proper to develop all sorts of phantasms. The collective 
and the individual, the criminal and the revolutionary are closely intermingled so as to 
suggest, in their very confusion, the chaotic and elusive nature of the city. The urban 
metaphors of the pieuvre, the spider, the image of the 'cite tentaculaire', convey and 
develop the hideous figure of social chaos, of the 'hydre de l'anarchie' that threatens the 
upper world. The people are easily confused with the image of the city-monster -  the 
Leviathan as we have seen -  which seems to protect those primitive beings. It is as if 
Mercier's faubourg Saint Marcel (mentioned in chapter 4) had spread to the entire 
capital.
'Barbares', 'sauvages', 'nomades', ces expressions generalement employees par Sue et par Hugo et 
qui evoquent les unes et les autres une race primitive, vivant a l'ecart des gens civilises, ne 
designent pas seulement les habitants des bas-fonds [...], mais un pourcentage eleve de la 
population parisienne.0
This blurred image of urban monstrosity, blending the representation of the city with 
that of its restless working (or non-working) class finds a perfect illustration in the bas- 
fond: 'the bas-fond is the place of regressive reduction to the animal and the primitive', 
Prendergast notes.10 Everything coming from the bas-fond bears the mark of the evil
nineteeenth century, it tends to oppose the rich to the poor, weakened by misery and suspected o f being 
criminals, revolutionaries and spreaders o f  disease. See Bernard Marchand, Paris, histoire d'une ville, pp. 
65-6.
^Chevalier, Classes laborieuses et classes dangereuses, p. 10.
10Prendergast, Paris and the Nineteenth Century, p. 87.
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Beast: the people, the buildings and the city are confused in one single hideous 
monstrous figure. The galetas of the Thenardiers corresponds to this monstrosity; a 
hideous slum with dark comers which could hide terrible creatures:
De la d'affreux coins insondables oil il semblait que devaient se blottir des araignees grosses 
comme le poing, des cloportes larges comme le pied, et peut-etre meme on ne sait quels etres 
humains monstrueux (Mis., II, p. 274).
But perhaps worse than the bas-fond itself, are the people who live in there, as if the 
phantasmagoria of the place had spread to its half-human creatures. In Les Miserables, 
Hugo describes the gang of conmen and criminals, la bande a Patron-Minette, as 'un 
mysterieux voleur a quatre tetes, [...] le polype monstrueux du mal habitant la crypte de 
la societe' {Mis., II, p. 253). The people of the bas-fond, like the people of the Cour des 
Miracles, are repeatedly compared to every possible infernal creature, not only animal 
(spiders, bats) but also supernatural (demons, devils, ghouls, vampires, ghosts, spectres). 
They are described in a bestial and fantastic way: the escape of Claquesous is described 
as a feerie (II, p. 394 -  although Hugo also suggests that the police may have let him go), 
whilst Eponine is seen as 'une envoyee des tenebres' by Marius (II, p. 272) and as a 
goblin by Mabeuf (II, p. 401). For the animality of these creatures is not the worst 
aspect of their abnormality: worst of all is the urban evil that seems to invade their 
soul -  if they still have one. This image of bestiality underlines the double abnormality 
of the 'people of the abyss', both animal (biological beast) and evil (the Biblical Beast). 
The figures of animality and the Beast intermingle in an extremely powerful way, 
mixing bestiality and demonisation and linking animality to pure evil. Hence the 
discourse of order and peace which seeks to protect society from being overwhelmed by 
waves of wild and primitive savagery.11 'Order and peace', the powerful political 
message of Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte, matches its time, reassuring rural France and 
the bourgeois elite alike, both of which are terrorised by the resurgence of the red 
spectre of sans-culotterie. By that time, the myth of the People fails to compensate for 
the equally powerful myth of the populace.
1 *Dolf Oehler, Le Spleen contre Voubli. Juin 1848. Baudelaire, Flaubert, Heine, Herzen  (Paris: Payot,
1996), p. 37-8.
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(ii) From the People to the populace: the illegitimacy of popular revolt
II y  a sous toutes les grandes villes des fosses aux lions, 
des cavernes ferm ees d'epais barreaux. [ .. .]  Des cages 
ouvertes, s'elancent les hyenes de 93 et les gorilles de 
la Commune4^
This clash between the myth of an enlightened, revolutionary People and that of 
reckless, mob-like barbarians is one of many aspects of the mythical framework of 
nineteenth-century France. Both because of their violence (the People degenerating into 
the mob) and their resignation (accepting Napoleon Ill's regime), the people are not 
fulfilling their promise. How can one explain this deviancy when it is said time and time 
again that the People as such are good and benefit from a reliable instinct? Michelet in 
particular -  who sees himself as one of them -  insists on this point:
Le trait eminent, capital, qui m'a toujours frappe le plus, dans ma longue etude du peuple, c'est que, 
parmi les desordres de l'abandon, les vices de la misere, j'y trouvais une richesse de sentiment et 
une bonte de coeur. [...] ils suivent un instinct de bonte, l'aveugle elan d'un bon coeur (Pe, p. 64).
If they are so good and perceptive, then how can they turn their back on their 
revolutionary ideals? Ignorance, misery, the dehumanisation of the mob: interpretations 
vary. The urge to educate (Hugo particularly insists on that), to enlighten the masses, 
reveals a weakening optimism. By the end of the century, a whole tradition of suspicion 
and fear, running from Maistre to Le Bon will legitimate a certain degree of alienation 
of the people in favour of social cohesion. From Versailles 1789, to Versailles 1871, the 
century is driven by this question: if the People's violence was legitimate in 1789, even 
sacralised, how would their violence in the nineteenth century be interpreted? What 
meaning was to be given to the relentless revolutions and riots that continued to shake 
the capital?
1848 was a turning point in a process that saw the myth of the People gradually being 
replaced with the ideology of class struggle; the ideal of national unity now seemed 
clearly undermined by social and economic divisions. And this was only two years after 
Michelet devoted a third of his Le Peuple to what should unite them. As he was to 
acknowledge later: 'un monde a sombre depuis lors' (Pe, preface of 1865, p. 247). June 
inflicted a fatal blow to the dispositif legendaire. And the myth of the People was 
affected by something that June 1848 had made explicit: a clash between the People -  
as it had thus far been imagined -  and the people who were fighting on the barricades
^Theophile Gautier, Tableaux de Siege, Paris, 1870-1871 (Paris: Charpentier, 1871), pp. 372-3.
against the Republican troops. Bourgeois and workers no longer had the same dreams.13 
Michelet had been proud to be counted among the barbares in 1846, but when his 
hunch that France could be divided into two nations became reality, the emotional 
quality of the word barbares took a new dimension.14
The myth of the People elaborated in the nineteenth century in France was an 
intellectual construction in the way Hobbes and Rousseau's concept of 'etat de nature' 
had been: an idea more than a reality. It was in the nature of that myth to meet a need 
for social cohesion that had been at risk ever since the French revolution. The abstract 
quality of the notion helped to attenuate the many divisions that threatened France at a 
time which was also characterised by an increasing tendency to individualism: 'entre 
individu et groupe, il n'y a pas de differences sociales ou economiques', Ellul notes;
'c'est une idee abstraite a laquelle on confere tous les attributs de la souverainete'.15 
This intellectual construction was also a sacred and mythical one; one that had deified 
the People, France, and history in a single move.
The myth of the People fueled the politics of the first part of the century. Hence, the 
effort to excuse, or even legitimise, its revolutionary violence, as it allowed the People 
to access history, as we have seen in the previous chapter. It is this myth that endured 
until 1848, when universal suffrage gave it a fatal blow: no one had thought then than 
the People could go wrong. The constitution of the myth of the People in its Parisian 
shrine had somehow de-realised the rest of the country. But in December 1848, 
universal suffrage consigned the 'capitale du genre humain' to a marginal place. Was 
there a national myth of the People? As Marx argued, 1848 and 1851 have to be 
understood together, the coup being nothing more than the natural outcome of the 
peasants' decision to elect a Napoleon as their leader.16 The socio-economic structure 
of the French peasantry fragmented the country into tiny, self-sufficient and isolated 
groups, with no sense of belonging to a community (class, people nor nation). France 
was then nothing more than the sum-total of its inhabitants, lacking collective 
consciousness: 'the great bulk of the French nation is formed by simple accretion, much 
as potatoes in a sack form a sack of potatoes' (p. 117). Marx further argued that this
13Servier notes a difference between the bourgeois rational, scientific technocratic utopia and working 
class millenarianism. '[L'utopie bourgeoise] 'represente les aspirations de la bourgeoisie, a l'oppose de 
toute pensee revolutionnaire, de toute regeneration de la societe par la seule vertu mystique du peuple'. 
Jean Servier, H istoire de l'utopie (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), p. 366.
14'Le mot me plait, je l'accepte... BarbaresY  (p. 72). He later adds: 'Une France!... N e devenons jamais
deux nations, je  vous prie'. (p. 75). Hugo summarises it all: 'au fond que fut juin 1848? Une revolte du 
peuple contre lui-meme' (Mis., Ill, p. 197).
16Ellul, H istoire des institutions, p. 357.
16See Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire o f  Louis Bonaparte, in Later P olitical Writings, ed. and trans. 
by Terrell Carver (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 116-7.
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undermines the democratic value of the universal suffrage which now benefits the 
executive power: if the people have no political sense, then their vote only means they 
surrender their democratic power to Napoleon III. But the perverted universal suffrage 
has another impact, this time on Paris's pretense to speak in the name of the People. If 
universal suffrage claims to guarantee the democratic nature of a regime, it also gives 
primacy to unpoliticised peasant over potentially revolutionary Parisians.
The result was that the city that had embedded the revolutionary values for so long 
was marginalised in the name of democracy. Worse, Paris, blemished by the criminality 
and envy associated with it, was now viewed as perverting its mythical mission, 
confusing riots with revolution. After they had contributed to the myth of the People, 
Michelet and Hugo needed to clearly separate the enlightening myth from the darkening 
mobs of the nineteenth century -  those Maistre called 'la populace', described with a 
similar fascinated horror by Zola and Le Bon. And if Hugo deplored that the People 
were asleep, he, too, acknowledged that the mob most certainly were not.
If Hugo remains the poet of the People, he is equally the writer of the crowds. The 
distinction between the two is crucial in his work and thought. Numerous figures and 
visions serve to show how the people, when not serving their sacred mission, were 
thought of as degenerating into populace. It is the case, notably, of the people of La 
Cour des Miracles, whose crooks have nothing to do with the People : 'dechet du passe 
et presence prophetique des "classes dangereuses'", Seebacher comments.17 For Hugo, 
the people are as different from the populace as the revolution is from the emeute18 -  
the difference being one of legitimacy: 'ii y a l'emeute et il y a l'insurrection', he explains, 
'ce sont deux coleres; l'une a le tort, l'autre a le droit'. For Hugo, it is the reaction against 
tyranny that legitimises insurgency: 'la guerre du tout contre la fraction est insurrection; 
l'attaque de la fraction contre le tout est emeute' {Mis., Ill, p. 77). On the other hand, 
revolution cannot be confused with the jacquerie -  'revolte du malaise contre le bien- 
etre' {Mis., Ill, p. 23). The enlightenment brought to and by the People in 1789 rendered 
the jacquerie obsolete: 'la revolution est la vaccine de la jacquerie. [...] Le grand ressort 
du spectre rouge est casse' {Mis., Ill, pp. 24-5). In Paris, he writes 'apres la revolution 
fran9 aise, aucune gangrene du peuple fran9 ais n'est possible' (P, p. 95): the jacquerie 
belongs to the past. Or so it should. But in a context of social division and isolation, 
envy emerges as a renewed threat, as Tocqueville pointed out:
17Seebacher Victor Hugo ou le Calcul des profondeurs, p. 186.
18Hugo seems stuck between Maistre on his right, who sees popu lace  where he should see the People, and 
Blanqui on his left, who mistakes the first for the second: 'II n'y avait dans Blanqui rien du peuple et tout 
de la populace' (CV, I, p. 781). See also P, pp. 66, 84 and 96 (on Maistre).
167
Les hommes [...] n'y sont que trop enclins a ne se preoccuper que de leurs interets particuliers, 
toujours trop portes a n'envisager qu'eux-memes et a se retirer dans un individualisme etroit ou 
toute vertu publique est etouffee.1^
This social break-up -  envy jeopardising national unity and social cohesion -  that 
became so vividly apparent after June 1848, allows its contemporaries to make sense of 
the 'spectre rouge' which fails to die as it should after 1789: individual selfishness and 
envie provide a meaningful explanation of the people’s otherwise inexplicable tendency 
to revolt.
The Jacquerie encapsulates the counter-myth of the barbarians. It emerges from the 
phantasmagoria I described earlier. It presents a double threat to social order and to the 
myth of the People: in both cases, it is antagonistic to the idea of progress (be it 
bourgeois or romantic), it is archaic. The gap between the two myths is manifest, 
opposing the mission attributed by the writers to the People to the reality of 
contemporary uprisings that resisted this model. The people degenerating into mobs was 
a constant contradiction of the myth of the People bom from 1789. Far from being seen 
as part of a continuing struggle that was anything but resolved with Thermidor, 
contemporary rioters were associated with criminals and miserables. One trademark of 
the discourse on Parisian rebellion in the second part of the nineteenth century was 
precisely to confuse urban barbarians and modem revolutionaries, thus denying the 
latter any moral or political justification.
If collective and spontaneous violence is never interpreted as a political action, it is 
because it remains highly illegitimate as an expression of the mob, anarchy and chaos. 
Understood as barbarian, animal and evil in nature, it can not be considered as a 
political, conscious action. The idea that the uprisings of the nineteenth century are 
based on a thoughtful political agenda is alien to the thinkers of the time. The elite, 
including the left, sees them as alienated, blind and archaic. Let us insist again on the 
importance of the ideal of progress in this regard, and its use in a discourse that rejected 
what it labeled 'archaic'. The myth of the People, the priority of the symbol -  as defined 
by an elite -  over the autonomy and identity which the people might constitute for 
themselves is a major aspect of the discourse against revolutions and uprisings in the 
second half of the century.
This discourse focuses on the city's classes dangereuses; and more specifically on 
the ouvrier. Doubly feared as a possible criminal and a revolutionary, the ouvrier is 
rarely opposed as a political opponent — this would somehow legitimate his form of
l^Tocqueville, L'Ancien regime et la revolution, pp. 50-1.
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protest. Drawing a picture of the lower classes as controlled by their instincts is one way 
to dodge a political analysis of their revolt and avoid any dialogue: there is no 
communication possible between men and beasts. For the bestiality of the enemy is not 
to be taken purely metaphorically: the rioters are real, actual herds of savage beasts, 
packs of dogs, enraged wolves, hyenas, or even vermin.20 They are driven by their 
animal instincts.
The logic is not one of seeking to understand a phenomenon, but one of surviving in 
the face of a threat by providing relevant meaning -  which, as we have seen, is a major 
function of myth. Monsters, demons, evil are a terrorising representation of the other, 
one which helps to construct the identity of a community -  a priority for the relatively 
new bourgeois political power. Confusing the city, deviant individuals (criminals or 
revolutionary) and the masses in the same figure -  the monster -  the bourgeoisie aims to 
define a contrario the basis for its own social model: rationality, space, light, hygiene, 
circulation are the major themes not only of bourgeois discourse, but of nineteenth- 
century urbanism, as we have seen. Bourgeois identity thus defines itself in opposition 
to its perception of popular violence: based on an idea of human progress, it opposes the 
animal regression of violence; in insisting on science and rationality, it opposes the 
instincts liberated by the mob; lastly, the bourgeois see urban, collective violence as 
reminiscent of the jacqueries, as though the exode rural had brought legions of 
barbarians to invade the cities. If'that mob is [...] identified with the monster [...], revolt 
itself thus takes the shape of a monster'.21 It follows that the discourse that denounces 
riots can only do so by referring to depoliticised, yet highly mythical terms:
Une lutte manicheenne du Bien contre le Mai, de la civilisation contre la barbarie, de l'ordre contre 
l'anarchie, de l'intelligence contre la betise, de la tete contre le ventre, du devoir contre l'egoi'sme, 
du travail contre la paresse, enfin de l'elite de la societe contre tout ce qui est mauvais, pervers et 
bestial.22
We have seen that this discourse is not the prerogative of bourgeois power alone. 
Hugo, Sue, Zola, all self-proclaimed socialists, all indulged in the fear of their time: the 
urban mass unleashed, bringing chaos, ordeal, and apocalypse. As the People are frozen 
into a myth, the incomprehension of what the real, actual people of the city are about 
reaches new heights. The extraordinary violence of the discourse denouncing the events
20Oehler, Le Spleen contre Voubli. See also Pierre Michel, Un M ythe rom antique: les barbares. 1789- 
1848 (Lyon: Presses Universitaires de Lyon, 1981), and Jean Pommier, Les Ecrivains devant la 
revolution de 1848  (Paris: PUF, 1948).
21Brombert, Victor Hugo and the Visionary Novel, p. 18.
22Paul Lidsky, Les Ecrivains contre la Commune (Paris: La Decouverte, 1999) p. 48.
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of June 1848 prefigures the almost unanimous denunciation of the Commune.23 And by 
1871, the rhetorical violence is unleashed with virtually no dissident voice to be heard.
It seems that the time has then come to settle scores with the great urban monster and 
the fears it had generated for so long. The defeat of the Commune brings Paris down. 
And it falls to the writers to put the last nail in the coffin: the last Parisian insurrection 
generated the most unanimous literary denunciation of a revolution, even among self- 
proclaimed socialists such as Zola.
(iii) Urban expiation: the end of a myth
I believe one of the best illustrations of the outburst of rhetorical violence against the 
Communards is to be found in Zola. Just as Hugo was the poet of the People, Zola was 
undoubtedly the writer of the mobs. Before writing directly about the Commune, he had 
produced one of his masterpieces which can be said to be deeply influenced by the 
Parisian events. Although set in the North of France and focusing on the mines, I regard 
Germinal as an allegory of the bas-fond\ the population is equally in the dark, physically, 
morally and metaphorically; equally sodden with misery. Le Voreux represents both the 
inferno of modern industrial cities and the never-ending fall of the people.24 It is the 
ultimate symbol of the urban underworld, with its claustrophobia (the mines' galleries) 
and darkness (coal and the absence of light); the promiscuity between men and women; 
moral depravation; absolute misery; and just enough political consciousness to bring the 
miserables to their ruin without enlightening them.
The scenes of insane crowds -  one of Zola's trademarks -  culminate in a mad 
uprising before the closing of the novel brings the promise of future germination:
Des homines poussaient, une armee noire, vengeresse, qui germait lentement dans les sillons, 
grandissant pour les recoltes du siecle futur, et dont la germination allait faire bientot eclater la 
terre.25
A promise which is met in La Debacle -  the penultimate episode of Zola's great 
panorama of life under the Second Empire, Les Rougon-Macquart.26
In La Debacle, Zola proposes an extraordinary account of the Commune. The two 
main protagonists, Jean and Maurice, had met during the Prussian war in 1870 and
23See Oehler on 1848 and Lidsky on 1871.
24See Jean-Claude Charvoz, 'Le Monde imaginaire d'Emile Zola d’apres les Rougon-Macquart', in Le 
Retour du mythe (Grenoble: Presses Universitaires de Grenoble, 1980), pp. 83-115.
23Emile Zola, Germ inal (Paris: Gallimard, 1978), p. 594.
2% m ile Zola, La D ebacle  (Paris: Gallimard, 1984). 'La debacle' generally refers to the military disaster o f  
Sedan, but the dramatic outcome o f  the self-inflicted defeat o f  Paris certainly prolongs the disaster o f  
1870.
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become close friends. Yet in 1871 they find themselves on opposite sides: Maurice is a 
Parisian Communard, Jean a Provincial Versaillais. They remain friends. However, 
during a fight, Jean accidentally fires on his friend. Overwhelmed with his act, he then 
hides him, protecting him, trying to look after a wound that will prove fatal. Meanwhile, 
Paris is burning, set alight by the desperate Communards gone insane as their inevitable 
defeat comes closer.
'Paris brule !' is the final chapter's leitmotiv, illustrating its main theme: expiation -  
'expiation de tout un peuple' (p. 554). The capital of Nana and La Curee, of the Bonheur 
des Dames and Son Excellence Eugene Rougon, the city of all the depravations of the 
second Empire, the great Babylon, faces its apocalyptic sentence at last, burning and 
bleeding altogether:
Une grande clarte rouge eclairait deja le ciel, au sud, comme si tout Paris se fut embrase. A mesure 
que la nuit s'etait faite, cette lueur avait grandi; et, peu a peu, elle gagnait l'horizon entier, 
ensanglantant un vol de petits nuages qui se noyaient, vers Test, au fond des tenebres accrues (p. 
551).
The Prussians, who had been unable to take the capital despite a harsh siege, now 
contemplate the spectacle with delight: despite their victory over France, 'rien ne valait 
ce spectacle de Paris, detruit de folie furieuse, s'incendiant lui-meme' (p. 554). Yet they 
are not simply pictured as mere enemies, enjoying the self-inflicted French defeat, they 
see themselves, rather, as France's new divine wardens, sent to
Chatier un peuple pervers. Paris brulait en punition de ses siecles de vie mauvaise, du long amas de 
ses crimes et de ses debauches. De nouveau, les Germains sauveraient le monde, balayeraient les 
demieres poussieres de la corruption latine (p. 555).
But what makes the necessity of divine punishment all the more poignant is that it is a 
vision shared by Maurice himself. The wounded, feverish rebel goes from nihilistic, 
frantic, delirium to the consciousness of the evil nature of the Commune. Zola excels in 
descriptions of madness; here, Maurice's insanity is fueled by the fire that is burning 
Paris and him at the same time: 'Ah ! dit a son tour Maurice, repris de folie devant cette 
destruction qu'il avait voulue, que tout flambe done et que tout saute !' (p. 561) -  a 
passage that echos Souvarine's trance in Germinal. The feverish delirium brings 
Maurice to the fantastic vision of a fiery dance in the Tuileries: 'Ah ! Dansez, dansez 
done, dans vos cotillons qui fument avec vos chignons qui flamboient' (p. 562). The 
lights of the second Empire that had fed on misery, and was inextricably perverted by 
disease are now shining in its own destruction: it is all too good to see the purifying
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flames bringing it all to an end. The inevitable reference to Sodom and Gomorrha made 
by Zola at this stage symbolises the fate of modern Babylon.
The fire purifies not only because it destroys the Paris of Napoleon III but also 
because it reduces a revolutionary city to ashes. The second Empire and the insurrection 
are seen as the two faces of the same coin: the two signs of Paris perversion. The capital 
of envy -  'ville unique et universelle, machine a produire de la gloire et de l'innovation, 
mais aussi de l'echec et de l'amertume'27 -  had come to symbolise moral, urban, 
political, and social degradation altogether. Paris was rotten to the core, not just with 
filthy Second Empire lucre, but equally with the revolutionaries' envy. The 
Communards have just added to the dirt (p. 569).
When asked why he, a soldier at Sedan, joined in such a perverse course of action, 
why he joined these 'scum', Maurice does not refute the terms of the question, nor the 
'salete' of his actions: 'parce qu'il y a trop de souffrance, trop d'iniquite et trop de honte', 
he answers in a tone reminiscent of Valles. His actions, like those of Souvarine and 
Etienne in Germinal, can be explained in many ways -  misery, hunger, injustice yet 
they remain essentially illegitimate and tarnished with madness, and it falls to Maurice 
himself to acknowledge it. As Paul Lidsky noted, the best way to prove that the 
Commune is evil is to have a Communard say so: 'non seulement les Communards font 
leur autocritique, mais encore ils deviennent les porte-parole des ecrivains'.28
The punishment has only started, though, and it is now the turn of the Versaillais to 
indulge in destruction in a 'Paris delivre' (p. 570). Delivered from its imperial sins by 
the fire, it can now be freed from its revolutionary sinners. As the ashes fly all over the 
city, Paris continues to burn, and the settling of scores begins. The scale is great, but 
also extraordinarily mythical:
La demence soufflait. [...] Detruire pour detruire, ensevelir la vieille humanite pourrie sous les 
cendres d'un monde, dans l'espoir qu'une societe nouvelle repousserait heureuse et candide, en 
plein paradis terrestre des primitives legendes ! (p. 571).
Maurice fully subscribes to the need for this destruction, again echoing Souvarine's 
nihilistic frenzy in Germinal. War is good, he argues, 'elle fait son oeuvre' (p. 572). And 
this work is to tear out the weed, and to enable the good seeds to grow. The radical 
nature of the treatment is justified, he argues, as he recalls his friend Jean's advice:
Lorsqu'on avait de la pourriture quelque part, un membre gate, qa valait mieux de le voir par terre, 
abattu d'un coup de hache, que d'en crever comme d'un cholera... J'ai songe souvent a cette parole,
27Christophe Charle, Paris Fin de siecle. Culture et politique  (Paris: Le Seuil, 1998), p. 12.
28Lidsky, Les Ecrivains contre la Commune, pp. 138-9.
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depuis que je  me suis trouve seul, enferme dans ce Paris de demence et de misere... Eh bien ! c'est 
moi le membre gate que tu as abattu... (p. 576).
A pathetic acknowledgement: Maurice admits that he is the rotten part of his friend: 
'j'etais l'ulcere colie a tes os' (p. 576); which equals saying that Paris is France's 
gangrenous limb. This becomes particularly evident if we bear in mind that Jean is a 
Macquart, stemming from the rotten part of the genealogical tree elaborated by Zola in 
his obsession with atavism. The Macquarts are affected by alcoholism and madness: 
Jean is the son of Antoine, so soaked in alcohol that he will die of self-combustion;29 
he is also the brother of Gervaise (possibly Zola's most pathetic example of atavistic 
fate); the uncle of demented Jacques (La Bete humaine), the perverted Nana, and of 
Etienne, the activist and survivor of Germinal, who suffered from an attack of delirium 
similar to Jacques's in La Bete humaine, and similarly explained by an insane and 
destructive heredity. And yet one exception in a rotten genealogical branch, Jean is the 
healthy part, the rural one.
Maurice dies and so soon will the fire, the redness of the city owing more now to the 
sunset but still reminiscent of the blaze: 'les toitures s'embrasaient, telles que des lits de 
charbons. [...] Paris achevait de se consumer en braise' (p. 581). The bad seed is gone to 
allow the germination of a long desired golden age:
Le pauvre etre s'en etait alle, affame de justice, dans la supreme convulsion du grand reve noir qu'il 
avait fait, cette grandiose et monstrueuse conception de la vieille societe detruite, de Paris brule, 
du champ retoume et purifie, pour qu'il y poussat l'idylle d'un nouvel age d'or (p. 580).
In an extraordinary statement, Zola concludes with a reactionary call for the traditional 
rural values of France, a return to its pre-revolutionary roots:
C'etait la partie saine de la France, la raisonnable, la ponderee, la paysanne, celle qui etait restee le 
plus pres de la terre, qui supprimait la partie folie, exasperee, gatee par l'Empire, detraquee de 
reveries et de jouissances; et il lui avait ainsi fallu couper dans sa chair meme, avec un arrachement 
de tout 1'etre, sans trop savoir ce qu'elle faisait. Mais le bain de sang etait necessaire, et de sang 
fransais, l'abominable holocauste, le sacrifice vivant, au milieu du feu purificateur. Desormais le 
calvaire etait monte jusqu'a la plus terrifiante des agonies, la nation crucifiee expiait ses fautes et 
allait renaitre (p. 576).
As the evening twilight falls on Paris as a modern, revolutionary myth, the dawn is set 
on the promise of a new, yet traditional France, a healthy, non-urban, non-destructive 
revolution in its original meaning of an eternal return.
29Emile Zola, Le D octeur P ascal (Paris: Le Livre de Poche, 1968), pp. 293-4.
(iv) The thirst for urban apocalypse
What the blaze of Paris, or rather, its narration by Zola indicates, is a sort of 
fascination with seeing Babylon on its knees, humiliated by itself, defeated by its own 
perversion and excesses. The tension of the century between boredom and the nostalgia 
for greatness finds its breaking point here: 'intellect and feeling were, literally, 
fascinated by the prospect of a purging fire'.30 The greater the city, the greater the fall; 
as the ultimate city, the fall of Paris is described as the greatest in history and myth alike 
'ni Babylone, ni ses filles, ni la vieille Sodome et la vieille Gomorrhe n'ont ainsi peri de 
leurs propres mains. [...] Jerusalem est depassee. Depuis le Christ, aucune ville n'est 
tombee de cette mort'.31 The apocalypse symbolised by the burning of Paris echoes the 
abnormal status of the capital -  'image completement hors normes de la capitale 
ffan9 aise, foyer de toutes les passions, de toutes les folies, de toutes les richesses, de 
tous les pouvoirs'.32 From 1789 to 1871, Paris had grown out of proportion: capital of 
modernity, and of the new, bourgeois power, it had also come to harbour too many 
antagonisms, too many dark comers, too many uncertainties, too many threats. The 
extraordinary success of the photo albums of Paris's ruins that followed seems to make 
the best use of new technology in order to immortalise Mercier's daydream a century 
earlier, when he had imagined and visualised Paris cmmbling down over its weak 
foundation (see chapter 4).
As long as Paris was resisting the Prussians, it was fighting in the name of France in 
a stmggle made all the more sublime by France's defeat. But when the stmggle becomes 
Franco-French again -  'la guerre a eclate entre Paris et Versailles' (CV, II, p. 632) it 
seems that the time has come to put Babylon down. In 1871, Paris ceases to lead France 
as it claimed to do for about a century; imposing its rules, its myth, its phantasmagoria 
upon the rest of the country. The domination of modern Babylon comes to an end. And 
what an end it is: an apocalyptic self-destruction. Paris could not be defeated by anyone 
other than itself: 'Paris ne sera pas tue, Paris se tuera lui-meme'.33
This urban apocalypse 'fired' the writers' imagination. As if they felt that the blaze 
signified the end of a myth, they could not help but see the last Parisian uprising and its 
defeat as something worthy of the great monster Paris once had been. How
30Steiner, In Bluebeard's Castle, p. 27.
3 ^Louis Veuillot, 'Paris brule', in Paris pendant les deux sieges, in CEuvres com pletes (Paris: Lathielleux, 
1927), vol. XIII, p. 490.
32Charle, Paris Fin de siecle, p. 8.
33Maxime Du Camp, Paris, ses organes, ses fonctions et sa vie jusqu'en 1870  (Monaco: Rondeau, 1993), 
p. 747.
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extraordinary, though, that it fell to the writers to indulge in the apocalypse of an urban 
monster they had so willingly contributed to creating.
The fact that the Commune was almost never analysed but rejected; never seen as a 
political (or even social) event but as the outburst of senseless anarchy and destruction -  
fievre obsidionale -  takes the dominant discourse to a spiritual and moral level.34 The 
meaning of the semaine sanglante is essentially moral: it is a crusade against evil, and a 
healthy reaction against the havoc of envy. And this quasi-mystical fight is precisely set 
in the 'cite maudite', modern Babylon. The building of the Sacre-Coeur as a gesture of 
expiation will be the outcome of this religious logic of exorcism. In a century of 
secularisation and rationality, the contrast is striking.
The reference to an apocalypse tells us not so much about the reality of the 
Commune itself as the degree of mythical thinking reached by 1871 France. The 
increased emotional sharpness underlines a certain primacy of myth over the real. If the 
discourse of the apocalypse appears striking in the century of rationality, let us not 
forget that rationality itself serves a myth; thinking in terms of progress helps to 
delegitimise the deviant by labeling it 'archaic', going in the wrong direction as defined 
by the dominant discourse. Similarly it uses a vocabulary of science to demonstrate the 
inadequacy (biological, pathological) of the deviant. The doctors of the city claim to use 
science to make a diagnosis, based on an apparently neutral and objective observation of 
the facts, when their description is shaped by dominant ethics and modern beliefs. As 
Corbin noted, Zola 'reproduit les decoupes sociales indiquees par les savants et par les 
observateurs sociaux, quelques decennies auparavant'.35 Yet again, rationalism and 
myth meet when they confuse 'le mot et la chose'.
Thus it would be wrong to assume that the military and symbolic victory of the 
Versaillais is solely a victory of a reactionary elite. If the rhetoric of the apocalypse 
dominates the perception of the Commune's fall, it is also because of a tension that has 
run through the whole century ever since the fall of Napoleon; a mental framework 
made of the already mentioned boredom and exacerbated imagination that grew in Paris; 
of the morbid fascination for darkness, emptiness and heroism; of the poetics of 
boredom, disgust and decadence. Gautier's 'plutot la barbarie que l'ennui' seems to sum 
it all up, as Steiner noted:
34See Lidsky p. 68. There is no point in analysing what is perceived as a pathological and criminal 
movement.
^Corbin, Le Temps, le desir et Vhorreur, p. 234.
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If we can come to understand the sources o f that perverse longing, o f  that itch for chaos, we will be 
nearer to an understanding o f our own state, and o f the relations o f our condition to the accusing 
ideal o f  the past.36
The picture of Paris ashes, the Sacre-Cceur, the apocalypse are stunning illustrations 
of the theologico-political framework of the nineteenth century and of the social 
function of myth in modem societies, particularly in times of crisis and identity's 
uncertainties. France's reconstruction had to take into account the fragility of the 
national community, which made it all the more urgent to create favorable conditions 
for the constitution of collective identity. The violence of the rhetoric against the 
Commune is therefore no more senseless than the violence it denounces; it has its own 
logic and responds to a very real issue of social cohesion, seeking securing references 
that would allow the constitution of two antagonistic yet complementary identities: the 
society's and the monster's. The discourse's violence reflects the violence of the fear felt 
by the Versaillais: it is not only or even predominantly rational but affective. As Lidsky 
observed, '[il] reflete la peur et [...] doit, contradictoirement, l'entretenir en meme temps 
que la conjurer',37 one of the main functions of myth as we have seen. The fear of 
social disintegration generated the discourse of national, republican unity facing the 
divisions brought by the communal agenda of the workers; nothing could better 
symbolise the end of the People and Paris as a myth.
And nothing could better symbolise the growing mythical function of a second 
Leviathan either: the modem state. For if Paris is seen as an urban monster, it is also 
associated with the regime's machine. In a context of secularisation of society and 
profound shake-up of its foundations, it now falls to the state to guarantee social 
cohesion and national identity. Paris-state; Paris-place: on a political level too, the 
Parisian double Leviathan informs us about the function of myth in modern society.
36Steiner, In Bluebeard's Castle, p. 18.
37Lidsky, Les Ecrivains contre la Commune, p. 158.
Chapter 7
Paroles at Odds: the law of the state, the conscience of the seer
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Vous fon dez une republique de glaives, [...]  je  
fonderais une republique d'esprits. *
Si Paris a fa it la revolution, il I'a aussi en partie  
perdue.  ^
In the aftermath of the Commune, Paris was stripped of its military and municipal 
power: the garde nationale was dissolved and, from 1871 to 1974, the capital would be 
the only city without a mayor.3 These decisions favoured a clear distinction between 
local and national power, the latter regarding the municipality with a suspicion 
reminiscent of Thermidor's. 'Saturee d'histoire, de luttes et de politique, la ville des 
revolutions est en meme temps, pour la premiere fois, confrontee a son impuissance 
reelle'.4 This, in turn, affected the symbolic status of the capital. In this final chapter, I 
propose to look at this change of status which affected Paris as a site of power. 
Although the Republic seems to prevail, we shall see that the defeat of Paris as a myth 
can be interpreted as a catastrophe equivalent to that of 1848. Inevitably, it fell to Hugo 
the seer to respond.
The local, popular power of revolutionary Paris was replaced with a more national, 
representative and institutional entity after Thermidor, and most notably under 
Napoleon's leadership. We shall see how the Leviathan-city coexisted with the 
Leviathan-state, and the importance of the latter in the process of modem myth-making. 
The question of local and national power is of major importance: as Lefort pointed out, 
'la position et la representation du pouvoir, la figuration de son lieu, sont [...] 
constitutives de l'espace social, de sa forme, de sa scene'.5 I aim to demonstrate that the 
social function of myth in modem times cannot be fully understood without a look at 
the modem state.
1Hugo, QT, p. 371.
^Daniel Roche, Atlas de la Revolution franqaise, 11. 'Paris' (Paris: Editions de l'EHESS, 2000), 
<www.ehess.fr/editions/ouvrages/0013-Introduction.html>, p. 4.
3Paris was under the authority o f  two prefets, hence the ministries o f  the Interior and the Police -  
whenever these two were separate. Clemenceau vainly proposed a mayor for Paris: 'L'Assemblee juge 
qu'un vrai maire de Paris serait trop puissant dans la Republique' (Favier, Paris, 897). More recently, 
Jacques Attali reported Mitterrand's own suspicion towards a Parisian mayor: 'Souvenez-vous d'Etienne 
Marcel' he confided, Verbatim (Paris: Artheme-Fayard, 1993), vol. 1, p. 23.
4Charle, Paris fin  de siecle, p. 13.
5Lefort, Essais sur le politique, pp. 122-3.
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The state is rarely considered in the field of I'imaginaire, and yet studying it provides 
an excellent perspective on the relation between facts and their representation:
[Lj'histoire de l'Etat doit etre par excellence le produit d'une articulation entre l'histoire des faits et 
l'histoire des idees et des representations sociales. L'Etat travaille la societe en meme temps qu'il 
est constitue par l'image que celle-ci se fait de lui. II n'est pas un objet qui aurait en lui-meme sa 
consistance propre, exterieur a la societe, mais la resultante d'une interaction pennanente avec
elle.^
This effectively brings I'imaginaire and politics together: 'Produit de la societe, [l'Etat] a 
simultanement vocation a la produire'.7 Social fragmentation and political uncertainties 
generated by the revolution's legacy led the state to evolve so as to ensure that 
favourable politico-imaginary conditions would strengthen the nation's cohesion: 'L'Etat 
entend etre a la fois force de gouvernement et de recomposition du tissu social'.8 It is 
the unique politico-religious situation of France in 1789 that eventually led the state to 
embark on a new role -  both modem and mythical.
An understanding of the new symbolic status of Paris and the state will lead to 
Hugo's reflection upon the republican ideal in Quatrevingt-treize, a novel written at a 
time when the republic made its third attempt to inscribe the revolutionary legacy in 
solid institutions. In the aftermath of 1871, Hugo chooses to go back to 1793 in order to 
rethink the mythical function of Paris as the place of revolutionary revelation at the very 
moment when the city as a modem myth was being quashed. Looking at Girard again 
will help to better understand what Hugo's conception of an enlightened Republic, and 
what he hopes to achieve in terms of demystification.
(i) A revolutionary parole
It is worth remembering that the Revolution of 1789 occurred in a context of 
relatively weak administrative stmctures led by an equally weak head of state. The 
revolutionaries found themselves in a unique position as they could not operate within a 
reliable institutional framework.
C'est ce qui explique sans doute pour une large part l'extraordinaire fluidite de la politique 
revolutionnaire, qui n'a jamais de point d'appui etatique fort. La Revolution, en 1789, s'est installee 
dans un espace abandonne par l'ancienne monarchie, espace qu'elle n'a jamais reussi a restructurer 
de faqon durable et systematique jusqu'au Consulate
^Rosanvallon, L'Etat en France de 1789 a nos jours, p. 14.
7Lefort, Essais sur le politique, p. 217.
8RosanvalIon, L'Etat en France de 1789 a nos jours, p. 115.
^Furet, La Revolution en debat, p. 80.
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This relatively ill-structured space -  further broken up by the Revolutionaries 
themselves -  was nonetheless very much localised: as we have seen in chapter 3, the 
Revolution was the moment that brought political power back to Paris and 'sacralised' 
the capital.
The concentration of powers in one same location was to benefit the Parisians : 'Tous 
les pouvoirs sont desormais concentres a Paris, et a la merci du peuple'.10 But it was on 
August 1792 that the people of Paris stepped in the institutional arena too. The legal 
commune was swept away by the sectionnaires and replaced with a commune 
insurrectionnelle. 'Maitre de la rue, le peuple est maitre du pouvoir'.11 The citoyens 
passifs were now fully integrated in the revolutionary process: they could join the garde 
nationale and the local assemblies, in other words, be militarily and politically active: 
'Par le suffrage universel et l'armement des citoyens passifs, cette seconde revolution 
integra le peuple dans la nation et marqua l'avenement de la democratic politique1.12
In this unique situation made of an elusive institutional framework and the pressure 
of the Parisian street, the revolutionaries had to compete in a symbolic contest for a 
position of legitimacy as recognised by the popular and revolutionary discourse. The 
empty space was, in this context, filled not so much with new institutions, as with the 
people's parole seen as encapsulating and expressing the new idea of souverainete 
populaire.
Claude Lefort observed that the logic of the revolutionary discourse during the Terror 
consisted in the paradoxical effort to speak for, and represent, the souverainete 
populaire without ever giving the impression of stepping into the (monarchic) role of 
head of the new regime: 'la Terreur multiplie les positions de pouvoir en ouvrant la 
possibility a qui les conquiert de masquer l'exercice de la toute-puissance [...]. La 
Terreur est revolutionnaire en ceci qu'elle interdit l'occupation de cette place'.13 In other 
words, the leaders have to be seen as the voice of the Revolution; their position depends 
on them personifying, and being identified with the revolutionary parole:
Le heros revolutionnaire tire son existence de la parole qui le nomme comme tel. [...] Le pouvoir 
de la parole est lie au charme tel que, emise par l'orateur, elle semble plus que la parole d'un 
homme: celle meme du heros collectif, de l'Assemblee ou, par-dela l'Assemblee, celle du peuple.14
1 Wavier, Paris, p. 844.
11Ib id ., p. 846.
12Albert Soboul, La Revolution frangaise (Paris: Gallimard, 1982), p. 245.
13Lefort, Essais sur le politique, p. 116. Lefort starts from a speech made by Robespierre on 11 Germinal 
An II. See pp. 81-119.
u Ibid., pp. 89-90.
179
It is precisely this sense of a collective discourse voiced by one, where the word of the 
Conventionnels and those of the people seem to merge, that is seen, notably by Hugo, as 
the indication of a revelation similar to the revelation of the Word -Verbe in Saint 
John:15 'II y avait dans la Convention une volonte qui etait celle de tous et n'etait celle 
de personne. Cette volonte etait une idee, idee indomptable et demesuree qui soufflait 
dans l'ombre du haut du ciel. Nous appelons cela la Revolution' (QT, p. 171). This idea 
is not man-made, it is the Word of God: 'Le redacteur enorme et sinistre de ces grandes 
pages a un nom, Dieu, et un masque, Destin' {Ibid.).
As we have seen in chapter 5, the Revolution was the moment when God's will and 
the people's action meet. What happens in the Convention is precisely the Word of God 
being heard through the revolutionary parole: 'La Convention a toujours ploye au vent; 
mais ce vent sortait de la bouche du peuple et etait le souffle de Dieu' (p. 172). Hence 
the importance of the revolutionary and popular parole in Quatrevingt-treize: the voice 
of the people 'se fait enfin parole prononcee, proclamee, entendue, ecoutee. La 
construction du roman porte la marque de ce toumant essentiel qui se situe, dans 
l'histoire, en 93 et qui s'execute en un lieu precis: Paris'.16 If Paris is the sacred place of 
revolutionary revelation it is because it is the place where this parole is expressed.
For Hugo, there is more in 1793 than the Terror: the bloodshed coincided with the 
peak of the revolutionary parole as expressed by the people of Paris and the Convention 
in a symbiosis never achieved since. Hugo goes into great detail to explain how the 
assembly operated as a place, so as to allow the public not only to flock in, but also to 
speak to and with the Conventionnels in a permanent, ever-renewed dialogue (QT, p. 
155); how the Convention's proceedings were constantly under siege from the people's 
expectations and wishes (QT, pp. 165-6). In this relation lies the whole ambiguity of 
1793 as the peak of revolutionary sacralite. The sacred had been -  literally -  detached 
from the king's body and was now invested in the parole. Hence the symbolic status of 
the Conventionnels, the voices of the Revolution. However, the position of the people in 
the revolutionary process since August 1792 meant that the word of the Conventionnels 
needed constantly to be in tune with the people's. Should the link between the people 
and their representatives be in crisis, the first could reclaim the glaive de la loi. This 
sword of Damocles had hung over the Convention since the 10 August which had 
shown the will of the people to take the law into their own hands when they perceive the 
assembly as impotent. This is what had triggered the September massacres and the crisis
15Or verbum, the latin translation o f  the Greek logos, 'intelligence divine organisatrice du monde', 
Gabrielle Chamarat-Malandain, 'Voix et parole du peuple dans O uatre-vingt-freize', Groupe Hugo, 16 
decembre 1989, p. 5, n. 23.
16Chamarat-Malandain, 'Voix et parole du peuple dans Quatre-vingt-treize', p. 1.
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of the summer 1793: without a symbolic intermediary, they exerted justice so as to 
protect the sacred attainments of their revolution.17
Thermidor marked a radical rupture with this experience. It is in this regard 
significant that Robespierre, thus far seen as the voice of the souverainete populaire, 
should be denounced as a tyrant, as someone who manipulated the parole to assume a 
position of power.18 The parole was now held in suspicion, and needed to be replaced 
by solid institutions. This turning point affected Paris both institutionally and 
symbolically, as the local was no longer seen capable of embracing and representing the 
nation. From then on, the construction of modem institutions and administration would 
grow independently from a commune de Paris. The two Leviathans — the city and the 
state -  split and would not be confused again.
After the fall of Robespierre, the elaboration of a new constitution fueled debates and 
reflections, not just only about the Terror as such, but also about what was now seen as 
a deviation from the ideals of 1789: the 'despotisme de la liberte' put in place by a 
revolutionary government and a popular movement. This point is essential in that it 
would redefine the conception of souverainete populaire in the next century, and with it 
the conception of the etat liberal.19 The whole idea of the new constitution of Year III 
was precisely to prevent the return of any popular dictatorship.
As the assembly was back in its prerogative of effectively representing the nation, 
and acted in the name of souverainete populaire, the antagonism between Paris and the 
nation turned in favour of the province. The suspicion and fear generated by the central 
role that Paris had played and the last sans-culotte riot in Prairial justified for the 
Thermidoriens the need to reduce its power -  popular {sans-culotte) as well as 
institutional (the commune). The sans-culottes' rebellion was crushed and Paris' 
municipal power was reduced to its T/83e d'influence' praised by the Girondins.20 Still 
localised in Paris, the national power was no longer to be confused with a city now 
under the close control of the state:
17See Sophie Wahnich, La Liberte ou la mort. Essai sur la Terreur (Paris: La Fabrique, 2003), p. 45-50. 
'Pour comprendre l'economie emotive de la demande de terreur. [...] [II s'agit] de reperer quand et 
comment ce qui a ete produit comme sacralite revolutionnaire a ete bafoue. Ce qui produit effectivement 
I'effroi, c'est bien cette rupture du sacre' (p. 33). The Parisian sections put pressure on the Convention to 
have the Girondins arrested (2 June 1793), and a few months later to make the terror official (5 
September).
18The rumour spread that Robespierre wanted to become king. However implausible, this rumour proved 
believable by many contemporaries. See Bronislaw Baczko, Comment sortir de la terreur. Thermidor et 
la revolution  (Paris: Gallimard, 1989).
^ T h e debate started shortly after 9 thermidor. See Benjamin Constant, D e la fo rce  du gouvernement 
actuel de la France et de la necessite de rallier, published in 1796 (Paris: Flammarion, 1988).
7®That is, counting for nothing more than a departement. A doctrine formulated by the Conventionnel 
Lasource, cited by Favier, Paris, p. 853.
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La multiplication des fonctionnaires, [...] la presence pesante du prefet, maitre du jeu desormais, et 
la docile elite des notables constituent une toile serree d'interets convergents qui assure le controle 
efficace de la ville et tient en etroite dependance les classes populaires rendues inoffensives et 
privees de tout pouvoir.21
Meanwhile the state underwent massive transformations. After the turmoil of the 
Revolution, the administrative structure put in place by Napoleon was designed to 
endure and develop. Centralism was now combined with greater flexibility, adaptability 
and control, allowing a balance which favours changes without ever threatening the core 
of the state-system.22 No fewer than fifteen different constitutions were adopted 
between 1791 and 1958; and yet this never undermined the Napoleonic administrative 
structure which kept expanding. In a century known for its revolutions and political 
instability, the permanence of the state's apparatus is striking.
If this evolution is essential in an analysis of political mythology, it is because of the 
relation between the French state and the sacred. As we have seen in chapter 2, a 
process of secularisation affected the status of kings in the eighteenth century, and 
gradually brought the Church away from the public sphere. Consequently, the social 
link was gradually transferred to a secularised state, whose very functions therefore 
evolved: 'L'Etat n'est pas seulement un appareil administratif. [...] II est une forme 
efficace de representation sociale. [...] II produit du lien social et de l'unite, met en 
forme la societe et constitue la nation'.23 If one of the main functions of myth is to 
preserve social cohesion, in the post-revolutionary (re)construction of the nation, it fell 
to the state to preserve and facilitate the cohesion, unity, and identity of French society.
(ii) Modern state, mythical function
L'Etatfagonne la nation2^
The transition from religious to secular power leaves the state with the mission and 
authority to produce meaning for the community. It is now up to the state, via its 
recognition of the key moments of life (birth, marriage and death are now essentially 
civil), and through its surveys and missions (as the state itself develops the scope of its 
prerogatives) to shape society and collective identity, to legitimise the citizens' position
2^Chaussinand-Nogaret, 'La Ville jacobine et balzacienne', p. 550.
22Ellul, Histoire des Institutions, p. 363.
23Rosanvallon, L'Etat en France de 1789 a nos jours, p. 14-5.
2^Tocqueville, L'Ancien Regime et la revolution, pp. 259-60.
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within the framework it provides, and to make sense for the community. In this regard, 
the modern state steps into some functions thus far attached to the Church.
Interestingly enough, the secularisation of the modem state does not weaken the 
scope of its power: 'Avatar modeme de la sacralisation du pouvoir, la legitimite laicise 
son fondement sans en affaiblir la solidite puisqu'a l'investiture divine, elle substitue la 
consecration juridique'.25 The sacrality may have left the body of the king, but only to 
be transferred to the law by the revolutionaries. Burdeau further argues that the 
evolution of the state comes from the rationalisation of a belief in a superior, sacred 
authority thus far delegated from the gods:
Ne pouvant plus attacher credit aux fables, aux prodiges ni a l'onction sacree, on demande a une 
construction intellectuellement rationnelle ce que, dans les siecles anciens, les homines attendaient 
de la legende ou de la mythologie. ( .. .)  Le concept d'Etat rend acceptable le Pouvoir, en resolvant 
la contradiction qu'il recele et qui tient a ce qu'il est individuellement intolerable et socialement 
ineluctable. Par la, l'idee de l'Etat rejoint bien la raison d'etre de la pensee magique qui, par le sens 
qu'elle attribue aux phenomenes qu'elle explique, subordonne les comportements individuels aux 
croyances collectives.2^
Rational thinking and technique may well replace mythology, but the relation to a 
sacred institutional power survives: 'La France qui a le culte de l'Etat et de l’unite 
reductionniste, a change de religion d'Etat, passant du catholicisme gallican a la religion 
athee de l'Etat'.27 In fact, this secular religion is an essential part of the evolution of the 
French administrative system: 'Fatalite de la desymbolisation du monde: elle appelle son 
administration', Gauchet argues,
la prose des bureaux se substitue a la poesie du Prince. C'est au travers de son emprise 
envahissante [...] que l'Etat assure les etres de la stable lisibilite de leur monde que leur procurait 
autrefois la devotion pour le depositaire sacre du dessein intangible des dieux.2^
Rosanvallon analysed how the role of the state progressed after 1789 to produce the 
nation and society.29 What changed with the revolutionary and post-revolutionary state 
was the will to unify the nation, shape its references, and rationalise its organisation: 
'permettre une administration facile et reguliere conforme aux imperatifs d'exactitude et 
d'uniformite requis par un gouvernement representatif de l'unite nationale' (p. 103). 
Hence, the interest in education, linguistic policy (promoting French at the expense of
25Georges Burdeau, L'Etat (Paris: Le Seuil, 1970), p. 45.
26Ibid., p. 77.
27Chaunu, Le Basculement religieux de Paris auXVIIIe siecle, p. 17.
2^Gauchet, Le Des enchant ement du monde, p. 286.
29Rosanvallon, L'Etat en France de 1789 a nos jours. Further references w ill be made in main text in 
brackets.
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local languages and patois), enforcement of the metric system: 'il s'agit de mettre en 
place les techniques et instruments de mise en forme du social' (p. 103).
Here, we grasp the essential role of the state in the formation of the political 
imaginary as it aims to shape the social in a context made of the (re)composition of a 
national community fragmented by the Revolution, the end of corps intermediaires and 
the subsequent individualisation of society.30 Rosanvallon underlines the originality of 
this undertaking: 'tache inedite d'ordre sociologique et culturel qu'il s'assigne pour [...] 
combler le vide provoque par l'effondrement des structures corporatives et trouver un 
substitut a l'ancienne "concorde" du corps politique traditionnel' (p. 99). The modern 
state thus not only grows in size and power, its very nature changes:
L'Etat n'est plus seulement compris comme le sommet regulateur et organisateur d'une hierarchie 
articulee de corps intermediaires. II est erige en instance de production du social et devient l'agent 
principal d'unification d'une societe d'individus atomises (p. 96).
Gauchet argues against a dichotomy between society and the state that developed in 
the nineteenth century -  notably by Tocqueville, but also by Marx. The legitimacy of 
state power, and its apparently paradoxical expansion in the liberal era, lies precisely in 
the principle of national sovereignty: 's'il est fonde a s'insinuer en tout lieu [...] s'il est 
appele a s'interesser a une gamme toujours plus large de sujets [...] c'est au service de la 
prise transformatrice qu'une societe democratique entend s'assurer sur 1 'ensemble sans 
exception des mecanismes et des figures de son ordre'.31 The state becomes more 
technical, develops its expertise so as to adapt to society's evolution: 'Ce qui caracterise 
l'administration moderne c'est que, tout en conservant ces fonctions d'execution, elle est 
devenue l'organe de la rationalite technique de la societe particuliere'.32 In other words, 
the state expands, because it sees it as its mission -  as the delegate of sovereignty -  to 
know more about its citizens and to act upon more aspects of society:
II n'y a pas captation par l'Etat de la commande sociale comme s'il s'agissait de priver 
methodiquement la collectivite du savoir sur son etre et du pouvoir sur ses fins. II s'agit au 
contraire de les lui rendre, et c'est a ce dessein qu'est entierement ordonnee la concentration dans 
une instance speciale des moyens de connaissance, des instruments d'information et de saisie, des 
facultes d'investissement et d'orientation.33
30The decret D'Allarde and the Loi Le Chapelier suppressed the corporations in 1791. Effectively, this 
meant to forbid any intermediary power between the citizen and the state and seriously jeopardised the 
creation and functioning o f trade unions.
31 Gauchet, Le Desenchantement du monde, p. 261.
32Eric Weil, Philosophie politique, (Paris: Vrin, 1996), p. 149.
33Gauchet, Le Desenchantement du monde, pp. 287-8. In fact, the state relies on independent institutions 
to be properly informed and acts according to the law which also escapes its prerogatives; all this to 
ensure the good functioning o f  the social machine: 'tout ce travail immense d'extraction du savoir et de
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The nineteenth-century context of increasing social, political and economic 
fragmentation, and yet, at the same time, of relative tacit consensus about the position of 
the state and its social function, made it the prime target of political struggle: 'Car s'il est 
le centre vital de la nation, il suffit de s'en saisir pour etre maitre de la societe'.34 Furet 
further demonstrates how the new role of the state explains it has become the 'chief 
booty of the victor':35 'c'est le consensus [sur les structures de l'Etat] qui explique que 
toute visee de changement social, chez tous, implique la saisie prealable du pouvoir 
central de l'Etat'.36
The belief in the taking over of the state so as to adapt it to some political agenda and 
change society is nevertheless contradicted by the various regime changes that affected 
nineteenth-century France, all of which show that the regimes had to adapt to the state 
machinery, and not the reverse, as Marx himself acknowledged: 'All upheavals 
perfected this machinery instead of destroying it'.37 However the belief persisted in the 
possibility of wresting the state from bourgeois hands and changing it so as to prevent it 
from serving bourgeois interests. It is only after the Commune that Marx operated a 
radical turn: in The Civil War in France, the Communard experience led him to put the 
machinery -  rather than its bourgeois nature -  at the centre of his reflection.38 The 
Communards had explored a new model, in total contradiction with the dogma of a 
strong, centralised state: local, autonomous power, decentralisation, and self- 
governance. 'Les Communards apportent le modele "enfin trouve", Marx concludes, 
'modele qui passe par l'elimination de l'Etat-Leviathan.39
This institutional experience could have been criticised and analysed, its flaws 
highlighted. But as we have seen, such a debate was out of the question outside the
redefinition generalisee des normes n'a d'autre necessite que d'assurer au corps collectif comme tel sa 
souveraine determination de lui-meme' {Ibid., p. 288).
34Furet, La Revolution frangaise, vol. 1, p. 9. 'La vie politique franqaise est caracterisee au XIXe siecle 
par un consensus profond sur les structures de l'Etat, et par un conflit permanent sur les formes du meme 
Etat. [...] Le consensus sur l'Etat administratif rend les revolutions techniquement faciles, et le conflit sur 
la forme de l'Etat les rend inevitables', Furet explains in 'La Revolution dans I'imaginaire politique 
franqais', p. 81.
35Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire o f  Louis Bonaparte, p. 116.
36Furet, La Revolution en debat, p. 95.
37Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire o f  Louis Bonaparte, p. 116.
38Ansart argues that such a conception had been the result o f  an intellectual reflection developed outside 
the practical conclusion reached by the working class at the same time. Intellectually, the model o f  a 
central state seemed necessary. However, a close observation o f  the Commune's practice  o f  local power 
brought Marx to envisage what had been thus far almost impossible to conceive: that the alienating power 
o f  the state-Leviathan might not be inevitable after all. Pierre Ansart, Ideologies, conflits et pouvoir  (Paris: 
PUF, 1977), pp. 198 and 204.
39Ibid ., p. 204.
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working-class itself, which was severely damaged anyway by the anti-Communard 
reaction. In the context of a centralised state that had grown from monarchic absolutism 
to republican Jacobinism, the Marxian proposition that such a model could and should 
be outstripped opened up a frightful vision for a France that had not yet fully recovered 
from the revolutionary shock. 1871 not only reopened the wounds of 1793, it also 
encroached upon the state's prerogatives -  hence the perception of the Communards as 
bringing chaos to France. For one last time, Paris claimed to be the voice of the nation's 
interests and republican values, but this time there was no institutional vacuum to be 
filled: the revolutionary parole would be in direct opposition to the institution that 
claimed to be the incarnation of national sovereignty and society itself.
(iii) Revisiting 1793: resolving the deadlock of 1871
The elections of February 1871 had sent a majority of hommes de Vordre to the new 
republican assembly, thus reflecting France's rural power and its desire for peace and 
order -  a programme reminiscent of Napoleon Ill's. Paris -  like most major cities -  was 
at odds with the nation, as it had voted for a republican agenda, an essential part of 
which consisted in pursuing the war against Prussia, and liberating the occupied 
territory of Alsace and Lorraine.
Quite remarkably, given the past hostility shown by Paris to federalisme, a taste for 
municipal power followed, and when the insurrection started in March, one of the first 
claims was for self-governance: 'Le mouvement se tourne contre l'Etat, contre le 
pouvoir, contre une Assemblee nationale dans laquelle le peuple de Paris ne se 
reconnait pas. [...] L’autonomie politique de Paris est un symbole autant qu'une fm'.40 
Faced with its political weakness, Paris still entertained a nostalgia for its past national 
role, and although the representative system made its voice marginal, the capital 
endeavoured to represent the nation in a way similar to 1793, when its voice had led the 
nation, and when the legitimacy of the people's parole had been able to overwhelm the 
blind legality of the peasants' vote.
Therefore, the fall of the Commune marked the fall of the mythic status of Paris as 
the embodiment of the revolutionary, popular parole born in 1789. The victory of the 
Versaillais brought a final blow to the thus far untarnished mythical and revelatory 
quality of the capital of the Revolution. What died in Paris's apocalypse were not solely 
the bad seeds of urbanity, the evil Babylon, the havoc of envy, the roots of anarchy, the 
restless Leviathan: the revelatory power of Paris fell too. The fall of Paris in 1871 
echoed its rise in 1789 (both occurring in opposition to Versailles), but it was also
^Favier, Pahs, p. 896.
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reminiscent of 1793 in many ways: '93 est la guerre de l'Europe contre la France et de la 
France contre Paris. Et qu'est-ce que la Revolution? C'est la victoire de la France contre 
l'Europe et de Paris contre la France' (QT, p. 118). 1871 is a backlash in this regard:
Paris defeated by France, France defeated by Europe.41 For Hugo, this was, after 1851, 
a second historical catastrophe.
Hugo had shared much of Paris's fate: the siege and the outrageous news of France's 
defeat. The beginning of the Commune coincided with the funeral of his son, Charles.
He then moved to Belgium where he followed the events. If his attitude during the 
Commune seems ambivalent, his incessant calls for clemency for the Communards 
marks him out in the context of the curee described in the previous chapter. Hugo 
defended the defeated, pleading repeatedly for amnesty, making every effort to save 
them (Rochefort in particular) from the government's retaliation. Worse even: he 
welcomed political refugees in Brussels.42 His attitude, as we shall see, was not so 
much a matter of Christian charity as the result of a political and institutional reflection 
about the nature and system of the republic.
Hugo's profound rethinking of history after 1851 and his philosophy of the revolution 
developed in exile are put to the test yet again in 1871. The revelatory quality of the 
Revolution, much as the Christian revelation, ought to have changed history,
L'avenement de la conscience historique coi'ncidera avec celle d'une nouvelle logique de l'histoire 
mettant un terme a l'enchainement des crimes commis depuis la Revolution fransaise. [...] [Mais] le 
rejet de l'Empire [est advenu] selon [la loi] du Talion, reanimee par la Commune.43
1793 had been justified by Hugo because of the centuries of injustice that had preceded 
and prepared it. In contrast, the violence of 1871 has no moral, nor historical 
justification.
It is in the context of post-commune reaction -  a reaction made and justified in the 
name of the Republic itself -  that Hugo writes Quatrevingt-treize. His perception of the 
Commune as yet another civil war following yet another attempt at building a 
republican regime (at that stage by no means guaranteed to last any longer than the
41For Hugo the victory o f Germany concerns Europe as a whole. See CV, 2, p. 730.
42Hugo's attitude at a tune o f  extreme conflict attracted much violent reaction: his home in Brussels was 
besieged (see CV, 2, pp. 646-7) and he was subsequently expelled from Belgium - his attitude o f restraint 
generating a much violent opposition, a further illustration o f  the Erasmus syndrome. The following year, 
Barbey famously demolished L'Annee terrible as a piece o f  Prussian propaganda: 'Vous n'etes done [...] 
qu'un employe volontaire de la Prusse: [...] Vous pouvez renoncer a la langue franqaise, qui ne s'en 
plaindra pas; car depuis longtemps vous l'avez assez ereintee. Ecrivez votre prochain livre en allemand', 
Barbey d'Aurevilly, 'Un poete prussien' 13 mai 1872, in D ernierespolem iques  (Paris: Savine, 1891).
43Gabrielle Chamarat, 'Preface' in Chat., p. 18.
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previous ones) brings him to reconsider the sacred origins of modern France: 
Quatrevingt-treize 'est tout entier investi par une reflexion sur l'origine, sur cette origine 
des temps modemes, de l'histoire, de la societe, de la pensee et de la parole moderne 
que represente la Revolution franchise'.44 The future that lay ahead in 1871 cannot be 
thought of without a reflection on, and understanding of what 1793 had been. As he had 
written the uprising of 1832 through the prism of 1848, Hugo now writes 1793 with 
reference to 1871. A close parallel between the two contexts is drawn, notably when 
writing about the two bloodsheds: 'On adossait la chaine a une fosse creusee et l'on 
fusillait; les fusilles tombaient dans la fosse parfois vivants; on les enterrait tout de 
meme. Nous avons revu ces mceurs' (QT, pp. 189-90, my emphasis).45 This is a clear 
allusion to the semaine sanglante. Hugo had thought about the revolutionary revelation 
for decades, and was contemplating a vast work dedicated to it. 1871 made it all the 
more urgent.
What drives Hugo's reflection in Quatrevingt-treize, I believe, are two interrelated 
ideas which are essential with regard to the question of modern myth in the context of 
the third attempt to build the long-awaited republican regime on the ashes of Paris 
Commune: 1) the question of what I will be referring to as the Cainite cycle of violence 
that failed to be broken by 1789; and 2) the opposition between two Republican voices: 
the popular and revolutionary parole, and the frozen, rigid word of the decret.
(iv) Breaking the Cainite cycle: Christian revelation
La m ythologie est-elle Veternelle repetition de l'histoire, 
toujours incomprise, de Cam et A bel?4^
The attempts made by Hugo to break the renewed cycle of violence he sees in the 
anti-Communard reaction needs to be understood outside the usual set of moralistic and 
sentimental considerations. As Baudelaire said, Hugo is first and foremost a visionnaire 
and a poet, and this gives its value to his morals:
44Chamarat-Malandain, 'Voix et parole du peuple dans Quatre-vingt-treize', p. 1. It is worth mentioning in 
this regard, that at the very moment when the memory o f  the Commune is being erased -  physically and 
symbolically -  in Paris, Hugo turns to the great forgetting o f  the nineteenth century: the Vendee war.
45Many other similarities bring the two contexts together. The scenes of'L es rues de Paris en ce temps la' 
in particular echo the siege o f  1870-1871: 'Les Allemands etaient aux portes. [...] On souriait 
hero'iquement. [...] Tout etait effrayant et personne n'etait efffaye' (p. 110); 'Aucune defaillance dans ce 
peuple' (p. 114).
4^Rene Girard, La Voix meconnue du reel (Paris: Grasset & Fasquelle, 2002), p. 63.
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U ne s'agit pas de cette morale precheuse qui, par son air de pedanterie, par son ton didactique, 
peut gater les plus beaux morceaux de poesie; mais d'une morale inspiree qui se glisse, invisible, 
dans la matiere poetique, comme les fluides imponderables dans toute la machine du monde. La 
morale n'entre pas dans cet art a titre de but. Le poete est moraliste sans le vouloir, p a r  abondance 
et p lenitude de nature.47
I believe one way to understand his thought on charity and forgiveness is to come 
back to Girard's theory of mimetic violence and scapegoat seen in chapter 1, and look 
more specifically here at his interpretation of the Passion. What brings the seer and the 
anthropologist together is a common will to use revelatory tales to deconstruct the 
myths their society live in, and a similar willingness to stop the Cainite cycle.
I am using this phrase in reference to humanity's first crime by Cain, and the 
subsequent cycle of eternal revenge -  and thus violence. As we have seen, Rene Girard 
regards crime as the foundation of civilisation and culture.48 It is, in this regard, no 
coincidence that Cain founded the first city: human civilisation is based on a 'violence 
originelle', and it is the role of myth to hide this reality to the members of the 
community. This in turn allows the cycle of eternal revenge -  the Cainite cycle -  to 
operate; it is at the heart of what Girard calls Villusion mythologique.49
We have also seen in chapter 1 Girard's theory of the scapegoat, which is essentially 
a process of projection of the fears felt within a community (fear of social disintegration) 
onto an outsider (victime emissaire) which can easily be sacrificed without any fear of 
initiating a new cycle of revenge within the group. The process works so long as there is 
absolute unanimity about the culpability of the scapegoat, his responsibility in the 
group's crisis. The paradox of an innocent victim being seen by everyone -  including by 
himself -  as guilty is precisely the mark of Villusion mythologique. This illusion, Girard 
claims, is deconstructed by the telling of the Passion.
Often presented as yet another example of mythical narrative, the Passion is, for 
Girard, a revelation and a demystification in that, for the first time, the scapegoat is 
openly seen as innocent by the narrative: 'La victime est defendue par le texte au lieu 
d'etre attaquee'.50 The very fact that the text presents Jesus as an innocent figure is an 
indication that the myth no longer works: the spell that guaranteed the unanimity against 
the scapegoat is broken.
47Baudelaire, 'Les M iserables par Victor Hugo', p. 218. Baudelaire notes, however, that Les M iserables is 
an exception in the matter.
48Ibid., pp. 161 & 186.
^Girard, Et Je Vois Satan Tomber Comme I'Eclair, p. 115.
-^Girard, '2000 et le mythe de l'ere post-chretienne', p. 332-3.
For Girard, the gospels reveal the mystification which hides that human society is 
founded on collective violence. Being a Christian, for Girard -  in what I perceive as a 
very Hugolian way -, is therefore not so much about dogma, but about deconstructing 
myth and mystification: 'c'est precisement rompre avec l'unanimite victimaire';51 in 
other words, breaking free from the Cainite cycle of eternal violence:
La victoire de la vraie foi, ce ne sera pas le rassemblement de tous les hommes sous un regne 
unique conjoignant lui-meme le ciel et la terre; ce sera le renversement complet de ce qui fut 
l'universelle regie des hommes. [...] Se delier de ce qui est 1'obligation par excellence aux yeux du 
monde, a savoir la reciprocity violente, la voix du sang, le devoir de vengeance comme dette 
envers sa communaute d'appartenance.52
The relevance to Hugo's work -  from Le dernier jour d ’un condamne to his pleading for 
the Communards' amnesty -  is evident enough. But the question of amnesty that 
preoccupies and mobilises Hugo in the immediate aftermath of the Commune is not a 
matter of charity only. It derives from a reflection upon Republican institutions when 
they are perverted by this illusion mythologique.
What the Christian revelation developed by Girard, also shows, is how a perfect legal 
system -  as the Romans liked to see it -  not only proves incapable of breaking this 
illusion when it sees it, it is also subdued by it. Pilate knows Jesus to be innocent, 
acknowledges it, and yet, faced with the risk of a riot, caves in to the crowd and gives 
an aspect of legality to what he knows to be illegitimate.53 The legal crucifixion only 
replaces the spontaneous stoning. Nothing in this carefully crafted machinery of the 
legal roman system can prevent the execution of an innocent known as such by the 
Roman authority (not to mention the release of a criminal, Barabas).54 Despite the 
revelatory quality of 1789, this process is still at work. And now the Republic's 
condemnation of the Communards offers a new variation on an old theme, Hugo the 
seer embarks on a political reflection upon the very nature of the Republican institutions 
which are to be decided upon in the aftermath of a civil war.
51 Girard, La Voix meconnue du reel, p. 193.
52Gauchet, Le Desenchantement du monde, p. 164.
53Girard, Et Je Vois Satan Tomber Comme VEclair, pp. 49-50.
54See also Jacques Ellul, Anarchie et Chrisitianisme (Paris: La Table Ronde, 1998).
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(v) Hugo and the Republic: pro jure contra legem55
The poet is not only a seer, he is a deputy,56 and his pleading for amnesty is linked 
to his concern about the increasing power and influence of the executive: 'La question 
n'est pas une question de simple misericorde' he writes, 'une question de commutation 
ou de grace, c'est-a-dire une question executive: c'est une question de haute justice, de 
haute politique, d'effacement total du passe, c'est-a-dire une question legislative' (CV, p. 
849). Amnesty is, for Hugo, a matter of justice, it therefore depends on souverainete 
populaire -  i.e. on the Assembly (CV, 2, pp. 849-50). Hugo is clearly in favour of a 
parliamentary regime that would give preeminence to the legislative: Texecutif doit etre 
subordonne au souverain, a l'Assemblee' (CV, 2, p. 850).
This, however, needs to be nuanced: 'Hugo pense la souverainete -  legitime lorsque 
le peuple l'exerce directement sur lui-meme, nulle et non avenue dans tous les autres 
cas -  et ignore ou rejette l'Etat'.57 The suspicion Hugo feels for rigid institutions equals 
his fear of the people resuming their political indifference. They have to be fully and 
actively integrated into the republic. In this regard the dissolution of the garde nationale 
in favour of a professional army is a matter of serious concern: 'L'ecrasement de Paris 
amenera le desarmement de la garde nationale. Le desarmement de la garde nationale, 
c'est la livraison de la France a l'armee' he had predicted (CV, 2, p. 878). When his 
prophecy was fulfilled, he fearfully concluded: 'c'est la dictature de Vobeissancepassive, 
c'est la consigne superieure de la loi, c'est l'abime. Nous y voila (CV, 2, p. 882, my 
emphasis). A few years before the Boulanger crisis and the Dreyfus affair, Hugo sees it 
as a danger to leave the defence of the republic to the military only. But his reflection 
goes deeper and what he then fears most -  like Gambetta -  is a growing gap between 
the state apparatus and society.58
What this quotation also suggests, is an acute sense that the justice system -  even a 
republican one -  does not automatically serve justice. In fact what the repression of the 
Commune had showed was precisely a gap between the two: retaliation, vengeance, 
mythical violence and anti-communard hysteria had all been made in the name of a 
rational justice system. Hugo denounces the process: 'Ces hommes [Hugo refers to
55Hugo, 'Le droit et de la loi', in Actes et paroles, in OC, vol. XV-XVI/1, p. 581.
56Hugo was elected by the Parisians in February 1871 (second behind Louis Blanc), only to resign a 
month later. He was elected to the Senate in 1876. 'Dans son rapport a Paris, l'enjeu symbolique est bien 
plus fort que s'il etait elu depute de l'une des circonscriptions parisiennes. [...] II deviendra le delegue de la 
commune de Paris. [...] la Commune (avec une majuscule) a retrouve un heraut' Agnes Spiquel writes in 
her '1875', Groupe Hugo, 25 mars 2000, p. 7. His main fight in an increasingly reactionary chamber will 
be to obtain a vote on amnesty.
57Rosa, 'Ce que c'est que l'exil de Victor Hugo', p. 8.
58Madeleine Reberioux, 'Hugo dans le mouvement politique et social (1870-1885)', Groupe Hugo, 4 avril 
1987, p. 3.
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Thiers and his government], ils disent: tout avec la loi, tout pour la loi, tout par la loi. 
Qu'avez-vous fait? Fusillades sommaires, tueries sans jugement, cours martiales de 
hasard, justices improvisees, c'est-a-dire aveugles' (CV, 2, p. 736). In other words, Hugo 
claims: 'Vous partez d'un droit pour aboutir a un crime' (CV, 2, p. 713). Not 
surprisingly then, the opposition between republican legality and legitimacy -  rules and 
conscience -  in the context of a civil war is at the heart of Quatrevingt-treize.
The opposition between the rule and conscience was already at work in Les 
Miserables. Javert, who, like Cimourdain, owes much to Robespierre, represents the 
continual defeat of the former against the latter. Although Javert manages to persecute 
many characters, bringing incessant insecurity to Valjean's life, he ultimately incarnates 
the limits of the state when moved by a strict respect of the rules and nothing else: 'en 
un mot la Lettre sans l'esprit; c'est l'abominable Javert', Baudelaire proclaimed, 'Javert 
m'apparait comme un monstre incorrigible, affame de justice comme la bete feroce l'est 
de chair sanglante'.59 In the novel, Javert succeeds in victimising the innocent (Fantine, 
and as a result Cosette) while being totally inefficient in guaranteeing social and 
political order: the Thenardiers and their gang can be arrested, they never stay long in a 
prison described as a sieve; and he proves equally incapable of preventing the 
insurrection. His ultimate defeat will be his long lasting chase of Valjean who manages 
to make him doubt. 'Javert deraille', and kills himself.
This theme is examined further and in more details in Quatrevingt-Treize. The novel 
opposes two types of paroles which coexist in the Convention: 'celle de l'Assemblee, 
dont on a dit le contact etroit avec la rue, et celle que l'on peut appeler du "decret" et qui, 
paradoxalement, doit, pour etre operatoire, perdre une part de son contact avec la 
realite'.60 The popular and revolutionary parole is more emotional, but also in close 
contact with the real: 'ancre sur l'emotion de celui qui parle, proche du concret, figure 
avec energie [...]'.61 In the novel, it is personified by Radoub: 'emotion, familiarite des 
toumures et du vocabulaire, images vives, sens du burlesque, rythmes simples et forts, 
et surtout cet appel desespere au sens de la realite, que gomme le decret'.62 This is 
illustrated in his agonising participation in Gauvain's trial. The rule of the law and the 
people's sense of righteousness are then entirely at odds, and when the law is enforced, 
despite Radoud's vehement defence of Gauvain, the logic of the condemnation to death
-^Baudelaire, 'Les M iserables par Victor Hugo', p. 223.
60Chamarat-Malandain, 'Voix et parole du peuple dans Quatre-vingt-treize', p. 6.
61 Ibid.
62Ib id ., p. 7.
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of a much admired hero of the Revolution by the republic itself escapes Radoub who 
passes out.
In contrast, Cimourdain personifies the decret: 'II avait, pour tout soumettre a son 
autorite, le decret de la Convention [...], de pleins pouvoirs emanes du Comite de salut 
public, et une injonction de lui obeir, a lui delegue, signee ROBESPIERRE, DANTON, 
MARAT’ (p. 227). Hugo draws a terrible Robespierre-like portrait of the incorruptible, 
pure and inflexible revolutionary of 1793: Teffrayant homme juste' (p. 121) 'atteint par 
le virus effrayant de sa vertu' (p. 123). Cimourdain is described as austere (p. 117), rigid 
(p. 119); confusing reason with logic (Ibid. ). His immense knowledge acquired through 
constant study goes against life: Cimourdain 'savait tout de la science et ignorait tout de 
la vie' (Ibid.).
Opposing the decret, Gauvain is the man who represents the republican ideal; a very 
Hugolian voice for clemency, pleading for the enemies of the first republic as Hugo 
does for the enemy of the third: 'Amnistie est pour moi le plus beau mot de la langue 
franfaise' (p. 231).
Cimourdain and Gauvain are two antagonistic figures, united only by an enduring 
affection; 'ces deux antagonistes etaient deux amis', (p. 127). But that friendship is 
jeopardised by their irreconcilable conceptions of the revolution: 'L'amitie etait entre les 
deux hommes, mais la haine etait entre les deux principes' (p. 227). Through this 
dichotomy -  a soul cut in two halves (pp. 227-8) -  the Revolution reaches a turning 
point. As the republic seems to overcome its enemies, the question is raised as to what 
kind of republic is about to triumph: 'la republique de la terreur [ou] la republique de la 
clemence' (p. 226); Cimourdain's 'republique de fabsolu' or Gauvain's 'republique de 
l'ideal' (p. 368). What is at stake is not only the form of the republican regime, but the 
relation between the republic and the real.
Gauvain rejects Cimourdain's rather narrow conception of reality: 'Votre republique 
dose, mesure et regie l'homme; la mienne l'emporte en plein azur; c'est la difference 
qu'il y a entre un theoreme et un aigle. -  Tu te perds dans le nuage. -  Et vous dans le 
calcul'. (p. 368). For Cimourdain, all this is dream and utopia, the latter needing to be 
disciplined to be truly productive: 'II faut pourtant saisir l'utopie, lui imposer le joug du 
reel, et l'encadrer dans le fait' (p. 370). The claustrophobic image of the 'joug du reel' is 
opposed by Gauvain who personifies the freedom of the mind: 'Non! plus de joug! 
l'homme est fait, non pour trainer des chaines, mais pour ouvrir des ailes' (p. 372); 'je 
veux une republique d'esprits'. (p. 371). The brain is no longer the prison, the burial 
vault of the mind, it has become for Gauvain -  who speaks as a 'prophete' (p. 371) —
'[une] voute visionnaire' (p. 373).
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Malandain has analysed this relation between the two revolutionary paroles and the 
real: 'En face du discours de Cimourdain de la loi, de la ligne droite, Gauvain tente 
d'instaurer une parole qui evite et detourne l'abstraction'.63 The real as expressed by 
Cimourdain is too rational, too logical, to include life: 'la realite dont parle Cimourdain, 
parce qu'elle est soumise a trop de logique, n'est en fait qu'une representation abstraite 
de ce qui vit, et qui est mouvement, courbe, report dialectique {Ibid.). This is why 
Gauvain opposes the mathematical discourse of Cimourdain: 'un travail de substitution 
de termes ramene l'homme dans le monde et lui rend sa qualite d'etre pensant' {Ibid.).
And this theme that puts man -  rather than institutions -  at the centre of the Republic 
recalls Michelet: "Soyez freres", dit le christianisme. Mais pour etre frere, il faut etre; or, 
l'homme n'est pas encore; le droit et la liberte constituent seuls la vie de l'homme; un 
dogme qui ne les donne pas n'est qu'une fraternite speculative entre zero et zero'(RF, p. 
35). A true republican regime can only be made of these etre pensants. We are here at 
the heart of this thesis: for Michelet and Hugo, a Republic is first and foremost a system 
that breaks man free from the idleness, conformity and illusion of a politico-mythical 
system that 1789 ought to have revealed once and for all. Yet it depends on the people 
to hear this revelation and act accordingly.
(vi) 'Une republique d'esprits': parole and demystification
Le cadavre est a terre et Vi dee est deboufe^
Only these 'etres pensants' are capable of going beyond the word of the decret to see 
the principle: '[ils] ne confondent pas les affirmations du code avec les solutions du 
droit, et [...] ne croient pas que la volonte momentanee de la loi suffise pour reprimer 
l'etemelle revolte de la realite meconnue' (CV, 2, p. 745). The law is relative; le droit is 
absolute. And the law can only guarantee le droit if and when enlightened.
The work of humanity should fight both rhetorical violence and the Cainite cycle, the 
two being closely related. The Cainite cycle is not just about physical violence, it is first 
and foremost a violence committed against reality: 'A la terreur repond la terreur [see 
QT, p. 190]. Le langage est fonde sur l'injonction et menace par l'abstraction'.65 This 
explains Hugo's suspicion towards words when used to freeze meaning, just as religion
63Ibid.
64Hugo, cited in Franck Laurent, 'Victor Hugo, Le Rappel et la Commune', Groupe Hugo, 13 mars 2004,
p. 16.
65Chamarat-Malandain, 'Voix et parole du peuple dans Q uatre-vingt-treize ', p. 6.
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freezes the Word of God: 'le mot fixe les choses. L'idee les pense en devenir'.66 The 
opposition between word and ideal warns us that the legitimacy of the republican 
regime lies not in its legal framework as such, but in its humanity.
1793 -  the bloc of history collapsing -  reveals Cain/Marat: 'depuis six mille ans,
Cain s'est conserve dans la haine comme le crapaud dans la pierre, le bloc se casse, Cam 
saute parmi les hommes, et c'est Marat' (p. 140). Armed with his hatred and the legal 
force of the decret, Marat justifies the bloodshed because it is necessary to the victory of 
the Revolution. When Cimourdain prolongs this justification, he uses images similar to 
those used later by Zola in La Debacle: gangrenous France requires heavy surgery -  
which he very much identifies with butchery (p. 230). The terror is justified by 
historical necessity. The constitution and the declaration of the rights of man are 
suspended in the name of salut public, which takes primacy over the right; the 
principles are being sacrificed for more efficiency and the ultimate victory of the 
Revolution.
This discourse, made according to cold logic and a lifeless sense of the real reveals a 
contradiction between the end and the means which, for Gauvain, must obey the same 
principle: 'on ne fait pas le mal pour faire le bien (p. 231). To be more than a reified 
public object (res publica), the newly-born republic needs to be driven by a superior 
principle. 'Ce qui fonde [...] la civilisation [...], c'est, tout autant, et sans doute plus 
encore que le progres technique, la pensee qui l'organise'.67
The decret, rational and logical as it may be does not in itself guarantee anything 
other than a well-organised apparatus. But if men want to operate any differently from 
an anthill -  ants too are organised and disciplined (QT, p. 372) - , if the republic wants 
to be more than a mere institutional framework, they need to be guided by their 
conscience, not by the decret: 'la parole au nom du droit n'a de legitimite que garantie 
par une conscience qui, pour Hugo, s'assimile a fame et qui n'est pas autre chose que 
Dieu dans l'homme'.68 Hence Hugo's/Gauvain's idealism: they operate very much in the 
framework of a revolutionary, pre-modern state, where an inspired parole leads the 
republic. In 1871 such a conception seems at odds with the importance gained by the 
state:
Le droit n'a pas de visibility. II siege dans la conscience, celle de l'homme et celle des peuples.
Comment fonder une legitimite politique sur ce qui n'a pas de visibility? D'une certaine maniere,
Hugo n'adhere pleinement a la republique et ne la prend en charge dans son discours que
66Delphine Gleizes, 'Victor Hugo en 1848: la legitimite du discours', Groupe Hugo, 13 mars 1999, p. 5.
67Ibid., p. 2.
68Spiquel, '1875', p. 6.
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lorsqu'elle n'est plus un regime -  soumis aux contingences des lois et d'une constitution en pleine 
genese -  mais un ideal, grandi par les exigences du droit.^9
His theologico-political reflection seems very much incompatible with the framework 
of modem politics: 'la grande faiblesse de toute pensee gnostique, sa fragilite, reste 
qu'elle est incapable de s'incarner dans l'ordre socio-politique des collectivites 
modemes' Shayegan argues.70
The novel concludes on the moral victory of Gauvain (republican man) over 
Cimourdain (republican rule).71 It is, however, a victory to be. The Revolution had 
announced the triumph of equity over the judiciary; the future over the present that 
shaped it but which needs to be transcended (Gauvain was educated by Cimourdain); 
1793 had been the advent of the popular parole -  productive in the Convention, 
liberating with Gauvain. But the revelation of the revolutionary Word -  much as the 
revelation of the Passion in Girard -  does not mean it has been properly heard. In fact it 
is yet to be fully understood:
L'avenement d'une parole nouvelle, retrempee aux sources vives de la voix populaire, reste a la fin 
en attente d'une reconnaissance historique. Le discours de Gauvain [...] semble moins la considerer 
comme un acquis des temps m odem es que comme une conquete possible de l'avenir.72
And if the three protagonists who personify the past (Lantenac), the present 
(Cimourdain) and the future (Gauvain) all die, the people (Radoud, but also Michelle 
Flechard's three children, adopted by the Parisians) survive, and with them the hope that 
the revelation may, in the future, strike the people's consciences.
The myth of Paris, as the site of the revolutionary revelation and the people's parole 
had been a romantic attempt to find the means of demystification within myth itself, 
within the dispositiflegendaire. This attempt does not end in 1851, as it survives in 
exile with Hugo and in France with the democrates-socialistes. But after the missed 
opportunity of 1848, 1871 brings yet another blow to this idealism: this time the myth 
of Paris itself seems discredited. It is nonetheless at this very moment that Hugo goes 
back to its origins in an attempt to build a bridge between the revelatory quality of 
revolutionary and popular Paris and the nation,73 and to reinvigorate the republican
69Gleizes, 'Victor Hugo en 1848', p. 5.
70Shayegan , Qu'est-ce qu'une revolution relig ieuse?, p. 205.
71'Force a la loi' (p. 379) is follow ed by the last paro le  o f  the novel: Gauvain's 'Vive la republique!' (p. 
380).
72Chamarat-Malandain, 'Voix et parole du peuple dans Q uatre-vingt-treize', p. 7.
73This is illustrated by the Parisians meeting M ichelle Flechard in Q T: the Bretonne fails to understand 
anything from the situation she suffers from -  let alone any political dimension. Only the Parisians seem
196
ideal of the Printemps des peuples he had thus far incarnated. However, the romantic 
tradition very much dies in 1871, together with the democrates-socialistes' programme 
and the Commune: in 1871 the myth of Paris appears obsolete -  the parole coming in 
direct contradiction with the voice of the state, and losing the legitimacy thus far 
granted by its revelatory quality. Legitimacy now stands within the law.
Hugo suffers a stroke in 1878. 'Un totem, c'est ce que les republicans au pouvoir 
feront de lui, lorsqu'il n'aura plus guere les moyens de se defendre'.74 He dies a few 
years later in 1885, and is promptly pantheonise. The harmless myth of the patriarch of 
the third republic comes at a convenient time,75 and to this day Hugo is hardly 
remembered for his revolutionary philosophy and the subversive quality of his writing. 
Hugo had nevertheless offered a 'modele d'articulation de l'art et de la politique. [...] 
C'etait l'illustration et la realisation concrete d'un ideal politique et litteraire neuf: ou 
l'absolu de l'art ne pouvait etre disjoint de la democratic republicaine con9ue comme 
progression vers l'absolu'.76 The enduring myth of a Hugo as naive prophet of human 
progress still undermines the potentially subversive nature of his work. His legacy 
remains tainted by his recurring themes of charity, fraternity and justice. Perhaps these 
words resonate differently when written by Baudelaire who saw Les Miserables as a 
waking call: 'un etourdissant rappel a l'ordre d'une societe trop amoureuse d'elle-meme 
et trop peu soucieuse de l'immortelle loi de fraternite'.77 Offering the disturbing 
spectacle of miserables living and undermining the positive side of the myth of Paris, 
Hugo's book forces the reader to watch the unwatchable. In imposing the seer's vision 
onto the reader, the book anticipates a political awareness: 'c'est un livre interrogant, 
posant des cas de complexity sociale, d'une nature terrible et navrante, disant a la 
conscience du lecteur: "Eh bien? Qu'en pensez-vous? Que concluez-vous?"'.78 And 
Baudelaire further argues: 'N'est-il pas utile que de temps a autre 'le poete, le philosophe,
able to understand the broader picture o f  her plight, and who is responsible for it, when herself seems 
totally blind. See QT, pp. 26-35.
74Guy Rosa 'Hugo politique. 1872-1880', Groupe Hugo, 17 mars 1989, p. 8.
75'Dans les faits, la democratic republicaine a cesse tres vite -  des 1885-90 -  de s'identifier a la mutation 
continue et reciproque de l'ideologie et des rapports sociaux: a une revolution permanente et pacifique'. 
Ibid., p. 10.
I^Ibid. Although he opposed the Commune because it brought France into a civil war when it should have 
been fighting Germany, Hugo's political vision was very close to the programme o f  the Communards. In 
fact, and this is rarely pointed out, his conception o f  the republic had the commune at its heart: 'Une chose 
est a faire, enorme: constituer la Commune', intermediary between the state and the individual. 'Apres quoi 
la revolution de France sera vraiment fmie' (CV, 2, p. 772). Again Hugo is at odds with the model o f the 
central state that is consolidated by the post-1871 republic.
77Baudelaire, 'Les M iserables  par Victor Hugo', p. 224.
18Ibid., p. 220.
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prennent un peu le Bonheur egoi'ste aux cheveux, et lui disent, en lui secouant le mufle 
dans le sang et l'ordure: "Vois ton oeuvre et bois ton oeuvre"?'79
Paris the state survived Paris the myth. The defeat of the Commune and the scale of 
the repression weakened the socialist movement for a decade. The capital of revolutions 
no longer had much weight when faced with the legality/legitimacy of a Republican 
regime and the will of the country as expressed in elections. As the state mattered more 
in terms of shaping the nation's representations in a society characterised by 
individualism and massification, a new relation to public opinion emerged: 'Les plus 
clairvoyants decouvrent qu'il faut toucher f'opinion publique" et done inventer de 
nouveaux liens entre les intellectuels et le peuple qui sortent des schemas romantiques 
obsoletes'.80 To a large extent, the century of Hugo ends there, and with it the romantic 
belief in myth as a means of demystification.
Shayegan's quote above indeed shows the limits of this endeavour. But Hugo's 
political gnosis has at least one merit: to provide the tools to resist illusion 
mythologique, even when it is presented as rational. '[L'oeuvre de Hugo] ressemble fort 
au cogito de Descartes, et [...] si elle ne fonde ni une philosophie ni une religion, et 
encore moins une secte, elle etablit tres certainement une discipline et une culture de la 
conscience; [...] [une] theorie et pratique de la responsabilite [...] critique'.81 This often 
overlooked aspect of Hugo's work seems to me particularly relevant in the following 
century. In the context of growing, impersonal and elusive state power, where the 
regime itself becomes technical, the new techniques of propaganda are about to 
transform myth into a political weapon: ideology.
19Ibid., p. 224.
811Charle, P aris Fin de siecle, p. 14.
81 Jacques Seebacher, 'Hugo et la quadrature des religions', Groupe Hugo, 20 Septembre 2003, p. 3.
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Rien ne ressem ble p lu s a la pen see mythique que 
I'ideologie po litique. ^
II fa u t se sa isir de Vimagination des homines pour les 
gouverner.^
'C'est un espoir sans doute bien illusoire que de pretendre definitivement transcender 
l'opposition du rationnel et de l'imaginaire',3 Girardet writes, thus underlining the 
difficulty of reaching definite conclusions in this field. The problem of studying myth, 
he argues, lies in the fact that only those who live within mythic thinking can grasp its 
full reality. Seen from the outside, myth can appear as a dead body ready to be 
dissected; 'Entre les donnees de l'experience interieurement vecue et celles de la 
distanciation critique, le hiatus subsiste, qu'il est peut-etre possible de reduire, qu'il est 
vain pourtant de rever de totalement abolir' (pp. 23-4). However 'modem' and inscribed 
in socio-political realities it may be, the myth of Paris does not escape this difficulty.
(i) Paris, myth and modernity
The myth of Paris developed in the wake of the French Revolution, and within a 
politico-imaginary setting -  dispositiflegendaire -  which combined myth and history, 
poetics and politics. The shockwave of 1789 and the subsequent need to reconstruct the 
community on new foundations combined with the secularisation of society which 
transformed and sacralised politics and history. Historians, but also the state, were now 
in charge of modeling the collective representation of society and its past. Paris appears 
as the site of this theologico-politico-historical attempt both to reconstruct national 
memory and to build a nation on the promises of 1789.
In that regard, the specificity of Paris as a modem myth, when compared to another 
great example of a nineteenth-century city in literature, London, is that, although the 
gloom and darkness are common to both, Paris alone is the capital of a heavily 
centralised state and -  the two are closely connected -  the cradle of the Revolution. As 
1789 had raised the promise of radical changes which, for many, were still to be 
fulfilled, any of these changes affecting the nation would be decided in and by Paris. A
^Levi-Strauss, A n th ropo log ie structura le , p. 231.
^Fabre d'Eglantine, cited in Lefort, E ssais sur le p o litiq u e , p. 104.
3Girardet, M ythes et m ythologies po litiqu es, p. 23.
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culture of revolution developed, defining political life in terms of conflicts around the 
much debated legacy of 1789, and locating these conflicts where history was constantly 
being made and written: Paris. In other words, Paris became both a target (to seize the 
power located in the capital) and the place that shaped the symbolic contest for that 
power.
With this in mind, the representation of Paris in literature is far more than just 
illustrative, and serves one of the main functions of myth: making sense, interpreting the 
changes affecting the community. Thus, the dark and evil depiction of the city and the 
obsessions generated by its underworld that we have seen in authors as diverse as 
Balzac, Hugo, Sue or Zola, not only reflect a deep socio-cultural anxiety, but also an 
urge to provide meaning and social cohesion in a particularly vulnerable context: 1) The 
century of Prometheus had to cope with the many contradictions inherited from its 
'sacred origins'; 2) it also had to redefine itself in the light of the profound shake-up of a 
traditionally Christian country which went from its status of 'fille ainee de l'Eglise' to 
the 'fille ainee de la revolution'; 3) it had to face the massive transformation of and in 
the city (demographic explosion, Haussmannisation, urban imaginaire) and the 
increasing division between the capital and France; and 4) it had to resolve the 
contradictions between national sovereignty and individualism; in other words, to 
combine the local and the national within an attempt to (re)construct the French nation 
and its memory.
The poetics of oxymoron which characterizes the discourse on Paris matches the 
great flexibility of mythic discourse. Thus, Paris could very well serve to represent and 
explain radically opposed ideas. It was the place of poetic and political ambivalence and 
contradiction. It was a place that generated fears and fascination; terror and the 
comforting defences against it; admiration and repulsion; order and chaos. The 
contradiction reached its peak with Haussmann: at last, the city was expurgated of its 
filthy slums, rationalised, modernised. And yet the massive transformation of Paris was 
seen and vigorously denounced as the tragic destruction of an equally idealized city. 
Poets such as Baudelaire regretted the old city and proclaimed -  thus defining -  its 
authentic identity: mysterious, ambivalent, unknowable, unpredictable and restless, like 
its people.
The two dominant sets of representations of Paris echo the antagonisms of the 
French Revolution: sans-culotterie against bourgeoisie; violence of the street against 
violence of the state. Both are oppositional, exclusive and refractory -  although 
complementary and reflecting each other. The contradictions embedded in Paris 
correspond to the mythic nature of the capital: there is great ambivalence in the sacred
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as a tremendum fascinosum  that gives myth the ability to encapsulate the dark side of 
the human condition as well as its luminous, bright side.4
It is then less surprising to see Paris going from being the capital of revolutions to the 
place of their repudiation — the Commune being disavowed by the writers. This occurs 
through the redefinition of the myth of the People as we have seen at work in the 
writing of Michelet, Hugo and Zola. The masses gradually came to generate a genuine 
terror that derived from the perception of their inexplicable, archaic and bestial 
violence. The symbolic opposition between Paris and Versailles, which opens and ends 
the period considered for this study, can illustrate how the city of Baudelaire -  a place 
of ambivalent, anarchic and unpredictable qualities -  came to be defeated by the 
rationalism of the Versaillais. We have seen how Zola perfectly illustrated this 
evolution of the image of the people (prisoners of their instinct and animality), and the 
subsequent clash between the two lieux, Paris and Versailles. As an ephemeral 
reapropriation of the city by the people, the Commune appears retrospectively as an odd 
anachronism: Paris had already surrendered to the ordered model of the cite ideale. 
Within the century, the capital had become governed by bourgeois values and more 
importantly, in my view, by those of the state.
The study of the social functions of myth in religious societies explains why it 
endures in different contexts. Myth meets socio-psychological needs for authority and 
protection (by sanctifying the position of the leader); social cohesion (in legitimising 
social norms); and the affective needs of the community (addressing its fears). Because 
what is sacred is unquestionable and fixed (yet flexible and adaptable), it remains the 
best possible protection for social cohesion. Myth gives both a narrative and a frame of 
action to a community: it helps to make sense of the chaos that threatens it and to define 
the actions and rituals that keep that chaos outside from entering. This relation between 
emotion, mythic thinking and mythic discourse remains active in modem settings.
The importance of the Revolution in the nineteenth-century psyche partly accounts 
for the political power and social alienation of myth; we have seen the role of fear in the 
development of myth-making. As a religious process which sacralises collective 
memory and strengthens collective identity, myth seems very much needed in times of 
uncertainties, in modem and archaic societies alike. This not only explains why myth 
persists in modern times, it also suggests that rationalism can go hand in hand with the 
power of influence of myth (as the work of Zola illustrates so well). History, and the 
status it achieved in the nineteenth century stand at the crossroads of both.
4Paul Ricoeur, Le M ai (Geneve: Editions Labor et Fides, 1986), p. 18.
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(ii) Le sens de Vhistoire
L'H istoire c'est I'ecriture du progres de la civilisation; 
c'est aussi I'historiographie des dom inants?
History acquired a new influence in the nineteenth century, gradually combining the 
authority of a religion with the legitimacy of a science, and forming a new form of 
hermeneutic violence in the process. God's will is replaced by the reliability of science 
and values presented as universal and progressive: history claims to look at facts, to 
depend on an apparent objective conception of time and progress. However, there is a 
certain degree of hermeneutic violence in the history made in the nineteenth century, 
based on a myth, 'celui d'une continuity cumulative -  en fait lacunaire et violemment 
selective —, continuity destinee comme le mythe en general, a attenuer certaines 
contradictions [...] et a faire le lien (re-ligio) entre des termes antinomiques'.6
As the interpreters follow the agents in the making of history, the new priests of 
modernity found themselves in a position to decide the meaning of the French 
Revolution and the status of the People of 1789 (thus providing a framework for the 
interpretation of the People's actions in 1848 and 1871); 'idealisation guidee par la 
volonte de nier l'existence qui compose effectivement le peuple pour parler et agir en 
son nom'.7
Meanwhile, this progressive conception of history provides a very efficient tool to 
reject oppositions which are ipso facto  oppositions to progress, thus discredited in that 
their very opposition is a mark of their allegiance to old prejudices. There is no worse 
sin in the nineteenth century than going against one's time, against history. The new 
religion of history, too, has its heretics, those who deny the sens de Vhistoire (both 
meaning and direction): the archaic, anti-progressivists, reactionaries, retrogrades are 
the new losers o f history.
In this regard, it is interesting enough to observe that the failure of the French 
Revolution was transformed into a cultural, historical, intellectual and philosophical 
victory, and that the winners of 1815, Maistre, Bonald and Burke were relegated to the 
category of history's defeated, precisely because their conception of 1789 as a divine test 
was to be overwhelmed by the mythico-rational (modern) conception of the Revolution 
as the sacred origins of modern history. The opponents were presented not so much as
^Millet, Le L egendaire a u X IX e siecle, p. 121.
^Bernard, Le Chouan rom anesque, p. 39. M y emphasis.
7Lefort, E ssais sur le po litiqu e , p. 176. The author refers to 1848 here.
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contesting a position of authority, as the enemies of progress and reason, blindly 
attacking a system that aimed to free men from their prejudice and illusions: 'le discours 
dominant prend les allures d'une liberation'.8
The antagonism between the progressives and the reactionaries is not based on 
reason only or historical analysis, 'elle se fait selon les valeurs quasi-religieuses qui 
sous-tendent les ideologies en devenir'.9 New, modern myths help to distinguish what is 
legitimate from what is not: 'le verbe ideologique ne presente pas au sujet un eventail de 
possibilites entre lesquelles il aurait a choisir, mais une verite morale a laquelle il serait 
indigne et degradant de se soustraire'.10 The fact that rationalism is a self-proclaimed 
attempt at demystification gives it a legitimacy that a non-religious system would 
otherwise lack.
However rational this discourse claimed to be, it served its own myths, even in the 
name of demystification. The opposition to the Communards and the indulgence in 
representing Paris as suffering and humiliated clearly demonstrated that politics and the 
impulses of I ’imaginaire had blended in a political phantasmagoria. No one did more 
than Zola to base perceptions upon facts. And yet in his account of the Commune, he 
indulged in a deeply mythical account of these 'facts'. As I have argued, this is perfectly 
in the nature of myth which serves the needs of explanation and the provision of 
meaning, not accuracy.
Le reel raconte dicte interminablement ce qu'il faut croire et ce qu’il faut faire. Et qu'opposer a des 
faits? On ne peut que s'incliner, et obeir a ce qu'ils "signifient", comme l'oracle de Delphes. [...] 
Cette institution du reel est la forme la plus visible de notre dogmatique contemporaine. Elle est 
aussi la plus d isputee.11
This recalls Caillois's tale, 'le crocodile ensorcele', which brings religious and modern 
societies together in a relation of similar hermeneutic violence and rhetorical 
manipulation.
The specificity of modern mythic thinking lies precisely in a lack of awareness about 
its true nature; demystification and the ideal of rational thought are so prevalent that it is 
easy to rely on science without realising that science too can fulfill the need to believe. 
And yet science and information can be used within a system of beliefs — call it 
mythical or ideological. One can then confidently deny being myth's dupe as one relies 
on facts and rational arguments. This is where myth and ideology meet.
8Philippe Beneton, 'La Liberte conforme', G eopolitique  n° 61, Printemps 1998, p. 55.
9I b i d p. 56.
l 9Ansart, Ideologies, conflits e tp o u v o ir , p. 46.
1 ^Certeau, L'lnvention du quotid ien , p. 271.
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(iii) From myth to ideology
La conception historique du monde nous a liberes des 
dernieres chaines. [ . . .]  M ais quels sont les moyens de 
surm onter Vanarchie des convictions qui nous 
m enacen t? 12
The study of myth in the nineteenth century seems to bring religious myth and 
political mythology together as they both meet the same social needs: Tideologie 
satisfait les deux besoins majeurs de l'homme moderne : son besoin de croire et son 
besoin, non moins urgent, d'expliquer et de justifier sa croyance'.13 As integrated 
assertions, theories and aims that constitute a socio-political programme, ideology -  just 
like myth — has an explanatory function and dynamic quality; it invites the community 
to engage actively in the elaboration of a collective goal; and it meets its affective 
needs.
[Les ideologies] satisfont, d'une part, l'esprit co llec tif du groupe par la vision d'une societe close, 
et, d'autre part, elles pretendent etre scientifiques, done conform es a l'experience de la realite. 
Toute ideologic a une grande charge affective (...), et un appareil logico-rationnel qui lui donne 
une apparence scientifique et philosophique.14
Like myth, ideology claims to hold the monopoly of meaning and truth, but also of 
the criteria on which meaning and truth can be formulated. For Marx and Engels, 
ideologies were the values of a dominant class, imposed on other classes, which, when 
they integrated them, were seen as alienated. An ideology succeeds -  like myth -  when 
it is not seen for what it is (a collective belief) but as a global and rational system of 
interpretation: true and indisputable facts.
One could even argue that ideology is politics made religious: 'II y a [...] 
mythologisation de la politique quand il y a transfert d'aspiration (foi), de representation 
(mythes), de comportements (rites) de la sphere religieuse a la sphere politique, transfert 
[...] de l'esperance humaine de la religion dans la politique'.15 Which, as we have seen, 
is exactly what occurred in the nineteenth century -  a time of a teratologic marriage 
between politics and the religious: 'L'histoire est toujours faite par les hommes, mais la
12W ilhelm Dilthey, cited by Kurt Flash, 'La Verite com me multiplicite: l'experience de l'histoire', in 
Cyrille M ichon (dir), Christianism e. H eritage et destins, pp. 277-8.
13Shayegan, Q u'est-ce qu'une revolu tion  re lig ieu se? , p. 187.
XAIbid., p. 185.
15Sironneau, 'Retour du mythe et imaginaire socio-politique', p. 27.
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puissance des transformations socio-politiques envisagees a quelque de chose de 
religieux'.16
However, political ideology -  although religious -  is not reduced to a modern 
religion: although mystical, the ideological discourse does not include God; it is free 
from transcendence. And this poses a major problem: in a secular framework, the 
production of legitimate discourse cannot be based on an absolute; it is relative. Yet it 
claims to tell the truth and to be universal. As a self-proclaimed rational discourse, 
ideology is less likely than religion to benefit from unverifiable principles: 'L'ideologie 
est privee de cette caution absolue et va done se trouver dans l'obligation de reinventer 
les arguments necessaires a l'etablissement des valeurs sans pouvoir se fonder sur une 
autorite incontestee.'17
In a context of rationalisation and the fragmentation of society that characterises the 
nineteenth century, the absence of a collective, agreed, transcendent authority turns 
ideologies into the locus of social and political conflicts: 'L'ideologie ouvre un champ 
de bataille permanent a la conquete de l'influence, a l'agression et a la defense des 
pouvoirs, au maintien des controles et a la revolte contre les controles'.18 The 
ideological discourse is a double process of legitimisation of the holders of political 
authority and delegitimisation of their opponents: 'le propre d'une ideologie politique est 
de construire un double raisonnement d'invalidation et de validation des systemes de 
pouvoir', Ansart further argues.19
As the myth of Paris posed the French Revolution as the origin of modern France, 
the opponents to that myth were discredited, as we have seen. The radical nature of the 
revolutionary rupture created 'une opposition fondamentale destinee a avoir quasiment 
la force d'une querelle religieuse autour de deux conceptions du monde'.20 But we have 
also seen that these origins were in need of definition and agreement, therefore 
facilitating antagonism between the sons of the Revolution themselves.
The French Revolution -  and the subsequent definition of its mythical and social 
function -  provided the main elements for ideology to develop. It combined secular 
messianism (reshaping man and the world to its ideal) with a symbolic struggle for 
legitimate power through the practice of discourse, la parole. The point of my 
discussion of Lefort's analysis of Robespierre's discourse and of Hugo's Quatrevingt- 
Treize was to show this.
^ G au ch et, 'Croyances religieuses, croyances politiques', p. 271.
17Ansart, Ideologies, conflits et pou vo ir, p. 40.
18Ibid ., pp. 36 and 45.
19Ibid., p. 43.
29Furet, La R evolution  en debat, pp. 77-8.
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Les procedes de manipulation des debats, de selection des adherents, des militants au service d'un 
discours hom ogene, gagnent une efficacite pratique en m em e temps que symbolique: le pouvoir 
qui se dissimule dans la parole pour s'accoupler avec l'opinion se convertit en pouvoir politique.2 1
As we have seen with Lefort's analysis of Robespierre's discourses, the revolutionaries 
discovered how public opinion and dominant discourse could make history.
(iv) The danger of mythic thinking
One interesting example of the modern system of belief is the nineteenth-century 
taste for utopia which blends rationalism and millenarianism, techniques and faith, to 
propose new forms of a collective -  and in a way totalitarian -  dream: 'faire entrer le 
non-encore advenu dans un plan determine'.22 The belief in a unique and perfect social 
system yet to be constructed indicates an evolution of myth within the framework of the 
ideology of progress: instead of looking at the past (the golden age), one turns to the 
future (utopia). The observation of nature and mankind legitimates the perfection of a 
model elaborated rationally. In return, the perfection of the model justifies any means, 
however coercive. The model is set, and it is up to man to adapt to it. 'L'utopie est 
toujours peu ou prou une immobilite revee, un jeu abstrait qui annule magiquement les 
surprises du temps, ou tente de les conjurer par des regies reputees immuables. Elle 
projette d'abolir l'histoire ou de la petrifier'.23 This is criticised by Isaiah Berlin as it 
tends to freeze the ideal, when social organisation is by nature unstable, requiring a 
constant compromise between its members, and constant readjustments24 -  a very 
Hugolian point. As we have seen, Hugo's main aim was to raise consciousness, and 
forbid the materialisation of principles into spiritless rules (identified with Javert and 
Cimourdain). For him, la Republique d'esprits can last so long as the ideal prevails over 
the rules. Ideology allows exactly the opposite.
By the end of the century, ideology combines the legitimacy given by reason and 
science with the influence of myth in the gradual consciousness of the extraordinary 
power of suggestion of this modern, politico-religious recipe. The sacred spread in the 
social system at the same time when renewed pessimism about human nature, the 
development of the masses, and the revolutionary belief that human progress could only 
come from a regeneration of society left the individual in a relatively minor position. It
21Lefort, E ssais sur le p o litiq u e , p. 150.
22Gauchet, Le D esenchantem ent du monde, p. 257.
23Ozouf, Les Aveux du rom an , p. 344.
24See Isaiah Berlin, The C ro o k ed  Tim ber o f  Humanity: chapters in the h istory o f  ideas (London: John
Murray, 1990).
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is only in the 1940s that the full consequences of this trend became a major source of 
concern.
The shock of the Second World War falls largely outside the field of this research. 
However, the renewal of mythic thinking in Nazi Germany and its confusion with 
political ideology through modern techniques brought Cassirer to formulate valuable 
insights into the relation between the modern and the religious. I believe his Myth o f the 
State very much prolongs Hugo's premises, exploring the consequences of what are 
essentially Hugo's defeats, whilst taking a highly nineteenth-century stance on the 
relation between religion and reason.
Cassirer published The Myth o f  the State in 1944 as a response to Rosenberg's The 
Myth o f  the twentieth century, and to its influence upon Nazi Germany. Both authors 
start from a similar acknowledgement: the return of myth in modem times. For 
Rosenberg, the old forgotten myths were to reconcile Europe with its gods and bring 
invincible force to its people. Cassirer cannot help but share a similar diagnosis on this 
invincible force, but sees this mythical resurgence as responsible for the success of 
totalitarianism in the twentieth century. The gods are indeed an extraordinary power 
over the mind. Long repressed by the triumph of reason, they seem to have come back 
to strike in the heart of modernity. After such a turn, The Myth o f  the State attempts to 
be what Hugo's work had in a very different mode tried to be: une prise de conscience -  
'la grande psychanalyse de ia pensee politique occidentale, que celle-ci n'a pas faite et 
qui l'a conduite au desastre'.25
What impresses and horrifies Cassirer most is the absolute powerlessness of reason 
confronted by the strength of a mythical influence in politics:
The m ost alarming feature [...] o f  m odem  political thought is the appearance o f  a new power: the 
power o f  mythical thought. The preponderance o f  mythical thought over rational thought in some 
o f  our m odem  political system s is o b v io u s .2^
A disciple of the Enlightenment, Cassirer sounds grim when admitting the defeat of 
reason before la pensee magique: 'It is beyond the power of philosophy to destroy 
political myths. A myth is in a sense invulnerable. It is impervious to rational 
arguments; it cannot be refuted by syllogisms'.27
For him, the separation between reason and the intellect on the one hand, and myth 
and religion on the other is absolute. They are totally antagonistic, but what the lessons
2W ergely, C assirer, p. 37.
2^Cassirer, The M yth o f  the S tate, p. 3.
27Ibid., p. 296. 'Here rational and scientific thought openly confess their breakdown; they surrender to 
their most dangerous enemy' (p. 4).
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of history seem to suggest is that myth has benefited from modernity and taken its 
revenge after its traditional exclusion from secular, western philosophy. Hence, the 
power of mythical rhetoric seen in chapter 3 is no longer safely contained in archaism: 
pensee magique has spread and contaminated the most modem and secular societies 
through politics; this monstrous aberration which combines modern techniques and 
political purpose has brought the alienating capacity of myth to unprecedented heights: 
'Myth has always been described as the result of an unconscious activity and as a free 
product of imagination. But here we find myth made according to plan. The new 
political myths do not grow up freely'.28 The rational state combines with the power of 
influence of myth, a power that was reborn in the wake of the Revolution.
In this regard, Cassirer regards the resurgence of myth operated by the Romantics as 
a dangerous mistake, both philosophically and politically: 'myth becomes [...] a subject 
of awe and veneration. It is regarded as the mainspring of human culture. [...] Instead of 
being the opposite of philosophic thought myth has become its ally; and, in a sense, its 
consummation'.29 The Romantics broke from a tradition of opposing muthos and logos, 
and in legitimating myth in the century of secularisation, made a dramatic contresens: 
instead of reaching a superior degree of human consciousness and freedom of the mind, 
man can now sacralise himself, and turn his story into a myth. In other words, the 
Romantics missed an unprecedented opportunity -  made possible by the 
Enlightenment -  to free themselves from God and, instead, repositioned the divine 
within the human; 'conferant un pouvoir au mythe, [le Romantisme] a ouvert la voie a 
quantite de perversions concernant le sujet, la morale, la politique et la technique'.30 It 
fell to Cassirer to assess the dramatic consequences of this deviation in 1945.
Cassirer's critique of modem myth is based on the premise that reason and myth are 
two separate fields and should remain so. 'Pour preserver la liberte de l'esprit, il faut 
cesser de "croire" dans la vie politique et avoir avec elle des rapports techniques et 
secularises' Vergely summarises.31 Indeed, 'La pensee mythico-religieuse est une pensee 
anti-critique, non conceptuelle'.32 And yet, what I have tried to demonstrate, is the 
interference between rational and mythical thought, and the role played by belief in the 
constitution of modern society. The idealism of Cassirer derives from a long tradition of 
suspicion towards the religious, and is based on the belief that man could operate 
outside its framework. But can we? The success of Durand in putting Vimaginaire back
28Ibid., p. 282.
29Ibid., p. 183.
30Vergely, C assirer, p. 73.
31/6/<7., p. 69.
32Shayegan, Q u'est-ce qu'une revolu tion  relig ieu se? , p. 237.
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at the centre of the humanities helps to provide some valuable answers, as well as 
contributing to rehabilitate Hugo.
(v) Homo religiosus?
L'incom prehension m oderne du relig ieuxprolonge le
religieux.^3
Maistre, 'le voyant -  clair -  de l'obscur' as Steiner calls him,34 had rejected the 
premise set by the Enlightenment and the revolutionary gospel as fundamentally biased. 
The so-called 'freedom' from religion was yet another illusion, he claimed, and its 
outcome was doomed: left to themselves, men would become the victims of their own 
inability to fix themselves any limits; humanity was bound to go insane. Maistre's 
sombre pessimism about human nature and cruel disdain for man's pretense to govern 
himself reasonably strike a few sensitive chords in the twentieth century and pave the 
way for rethinking the relation between the religious and the political.
Surprising as it may seem, the homo democraticus joined in this pessimistic analysis. 
Tocqueville raised a similar religious issue: 'que faire d'un peuple maitre de lui-meme, 
s'il n'est pas soumis a Dieu?'35 What shall become of a humanity left to itself, without 
any principles other than its own, human, all too human?
The outcome of the universal suffrage in 1848 brought a fatal blow to the Romantic 
optimism in that regard: the apparent inability of the masses to make the 'right' choice 
was starting to cause some concern among the Republicans themselves. The end of the 
century showed unprecedented interest in, and horrid fascination for, crowds, mobs and 
masses, as irrational, violent and non-human entities. A country of reactionary peasants 
and cities of rioters seemed not the most favourable conditions for a democratic system 
precisely based on the assumption that man can and should govern himself. When the 
myth of the enlightening People gave way to a picture of shapeless masses and 
unpredictable mobs, Maistre's warning started to sound disturbingly relevant.
Many have wondered about the influence of Rosenberg's work in the 1930s, and 
Durand offers an audacious parallel to explain it: 'C'est que le nazisme, comme la 
revolution franqaise, a fourni a un peuple [...] un ensemble de rites et de mythes, une
33Girard, La Violence et le sacre , p. 391.
34Steiner, 'A l'ombre des Lumieres', in M ichon, Christianism e: heritages et destins, p. 36.
35Alexis de Tocqueville, D e la  D em ocra tie  en Am erique (Paris: Gamier-Flammarion, 1981), vol. I, p. 
401.
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prothese du religieux'.36 However disturbing the parallel, and although I tend to reject 
teleological interpretations of totalitarianism which would start in 1793, the point raised 
by Durand is interesting in that it focuses on a religious vacuum that needs to be filled. 
Durand believes that 'mythical explosions' arise when the leaders of a community (what 
he refers to as 'les magisteres') ignore the evolution of the collective psyche. There is a 
fundamental contradiction in the return to myths initiated by the Romantics and an elite 
that claimed to speak in terms of rationality: 'les grands magisteres de l'Occident -  
Eglises et Etats -  ont boude la remythologisation. [...] D'un meme pas, Eglises et Etats 
democratiques ont laicise les savoirs, secularise les pouvoirs...' (pp. 38-9).
Yet, Durand further argues, the need to dream, to imagine, to believe remains, 
uncontrolled, anarchic. The disciples of Reason failed to see the implication of the dark 
counter-current, even though it was very widely expressed in the nineteenth century in 
France -  Vimaginaire du bas-fond. 'L'absence des magisteres collectifs pour controler 
les poussees des nouvelles "theologies" abandonne nos remythologisations au peril de 
leurs effets' (p. 41). Such a vacuum allows, and even requires, the return of the gods:
'Les dieux ignores [se vengent et] reinvestissent fanatiquement les passions et les 
pulsions [de l'homme] dans l'attitude politique et sociale'.37 Hence the need to 
acknowledge, accept and understand the relation man establishes with his gods rather 
than denying it.
Les dieux nous renseignent seuls sur nous-m em es. La m ythologie, la tragedie, la litterature grecque 
[...] nous renseignent seules sur ce qu'etaient culture et civilisation grecques, sur ce qu'etait 
l'homme hellenique. M ais pas seulem ent sur cet homme-la: egalement sur ce que nous sommes. 
Elies demystifient en nous ce que nous attribuions ideologiquem ent a une positivite objective.38
It was precisely one of the endeavours of this work to engage with the religious: what 
Hugo, Girard and Durand show, though in very different ways, is not only the danger of 
ignoring the religious, but also the demystifying, subversive and revolutionary potential 
within myth itself.
-^Durand, Introduction a la  m ythodologie, pp. 36.
37Durand, Science de l'homme et tradition , pp. 229-30.
3%Ibid., p. 234.
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(vi) Homo democraticus?
La "lutte fin a le"  ne sera  pa s ce que prevoya it Marx : 
elle opposera  le ph ilosoph e tragique au nihilisme de la 
m assification  p la n e ta ire }^
In a context that combined individualism and masses — the two sides of a single 
coin40 -  Tocqueville worried about a new form of despotism; a soft one, coming not 
only from the new power of the state, but equally from a democratic, individualistic 
society itself: 'je vois une foule innombrable d'hommes semblables et egaux qui 
tournent sans repos sur eux-memes pour se procurer de petits et vulgaires plaisirs, dont 
ils emplissent leur ame'; each one isolated and detached from any collective 
belonging.41 Marx's sack of potatoes meets La Boetie's drogueries. In this context, 
liberty ceases even to be desirable: some may be afraid of it as they confuse it with 
anarchy; others are going back to the concept of'servitude necessaire': dangerous or 
impossible, liberty remains in doubt.42
This brings us back to the issue raised by the Grand Inquisitor about the very 
possibility -  or desire -  of human emancipation; his need for authority; his search for 
something or someone to believe in -  concerns which link Tocqueville and Dostoevsky 
in an unlikely combination.43 Ideology and religion have this in common that they 
facilitate social norms and submission to authority and help the collective in a persistent 
opposition to the individual 'posed as the sphere of freedom, autonomy and rebellion'.44 
From myth to ideology, the system of belief may differ, but faith and the need for 
certainties seem to prevail.
A hundred and fifty years after Fabre d'Eglantine had noticed the importance of 
controlling man's imagination, it fell -  interestingly enough -  to Freud's nephew, 
Edward Bernays, to push the logic further and to theorise propaganda and public 
relations after World War I. But it was in the 1930s and 1940s that the power and 
influence of what Durand referred to as 'l'imagination symbolique', showed its full
39Jean Granier, N ietzsche  (Paris: PUF, 1982), p. 34. The author refers to Nietzsche's Zarathoustra, and 
the unwillingness o f  the people to fo llow  the philosopher's m essage.
40See Ellul, H isto ire des institutions, p. 259.
41 Tocqueville, D e La D em ocratie  en Am erique, vol. II, p. 385.
42Ibid., p. 397.
43'desesperant de rester libres, ils adorent deja au fond de leur coeur le maitre qui doit bientot venir'. This 
sentence could have been writen by the Russian novelist. It is in fact by the French liberal (De La 
D em ocratie en A m erique, vol. II, p. 397).
44Prendergast, P aris an d  the N ineteenth  Century, p. 211.
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impact. Goebels had been an attentive reader of Bernays who would have to think again 
about the lesson given by his 'disciple', and subsequently embarked on developing new 
techniques to attenuate and control the demons of the masses.
The alienating quality of myth has probably never been better understood. It has 
never been so efficient either: with unprecedented sophistication, divertissements and 
drogueries combine with media and PR techniques to keep the restless masses -  and 
individuals — asleep and satisfied. In this sense as in so many others, 'le XXe siecle n'a 
pas prepare le XXIe : il s'est epuise a satisfaire le XIXe'.45
45Romain Gary, A u -dela  de cette  limite, vo tre  ticket n 'estp lu s va lab le  (Paris: Gallimard, 1975). Or, as 
Kristeva put it: 'Our century is still living on the nineteenth century's momentum' cited by Terdiman, 
D iscourse /  C ounter discourse, The th eory an d p ra c tice  o f  sym bolic  resistance in nineteenth-century 
France (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1985), p. 43.
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